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1.1 Research Question 
 
This research aims to investigate to what extent the assessment of consumer perception in EU 
trademark law should be based on normative considerations or empirical findings in the light 
of the overarching objectives underlying the EU trademark system, including the aim to 
ensure undistorted competition, protect consumers against confusion and offer room for 
(commercial) freedom of expression. In particular, the research addresses potential risks of 
too much reliance on empirical findings when assessing consumer perception. Without 
normative corrections, EU trademark law may become a self-servicing mechanism for the 
industry. If trademark protection is granted whenever a company manages to educate 
consumers to recognise a given sign as a trademark, the need to keep certain signs free for 
other traders and/or the public at large could hardly ever prevail in cases where trademark law 
provides for the option to acquire distinctiveness through continuous use in trade. Similarly, 
the infringement analysis could become imbalanced if it was reduced to a mere exchange of 
empirical studies seeking to demonstrate or rebut the existence of a likelihood of confusion or 
dilution. Taking these questions and concerns as a starting point, the research seeks to 
critically assess current EU trademark law and practice, and develop a new framework for the 
assessment of consumer perception that reduces the risk of EU trademark registration and 
infringement decisions becoming a mere schematic exercise which trademark owners can 
influence through empirical evidence to such an extent that countervailing values, such as 
freedom of competition and (commercial) freedom of expression, are forced onto the side 
lines. 
The research is closely linked with problems arising from current EU trademark law 
and practice. For example, it is not clear whether the measurement of consumer perception, as 
currently conducted in practice, guarantees the proper functioning of markets. Remarkably, 
assumptions regarding consumer perception are in fact often accepted without proof.1 In the 
area of trademark registrations, assumptions stemming from CJEU jurisprudence, such as the 
assumption that consumers are not ‘in the habit’ of regarding non-traditional marks as 
indicators of origin, give rise to the question whether consumers really have difficulties 
recognising colours and shapes as identifiers of commercial source.2 If the Court introduced 
the assumption of consumers not being ‘in the habit’ of perceiving such signs as trademarks 
as a tool to keep signs of this kind free, the effectiveness of this regulatory model becomes 
doubtful with every marketing strategy teaching consumers that colours or shapes can 
constitute trademarks. The consequences of operating on the basis of such assumptions can be 
far-reaching. If a trademark owner can prove that consumers recognise a particular sign as an 
 
1 See for example CJEU, judgment of 12 February 2004, case C-218/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:88 (Henkel), para 49; 
CJEU, judgment of 7 October 2004, case C-136/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2004:592 (Mag Instrument/BHIM), para 31; 
CJEU, judgment of 12 January 2006, case C-173/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:20 (Deutsche SiSi-Werke/BHIM), para 
31; CJEU, judgment of 6 May 2003, case C-104/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:244 (Libertel); CJEU, judgment of 24 
June 2004, case C-49/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:384 (Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH), para 39. 
2 CJEU, judgment of 6 May 2003, case C-104/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:244 (Libertel), paras 65 and 55. 
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identifier of commercial source, trademark protection will normally be granted.3 Moreover, if 
a trademark owner can prove that his mark is recognised by a significant portion of the 
relevant population, the trademark will even be classified as a mark having a reputation, with 
the consequence of an enhanced scope of protection.4 Hence, the trademark system may 
appear as a self-servicing system if the decision on the grant and scope of protection actually 
depends on a schematic empirical approach to consumer perception.  
At the same time, it is clear that EU trademark law offers sufficient starting points for 
a normative recalibration of empirical evidence. The concept of an average, well-informed 
consumer as such is already a normative legal construction5 that offers room for normative 
considerations besides empirical findings. If the average consumer is approached empirically, 
consumer behaviour can be assessed factually. If this concept is approached normatively, 
however, the law leaves room for assumptions regarding how consumers should behave in the 
marketplace, namely in a way that we believe generates a desirable result from the perspective 
of overarching policy goals, such as fair and undistorted competition, and this normative 
approach can deviate from how consumers behave in real life.6 Although Recital 16 of the 
Directive7 states that ‘the ways in which likelihood of confusion can be established, and in 
particular the onus of proof in that regard, should be a matter for national procedural rules,’ it 
may make sense to fill in the concept of the consumer normatively, because ‘the more the 
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumer is a normative 
fiction, the greater the scope for the CJEU to create legal rules that establish EU-wide 
standards. The more empirical that question becomes, the greater the role of national courts 
and the more likely that divergent market realities in Europe will result in different outcomes 
with adverse effects on the creation of an integrated market.’8  
On the other hand, if we approach the concept of ‘consumer’ too normatively, we 
could indeed have a full Europeanisation of trademark law, but the consequence may also be a 
trademark law that fails to properly reflect market reality and prevent consumer confusion. 
For example, if we normatively decide that colours should not be registered, every trader 
could use the colours green and yellow on their tractors9 even if consumers recognise the 
colour combination as a badge of origin. This would mean disregarding one of the core 
rationales of trademark law, i.e. the protection of consumers against confusion. On the other 
hand, if we approach the concept of consumer too empirically, trademark owners may in 
practice be capable of teaching consumers to perceive any sign as a trademark by using the 
sign in a typical trademark context.10 Similar questions arise with regard to the scope of 
protection. The more a trademark owner invests in advertising presenting a particular 
 
3 Admittedly, EU trademark law provides for the possibility of an outright exclusion of official signs, signs of 
high symbolic value, religious signs and functional shapes (Arts. 4(1)(e)(h), 4(3)(b),(c) TMD 2015). These 
outright exclusions cannot be overcome, even if the sign has acquired distinctiveness through use in trade.  
4 CJEU, judgment of 14 September 1999, case C-375/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:408 (Chevy), para 26. 
5 CJEU, judgment of 11 November 1997, case C-251/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:528 (Puma/Sabel), para 23; CJEU, 
judgment of 22 June 1999, case C-342/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:323 (Lloyd/Loints), para 26. 
6 Dinwoodie and Gangjee (2016), p. 345 (emphasis in the original text). 
7 Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015. 
8 Dinwoodie and Gangjee (2016), p. 369. 
9 EUTM registration 006258131 of 31 July, 2008 (Deere & Company). 
10 See Chapter 3. 
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trademark as a symbol of a desirable lifestyle or attitude, the more positive associations 
consumers will develop towards the trademark and the higher the chance that consumers will 
be willing to pay extra for the brand image evoked by the trademarked product. Once a 
trademark owner creates a favourable brand image, he can enjoy broader trademark 
protection, including protection against blurring, tarnishment and unfair free-riding. Again, 
EU trademark law appears as a self-servicing mechanism for the industry. In this case, the 
investment made by the trademark proprietor shapes the scope of protection. 
If the trademark system indeed offers dysfunctional incentives (in the sense of 
encouraging its use as a self-servicing mechanism that allows the acquisition of rights and the 
extension of the scope of protection), we will need to develop a new theoretical framework. 
More specifically, it will be necessary to subject our legal assumptions about consumer 
perception to a careful evaluation based on an appropriate mixture of empirical and normative 
factors. One option might be to make sure that the analysis of the acquisition of trademark 
rights through use in trade and the application of infringement criteria take into account 
normative aspects, such as the interests of competitors and the public at large in keeping a 
given sign free, rather than basing decisions solely on the perceptions of the target public.11 In 
the area of registration decisions, another option is to use normative considerations as a basis 
for introducing broader outright exclusions of particular signs from trademark protection – 
exclusions that apply regardless of whether the signs concerned have acquired distinctiveness 
through use in trade. The current functionality doctrine in EU trademark law can serve as an 
example of this regulatory model.  
 
Against this background, the main research question underlying the following analysis can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
How much importance should be attached to empirical and normative factors when 
assessing consumer perception in EU trademark law? 
 
1.2 Methodology and Approach 
 
1.2.1 Legal-theoretical Desk Research 
 
This research question requires an in-depth analysis of the legal framework regarding 
consumer perception. To lay groundwork for the analysis of the interplay of empirical and 
normative impact factors in registration and infringement scenarios, I will first analyse the 
foundations and rationales of trademark law. Once the objectives of the protection system 
have been clarified, it becomes possible to assess the suitability of empirical and normative 
considerations as tools to further the overarching goals of the system (Chapter 2). 
Furthermore, this research will describe the role played by consumer perception when it 
comes to the question of trademark registration (Chapter 3), trademark infringement 
(Chapters 4 and 5), and trademark limitations requiring use in accordance with honest 
 
11 CJEU, judgment of 4 May 1999, case C-108/97, C-109/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:230 (Windsurfing Chiemsee), 
para 48; CJEU, judgment of 6 May 2003, case C-104/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:244 (Libertel), para 59; CJEU, 
judgment of 10 April 2008, case C-102/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:217 (Adidas/Marca). 
14 
 
practices (Chapter 6). This investigation will include national and EU case law concerning 
consumer perception to determine whether the concept of consumer is seen as primarily 
normative or empirical at the moment, and to what extent this is problematic.  
 
1.2.2 Interdisciplinary Approach 
 
In addition, the study of empirical and normative impact factors includes an interdisciplinary 
analysis that goes beyond the discipline of law. The leading legal assumptions regarding 
consumer perception will be compared with insights from consumer behaviour theories, 
consumer marketing and economics literature to investigate whether the current legal 
assumptions are correct and appropriate in the light of the objectives underlying EU 
trademark law. The outcome of this interdisciplinary approach will be used to formulate 
recommendations for reforming the trademark law system (Chapter 7) if the research 
confirms that the current EU trademark system, indeed, applies an imbalanced amalgam of 
empirical and normative assessment factors. 
 
1.2.3 Empirical Approach 
 
Finally, the research project also includes a data analysis of 189 Dutch cases in an effort to 
investigate how national courts assess the likelihood-of-confusion question in practice when 
establishing the facts relevant to the decision. Analysing a large number of cases makes it 
possible to reveal the impact of the degree of a mark’s distinctiveness and corresponding 
empirical findings on the likelihood-of-confusion assessment. In comparison to other EU 
countries, Dutch cases are of particular interest because of the regional character of the 
underlying trademark norms. The trademark legislation applied by Dutch courts is drawn 
from a single Treaty – the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property (Trademarks and 
Designs) – which has direct effect in three EU Member States. Furthermore, Benelux law has 
traditionally been an important element in harmonising EU trademark law. The impact of the 
Benelux tradition can still be seen in the anti-confusion provision in the EU Trade Mark 
Directive.12  
 
1.3 Research Questions and Outline 
 
In conclusion, this following study consists of an inquiry into several complex questions that 
must be answered using insights from a number of fields. In addition to the more theoretical 
legal-doctrinal questions, behavioural theories and empirical studies are employed to 
investigate how much importance can be attached to an empirical appreciation of consumer 
perception without causing imbalances at the registration stage or when deciding on 
infringement.  
To lay sufficient groundwork for discussing the main research question provided 
above, I need to take several steps and raise several sub-questions. As already indicated, I will 
first explore the theoretical foundations of the trademark law system. Focusing on the 
 
12 Art. 10(2)(b) TMD 2015 and Art. 9(2)(b) EUTMR. 
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objectives underlying trademark law, the study identifies the reasons for reliance on consumer 
perception as a central yardstick for registration and infringement decisions in EU trademark 
law. The analysis of the rationales of trademark protection also introduces the tension 
between a normative and an empirical approach to consumer perception. The corresponding 
research sub-question answered in Chapter 2 is as follows:  
 
What are the rationales of trademark protection and are these rationales linked to a 
more normative or more empirical approach to consumer perception? 
 
Chapter 2 elaborates on the rationales of trademark law, such as market transparency, fair and 
undistorted competition between traders, ensuring the efficient regulation of supply and 
demand in market economies, and in particular the importance of protecting consumers 
against confusion (including the reduction of consumer search costs from an economic 
perspective). The question of the need for protecting brand goodwill based on the double 
identity clause and the dilution doctrine is also discussed. Furthermore, countervailing values, 
such as freedom of (commercial) expression and freedom of competition are explored.  
Chapter 2 also points to the current tension in trademark law between a normative and an 
empirical approach to consumer perception, i.e. protection of consumer interest in enhanced 
consumer information and consumer choice versus the investments of trademark owners. The 
rationales of other intellectual property systems are also compared.  
 
On this theoretical basis, the following Chapters (3-6) address the impact of a normative or 
empirical analysis of consumer perception on decisions concerning trademark registration, 
trademark infringement, and trademark limitations raising the question of honest practices. 
These chapters examine whether current EU trademark law on the acquisition (Chapter 3) and 
scope (Chapter 4-6) of protection is primarily based on normative considerations or on 
empirical findings, and whether this is problematic in the light of the overarching objectives 
of EU trademark law.  
 
In Chapter 3, the following sub-question is answered: 
 
Is the threshold for acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade high enough to 
prevent traders from investing in signs that belong to the public domain and should be 
kept free, or does EU trademark law create dysfunctional incentives and make it 
attractive for traders to invest in non-distinctive, descriptive and generic signs, such as 
cultural and non-traditional signs?  
 
This chapter investigates whether the existing balancing tools in EU trademark law are 
sufficient to prevent the misappropriation of signs that should be kept free from the 
perspective of freedom of competition and freedom of (commercial) expression. In this 
context, the threshold for assuming acquired distinctiveness is viewed from a legal, economic 
and psychological perspective. It is argued that the threshold for assuming acquired 
distinctiveness is not efficient enough and should therefore be applied more restrictively. This 
chapter also discusses whether this instrument creates dysfunctional incentives by making it 
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attractive for traders to invest in non-distinctive, descriptive and generic signs. Trademark 
owners might influence that these signs acquire distinctiveness through use in trade and invest 
as needed until they acquire control of their preferred sign. Furthermore, the chapter analyses 
whether it is advisable to adopt a broader range of outright exclusion clauses that cannot be 
overcome through acquiring distinctiveness in consequence of use in trade. In addition, this 
chapter examines whether national and European case law on the acquisition of trademark 
rights, and in particular the possibility of acquired distinctiveness in the case of non-
distinctive, descriptive and generic signs, follows a more normative or empirical approach to 
consumer perception. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine whether national and European case law on the scope of protection 
of trademarks is determined merely by normative considerations or empirical findings, 
including topics such as the concept of ‘likelihood of confusion’ and the concept of ‘average 
consumer’. The sub-question answered in Chapter 4 is: 
 
Is it appropriate to rely almost exclusively on empirical findings concerning the 
public’s perception when assessing whether a likelihood of confusion exists, or does 
reliance on empirical findings create dysfunctional incentives and encourage traders to 
invest in marketing and branding campaigns concerning design elements that should 
better be kept free for competitors?  
 
This chapter starts with an overview of literature and case law demonstrating that trademark 
law is not only about protecting trademark owners but also about ensuring undistorted, fair 
and meaningful competition. It is argued that the current infringement analysis in the 
confusion context is imbalanced since the CJEU has ruled in Adidas/Marca that no normative 
corrections should be made in favour of third parties’ interests. Furthermore, I provide a 
literature overview that reveals that the CJEU does offer broader protection against confusion 
in the case of highly distinctive marks, which is a normative correction in favour of trademark 
owners. From an empirical perspective, consumers are less likely to be confused when 
confronted with a sign similar to a highly distinctive trademark. The real perception of 
consumers is thus not decisive for the outcome of the case when highly distinctive trademarks 
are involved. In addition, I discuss national case law concerning the three-stripe motif of 
Adidas to illustrate that decisions were more balanced before than after the Adidas/Marca 
case.  
 
Chapter 5 elaborates on the concept of likelihood of confusion and discusses the following 
sub-question: 
 
How  precisely do national courts assess likelihood-of-confusion questions in practice 
and do they follow a more normative or more empirical approach to consumer 
perception? 
 
This chapter investigates whether the confusion analysis in trademark law is at risk of being 
used strategically as a self-servicing mechanism by the industry to obtain trademark rights to 
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descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs. In this context, two features of the trademark 
system are seen as particularly worrisome. First, trademark owners can strengthen the 
distinctive character of their marks by investing in marketing and branding campaigns. 
Second, trademark owners can afford expensive surveys demonstrating the high 
distinctiveness of their marks and strengthening their position in an infringement case. I 
carried out a study of 189 Dutch cases to find out precisely how national courts approach the 
likelihood-of-confusion question in practice and whether they assess consumer perception 
more normatively or more empirically (thereby stressing the highly distinctive character of 
the trademark and corresponding market studies).  
  
Chapter 6 explores the impact of a normative or empirical analysis of consumer perception on 
trademark limitations and the question of use in accordance with honest practices. The 
following sub-question is answered: 
 
Should judges assess the honest practices proviso implemented in the trademark 
limitations from a normative perspective (according to ethical standards concerning 
behavioural norms of fairness and decency in a given sector) or an empirical 
perspective (assessing which measures are taken by competitors to reduce trademark 
harm)? 
 
This chapter analyses how to interpret the honest practices proviso when assessing trademark 
limitations. The standard for assessing honest practices would currently involve a merely 
literal repetition of the infringement criteria, thereby resulting in a circular line of reasoning 
and leaving the limitations practically moot. In an attempt to explore possible solutions I first 
discuss Art. 10bis of the Paris Convention (PC) since it is from this provision that the 
expression ‘honest practices in industrial and commercial matters’ is derived. I then explore 
whether there is room for a broader interpretation of the concept of honest practices under 
CJEU case law. I also give some examples to illustrate how national courts could interpret the 
concept of honest practices. This chapter further analyses whether the honest practices proviso 
should be more normatively or more empirically based.  
 
In the final chapter, the results of this inquiry are used as a starting point to formulate new 
solutions that may eliminate dysfunctional incentives and ensure a proper balance between 
trademark rights and the interests of consumers, competitors and the public at large. 
Summarising and synthesising the results of the research carried out in Chapters 1 to 6, 
Chapter 7 will lead to concluding recommendations on the appropriate combination of 










2 Rationales of Trademark Protection 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
As other intellectual property rights, trademark rights can be seen as economic rights. The  
nature of trademark rights, however, is different from other intellectual property rights that 
protect creative or innovative efforts, such as copyright and patents.13 Another key element of 
trademark law is that the granted rights can last forever since protection depends on the 
perception of consumers and continuous, genuine use in trade, whereas copyright and patent 
law protection expire after a certain period of time, long enough to safeguard the intended 
incentive and reward.14  
Rather than providing exclusive rights on creative or innovative efforts, trademark law 
offers a communication channel for enterprises to identify the goods or services coming from 
their business, distinguish their products from other traders, and transmit messages about their 
products to consumers. This in turn informs the market place, and regulates consumer choice 
by supplying the right products and reducing unwanted products at minimal consumer search 
costs. Instead of limiting competition, trademarks can thus be seen as a legal instrument that 
stimulates competition.15   
Justifying the granting and scope of trademark rights, the CJEU frequently refers to 
certain functions that trademarks fulfil in the market place, such as the origin function, quality 
function, advertising function, investment function, and communication function.16 
Elaborating on the rationales of trademark law, the trademark functions as recognised by the 
CJEU are therefore taken as a starting point here. This chapter further investigates to what 
extent trademark rights that safeguard these trademark functions are justified in light of 
economic or other rationales based on fairness and decency. Finally, it examines whether the 
trademark functions are at risk of creating a trademark system that is a self-servicing 
mechanism for the industry. 
 
2.2 Essential Origin Function 
 
The CJEU recognises the origin function as the ‘essential function’ of a trademark. The Court  
emphasises that the essential function of a trademark is ‘[to] guarantee the identity of the 
marked goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any 
possibility of confusion, to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another 
origin.’17 In this regard, Recital 16 of the TMD 2015 states that the function of the protection 
 
13 Brown et al. (2019), p. 528: ‘according to the dominant economic perspective there is no such reward for 
creativeness in the rationales underpinning registered trade mark protection: the theoretical underpinnings are 
generally regarded as far more market-focused.’ 
14 Cohen Jehoram et al. (2010), p. 7. 
15 Kur and Senftleben (2017), pp. 3-4. 
16 CJEU, judgment of 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:378 (L’Oréal/Bellure), paras 58, 65. 
17 CJEU, judgment of 12 November 2002, case C-206/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:651 (Arsenal/Reed), para 48; CJEU, 
judgment of 16 November 2004, case C-245/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:717 (Anheuser Busch), para 59; CJEU, 
judgment of 25 January 2007, case C-48/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:55 (Opel/Autec), para 21; CJEU, judgment of 23 
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of the trademark ‘is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin.’ The 
CJEU stresses that ‘for the trade mark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of 
undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain, it must offer a 
guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have been manufactured or supplied under 
the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality.’18  
The essential function was recognised for the first time in the context of enhancing the 
objective of a competitive common market.19 In HAG-II, the CJEU elaborated on whether 
national trademark rights could be seen as an impediment to the free movement of goods and 
result in an artificial partitioning of markets. In the CJEU’s view, trademarks could be 
justified as ‘an essential element of the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty 
aims to establish and maintain. In such a system enterprises must be able to gain customers by 
the quality of their products or services, which can be done only by virtue of the existence of 
distinctive signs permitting identification of those products and services.’20  
Trademark protection is thus needed for several reasons: trademarks enable enterprises 
to indicate commercial origin and give reliable quality information. As a result, consumers 
can rely on these signs, because third parties are prevented from making confusing use of 
trademarks and trademark proprietors run the risk of losing business when they do not keep 
quality at a satisfactory level. From the perspective of trademarks, as a vehicle of information, 
the origin function stimulates consumers to identify and choose products.21 Consumers 
however do not need to be aware of the manufacturer or place of production; it is enough that 
they are able to distinguish the marked products of an individual enterprise from those of 
other companies. Consumers would rather seek to identify certain products because of their 
specific product characteristics.22 In the absence of knowledge about the given local source, 
trademarks are now seen as safeguarding the link with a constant source of production.23  
The essential origin function is thus grounded in the fundamental principle of 
undistorted competition.24 Safeguarding a transparent market through trademark protection 
 
March 2010, cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159 (Google/Louis Vuitton), para 82. See also Art. 
3(a) TMD 2015, which states that trademarks must be ‘capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings.’ 
18 CJEU, judgment of 12 November 2002, case C-206/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:651 (Arsenal/Reed), para 48. See 
also: Cohen Jehoram et al (2010), p. 11. See further: CJEU, judgment of 25 July 2018, case C‑129/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:594 (Mitsubishi/Duma), para 44: ‘any act by a third party preventing the proprietor of a 
registered trade mark in one or more Member States from exercising his right to control the first placing of goods 
bearing that mark on the market in the EEA, by its very nature undermines that essential function of the trade 
mark.’ 
19 Gangjee (2013), p. 10. 
20 CJEU, judgment of 17 October 1990, case C-10/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:359 (HAG II), para 13. See Max Planck 
Institute (2011), p. 51. 
21 Gangjee (2013), p. 11; Griffiths (2011), p. 2. 
22 Economides (1988), p. 527; Cohen Jehoram et al (2010), p. 37; Altman and Pollack (2020), para 17:2, pp. 21-
22. 
23 Sakulin (2011), p. 44. 
24 CJEU, judgment of 17 October 1990, case C-10/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:359 (HAG II), para 13; CJEU, judgment 
of 11 July 1996, cases C-427/93, C-429/93, and C-436/93, ECLI:EU:C:1996:282 (BMS/Paranova), para 43; 
CJEU, judgment of 11 November 1997, case C-349/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:530 (Loendersloot/Ballantine), para 
22; CJEU, judgment of 12 November 2002, case C-206/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:651 (Arsenal/Reed), paras 47-48. 
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ensures fair competition between traders, protects consumers against confusion and supports 
the proper functioning of markets.  
 
2.2.1 Quality Function 
 
The quality function is closely related to the essential function; they are in fact ‘two sides of 
the same coin’.25 The CJEU emphasises that under the trademark law system ‘an undertaking 
must be in a position to keep its customers by virtue of the quality of its products and services, 
something that is possible only if there are distinctive marks enabling customers to identify 
those products and services. For the trade mark to be able to fulfil this role, it must offer a 
guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced under the control of a single 
undertaking that is accountable for their quality.’26 The guarantee of a certain quality must be 
construed as part of the origin function.27 As Advocate General Jacobs argues: ‘the relevance 
of the trade mark’s function as a guarantee of origin lies […] in the fact that the trade mark 
conveys to the consumer certain perceptions as to the quality of the marked goods. The 
consumer is not interested in the commercial origin of goods out of idle curiosity; his interest 
is based on the assumption that goods of the same origin will be of the same quality.’28 
 
2.2.2  Reduction of Consumer Search Costs 
 
From an economic perspective, the essential origin function can be seen in light of the 
consumer search costs rationale. By safeguarding the identifier of commercial source, 
trademark law prevents consumers from being misled and purchasing the wrong product. It 
also contributes to a trading environment in which consumers can rely on source identifiers.29 
The assurance that the information concerning the commercial source is correct leads to a 
 
25 Gangjee (2013), p. 11. See also: Glaxo Group v Dowelhurst [2000] ETMR 415, 425 (Ch) (Laddie, J.): ‘the 
mark is a sign to the customer both that the goods are the goods of a particular source (whether he knows or 
cares what that source is) and that the proprietor of the mark holds himself out as responsible for those goods and 
their quality. This representation of responsibility for quality is inseparable from the mark’s function as an 
indication of source.’ See also Opinion of AG Jacobs, 29 April 1997, case C-337/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:222 
(Dior/Evora), para 41. 
26 CJEU, judgment of 17 October 1990, case C-10/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:359 (HAG II), para 13. 
27 CJEU, judgment of 12 November 2002, case C-206/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:651 (Arsenal/Reed), para 60; 
Opinion of AG Jacobs, judgment of 29 April 1997, case C-337/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:222 (Dior/Evora), para 42; 
CJEU, judgment of 12 February 2004, case C-218/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:88 (Henkel), para 30; CJEU, judgment 
of 18 June 2002, case C-299/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:377 (Philips/Remington), para 30. 
28 Opinion of AG Jacobs, 13 March 1990, case C-10/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:112 (HAG II), paras 72, 18: ‘Without 
trade mark protection there would be little incentive for manufacturers to develop new products or to maintain 
the quality of existing ones. Trade marks are able to achieve that effect because they act as a guarantee, to the 
consumer, that all goods bearing a particular mark have been produced by, or under the control of, the same 
manufacturer and are therefore likely to be of similar quality. The guarantee of quality offered by a trade mark is 
not of course absolute, for the manufacturer is at liberty to vary the quality; however, he does so at his own risk 
and he — not his competitors — will suffer the consequences if he allows the quality to decline. Thus, although 
trade marks do not provide any form of legal guarantee of quality — the absence of which may have misled 
some to underestimate their significance — they do in economic terms provide such a guarantee, which is acted 
upon daily by consumers.’ 
29 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 7; Posner (2011), p. 58; Bently and Sherman (2014), p. 816. 
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decrease in consumer search costs, which are defined as the costs of obtaining information 
about products or having to deal with the risks of uncertainty.30 Search costs increase when 
products are complex or necessitate specialist knowledge to examine them properly, or when 
the product needs to be reliable, durable and safe in the long-term.31 Particularly, search costs 
arise concerning unobservable product features:  
 
‘[in] many markets, sellers have much better information as to the unobservable 
features of a commodity for sale than the buyers. This is known as information 
asymmetry. Unobservable features, valued by the consumer, may be crucial 
determinants of the total value of the good. Observable features can often be imitated 
to the smallest detail, even though huge differences remain in the unobservable 
features of the product. In the absence of trademarks, faced with the choice between 
goods which look identical, the consumer will only by chance pick the one with the 
desirable unobservable qualities.’32 
 
In essence, trademarks improve the efficiency of purchasing decisions and contribute to a 
better functioning of markets in general.33 Trademarks also enable consumers to use their own 
meaning-making as a source of information.34 Consumers generate information about their 
own previous product experiences35 or collect information based on experiences from family 
members or friends, and ultimately decide on which meanings they attach to a certain 
trademark.36 Accordingly, consumers can easily and quickly obtain the necessary information 
about desirable products through perceiving the trademark. Consumers do not need to fully 
investigate the commercial source and product qualities of a potential purchase, but simply 
extract the necessary information from the trademark to make an informed purchasing 
decision. Trademarks thus provide product-related information at a low cost, enhance 
consumer information, and generate more market competition.37 
 
30 Griffiths (2008), pp. 246-247; Griffiths (2011), p. 127; Landes and Posner (1987), pp. 269-270; Kratzke 
(1991). 
31 Griffiths (2008), p. 247. 
32 Economides (1988), p. 526. 
33 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 7; Griffiths (2008), p. 247; Landes and Posner (1987), p. 266; Bently and 
Sherman (2014), p. 816; Bradford (2008), p. 1243. Trademark protection also ensures that the right products are 
produced and offered on the market, and thus guarantees the efficient distribution of resources: ‘by enabling 
consumers to connect information to precise product[s] more accurately, trademarks help consumers express 
more accurately their preferences and tastes for the varying mix of product features, quality, and prices each 
finds desirable. Trademarks can, therefore, help ensure that the pricing signals received by producers from the 
market (or “expressed demand”) more accurately reflect consumer’s actual tastes and preferences (or “actual 
demand”).’ See: Lunney (1991), p. 432. See also: Kratzke (1991), p. 212. 
34 Griffiths (2008), p. 248. 
35 Trademarks could also help consumers to buy infrequently purchased goods. A consumer may be an 
infrequent buyer of a certain electronic product, but a frequent buyer of the overall category of electronic 
products, and they could use their pervious experience to buy goods sold under the same trademark. Having said 
that, enterprises do not per definition sell all their products according to the same high quality standards. This 
only happens if demand and cost conditions are highly similar. See Economides (1988), p. 531.    
36 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 8;  Economides (1988), p. 528. 
37 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 8.  
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2.2.3 Incentive for Improving Product Variety and Quality 
 
In addition to granting essential product information, trademarks stimulate enterprises to keep 
product quality at a satisfactory level.38 If enterprises start to reduce their product quality 
standards, consumers expecting to get a higher product quality will probably be disappointed 
and avoid subsequent purchases. In particular, trademarks encourage enterprises to invest in 
unobservable product characteristics. If there were no trademarks   
 
‘…firms would produce products with the cheapest possible unobservable qualities, 
because high levels of unobserved qualities would not add to a firm’s ability to sell at 
a higher price and realize higher profits. However, if there is a way to identify the 
unobservable qualities, the consumer’s choice becomes clear, and firms with a long 
horizon have an incentive to cater to a spectrum of tastes for variety and quality, even 
though these product features may be unobservable at the time of purchase.’39 
 
Accordingly, it could be argued that trademarks are at least indirectly responsible for keeping 
the quality standard at a constantly satisfactory level. Due to the source-identifying function 
of trademarks, enterprises are stimulated to invest in product quality and variety, and 
encourage innovation, particularly when consumers are highly risk-averse with regard to 
hidden features.40 Consumers may pay a substantial premium for the guarantee of a certain 
quality of the hidden features of the products.41 Traders offering trademarked products that do 
not comply with the quality standards to be expected by consumers will probably be less 
successful.42  
 
2.2.4 Risk of Expanding Trademark Protection 
 
The search costs rationale thus provides a strong justification for the protection of the origin 
function of a trademark. It can also be invoked with regard to the quality function. 
Nevertheless, granting trademark protection leads to social costs since trademark owners can 
 
38 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 8; Griffiths (2008), pp. 248-249; Landes and Posner (1987), p. 269-270; Posner 
(2011), p. 58; Altman and Pollack (2020), para 17:3, p. 24; Griffiths (2011), p. 35.  
39 Economides (1988), p. 526. See also: Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 8; Griffiths (2008), p. 247; Griffiths 
(2011), pp. 128, 131-132.  
40 Griffiths (2008), p. 247; Economides (1988), p. 527; Landes and Posner (1987), pp. 269, 280, 303; Maniatis 
and Kamperman Sanders (1993), p. 407. Nevertheless, trademarks do not necessarily guarantee consistency of 
quality. Consumers cannot know whether enterprises have changed their business strategy resulting in a decrease 
of the quality standard of their products. Enterprises may decide that reducing product quality and costs might 
outweigh the costs of a damaged reputation and long-term sales once consumers become aware of the product’s 
decreased quality. Firms might not be concerned about future profits, for example if a manager serves his own 
interests rather than those of shareholders. By the time the company becomes less successful, the manager will 
have moved on. See: Aldred (2008), pp. 270-272. See also: Griffiths (2011), p. 109, 146. However, traders are 
not allowed to change the trademarked product in such a way that consumers are deceived (Economides (1988), 
p. 529; Altman and Pollack (2020), para 17:3, p. 23).  
41 Griffiths (2008), p. 248. 
42 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 9. 
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enjoy protection for a potentially unlimited period of time.43 Trademark protection increases 
the information costs for other traders and newcomers who might not have sufficient 
advertising funds.44 Therefore, the benefits of reducing consumer search costs have to be 
balanced against other traders’ legitimate reasons for using similar signs.  
A problematic aspect is the costs of exclusion; these costs greatly depend on the right 
boundaries around subject matter and scope of protection. If the subject matter of a trademark 
is too broadly defined, other traders could be hindered in their ability to compete.45 Protecting 
a trademark consisting of descriptive terms or words that other traders may reasonably want 
to use is more costly than protecting unusual words or invented and arbitrary words.46 These 
marks contain additional information that is useful to consumers, such as information about 
the features or the source of the product, and therefore form a partial substitute for 
advertising.47 For instance, if traders are prevented from informing consumers that their 
products are tasty or fresh, the traders’ ability to compete effectively decreases.48  
To counterbalance these costs, trademark law traditionally only prohibits the use of 
identical or similar signs attached to identical or similar goods when a likelihood of confusion 
among consumers exists.49 Furthermore, only distinctive signs achieve trademark protection.50 
Nevertheless, in the last decades, the subject matter and scope of trademark protection have 
increased. For example, several types of non-traditional marks can be currently registered, 
including marks consisting of colours, shapes, sounds, smells, video clips, holograms or 
gestures.51 One of the causes seems to lie in the definition of ‘what can represent a mark’52: 
 
43 Calboli (2018), p. 289; Kratzke (1991); Bently and Sherman (2014), p. 813. 
44 Bradford (2008), p. 1242; Bently and Sherman (2014), p. 814. 
45 Sakulin (2011), pp. 56-57. The reduction of search costs should therefore not be seen as ‘an end in itself’. 
Instead, trademark protection aims to generate a more competitive market. In this light, trademark protection on 
certain signs, such as shapes, should be rejected if it reduces competition, even though this could lead to higher 
search costs. Bently and Sherman (2014), p. 816; Dogan and Lemley (2008), p. 69.  
46 Griffiths (2008), p. 259; Griffiths (2011), pp. 233, 235-236.  
47 Cross (1997), p. 106; Bently and Sherman (2014), p. 814.  
48 Landes and Posner (1987), p. 296. 
49 Art. 15 TRIPs Agreement; Art. 10(2)(b) TMD 2015.  
50 Art. 3 TMD 2015 refers to the abstract capability to distinguish, while Art. 4(1)(b) TMD 2015 stipulates the 
actual distinctiveness of a trademark in relation to the goods or services. The abstract capability to distinguish 
exists independently of a concrete product reference and cannot acquire distinctiveness through use in trade. It 
exists if it cannot be excluded that the sign can serve as a product-identifying and origin-meaning means for any 
conceivable product. From a purely theoretical perspective, the sign must have the capacity to perform the 
function of a trademark on the market. For example, the trademark ‘Deutsche Bank’ is distinctive in the abstract, 
although it does not have concrete inherent distinctiveness with regard to services in class 36. However, if the 
sign acquires distinctiveness through use in trade, the trademark has become concretely distinctive for services in 
class 36. See Fezer (2009), pp. 350-352, 551. 
51 New types of trademarks might be particularly problematic: ‘trademark rights in certain non-traditional 
trademark subject matter may in effect be broader than rights in word marks and other traditional marks. There is 
always a chance the party claiming infringement owns a very broad scope of rights in a non-traditional mark 
since (1) the right of trademark exclusivity extends to marks which are identical or similar to the mark – identity 
of the parties’ marks is not required – and (2) courts and juries may deem the mark to encompass a larger range 
of subject matter than what is actually used by the trademark owner since the registration may not provide clear 
notice of the boundaries of the mark.’ Therefore, it might be better to interpret the text of Art. 15(1) TRIPS 
narrowly and to establish that certain types of marks cannot be used to distinguish goods or services. See: 




‘Notably, the test to protect a sign as a mark is no longer that a sign necessarily needs 
to be distinctive of existing products. Instead, any sign that has a potential to be 
distinctive – that is because it is original, interesting, and appealing to the human eye 
and sense – can be protected as a mark. Today, this can include, not surprisingly, 
product designs and a variety of aesthetic product features, which are certainly 
distinctive under this looser and circular definition.’53 
 
In addition, the degree of distinctiveness not only stipulates whether a sign can be registered 
but it also influences the scope of protection. The more distinctive the trademark, the greater 
the scope of trademark protection.54 The distinctiveness requirement might therefore be 
risky.55 As McKenna points out,  
 
‘Modern trademark law essentially instantiates a one-way ratchet to broader trademark 
rights. As courts in the early twentieth century broadened trademark owners’ rights, 
consumers grew to expect that trademark owners had increasingly broad control over 
their marks. Those changed consumer expectations then became the basis for even 
broader trademark rights, which then in turn created even greater expectations. And on 
it has spiralled, with the help of marketers, who specialize in influencing consumer 
expectations.’56 
 
The exclusive rights necessary to protect the origin function of a trademark can be used 
strategically to achieve additional profits. Although trademark owners need to be exclusively 
entitled to use a trademark in all market segments and prevent third parties from using 
confusingly similar signs in order to communicate about the trademarked product effectively, 
they will not hesitate to also attach messages to the trademark that are unrelated to the 
commercial origin.57 The exclusive rights necessary to guarantee the essential origin function 
of the trademark automatically also protect and stimulate proprietors to invest in the creation 
of their desired brand image.58 This raises the question of whether trademark law should go 
 
52 Calboli (2018), pp. 293-294. See Art. 15(1) TRIPs Agreement: ‘Any sign, or any combination of signs, 
capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be 
capable of constituting a trademark. Such signs, in particular words including personal names, letters, numerals, 
figurative elements and combinations of colours as well as any combination of such signs, shall be eligible for 
registration as trademarks. Where signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or 
services, Members may make registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired through use. Members may 
require, as a condition of registration, that signs be visually perceptible.’ 
53 Calboli (2018), p. 295. Irrespective of this looser definition, the trademark still needs to overcome the absolute 
grounds for refusing trademark registration (Art. 4 TMD). Besides, the possibility of registering product shapes 
is not new. Nevertheless, historically, product shapes were not protectable in countries like the United Kingdom 
and Germany. See Gangjee (2018), p. 63; Beier and Reimer (1955), p. 1282.  
54 Art. 16(3) TRIPs Agreement, Art. 10(2)(c) TMD 2015. 
55 As trademark owners can teach consumers to perceive practically any sign as a trademark and subsequently be 
rewarded with trademark protection. See Gangjee (2018), p. 61; Senftleben et al (2012), pp. 7-8. 
56 McKenna (2007), p. 1899. 
57 Kur and Senftleben (2017), pp. 9-10. 
58 Griffiths (2011), pp. 111, 123-124.  
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beyond its core function of protecting trademarks as source identifiers, and broaden the scope 
of protection to additional functions related to the creation of a brand image.59 In Austin’s 
view  
 
‘[i]f consumer impressions were fully delineating of the rights in a trademark, the 
metes and bounds of trademark rights could be largely determined by the genius of 
marketers and the resources firms have available to promote their brands. […] We 
have a typical chicken-and-egg problem here: do brands expand as a result of the 
efforts of marketers, or do changes in the law encourage marketers to think of new 
ways of expanding brands? And there is also an important normative aspect to all of 
this: should the law fall into step with marketers’ innovations, and bolster their 
activities with legal rights to match?’60 
 
2.3 Accessory Functions 
 
For several years, it was unclear whether it was possible to protect additional functions that go 
beyond the core origin function of trademarks.61 Before the EU trademark legislation came 
into force, in several EEC Member States it was common to provide for enhanced protection 
in cases involving a trademark that was ‘famous’ or known to a substantial part of the relevant 
circles, and where the use was considered ‘unfair’. However, most countries granted this form 
of protection based on provisions of unfair competition legislation or general tort law instead 
of trademark law.62  
It was only in the context of Europeanisation that enhanced protection for reputable 
marks was laid down in the Community Trade Mark Regulation and optionally in the Trade 
Mark Directive. In the proposals for the final legislation, protection was granted against the 
use of identical or similar marks for identical or similar goods or services, ‘where such use 
creates a serious likelihood of confusion on the part of the public’.63 Enhanced protection 
against similar signs used for dissimilar goods was accepted, though protection was restricted 
to community marks ‘with wide repute’.64 It was between 1984 and the adoption of the TMD 
in 1988 that the present notion of ‘trade marks having a reputation’, which was broader than 
the previous concepts of ‘famous’ marks or marks with ‘wide repute’, was enshrined in the 
TMD as well as the CTMR.65  
However, this extended protection only concerned trademarks with a certain degree of 
renown; so the impact could be restricted. The consideration that ‘ordinary’ marks could also 
 
59 Kur and Senftleben (2017), pp. 9-10.  
60 Austin (2008), pp. 174-175. 
61 Gangjee (2013), p. 9. Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 13. 
62 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 11. 
63 Proposal for a first Council Directive to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, OJ 
C 351/1 (31.12.1980). 
64 Proposal for a Council Regulation on Community trade marks, OJ C 351/5 (31.12.1980). 
65 Art. 8(1)(d) of the Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Trade Mark COM(84) 470, 
OJ C 230/1, 31.8.1984: ‘where the [trade mark] is of wide repute in the Community and where use of that sign 
would constitute unwarranted exploitation of the commercial value and the repute of the Community trade 
mark’. See also: Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 12. 
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enjoy broader protection may not even have occurred to the legislators, although it was not 
explicitly excluded. Since recital 8 CTMR and recital 10 (later 11) TMD state that ‘in 
particular’ the origin function of a trademark should be protected, there was room left for 
protecting other functions than the essential origin function.66 This became apparent in the 
context of trademark protection in double identity cases. After years of uncertainty, the CJEU 
finally stated in L’Oréal/Bellure: 
 
‘These functions include not only the essential function of the trade mark, which is to 
guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services, but also its other functions, 
in particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services in question and 
those of communication, investment or advertising.’67 
 
Accordingly, enhanced protection under the double identity clause could also be granted if a 
trademark did not have a reputation.68 Under the double identity rule all trademarks have 
protection of communication, investment, and advertising functions. In Interflora v. Marks & 
Spencer, the CJEU confirmed this ruling by stating that although a trademark always fulfils its 
origin function, it also performs other functions if the proprietor uses these accordingly, for 
example for advertising or investment purposes. If a trademark fulfils one or more accessory 
functions, protection should be granted under the double identity rule. The CJEU concluded 
that there were no grounds to argue that only trademarks with a reputation could perform 
functions other than that of indicating origin.69  
The CJEU has discussed the advertising function in several cases, and addressed the 
fact that the positive reputation of a well-known mark needed protection irrespective of 
whether the origin function was affected,70 thus even when consumers were not likely to be 
 
66 The CJEU may recognise even more trademark functions in future. See for example: Opinion of AG 
Trstenjak, 3 February 2011, case C‑482/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:46 (Budějovický Budvar/Anheuser-Busch), para 
63, fn. 26: ‘They include, according to legal writing on trade mark law, inter alia the coding, guarantee, origin, 
identification and individualisation, information and communication, monopolising, naming, quality, distinction, 
confidence, distribution and advertising functions, without the individual functions always having legal 
relevance in addition.’ See also: CJEU, judgment of 22 September 2011, case C-323/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604 
(Interflora/Marks&Spencer), para 39.  
67 CJEU, judgment of 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:378 (L’Oréal/Bellure), para. 58. 
68 In the sense of Art. 9(2) EUTMR or Art. 10(2)(c) TMD 2015. Although for double identity protection, the 
signs and products must be identical, whereas for extended protection similarity between the signs and products 
is sufficient. Besides, the functions must be detrimentally affected under the double identity clause, whereas for 
extended protection merely taking unfair advantage is sufficient.  
69 CJEU, judgment of 22 September 2011, case C‑323/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604 (Interflora/Marks & Spencer), 
para 40. These functions are further confirmed in: CJEU, judgment of 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08, C-237/08 
and C-238/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159 (Google/Louis Vuitton Malletier et al), para 77; CJEU, judgment of 25 
March 2010, case C‑278/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:163 (Die BergSpechte Outdoor Reisen/Günter Guni), para 31; 
CJEU, judgment of 8 July 2010, case C‑558/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:416 (Portakabin Ltd/Primakabin BV), para 
30. 
70 Well-known marks ‘frequently perform functions which go beyond linking goods or services to a uniform 
source. They present a powerful image of quality, exclusivity, youth, fun, luxury, adventure, glamour or other 
reputedly desirable lifestyle attributes, not necessarily associated with specific products but capable of presenting 
a strong marketing message in itself.’ See: Opinion of AG Sharpston, 26 June 2008, case C‑252/07, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:370 (Intel Corporation/CPM United Kingdom Ltd), para 8. 
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confused.71 In using a trademark, the proprietor might not only seek to indicate the origin of 
their product, but also use ‘its mark for advertising purposes designed to inform and persuade 
consumers.’72 The defendant’s use of the trademark can therefore be prohibited ‘where that 
use adversely affects the proprietor’s use of its mark as a factor in sales promotion or as an 
instrument of commercial strategy.’73  
The investment made to develop the reputation of trademark is also seen as worth 
protecting.74 The creation of a brand image is an expensive endeavour.75 The investment 
function concerns the proprietor’s use of the trademark ‘to acquire or preserve a reputation 
capable of attracting consumers and retaining their loyalty’.76 If a third party substantially 
interferes with the proprietor’s investments to achieve this reputation, the third party’s use 
adversely affects the trademark’s investment function.77 Although there might be some 
 
71 Although it seems to have been reluctant to consider that the function was factually impaired. See: Simon 
Fhima (2011), p. 325. See also: Gangjee (2013), p. 12. See further: CJEU, judgment of 22 September 2011, case 
C‑323/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604 (Interflora/Marks & Spencer), para 38; CJEU, judgment of 23 March 2010, 
cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159 (Google/Louis Vuitton), para. 77; CJEU, judgment of 18 
June 2009, case C-487/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:378 (L’Oréal/Bellure), paras 58, 65.  
72 CJEU, judgment of 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159 (Google/Louis 
Vuitton), para 91. 
73 CJEU, judgment of 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159 (Google/Louis 
Vuitton), para 92. See also: CJEU, judgment of 25 July 2018, case C‑129/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:594 
(Mitsubishi/Duma), para 46. Regarding keyword advertising cases, however, the CJEU stated that the third 
party’s use of the trademark to pop up the display of one’s own advertising as a sponsored link does not lead to 
an adverse effect. This trademark would also appear highly in the list of natural search results (CJEU, judgment 
of 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159 (Google/Louis Vuitton), paras 97-98).  
Furthermore, the mere fact that the third party’s use of keyword advertising forces the trademark owner to 
intensify his own advertising to maintain or strengthen his profile with consumers, cannot be seen as an adverse 
effect of the advertising function (CJEU, judgment of 22 September 2011, case C‑323/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604 
(Interflora/Marks & Spencer), para 57). 
74 Opinion of AG Jacobs, 29 April 1997, case C-337/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:222 (Dior/Evora), para 42: ‘Those 
functions are said to arise from the fact that the investment in the promotion of a product is built around the 
mark. It is accordingly reasoned that those functions are values which deserve protection as such, even when 
there is no abuse arising from misrepresentations about either origin or quality.’ The Advocate General, 
however, argued that these additional functions are ‘merely derivatives of the origin function’.  
75 EU General Court, judgment of 19 June 2008, case T‑93/06, ECLI:EU:T:2008:215 (Mülhens GmbH & Co. 
KG/OHIM), para. 26: ‘the mark has an inherent economic value which is independent of and separate from that 
of the goods or services for which it is registered. The messages in question which are conveyed inter alia by a 
mark with a reputation or which are associated with it confer on that mark a significant value which deserves 
protection, particularly because, in most cases, the reputation of a mark is the result of considerable effort and 
investment on the part of its proprietor.’  
76 CJEU, judgment of 22 September 2011, case C‑323/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604 (Interflora/Marks & Spencer), 
para 60. See also: CJEU, judgment of 25 July 2018, case C‑129/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:594 (Mitsubishi/Duma), 
para 46. 
77 However, the trademark owner cannot evoke their trademark rights – in conditions of fair competition that 
respect the trademark’s function as an indication of origin – when the only consequence of the third party’s use 
in keyword advertising is that the trademark owner has to increase their efforts to acquire and preserve a 
reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining their loyalty. If some consumers no longer buy the 
trademarked products, this is not sufficient to conclude that the investment function has been affected. See: 




overlap with the advertising function, the CJEU argues that the two are nonetheless different. 
Not only is advertising deployed but several commercial techniques are also used to develop 
and maintain a trademark’s reputation.78  
The final function discussed here is the communication function, which has not so far 
been elaborated by the CJEU, and the necessity of which is debatable since it seems to 
overlap broadly with the other functions.79 An explanation of the communication function can 
be found in the Advocate General’s opinion of the L’Oréal/Bellure case. In his view, a 
trademark is an instrument that gives consumers different types of information on the goods it 
identifies, including ‘“accumulated” information on the mark as a result of promotion and 
advertising carried out by the proprietor – for example, messages relating to non-physical 
characteristics which give an image of the product or the company in terms which are general 
(for example, quality, trustworthiness, reliability, etc.) or particular (for example, a certain 
style, luxury, strength).’80 That capacity of the trademark to communicate information would 
therefore also deserve protection.  
 With the recognition of these accessory functions, the CJEU thus accepted the 
protection of trademarks as brands: ‘These other functions are relevant in the contemporary 
business life where trade marks often acquire independent economic value as brands that are 
used to communicate wider messages than the simple origin of goods or services.’81 The 
CJEU expanded the protection of trademarks, particularly those with a reputation.82 While the 
protection of these other functions might still be based on the origin function,83 it also seems 
conceivable to protect the accessory functions independently, so that the origin function of the 
trademark does not necessarily have to be impaired.84  
 
78 CJEU, judgment of 22 September 2011, case C‑323/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604 (Interflora/Marks & Spencer), 
para 61. 
79 Gangjee (2013), pp. 11-12; Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 303. See also Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 9 December 
2010, C-324/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:757 (L’Oréal/eBay), para 112, fn. 58: ‘As to the communication function, it 
seems that in the doctrine the elements of this function are to a large extent covered by the distinguishing and 
origin function, advertising function and the investment function. Hence it is not necessary to address it 
separately here.’ 
80 Opinion of AG Mengozzi, 10 February 2009, case C‑487/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:70 (L’Oréal/Bellure), para 54.  
81 Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 9 December 2010, case C‑324/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:757 (L’Oréal/eBay), para 46.  
82 However, the further development of the function theory indicates that it not only extends the scope of 
protection by including more trademark functions, it also can work in the opposite direction. In ruling that no 
adverse affect could be identified, the CJEU has developed the function theory as a tool to reject a trademark 
claim. Therefore, the function theory is shown to operate in two directions. On the one hand, it extends the scope 
of the double identity rule. On the other hand, it functions as a balancing tool that might replace explicit defenses 
in the wording of Art. 9(2)(a) EUTMR and Art. 10(2)(a) TMD 2015, such as a reputation requirement and a ‘due 
cause’ defense. In this way, the function theory may restrain the scope of protection to reasonable proportions. 
See: Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 15. 
83 Opinion of AG Jacobs, 29 April 1997, case C-337/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:222 (Dior/Evora), para 42: ‘However, 
those functions seem to me to be merely derivatives of the origin function: there would be little purpose in 
advertising a mark if it were not for the function of that mark as an indicator of origin, distinguishing the trade 
mark owner's goods from those of his competitors. In my view, therefore, even if other facets of trade marks 
might require protection in certain circumstances, the Court's emphasis on the origin function of trade marks 
was, and remains, an appropriate starting point for the interpretation of Community law relating to trade marks.’ 
84 CJEU, judgment of 22 September 2011, case C‑323/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604 (Interflora/Marks & Spencer), 
para 38; CJEU, judgment of 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159 (Google/Louis 
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 Furthermore, regarding extended protection,85 the CJEU ruled in L’Oréal/Bellure that 
the brand image need not be harmed; the mere advantage taken by the defendant of the brand 
image and reputation could already be considered unfair: 
 
‘In that regard, where a third party attempts, through the use of a sign similar to a 
mark with a reputation, to ride on the coat-tails of that mark in order to benefit from its 
power of attraction, its reputation and its prestige, and to exploit, without paying any 
financial compensation and without being required to make efforts of his own in that 
regard, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in order to create 
and maintain the image of that mark, the advantage resulting from such use must be 
considered to be an advantage that has been unfairly taken of the distinctive character 
or the repute of that mark.’86 
 
The CJEU thus factually acknowledges ‘the brand as an independent object of proprietary 
rights’.87 If a third party is likely to benefit from the positive brand associations, this use of 
the trademark can also be prohibited. The marketing efforts made by the trademark owner to 
create and sustain the brand image currently provide a basis for guaranteeing legal 
protection.88 
 
2.3.1 Reduction of Consumer Search Costs 
 
The justification for protecting brand goodwill based on the accessory trademark functions 
and the concept of dilution is debatable. Proponents of brand protection argue that this 
additional form of protection must be seen in light of the aim of reducing search costs.89 The 
 
Vuitton), para 77; CJEU, judgment of 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:378 (L’Oréal/Bellure), 
paras 58, 65. 
85 Which was then dealt with by the CJEU under Art. 5(2) TMD, which is now Art. 10(2)(c) TMD 2015.  
86 CJEU, judgment of 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:378 (L’Oréal/Bellure), para 49. 
87 Gangjee (2013), p. 15. Although the CJEU seems to have been reluctant to concretely determine in which 
cases the accessory functions of the trademark are in fact affected. Instead, the origin function has been 
interpreted more broadly. See: Kur (2020), pp. 169-170, 172. 
88 This can be seen as a shift in the trademark doctrine. Traditionally, trademarks were based on preventing 
deception and later on economic rationales. See Gangjee (2013), p. 15. Nevertheless, the CJEU revealed in 
Interflora/Marks & Spencer that they are willing to consider whether free-riding was made with ‘due cause’. If 
the advertiser only wanted to provide an alternative for the products of the trademark owner, without causing 
dilution or tarnishment and without adversely affecting the functions of the trademark in question, then it is 
reasonable to conclude that this was done within the ambit of fair competition (CJEU, judgment of 22 September 
2011, case C-323/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604 (Interflora/Marks & Spencer), para. 91). Furthermore, also in the 
functions discussion the CJEU has enabled competitors to rely on the functions against actions that are inherent 
in fair competition, such as offering alternatives to the protected brand (CJEU, judgment of 22 September 2011, 
case C-323/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604 (Interflora/Marks & Spencer), paras. 57-58, 64; CJEU, judgment of 23 
March 2010, cases C-236/08-C-238/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159 (Google/Louis Vuitton), para. 69.   
89 Trademark dilution protects the trademark against interferences with its uniqueness. This is classically 
described as ‘the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark 
or name by its use on non-competing goods’. Schechter (1927), p. 825. The concept of dilution is ‘targeted at 
reducing consumer search costs, just as traditional trademark law is.’ Dogan and Lemley (2005), p. 493; 
Bradford (2008), p. 1231. 
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immediate association between the trademark and the goods or services for which it is 
registered would be weakened if a trademark becomes associated with several unrelated 
products, leading to increased consumer search costs: 
  
‘Suppose an upscale restaurant calls itself “Tiffany.” There is little danger that the 
consuming public will think it’s dealing with a branch of the Tiffany jewelry store if it 
patronizes this restaurant. But when consumers next see the name “Tiffany” they may 
think about both the restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy of the name 
as an identifier of the store will be diminished. Consumers will have to think harder – 
incur as it were a higher imagination cost – to recognize the name as the name of the 
store … So “blurring” is one form of dilution.’90  
 
A third party who takes a free-ride on the familiarity of a well-known trademark thus causes 
an increase in ‘internal search costs’, i.e. the mental time and effort required of consumers to 
associate the trademark with the proprietor of the goods and the corresponding goodwill.91 
Since other associations are built around the trademark, the next time consumers are 
confronted with the trademark they must ‘think for a moment’ before they recognise it as the 
mark of the product.92 Trademarks are ‘information chunks’ that serve as ‘core nodes’ in 
memory around which consumers connect and organise other ‘associated’ information about 
the product.93 New associations to this cognitive network would weaken this chunk of 
information and thereby the strength of the brand.94  
Furthermore, dilution protection would not only be needed to protect strong and 
unique brands, it would also maximise consumer choice: ‘In consumers’ hectic lives today, 
the shortage of time requires that brands help “edit” the overwhelming array of choices in a 
crowded marketplace.’95 It has also been argued that an increase in time or effort to assess a 
trademark might create negative feelings towards the trademark in the same way as a familiar 
brand evokes positive feelings. Trademark familiarity makes it easier to decide efficiently 
because of its capability to transmit information about risk and quality to consumers through 
quick and efficient innate emotional response mechanisms.96 Consumers might have less 
positive feelings towards the senior mark after sufficient exposure to blurring ‘not because she 
believes the blurring uses were authorized, but because she now reflexively finds the senior 
 
90 Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).  
91 Bradford (2008), p. 1232; Jacoby (2001), p. 1047; Landes and Posner (2003), p. 207; Tushnet (2008), p. 518. 
‘The information consumers can obtain and process is in part a function of how clear the association between 
mark and product remains in their minds; ‘clutter’ therefore imposes real costs on consumers.’ Lemley (1999), p. 
1704 fn. 90. See also: Swann (2002), p. 610. 
92 Posner (1992), p. 75; Beebe (2006), p. 1149. See also McCarthy (2004), pp. 727-28: ‘there is potential harm to 
both consumers and mark owners if a once-unique designation loses its uniqueness. The argument is that this 
makes it harder for consumers to link that designation with a single source – the hallmark of a strong trademark. 
Under this theory, dilution increases the consumer’s search costs by diffusing the identification power of that 
designation.’ 
93 For example, the trademark ‘Budweiser’ reflects a certain price, the name of the manufacturer, that it is 
produced in containers and labelled with a red and white logo, etc. See: Jacoby (2001), pp. 1024-1025. 
94 Jacoby (2001), p. 1049. 
95 Swann (2002), pp. 598, 603.  
96 Bradford (2008), pp. 1230, 1235.  
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mark less credible and therefore more taxing. Essentially, the term dilution refers to an 
alternative form of “confusion” that is pre-conscious and automatic.’97 
Nevertheless, commentators are critical of the idea that a few extra seconds of 
consideration would justify enhanced protection.98 Consumers might have to think ‘a bit 
longer’, but ‘it is difficult to see how it impairs a mark’s ability to communicate information 
when the defendant’s product is compatible with the plaintiff’s and consumers are not 
confused’.99 For example, Ford Motor Company and Ford Modeling Agency are both 
reputable trademarks but consumers do not seem to have difficulties distinguishing between 
them.100 After a while, the existing associations may disappear and consumers learn that the 
name ‘Ford’ refers to non-related businesses.101 Courts also seem to be reluctant to consider 
‘trivial increases’ of mental search costs as sufficient legal grounds for a dilution claim.102  
Furthermore, it could be questioned whether the cognitive models for assessing 
increased consumer search costs are accurate.103 Moreover, any delay in the assessment of 
whether the sign refers to the original trademark ‘Ford’ might be compensated for by easier 
retrieval from memory. Signs that have a variety of associations might be more easily 
activated and referring to one sign could ‘prime’ people to revoke a similar variant thereof.104 
‘Thinking hard’ does not have to be a bad thing because it requires more mental processing 
which results in a better long-term memory for the trademark in question.105 
Even if dilutive use of a trademark causes some harm, an ‘emphasis on fleeting 
reactions, which tend to reflect short-term interests, fails to reconcile convenience with long-
term interests in enhanced competition’.106 An increase in negative feelings about the leading 
brand may rather prove welfare and enhance consumer choice.107 Blurring allows newcomers 
to enter a dense market more easily.108 Brands have the advantage that they are automatically 
preferred above other products because they seem less risky. Consumers are also inclined to 
interpret information in accordance with initial expectations. Once they have positively 
evaluated the brand, they will also assess brands positively.109 
 
97 Ibid., pp. 1234, 1273, 1278, 1298. 
98 Welkowitz (1991), p. 542; Beebe (2006), pp. 1165-1170; Bradford (2008), p. 1232. 
99 Bone (2006), p. 559. See also: Austin (2004), p. 895: ‘Implicit in Judge Posner’s approach is the idea that 
consumers care that they must think harder - that they suffer detriment, for instance, when they are forced to hold 
two or more different meanings of “Tiffany in their heads.” If dilution imposes an imagination “cost,” it follows 
that the ordinarily prudent consumer is somebody who prefers to have her imagination unburdened by 
conflicting messages about brands. But this is not necessarily so, or even more likely so. … [F]or some people, 
[it might] be more fun than costly.’ 
100 Beebe (2006), p. 1150; Bradford (2008), p. 1233. Trademarks could be strong and not unique at the same 
time. Context might be sufficient. See: Tushnet (2008), p. 531. 
101 Bradford (2008), p. 1248.  
102 Beebe (2010), p. 850; Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 17. Besides, dilution is only a ‘trivial subset’ of other 
information that may impede the desirable brand image, such as use of the trademark in news reporting, 
criticism, or for example, use of trademarked products in daily life. Bradford (2008), pp. 1249-1250.  
103 Tushnet (2008), pp. 527-546. 
104 Ibid., pp. 536-538. 
105 Ibid., p. 539. 
106 Bradford (2008), p. 1240. 
107 Ibid, pp. 1237, 1287.  
108 Ibid., p. 1287.  
109 Ibid., p. 1268. 
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The same applies to the concept of ‘tarnishment’110 which can be seen as a subset of 
blurring.111 The negative associations evoked in the minds of consumers may only interfere 
with the search costs rationale if these associations are utterly wrong, confusing or misleading 
and when they impact subsequent purchase decisions.112 For example, negative associations 
evoked by the use of the trademark on inferior goods could result in higher search costs 
because these associations wrongly impact consumers’ attitude towards the quality of the 
goods of the senior mark. However, these increased search costs are already largely prevented 
through protection against indirect confusion. Truthful criticism or commentary might also 
negatively influence the trademark’s reputation, but it also positively impacts search costs 
since consumers are informed about facts that might be relevant to their next purchasing 
decision.113 The concept of free-riding is even more difficult to explain with the search costs 
rationale because there is no real harm done.114 
 
2.3.2 Utilitarian Incentive Rationale 
 
According to the utilitarian incentive rationale, copyrights and patents are assigned to 
encourage creative and innovative efforts for the overall welfare of society. In this light, it 
could be argued that trademarks should also be granted legal protection in order to encourage 
the creation and maintenance of goodwill through investment in quality and advertising.  
 
110 The CJEU has defined the concept of ‘tarnishment’ in L’Oréal/Bellure: ‘...when the goods or services for 
which the identical or similar sign is used by the third party may be perceived by the public in such a way that 
the trade mark’s power of attraction is reduced. The likelihood of such detriment may arise in particular from the 
fact that the goods or services offered by the third party possess a characteristic or a quality which is liable to 
have a negative impact on the image of the mark.’ (CJEU, judgment of 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:378 (L’Oréal/Bellure), para 40). A definition of blurring can be found in Intel/CPM: ‘...such 
detriment is caused when that mark’s ability to identify the goods or services for which it is registered and used 
as coming from the proprietor of that mark is weakened, since use of the later mark leads to dispersion of the 
identity and hold upon the public mind of the earlier mark.’ (CJEU, judgment of 27 November 2008, case C-
252/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:655 (Intel/CPM), para 29). 
111 It could also reduce the distinctiveness of the trademark as a source identifier. See: Judge Posner, Ty Inc. v. 
Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511-512 (7th Cir. 2002): ‘Now suppose that the "restaurant" that adopts the name 
"Tiffany" is actually a striptease joint. Again, and indeed even more certainly than in the previous case, 
consumers will not think the striptease joint under common ownership with the jewelry store. But because of the 
inveterate tendency of the human mind to proceed by association, every time they think of the word "Tiffany" 
their image of the fancy jewelry store will be tarnished by the association of the word with the strip joint.’ 
112 Brand-extension research suggests that dilution by tarnishment is unlikely when there is no source confusion, 
because consumers have firm mental concepts of strong brands. Tushnet (2008), p. 543. 
113 Sakulin (2011), p. 60. 
114 Posner gave the example of a Tiffany’s restaurant in Kuala Lumpur taking a free-ride on the good reputation 
of the Tiffany’s brand. People in Kuala Lumpur would never buy anything in the jewelry store, such that the 
efficacy of the trademark as source identifier would not be harmed. If however the trademark owner can prevent 
third parties to benefit from the investments made in the brand image, economists could claim that the famous 
name will be “internalised”, i.e. Tiffany will enjoy the full benefits of their investments instead of sharing them 
with third parties resulting in an increase of investments in creating the prestigious name. Since the number of 
prestigious names is so vast, trademark owners could not expect to get substantial license fees from licensing 
trademark use. See: Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002). Landes and Posner (1987), p. 308. 
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Brand advertising enables enterprises to compete in an additional dimension and 
thereby encourage competition by improving information quality.115 A woman drinking a 
Budweiser or smoking a Camel might be happier when using branded products rather than 
generic alternatives.116 Emotional preferences are not different or less valuable than utilitarian 
needs, and consumer well-being improves by supplying information that helps satisfy 
emotional preferences as well.117 Consumers are ‘logically, rationally and emotionally [..] 
interested in more than quality and price’. Brands for instance also give people social 
status:118 
 
‘A cook using WILLIAMS-SONOMA kitchen equipment to host a dinner will 
enhance his reputation among guests who value quality housewares. Not only will he 
garner the functional, use-benefit of the cookware, and enjoy the emotional benefit of 
cooking well with quality equipment, but he also will express himself subtly as 
someone who can afford the best and who merits the admiration of his guests for his 
good taste and a presumed culinary aptitude.’119 
 
Every form of interference with associations or feelings that consumers may have towards the 
brand ‘would undermine its essence’.120 The trademark’s image would become less appealing 
if traders were allowed to free-ride on the associations of the brand: ‘Confusion of the mark’s 
meaning, indeed, would be more detrimental than confusion of the mark.’121 Furthermore, 
advertising also informs consumers about a certain quality of a product. High investments in 
advertising suggest a certain level of investment in the brand.122  
 Nevertheless, it is debatable whether there is any need for brand image creation that is 
justified under the incentive rationale.123 Some commentators suggest that the process of 
stimulating new desires, such as associated status, and then satisfying these desires does not 
necessarily lead to more welfare. Products that offer the owner a particular status could result 
 
115 Economides (1988), pp. 532-533; Nelson (1975), p. 213. See also Scott et al. (2008), p. 296: ‘[Strong brands] 
help product differentiation, facilitate consumer choice and incentivize purchasing’.   
116 Litman (1999), p. 1730; Dilbary (2007), p. 607; Bradford (2008), pp. 1255-1256. If a brand makes consumers 
feel better, purchasing these brands will improve their welfare.  
117 Bradford (2008), p. 1255; Nelson (1975), p. 213; Swann (2002), p. 618; Bone (2006), p. 603; Dilbary (2007), 
pp. 607-608, 622-628. 
118 Swann (2002), p. 594, 618: ‘A brand that today only denotes source and quality is thus often lacking in added 
attributes or content that consumers now want, demand and need.’ See also: Dilbary (2007), pp. 622-628; 
Griffiths (2008), pp. 252-253; Altman and Pollack (2020), para 17:5, p. 35. 
119 Swann (2002), p. 615. 
120 Ibid., p. 615. 
121 Ibid., p. 615. 
122 Nelson (1975), p. 214; Bradford (2008), p. 1256; Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1992), p. 31: ‘This lower 
average is counterbalanced by lower variance in product quality, giving branding a risk-reducing rather than a 
quality-guaranteeing function.’ 
123 Burrell & Gangjee (2010), pp. 547-548; Senftleben (2009), p. 59; Bone (2006), pp. 618-621; Dogan and 
Lemley (2004), p. 801; Lemley (1999), p. 1695; Litman (1999), pp. 1730, 1735; Lunney (1999), p. 465; 
Dreyfuss (1990), pp. 408-409; Denicola (1982), pp. 178-179; Scott et al. (2008), p. 297: ‘It is impossible to 
assert with any confidence – and without detailed, ongoing examination of the evidence – whether or not such 
expansion is justified on utilitarian grounds’.   
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in negative effects on others. Status is relative, such that others who do not have the same 
status symbols may feel at a disadvantage.124  
Research on happiness also shows that most television advertising makes people 
unhappy about their material situation, so creating new desires does not necessarily lead to 
more welfare.125 Consumers may also fail to opt for that which maximises their welfare 
because they are easily led and lack self-control; features that the standard rational choice 
theory assumes the sovereign consumer has.126 This theory also no longer embraces 
mainstream economic thinking.127 Consumers act like ‘cognitive misers’, deploying minimum 
effort in making an acceptable, and not an optimal, decision.128   
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether broad brand protection leads to more incentive to 
invest optimally in producing quality and goodwill. For instance, it is unlikely that Tiffany & 
Company would invest substantially more than it would otherwise in the jewellery market if it 
could capture the goodwill value of its Tiffany mark in the automobile market.129 The social 
interest in encouraging the creation of emotionally loaded products is not sufficient to justify 
the costs of exclusion.130  
Besides, if a consumer is interested in the utilitarian as well as the emotional features 
of a given product, the goodwill that might be harmed by a competitor’s use of the trademark 
is already protected by the essential origin function of the trademark.131 Trademark owners 
could further easily add emotional messages to their advertisements when informing 
consumers about desirable objective product characteristics.132  
Moreover, patents and copyrights have a different rationale that is directly related to 
the subject matter of protection. More works of art and technology would enrich society, but 
this does not hold for trademarks.133 Trademarks are aimed to enable consumers to quickly 
identify a particular product from a particular source. There is no need for more trademarks as 
 
124 Aldred (2008), p. 274. 
125 Ibid., p. 274. Brown argued that consumers are manipulated into choosing merely between ‘one illusion and 
another’. Consumers pay more for goods that are in fact not substantially distinct from generic substitutes, which 
decreases market efficiency. Brown (1948), pp. 1182-83; Griffiths (2011), pp. 36, 150, 162. 
126 Aldred (2008), pp. 275-277. 
127 Aldred (2008), p. 281. 
128 Bradford (2008), p. 1260. 
129 Bone (2006), p. 619. 
130 Ibid., p. 620; Litman (1999), p. 1735; Brown (1948), p. 1995; Lemley (1999), p. 1696. These potential social 
costs include the suppression of political and social commentary and works of arts, higher prices because of 
restricted competition, impoverishment of language and culture, and costs of trademark licensing. See also: 
Lunney (1999), p. 439: ‘protecting marks based on their value independent of their informational role risks 
creating monopolies, not merely in the neutral, descriptive sense, but in the ordinary and pejorative sense of 
unjustified and inappropriate market power.’ 
131 Brown (1948), pp. 1195, 1205; Litman (1999), p. 1735. 
132 Bone (2006), p. 620. An exception might be the production of perfumes which are highly emotionally laden 
products.  
133 Although it does not seem to be fair to consider creative and innovative efforts as valuable per se and 
investments in brand images as useless from a societal perspective. Inventions or literary and artistic works are 
also not by definition important contributions to the public domain. See: Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 19; 
Opinion of AG Jacobs, 13 March 1990, case C-10/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:112 (HAG II), paras 16-20. 
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an end in itself.134 In addition, ‘much of this expansion has nothing at all to do with deception-
based concerns, but represents an attempt to protect the investment in creating a desirable 
product for its own sake.’135 Furthermore, the fact that many consumers attach value to the 
emotional aspects of a branded product does not justify these aspects being granted further 
legal protection; we should be careful with granting broad trademark protection.136 
 
2.3.3 Sumptuary Code 
 
From a societal perspective, it is doubtful whether social distinction and consumerism through 
brand protection should be encouraged. As Barton Beebe pointed out, intellectual property 
law is increasingly applied as a modern form of sumptuary law.137 Brand protection against 
dilution serves as an apt example of endeavours to preserve our conventional system of 
consumption-based social distinction, i.e. our sumptuary code, against the threat of powerful 
copying technologies decreasing the distinctiveness of material goods and their capacity to 
provide consumption-based social distinction.138 Beebe argues that any efforts to preserve the 
sumptuary code by means of intellectual property law are however destined to fail:139  
 
‘Controls on the consumption of distinctive goods may maintain the distinctiveness of 
those particular goods, but the controls will do little to stabilize the sumptuary order if 
consumers can simply move on to other distinctive goods in an effort to distinguish 
themselves over, with, or against others. The fundamental failing of intellectual 
property law in this regard is that it does not seek to prevent the innovation of new 
forms of distinction, nor does it have any means of doing so. On the contrary, in its 
progressive incarnation, it deliberately encourages such innovation by offering its 
protection to all qualifying goods.’140 
 
Status items could become so commonplace that their social meaning might get lost.141 Brand 
protection used to preserve the sumptuary code leads to costs that would better be allocated 
elsewhere than ‘in the pursuit of intangible and otherwise typically quite meaningless and 
useless forms of relative utility’.142 Therefore, Beebe argues for developing an alternative 
system of social distinction, a common-based system, where the individual acquires 
distinction not through consumption of commodities but through the production of gifts, such 
 
134 Lemley (1999), pp. 1694-1695. See also: Dreyfuss (1990), p. 399: ‘[T]here is little need to create economic 
incentives to encourage businesses to develop a vocabulary with which to conduct commerce.” Contrary: Landes 
and Posner (1988), p. 271, who argue that trademarks enrich the language, although the benefits are small.   
135 Lunney (1999), p. 438. 
136 Litman (1999), p. 1728: ‘Many things have value. As Ralph Brown reminded us often, the essence of any 
intellectual property regime is to divide the valuable stuff subject to private appropriation from the valuable stuff 
that, precisely because of its importance, is reserved for public use.’ 
137 Beebe (2010), pp. 845-868. 
138 Ibid., pp. 848-859.  
139 Ibid., pp. 878-881. 
140 Ibid., p. 880.  
141 Ibid., pp. 881-882. 
142 Ibid., p. 882.  
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as open source or creative commons.143 Instead of expanding brand protection, intellectual 
property law, being ‘not just technologically but social – and politically – progressive’, should 
promote ‘the growth and extension of the social movements that both rely on and help to 
propagate this system of social distinction’.144  
 
2.3.4 Expressive Autonomy 
 
The ‘expressive autonomy’ theory, developed by Michael Spence, also fails to provide a 
sufficient basis for enhanced trademark protection. According to the expressive autonomy 
theory, brand owners should be free from compulsion to express a message that they have not 
chosen themselves. They should also have the freedom to not subsidise a message with which 
they do not wish to be affiliated.145 In line with this theory, brand owners should thus have the 
possibility to choose in which messages they wish to participate, in the sense that they 
facilitate their communication in association with the trademark.146 Third parties might affect 
this freedom of speech when their sign ‘alludes’ to the trademark, resulting in undesirable 
associations.147  
Nevertheless, this theory does not account for the necessity of extended brand 
protection; rather, it presupposes its legitimacy: ‘In Spence’s theory, brands are regarded as 
individual personalities that entitle the brand owner to expressive autonomy. However, the 
mere postulation of expressive autonomy does not make it plausible that brands ought to have 
the underlying personality status in the first place. The theory is a description rather than a 
justification of protection needs.’148  
 
2.3.5 Natural Law Reward  
 
Difficulties have also arisen with regard to the justification of enhanced protection based on 
the natural law reward argument. One might argue that a trademark owner creates goodwill in 
the same way that an author creates a work, and that a trademark needs to be created to grant 
protection in the same way that a patent needs to be invented.149 The trademark owner has 
made efforts to create a particular brand image, such that it feels right to give the results of 
these attempts to them.150  
 
143 Ibid., pp. 884-885. 
144 Ibid., pp. 885-886.  
145 Spence (2008), p. 308.  
146 Ibid., p. 308. 
147 Michael Spence gave the example of a poster with a picture of a pregnant Girl Scout dressed in the uniform of 
the organisation and labelled with its trademark. Her hands were situated above her belly and attached was the 
Girl Scouts’ motto ‘Be Prepared’. The use of the trademark in this case might be considered compelled speech. 
Spence (2008), p. 311. 
148 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 18. See also Spence (2008), pp. 312-313, where he formulates objections to the 
expressive autonomy theory. See further: Bently and Sherman (2014), p. 819: ‘it is hard to imagine either judges 
or traders supporting such radical rethinking of trade mark principles’. 
149 Bently and Sherman (2014), p. 815.   
150 Strasser (2000), p. 422: ‘as a matter of fairness, those who create something that benefits society should 
receive a reward for their efforts.’ 
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Nonetheless, the trademark owner’s attempts to create a brand image must be 
distinguished from artificial or innovative efforts to create art or develop technological 
solutions. Copyrights and patent rights expire after a limited period of time, such that works 
and innovations become freely accessible to the general public. Conversely, a trademark 
including the brand image could be monopolised by the trademark owner forever. As long as 
trademark owners renew their trademark registration and keep investing in brand images, 
proprietors can keep the benefits resulting from these endeavours for themselves. In this light, 
it is not clear why brand owners should be rewarded for their contributions to society.151 
Brand owners are also already remunerated with market benefits.152 
Within the framework of John Locke’s so-called ‘labour theory’, from which this 
rationale is originally derived, granting broad trademark protection based on efforts to 
develop and maintain a certain brand image is also questionable. According to Locke’s 
theory, ‘a person who labours upon resources that are either unowned or “held in common” 
has a natural property right to the fruits of his or her efforts’, and the state must respect and 
enforce this person’s natural right.153 With regard to intellectual property, the raw materials 
(facts and concepts) might in a way be ‘held in common’ and labours could be seen as 
enriching the value of finished products.154  
However, a brand image is not created ex nihilo and the creation of its commercial 
magnetism also relies on the efforts of others.  Furthermore, ‘while the associations between 
the mark and a source or goodwill may be instigated and nurtured by the trader, they are as 
much created by the customers and the public’.155 The creation of associations within the 
public mind is a ‘two-sided affair’.156 Not only do trademark owners need to invest in the 
development of a brand image, creative work also needs to be done by each member of the 
public.157 Furthermore, trademark owners make a substantial contribution in terms of time and 
effort in developing dispositions in brand recognition and brand recall in consumers’ mind. 
The trademark is used to achieve this objective. However, Locke’s labour theory cannot 
explain why trademark owners should own the brand image in people’s minds just because of 
their investment in a sign associated with that image.158 
Moreover, even if we accept the natural law reward argumentation, the property rights 
resulted from the labour of developing a brand image need not give trademark owners broad 
 
151 Senftleben (2009), p. 60.    
152 Van der Laan (2020), p. 27.    
153 Locke (1689). See also: Fisher (2001), p. 170.  
154 Fisher (2001), p. 170. 
155 Bently and Sherman (2004), p. 699.  
156 Scott et al. (2008), p. 299. 
157 Gerhardt (2010), p. 427; Heymann (2009), p. 651, Litman (1999), p. 1733; Wilf (1999), p. 1; Konzinski 
(1993), p. 975; Dreyfuss (1990), pp. 413-14; Altman and Pollack (2020), paras 17:1, 17:6, pp. 18, 36-37; Bently 
and Sherman (2014), p. 815.  
158 Scott (et al.), p. 304: ‘In fact, the problem for the labour theory is much worse, for a reason we have so far 
glossed over. We have been trying to locate the magnetism of a trade mark in its tokens, by granting them a 
dispositional property based on an analogy with a colour property. They are both dispositions to evoke responses 
in spectators. But the value of a trade mark’s magnetism goes beyond this kind of disposition. To take another 
simple example, brand recall is as significant for consumer choice as brand recognition. His ability to retrieve the 
brand, to think of the trade mark, is evidently crucial to its selling power. But this ability is a disposition in him 
to recall.’ See also Kur and Senftleben (2017), pp. 20-21.  
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and absolute trademark rights.159 Rather, McKenna points out that courts traditionally only 
offered trademark owners exclusive rights regarding a certain field of trade and against direct 
traders, such that these rights were quite limited. Trademark owners were protected against 
dishonest acts in the markets where they had actually laboured to attract customers. 
Infringement therefore only occurred when third parties tried ‘to steal a competitor’s existing 
customers.’160 Courts allocated an infringement claim only when consumers were likely to be 
confused about the actual source of the third parties’ product.161  
In the 20th century, however, courts and commentators started ‘to believe not only that 
trademark protection ultimately benefited consumers, but that consumers were the intended 
beneficiaries all along.’162 This shift in modern trademark law towards protecting consumers 
has however dismantled the scope of trademark rights to enforce any real limitations and 
paved the way for accepting broader trademark protection. Overbroad protection can therefore 




In sum, the consumer search costs rationale provides a plausible justification for the 
protection of the origin function of a trademark. Trademark protection safeguards consumers 
against confusion, and leads to a transparent market, a proper functioning of markets, and 
increasing consumer welfare. Nevertheless, the exclusive rights necessary to protect the origin 
function of a trademark can be used strategically to achieve additional profits. The exclusive 
rights necessary to guarantee the essential origin function of the trademark automatically also 
protect and stimulate proprietors to invest in the creation of their desired brand image. 
Consequently, not only are more signs currently registered, but the scope of protection has 
also been broadened.  
Previously, trademark law protected only a trademark proprietor’s business in their 
own market: not in markets in which traders were not involved, where they could not show 
that they had made investments or that diversion existed of hypothetical future consumers. 
Courts allocated an infringement claim only when consumers were likely to be confused 
about the actual source of the third parties’ product.164 Under modern trademark law, 
however, trademark owners can protect hypothetical future business in their own market and 
in other potential markets. McKenna points out that 
 
‘Since courts have unplugged trademark and unfair competition law from the 
requirement of competition, they have no normative framework within which to judge 
if a particular practice is “unfair” and no obvious method to determine infringement. 
Indeed, it is no coincidence that courts only developed the unpredictable likelihood of 
confusion factors after jettisoning the requirement of competition. Nor is it surprising 
 
159 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 21.  
160 McKenna (2007), p. 1889. 
161 Ibid., p. 1897. 
162 McKenna (2007), p. 1898. 
163 Ibid., p. 1904. 
164 Ibid., p. 1897. 
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that the unpredictability of these factors generally has worked in mark owners’ 
favor.’165   
 
In Puma/Sabel, the CJEU indeed explained that a likelihood of confusion exists when the 
consumer confuses the sign and the trademark in question (likelihood of direct confusion) but 
also when the consumer connects the proprietors of the sign and those of the trademark and 
confuses them (likelihood of indirect confusion)166 In Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, the CJEU 
further defined this requirement as ‘the risk that the public might believe that the goods or 
services in question come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from 
economically-linked undertakings.’167  
Furthermore, post-sale confusion also falls under the concept of likelihood of 
confusion, even though there is no reliable information on whether a casual observer of a 
product would purchase this product in future. In Arsenal/Reed, the CJEU argued that the 
notice in Mr Reed’s stall stating that the fan articles were not official Arsenal FC products, 
did not alter the finding that a likelihood of confusion existed. ‘Some consumers, in particular 
if they come across the goods after they have been sold by Mr Reed and taken away from the 
stall where the notice appears, may interpret the sign as designating Arsenal FC as the 
undertaking of origin of the goods.’ As there is no real harm done since consumers are not 
confused during the concrete buying process, the CJEU in fact protects consumers against 
tarnishment because there is a risk that the fan articles might reduce the trademark’s power of 
attraction.168 
The dilution doctrine even prohibits a third party from using similar signs when there 
is no likelihood of confusion of any kind and no risk that the third party will divert customers 
from the products of the trademark owner.169 In L’Oréal/Bellure, the CJEU confirmed that the 
brand image does not need to be harmed; the mere advantage taken by the defendant of the 
brand image and reputation could already be considered unfair.170 
From a competitive perspective, broadening the scope of protection to additional 
functions related to the creation of a brand image can be risky. Because of their capacity to 
symbolise and communicate extra features such as status or lifestyle attitudes, the 
psychological effect of brands and their market power can be tremendous. This could lead to 
high entry barriers, low market transparency, and big leveraging strength.171 Especially 
powerful players might see enforcing their presumed trademark rights as a ‘sort of self-fulling 
 
165 Ibid., p. 1904. 
166 CJEU, judgment of 11 November 1997, case C-251/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:528 (Puma/Sabel), para 16. 
167 CJEU, judgment of 22 June 1999, case C-342/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:323 (Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer), para 17. 
See also: Beebe (2010), p. 853. 
168 CJEU, judgment of 12 November 2002, case C-206/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:651 (Arsenal/Reed), para 57. See 
also: Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 322; McKenna (2007), p. 1908; Austin (2008), pp. 174-175; Beebe (2010), p. 
851. 
169 When a trademark has a reputation, the trademark owner can prohibit similar use against dissimilar goods and 
services where use of the sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or the repute of the trademark (Art. 10(2)(c) TMD 2015 and Art. 9(2)(c) EUTMR). 
170 CJEU, judgment of 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:378 (L’Oréal/Bellure), para 49. See also: 
Bently and Sherman (2014), pp 812-813.  
171 Kur (2008), p. 193; Litman (1999), p. 1730, fn. 77. 
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prophecy’.172 This is even more so in a case involving a trademark consisting of descriptive 
terms or words that other traders may reasonably want to use.173 These marks contain 
additional information that is useful to consumers, such as information about the features or 
the source of the product, and they are therefore a partial substitute for advertising. 
Furthermore, justifications based on incentives and rewards also fail to provide a 
convincing basis for extended trademark protection. None of the rationales justify why a 
trademark deserves more protection than its essential origin function since the brand image 
cannot be seen as independent from the trademark. The brand image is a by-product, which is 
automatically protected when the trademark is protected in its function as source identifier. If 
the origin function of a trademark is not impaired, protection of additional functions does not 
seem to be necessary.174 
But as long as consumers are indicated as the intended beneficiaries that need to be 
protected, and consumer perceptions and expectations serve as the basis for granting 
trademark rights, it can be expected that the trademark law system will recognise trademark 
owner’s investments in consumer education and accept their requests for further protection 
whenever consumer perception has been shaped through marketing campaigns, potentially 
even at all levels. Trademark owners often have sufficient financial resources to invest in 
expensive marketing campaigns that teach consumers to perceive almost any sign as a source 
identifier. The more a trademark owner invests in advertising presenting a sign as an identifier 
of commercial source, the broader the scope of protection. The more the trademark is seen as 
a symbol of a desirable lifestyle, the more willing consumers will be to pay more for the 
brand image that the trademarked product evokes. In fact, ‘familiarity with a brand can lead to 
an endlessly reinforcing positive feedback loop with advertising increasing familiarity and 
positive associations, and familiarity and positive associations increasing receptiveness to 
advertising claims.’175 
Since enhanced protection is firmly anchored in the EU trademark system and in 
international law, albeit in limited form,176 it is unrealistic to ignore the economic value of the 
additional functions of a trademark. However this does not mean that we should always help 
trademark owners gain more protection.177 If a trademark is used in a way that may harm the 
accessory functions of a trademark, this does not necessarily have to lead to an allocation of 
the trademark claim. For example, the CJEU argued that the advertising function does not 
protect trademark owners ‘against practices inherent in competition.’178  
Trademark rights must be weighed against third parties’ need to compete in a proper 
functioning market, and the ability to offer their own products as alternatives and supplements 
to the trademark owner’s products. Furthermore, it is important to accept the necessity of 
 
172 Kur (2008), p. 203. 
173 Griffiths (2008), p. 259. 
174 See also: Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 21; Griffiths (2011), p. 275. 
175 Bradford (2008), p. 1268. 
176 Art. 16(3) TRIPs Agreement. See also Art. 4(b)(ii) and (iii) of World Intellectual Property Organization, 
WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Well-Known Marks, WIPO publication No. 833, 
Geneva: WIPO, 2000.  
177 Litman (1999), p. 1729. 




ensuring freedom of expression and retaining the expressive use of associations and meanings 
conveyed by the trademark freely available.179 Trademark owners are not the only ones who 
have invested in trademark symbols, so did the public.180 
Therefore, trademark protection as a core instrument for regulating market 
transparency must be balanced against other important needs, such as free expression 
facilitating consumer information and consumers’ choice, and free competition preventing 
unneeded market entry thresholds. In this balancing of interests, trademark protection as a 
fundamental right to property181 must be valued in light of other traders’ freedom of 
commercial expression and freedom to conduct a business.182  
As Advocate General Maduro explains: ‘whatever the protection afforded to 
innovation and investment, it is never absolute. It must always be balanced against other 
interests, in the same way as trade mark protection itself is balanced against them. I believe 
that the present cases call for such a balance as regards freedom of expression and freedom of 
commerce.’183 A trademark system that merely follows the factual perception of consumers 
and subsequently forbids trademark use accordingly would give trademark owners a free hand 


















179 Trademarks ‘have become products in their own right, valued as indicators of the status, preferences, and 
aspirations of those who use them. Some trademarks have worked their way into the English language; others 
provide basis for vibrant, evocative metaphors. In a sense, trademarks are the emerging lingua franca: with a 
sufficient command of these terms, one can make oneself understood the world over, and in the process, enjoy 
the comforts of home.’ Dreyfuss (1990), pp. 397-398. 
180 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 23.  
181 Art. 17(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
182 Arts. 11 and 16 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. See also Recital 27 TMD 2015: ‘Furthermore, this 
Directive should be applied in a way that ensures full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and in 
particular the freedom of expressions.’ 
183 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, 22 September 2009, joined cases C‑236/08, C‑237/08 and C‑238/08, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:569 (Google/Louis Vuitton), para 102. 
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3 The Public Domain Is Under Pressure: Why We Should Not Rely On 
Empirical Data When Assessing Trademark Distinctiveness 
  
This chapter argues that the existing balancing tools in EU trademark law are not sufficient to 
prevent the misappropriation of signs. The present chapter considers whether the threshold for 
assuming acquired distinctiveness in EU trademark law is too low. In this context, the 
threshold for assuming acquired distinctiveness is viewed from a legal, economic and 
psychological perspective. It is argued that the threshold for assuming acquired 
distinctiveness is not efficient enough and should therefore be applied more restrictively. The 
study also reveals that this instrument may create dysfunctional incentives and may in fact 
make it attractive for traders to invest in descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs, 
because trademark owners can impact these signs acquiring distinctiveness and invest as 
needed until they acquire control of their preferred sign. In order to guarantee that these signs 
remain in the public domain, adopting an outright exclusion is necessary for descriptive, 
cultural and non-traditional signs that cannot be overcome through acquiring distinctiveness 
in consequence of use in trade. 
 
Keywords Acquisition of trademark rights · Consumer perception · Court of Justice of the 
European Union · Distinctiveness · Public domain 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Trademark law seeks to ensure market transparency. This is supposed to lead to fair 
competition, protect consumers against confusion, and ultimately guarantee the proper 
functioning of markets.184 However, current EU trademark law runs the risk of allowing 
trademark owners to dictate the meaning of signs that belong to the public domain.185 This 
problem is further exacerbated by the possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in 
trade.186 The interests of protecting intellectual property must be balanced with the need to 
protect the public domain. After all, the public domain is essential to ensure free and fair 
competition, freedom of speech and political and artistic freedom of expression. The debate 
about the gradual expansion of trademark rights187 raises the question of whether the threshold 
 
* This chapter is based on: Anemaet L (2016) The Public Domain Is Under Pressure – Why We Should Not Rely 
on Empirical Data When Assessing Trademark Distinctiveness. IIC 47(3):303-335. doi: 10.1007/s40319-016-
0459-8. See also: Senftleben MRF, Anemaet L (2013) Windsurfing Chiemsee revisited – Op weg naar een 
normatieve toets bij inburgering? Berichten Industriële Eigendom 7/8: 245-253. 
184 Senftleben (2012), pp. 8-9; Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of October 17, 1990, Case C-
10/89 (HAG II), para. 13; CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2002, Case C-299/99 (Philips/Remington), para. 30. 
185 The public domain can be understood to consist of all signs that are ineligible for, or excluded from, 
trademark protection. The public domain can also be understood  to comprise forms or using trademarked signs 
that remain unaffected by the exclusive rights of the trademark owner. See: Senftleben (2012), p. 3. For more 
information about the concept of the public domain: Guibault and Hugenholtz (2006); Samuelson (2006); and 
the various contributions to Boyle (2003). 
186 Senftleben (2012), pp. 7-8.  
187 See for example: Gangjee (2013); Senftleben (2013a); Ramsey (2003), p. 1096; Wilf (1999), p. 17; McKenna 
(2007), pp. 1841, 1899. 
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of distinctiveness functions properly. Is the threshold for acquiring distinctiveness through use 
in trade high enough to prevent traders from investing in signs that belong to the public 
domain? Or does EU trademark law create dysfunctional incentives and make it attractive for 
traders to invest in descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs? And is the current threshold 
still the right instrument to safeguard the public domain? 
This chapter shows that the public domain is under pressure. It argues that the 
threshold for assuming acquired distinctiveness is unpredictable and risky. Trademark owners 
are possibly encouraged to invest in descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs in order to 
have these signs registered. Remarkably, the assumptions of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereafter: CJEU) regarding trademark perception do not reflect the way 
consumer perception works. Consumers are able to recognise without difficulty a descriptive 
sign, an abstract colour or a shape as an identifier of commercial source. The consequence is 
that the marketing efforts of trademark owners are rewarded: since traders can prove that 
consumers recognise these particular signs as an identifier of commercial source, they achieve 
exclusive rights on a sign that describes a positive attribute of a good and thereby obtain an 
unfair economic advantage because consumers easily understand what the trademark stands 
for. This chapter argues that if we believe that descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs 
should remain in the public domain for reasons of public interest in not unduly restricting the 
availability of these signs for other traders and the general public, we need to create a far 
more normative test that will exclude these signs from trademark protection even if they have 
acquired distinctiveness through use in trade. If we want to guarantee the preservation of these 
signs, we need to implement an outright exclusion of descriptive, cultural and non-traditional 
signs that cannot be overcome through acquiring distinctiveness.  
 
3.2 Balancing Between Protecting the Public Domain and Protecting Consumers 
Against Confusion 
 
Exclusive trademark rights are in principle granted to a single trademark owner. These rights 
can be endlessly renewed188 on the grounds that market transparency would no longer be 
guaranteed if trademark protection was limited in the same way as copyright and patent 
protection.189 However, this does not mean that every sign can be removed from the public 
domain. EU trademark law offers a number of safeguards to keep signs free from trademark 
protection. In the Windsurfing Chiemsee Case, the CJEU has explicitly recognised that 
descriptive signs or indications relating to categories of goods or services need to remain 
freely available because  
 
it is in the public interest that they remain available, not least because they may be an 
indication of the quality and other characteristics of the categories of goods concerned, 
and may also, in various ways, influence consumer tastes by, for instance, associating 
the goods with a place that may give rise to a favourable response.190 
 
 
188 Article 18 TRIPS Agreement.  
189 Article 7 Berne Convention and Art. 33 TRIPS Agreement. 
190 CJEU, judgment of May 4, 1999, Case C-108/97, C-109/97 (Windsurfing Chiemsee), para. 26. 
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In this way the distinctiveness requirement ensures that every trader has equal access 
to communication tools that can be used to inform consumers about product characteristics 
and compete for market shares. It therefore protects the interests of commercial freedom of 
expression and fair competition.191 However, according to current EU trademark law non-
distinctive signs can acquire distinctiveness through use in trade: Where signs are not 
inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or services, Members may make 
registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired through use.192 
In opposition to absolute grounds for refusal based on public policy or principles of 
morality and signs of high symbolic value193 which cannot be overcome by demonstrating 
acquired distinctiveness through use in trade, non-distinctive, descriptive and generic signs 
can be registered if consumers perceive these signs as a badge of origin.194 Of course, this 
greatly reduces the strength of the distinctiveness requirement. The reasoning is that 
trademark protection is granted to non-distinctive signs that have become distinctive through 
use in trade because otherwise consumers will be confused by the new meaning of a 
descriptive sign they already know. For example, consumers will think of the trademark 
“Milka” when they see a lilac-coloured chocolate bar, because the colour “lilac” has acquired 
a new meaning through its use in trade. If another enterprise was allowed to use the colour 
lilac for their chocolate bars, consumers might be confused. In this way, trademark law can 
ensure market transparency and fair competition.195 Therefore, the interests of the trademark 
owner may outweigh the interests of the public domain and granting exclusive rights to the 
trademark owner may be justified: 
 
It follows that a geographical name may be registered as a trade mark if, following the 
use which has been made of it, it has come to identify the product in respect of which 
registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking and thus to 
distinguish that product from goods of other undertakings. Where that is the case, the 
 
191 Senftleben (2015).  
192 Articles 3(3) Trademark Directive [Art. 4(4) and (5) TMD 2015], 6quinquies(C)(1) Paris Convention and 
15(1) TRIPS Agreement. See also CJEU, judgment of May 4, 1999, Case C-108/97, C-109/97 (Windsurfing 
Chiemsee), paras. 44-45. In the Windsurfing Chiemsee Case, the CJEU considers that in determining whether a 
mark has acquired distinctive character following its use, the competent authority must make an overall 
assessment of the evidence that the mark has come to identify the product concerned as originating from a 
particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that product from those of other undertakings (para. 49). The 
CJEU mentions especially the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and 
long-standing the use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the 
proportion of the relevant class of persons who, because of the mark, identify goods as originating from this 
particular undertaking; and statements by chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional 
associations (para. 51). The CJEU also points out that the competent authority is not precluded from using an 
opinion poll to guide its judgment (para. 53).  
193 According to Art. 3(2)(b) TMD [Art. 4(3)(b) TMD 2015] EU Member States can adopt an optional refusal 
ground concerning trademarks that cover a sign of high symbolic value, in particular a religious symbol. A few 
EU Member States have adopted this refusal ground.  
194 Article 3(3) TMD [Art. 4(4) and (5) TMD 2015] and Art. 7(3) CTMR [Art. 7(3) EUTMR]. For a 
comprehensive list of absolute grounds for refusal see Art. 3 TMD [Art. 4 TMD 2015] and Art. 7 CTMR [Art. 7 
EUTMR]. The registration of a sign is also refused if the sign conflicts with the prior rights of third parties (Art. 
4 TMD [Art. 5 TMD 2015] and Art. 8 CTMR [Art. 8 EUTMR]).  
195 Senftleben (2013), p. 13. 
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geographical designation has gained a new significance and its connotation, no longer 
purely descriptive, justifies its registration as a trade mark. Windsurfing Chiemsee and 
the Commission are therefore right to assert that Article 3(3) does not permit any 
differentiation as regards distinctiveness by reference to the perceived importance of 
keeping the geographical name available for use by other undertakings.196  
 
In addition, the EU trademark law system includes other safeguards to protect the 
interests of commercial freedom of expression and fair competition. For example, a trademark 
owner is not allowed to prohibit a third party from using descriptive indications in trade 
provided that the use of the sign is in accordance with honest commercial practices.197 
Furthermore, the general public and other competitors cannot be forbidden to use their own 
name or address in trade,198 or where it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a 
product or service, in particular as accessories or spare parts.199 A further refusal ground – in 
addition to the refusal grounds related to public policy or principles of morality and signs of 
high symbolic value – concerns functional shapes. Signs consisting exclusively of a shape that 
results from the nature of the goods themselves and shapes necessary to obtain a technical 
result cannot be registered if they have acquired distinctiveness through use in trade. The 
claim that competitors can use alternative shapes to achieve the same technical result does not 
change this outcome.200 With regard to shapes that give substantial value to the goods,201 
esthetical elements are excluded if they give a substantial value to the goods.202  
This chapter does not argue that the EU trademark law system has no mechanisms for 
protecting the public domain. Instead the sections below show that the present protection 
mechanisms are not strong enough. The possibility of acquiring distinctiveness might 
endanger the public domain, i.e. our common language and culture. A rich reservoir of freely 
available signs is needed to guarantee artistic and commercial freedom of expression. Even if 
it is true that trademark owners enrich the public domain by adding new connotations to 
particular signs,203 these commercial connotations cannot possibly outweigh the loss of a 
cultural sign’s value,204 as in the example of “Nike”,205 the Greek Goddess of Victory. 
Therefore, even though reforms are needed206 that broaden the exclusion provision for shape 
marks so that signs that consist exclusively of (i) a shape or another characteristic that results 
 
196 CJEU, judgment of May 4, 1999, Case C-108/97, C-109/97 (Windsurfing Chiemsee), paras. 47-48.  
197 Article 6(1)(b) TMD [Art. 14(1)(b) and (2) TMD 2015] and Art. 12(b) CTMR [Art. 14(b) EUTMR].  
198 Article 6(1)(a) TMD [Art. 14(1)(a) and (2) TMD 2015] and Art. 12(a) CTMR [Art. 14(a) EUTMR].  
199 Article 6(1)(c) TMD [Art. 14(1)(c) and (2) TMD 2015] and Art. 12(c) CTMR [Art. 14(c) EUTMR].  
200 CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2002, Case C-299/99 (Philips/Remington), paras. 81-83; CJEU, judgment of 
September 14, 2010, Case C-48/09 P (Lego/Mega Brands), paras. 53-58.  
201 Article 3(1)(e)(iii) TMD [Art. 4(1)(e)(iii) TMD 2015] and Art. 7(1)(e)(iii) CTMR [Art. 7(1)(e)(iii) EUTMR].  
202 Judgment of the General Court of the European Union, 6 October 2011, case T-508/08 (Bang & 
Olufsen/OHIM), paras. 74-79.  
203 Salzberger (2006), p. 55; Richardson (2004), pp. 213-215.  
204 Senftleben (2015).  
205 CTM registration 000277889 of November 13, 2004 (Nike International Ltd.). 
206 Council of the European Union, 8 June 2015, 2013/0088 (COD), Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark; 
Council of the European Union, 8 June 2015, 2013/0089 (COD), Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (Recast). 
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from the nature of the goods themselves; (ii) a shape or another characteristic of goods that is 
necessary to obtain a technical result; or, (iii) a shape or another characteristic that gives 
substantial value to the goods are excluded from trademark protection, it is not clear whether 
such reforms are far-reaching enough to prevent the misappropriation of signs. For example, 
we might need an outright exclusion of descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs that 
cannot be overcome through acquiring distinctiveness in consequence of use in trade to really 
guarantee the preservation of cultural signs.  
However, before elaborating on the functionality doctrine and its limits, I first explain 
my concerns regarding the threshold for acquiring distinctiveness. In what follows, the 
possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade is considered from a legal, 
economic and psychological perspective (Section 3). Section 4 discusses other balancing tools 
within the EU trademark law system and makes suggestions for a far more normative test. 




3.3.1 Doubtful Foundation for the Possibility of Acquiring Distinctiveness Through  
Use in Trade  
 
Non-distinctive signs can acquire distinctiveness through use in trade because once a non-
distinctive sign has acquired distinctiveness through use in trade, this sign is considered to 
have acquired a new meaning and therefore make it possible to distinguish the goods or 
services of one undertaking from other undertakings. Furthermore, consumers might be 
confused by the new meaning of a descriptive sign they already know. This looks like a 
convincing argument,207 in particular with a view to Art. 6quinquiesC(1) of the Paris 
Convention and Art. 3(3) of the Trademark Directive [Art. 4(4) and (5) TMD 2015]. 
However, some scholars have pointed out that the possibility of acquiring distinctiveness 
might create dysfunctional incentives. According to Ramsey, the legal foundation of the 
possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade is invalid:  
 
Circular reasoning underlies the argument that confusing use of a descriptive term as a 
mark is misleading and can therefore be restricted to protect consumers. By granting 
and enforcing exclusive rights in descriptive marks, the government helps to make 
 
207 For example, in the Benelux the possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade is often applied:  
Benelux Court of Justice, judgment of February 9, 1977, NJ 1978, 415, BIE 1977, 195 (Rood-zwarte capsules); 
BCJ, March 9, 1977, NJ 1987, 416, BIE 1977, 203 (Blauwe gastank); District Court Amsterdam, June 26, 2000, 
IER 2000, 275 (Euro 2000); District Court The Hague, March 7, 2001, BIE 2002, 68 (Zonnatura/Natura); 
District Court Haarlem, May 21, 2002, IER 2002, 246 (De Echte Bakker); District Court The Hague, December 
4, 2003, BIE 2004, 25 (FunktieMediair/EtnoMediair); Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch, September 20, 2005, 
BIE 2006, 439 (Zorgwel/Welzorg); District Court Amsterdam, May 18, 2006, BIE 2007, 252 (Russische 
Bibliotheek). The court rejected that descriptive signs had acquired distinctiveness through use in trade in the 
following cases: Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch, May 28, 1990, BIE 1991, 187 (Weerts/L.R.D.; licht blauw 
gekleurde band op witte ondergrond van een luiervorm); Court of Appeal, November 1, 2007, BIE 2008, 75, at 
512, I.R.D.I. 2008, 438 (World Pack); Court of Appeal Amsterdam, November 3, 2009, IER 2010, 25, at 214 
(Media Mij/ANWB); Court of Appeal The Hague, March 26, 2013, IER 2013, 55, at 448 (Glashelder).  
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those marks source-identifying, which leads to the possibility of consumer confusion 
in the first place.208   
 
After all, consumers would not be confused about the commercial origin of goods or 
services if enterprises were not able to invest in these non-distinctive signs in the first place. If 
these signs were definitely excluded from trademark protection, enterprises would not be 
interested in investing in marketing campaigns aimed at educating consumers about the role 
of these signs as identifiers of commercial source. This would in turn reduce the need for 
protecting consumers against potential confusion by awarding trademark protection. If 
enterprises were to finally give up trying to educate customers to recognise non-distinctive, 
descriptive or generic signs as source identifiers, consumers would not be confused about the 
commercial origin of the relevant goods or services when these signs are used in the 
marketplace.209  
 This skepticism reflects the concern often expressed by scholars regarding the 
“propertisation” of signs and symbols, i.e. the gradual expansion of trademark rights as 
protection against dilution and unfair free-riding.210 According to McKenna:  
 
 As courts in the early twentieth century broadened trademark owners’ rights, 
 consumers grew to expect that trademark owners had increasingly broad control over 
 their marks. Those changed consumers expectations then became the basis for even 
 broader trademark rights, which then in turn created even greater expectations. And on 
 it has spiraled, with the help of marketers, who specialize in influencing consumer 
 expectations.211  
 
 Furthermore, the perception of the relevant public, which consists of average 
consumers of the goods in question who are reasonably well-informed and reasonably 
 
208 Ramsey (2003), p. 1150. 
209 Senftleben and Anemaet (2013), p. 247; Ramsey (2003), pp. 1100, 1150; McKenna (2007), p. 1899. Even if 
trademark law was not traditionally intended to protect consumers, but rather sought to protect producers from 
illegitimate diversions of their trade by competitors, this argument for the possibility of acquiring distinctiveness 
through use in trade is also doubtful, because competitors would not be able to profit from the efforts of the 
trademark owner since without the reward of trademark protection trademark owners would not be interested in 
investing in descriptive signs.  
210 For example, the CJEU substantially extended the number of functions of trademarks in L’Oréal/Bellure. 
These functions of trademarks are strongly articulated in terms of the agency of the trademark proprietor, see for 
example at 49: “the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in order to create and maintain the 
image of that mark” (CJEU, judgment June 18, 2009, Case C-487/07). See also Gangjee (2013); Senftleben 
(2013a); Ramsey (2003), p. 1096. Identifying the producer of the trademark as the sole possessor of rights is 
probably inaccurate, because not only do marketers invest in trademarks, but consumers make a considerable 
investment as well. Consumers invest both psychological meaning as well as additional capital by choosing to 
purchase a specific brand rather than another. By purchasing goods they subsidise the advertising costs of the 
trademark owners (Wilf (1999), p. 17). 
211 McKenna (2007), p. 1899. In addition, trademarks were not traditionally meant to protect consumers 
(McKenna (2007), p. 1841). 
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observant and circumspect212 is an abstract concept that is difficult to measure: actually, the 
average informed consumer does not exist.213 The question therefore is: to what extent are 
trademark owners able and – even worse – encouraged to invest in these particular non-
distinctive, descriptive and generic signs in order to have them registered? If they are 
encouraged to misappropriate signs that actually belong to the public domain, EU trademark 
law creates dysfunctional incentives and needs to be reformed. Not only have doubts arisen 
regarding the possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade with respect to non-
distinctive, descriptive and generic signs, but the consequences of this possibility with regard 
to signs of cultural significance and non-traditional signs, such as colours per se and shapes 
are also questionable. Just as descriptive signs, signs in the latter categories are often 
descriptive or generic.214 
 
3.3.2 Economic Aspects of Trademarks  
 
This problem can also be examined from an economic perspective. Search costs play a central 
role in trademark economics. Consumer search costs increase as a result of granting exclusive 
rights on descriptive or generic signs.215 The number of words that can adequately describe 
the qualities or the characteristics of a particular good is not unlimited. Especially if there are 
few alternatives, granting exclusive rights to descriptive and generic signs might be 
problematic. The protection of trademarked generic words is even worse, because it ignores 
all mention of competing brands and even seems to suggest their nonexistence.216 Therefore, 
descriptive and generic signs are excluded from trademark protection and can only acquire 
 
212 However, this concept of the well-informed consumer is weakened in the Lloyd/Lloint’s Case, para. 26:   
“However, account should be taken of the fact that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a 
direct comparison between the different marks but must place his trust in the imperfect picture of them that he 
has kept in his mind. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer's level of attention is likely to 
vary according to the category of goods or services in question.” (CJEU, judgment June 22, 1999, Case C-
342/97).  
213 This standard of the reasonably well-informed consumer matches the ideology of trademark law, i.e. market 
transparency leads to maximal prosperity. If consumers do have more knowledge about the products, the 
transaction costs will be lower and the consumers will be able to make better choices. Therefore, trademark 
owners are obliged to provide consumers with product information, with the consequence that we must assume 
that consumers actually read the information provided with products. The concept of a reasonably well-informed 
consumer is inextricably bound up with the concept of market transparency. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether 
trademark law is meant to protect consumers against confusion in the first place, because trademark law is a 
subjective right. For example consumers are definitely confused when trademark owners fail to use their right to 
prohibit third parties from using their trademark. Actually, the idea behind trademark law is to regulate the 
distance between competitors on the market. (Kabel (2005), pp. 15, 19, 25-26). See also Davis (2015), p. 21; 
Davis (2005), pp. 196-197.  
214 See for example German Federal Patent Court, November 25, 1997, Case 24 W (pat) 188/96, Mona Lisa, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1021, 1023 (1998); German Federal Patent Court, Nov. 9, 2005, 
Case 29 W (pat) 147/03, Porträtfoto Marlene Dietrich, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 333, 8.1 & 
8.2 (2006).  
215 Analogous to descriptive signs are common symbols or individual colours.  
216 Folsom and Teply (1980), pp. 220, 224. Consumers could think: “I agree that it looks like plexiglass, but if 
your substitute brand of cast acrylic sheet is really “Plexiglas”, then why isn’t it called that?”.    
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distinctiveness through use in trade.217 With regard to functional shapes the CJEU is cautious 
in granting exclusive rights, because the 
 
registration as a trade mark of a purely functional product shape is likely to allow the 
proprietor of that trade mark to prevent other undertakings not only from using the 
same shape, but also from using similar shapes. A significant number of alternative 
shapes might therefore become unusable for the proprietor’s competitors. That would 
be particularly so if various purely functional shapes of goods were registered at the 
same time, which might completely prevent other undertakings from manufacturing 
and marketing certain goods having a particular technical function.218 
 
This reasoning can equally be applied to other signs, such as generic or descriptive 
signs or colours. For example, granting exclusive rights to an abstract colour, such as lilac for 
chocolate bars, limits the availability of colours for other traders on the market, because the 
trademark owner can also prevent the use of colours similar to the colour lilac and trademark 
protection is even broader when this trademark has a reputation. If other traders then succeed 
in registering another colour on the market, the number of colours available for the category 
of chocolate bars would quickly be exhausted. The same applies to descriptive and generic 
terms. Furthermore, a trader that has achieved exclusive rights on a word that describes a 
positive feature of a good therefore obtains an unfair economic advantage because consumers 
easily understand what this trademark stands for219 and the costs are higher for competitors 
who need to inform consumers of the fact that their goods have this same feature but cannot 
freely use the descriptive word as a mark in their brand name or advertising.220 For example, 
if a competitor cannot use the word “coffee” to advertise his coffee machine because a 
trademark owner has exclusive rights to the word “coffee”, research costs will increase 
because consumers will have to read and remember more and more complex information, 
such as a description of coffee as “a hot dark brown drink with a slightly bitter taste”.221  
Besides, even when consumers are informed that competing products are good 
substitutes and possess the desired attributes, they may still be unwilling to risk buying goods 
 
217 Article 3(1)(c) and (3) TMD [Art. 4(1)(c) and Art. 4(4)(5) TMD 2015]; Art. 7(1)(c) and (3) CTMR [Art. 
7(1)(c) and (3) EUTMR].   
218 CJEU, judgment September 14, 2010, Case C-48/09 P, para. 56-57 (Lego Juris/BHIM). See also Quaedvlieg 
(1987), p. 36. 
219 See for example the trademark “Kinder” for chocolate products (transl. “children”). Consumers will easily 
understand what this trademark stands for, namely chocolate products produced especially for children. This 
trademark refers to the target group of the trademark (INT registration 298866 of June 14, 2005). See also  
Benelux Court of Justice, judgment of May 15, 1981, Berichten Industriële Eigendom 1981, 145 comment vdZ 
(Kinder). 
220 Ramsey (2003), p. 1161. See also footnote 334: “The English language currently contains a limited list of 
synonyms for reliable and other words that convey a product’s integrity.” For example, in the Kinder Case third 
parties had to litigate to the highest German Court in order to be able to use a descriptive sign in relation to their 
goods and services, which illustrates that third parties do not necessarily have a right to use this descriptive sign 
[German BGH, judgment of September 20, 2007, GRUR 2007, 1066, 1071 (Kinder II)]. See also Economides 
(1988), p. 538; Burgunder (1985), p. 404.  
221 Landes and Posner (1988), p. 278. See also Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, Pearson 
Education Limited, 2009.  
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without a trademark including descriptive elements.222 In this way, “a business that selects 
and uses a descriptive term as a mark on its product is, in effect, free riding on the attribute-
identifying value of the descriptive term.”223 After all, the new meaning that a sign has 
acquired through use in trade does not override the original descriptive meaning of that sign. 
These trademarks represent both a description and the single source of the product.224 The 
consequence of granting exclusive rights on descriptive signs is that consumers will pay 
higher prices for a smaller quantity while the value of the brands of competitors will 
decrease.225 Besides, a (less) distinctive trademark can deter other traders, particularly small 
firms, because even a successful legal procedure costs money, so that it might be cheaper to 
choose a different sign.226 Therefore we should be careful with granting trademark rights to 
descriptive signs that have acquired distinctiveness through use in trade. 
 
3.3.3 Non-Traditional Signs Such as Colours per se and Shapes 
 
The CJEU has extended the number of signs that need to acquire distinctiveness through use 
in trade. For example, in most cases, non-traditional signs, such as colours per se and shapes, 
have to acquire distinctiveness through use in trade. The CJEU argues that these 
nontraditional trademarks are not necessarily perceived in the same way as a word or 
figurative mark. 227 After all, consumers are used to immediately make assumptions about the 
origin of goods based on word and figurative marks. However, this principle does not apply 
when the sign in question coincides with the appearance of the goods it denotes,228 because 
according to the Henkel Case “Average consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions 
about the origin of goods based on the shape of their packaging, in the absence of any graphic 
or word element.”229 
According to the CJEU this means that it might prove more difficult to establish 
distinctive character in the case of such a three-dimensional trademark than in the case of a 
 
222 Folsom and Teply (1980), p. 227.  
223 Ramsey (2003), pp. 1155. See also CJEU, judgment of May 4, 1999, Case C-108/97, C-109/97 (Windsurfing 
Chiemsee), para. 26.  
224 Ramsey (2003), pp. 1155, 1157-1158. 
225 Landes and Posner (1988), p. 287. 
226 Spoor (1990), pp. 16-17; Senftleben (2013b), pp. 815-816; District Court of The Hague, May 4, 2011, Case 
LJN: BQ3525 (Nadia Plesner/Louis Vuitton), available at http://www.rechtspraak.nl; for a case comment, see 
also Visser (2011), pp. 740-742.  
227 Despite the fact that colours are included in Art. 15(1) of the TRIPS Agreement and shapes are included in 
Art. 2 of the Directive 2008/95/EC [Art. 3 TMD 2015]; Art. 4 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009 
[Art. 4 EUTMR], Art. 2.1 of the Benelux Treaty on Intellectual Property. See CJEU, judgment February 12, 
2004, Case C-218/01 (Henkel), para. 49; CJEU, judgment October 7, 2004, Case C-136/02 P (Mag 
Instrument/BHIM), para. 31; CJEU, judgment January 12, 2006, Case C-173/04 P (Deutsche SiSi-Werke/BHIM), 
para. 31; CJEU, judgment May 6, 2003, Case C-104/01 (Libertel); CJEU, judgment June 24, 2004, Case C-49/02 
(Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH), para. 39. 
228 CJEU, judgment of June 22, 2006, Case C-25/05 (Storck); CJEU, judgment of May 6, 2003, Case C-104/01, 
(Libertel), para. 65; CJEU, judgment of October 12, 2004, Case C-447/02, (KWS Saat/BHIM), para. 78.  
229 CJEU, judgment of February 12, 2004, Case C-218/01 (Henkel), para. 52; CJEU, judgment of April 8, 2003, 
Case C-53/01-C-55/01 (Linde), para. 48.  
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word or figurative mark.230 Only a trademark which significantly departs from the norm or 
customs of the sector and thereby fulfills its essential original function is argued to have 
distinctive character.231  
In the Libertel Case the CJEU followed the same line of argument with regard to 
colour per se.232 In the case of a colour per se, distinctiveness without any prior use is 
inconceivable, save in exceptional circumstances, particularly where the number of goods and 
services for which the mark is claimed is very restricted and the relevant market very 
specific.233 Signs consisting of a shape or a colour per se have to meet higher standards, 
despite the fact that in the Linde Case the CJEU explicitly confirmed that when assessing the 
distinctiveness of a three-dimensional shape trademark for the purposes of Art. 3(1) (b) of the 
Directive [Art. 4(1) (b) TMD 2015], no stricter test may be used.234 This additional threshold 
can be seen as the result of an effort on the part of the CJEU to keep standard product 
packaging and colours per se in the public domain. According to the CJEU, in the Libertel 
Case  
 
It must therefore be acknowledged that there is, in Community trademark law, a public 
interest in not unduly restricting the availability of colours for the other operators who 
offer for sale goods or services of the same type as those in respect of which 
registration is sought.235  
 
The CJEU therefore uses an actual assumption, namely that the consumer will not 
recognise the shape of the packaging and the colour as identifiers of commercial source, to 
reach a normative purpose: shapes and colours should remain available to other users on the 
market.236 However, the assertion of the CJEU that consumers are not “in the habit” of 
perceiving such signs as a badge of origin, becomes more and more doubtful with every trader 
who succeeds in linking a specific shape or colour with her enterprise as the origin of goods 
or services in the minds of consumers.237 Consider for instance the widespread recognition of 
the lilac colour of Milka and the colour magenta of the Deutsche Telekom; this shows us that 
consumers are able to recognise an abstract colour as an identifier of commercial source and 
that the marketing efforts of trademark owners are worthwhile.238 Even without any graphic 
 
230 The above-mentioned case-law, which was developed in relation to three-dimensional trademarks consisting 
of the appearance of the product itself, also applies where the trademark applied for is a figurative mark 
consisting of the two-dimensional representation of that product or a figurative mark consisting of the shape of a 
part of the product concerned (CJEU, judgment June 22, 2006, Case C-25/05 P (August Storck/BHIM), para. 29; 
CJEU judgment May 15, 2014, Case C-97/12 P (Louis Vuitton/BHIM).  
231 CJEU, judgment February 12, 2004, Case C-218/01 (Henkel), para. 49.  
232 CJEU, judgment May 6, 2003, Case C-104/01 (Libertel), para. 65.  
233 CJEU, judgment May 6, 2003, Case C-104/01 (Libertel), para. 66. 
234 CJEU, judgment April 8, 2003, Case C-53/01-C-55/01 (Linde), para. 49. See for an example of a highly 
distinctive shape of chocolate-sticks without use in trade: Dutch Supreme Court, judgment December 23, 2011, 
Case 10/02367, IER 2012, 29.  
235 CJEU, judgment May 6, 2003, Case C-104/01 (Libertel), para. 55. 
236 Senftleben and Anemaet (2013), p. 249. 
237 Senftleben (2013b), p. 803. 
238 CTM registration 000031336 of October 27, 1999 (Kraft Foods) and CTM registration 000212787 of August 
3, 2000 (Deutsche Telekom). See also CTM registration 000747949 of March 23, 2007 (MHCS) for the colour 
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or word element, consumers can certainly become used to deriving the origin of goods from 
of the shape or colour of their packaging, especially if more and more traders succeed in 
having this type of trademark registered. Therefore it is questionable whether the actual 
assumptions of the CJEU are still sufficient to prevent the misappropriation of these signs. 
The next paragraph analyses the general background of how consumer perception works. 
 
3.3.4 Consumer Perception 
 
How does consumer perception work? A consumer wishes a perception that leads to a quick 
recognition of the product, so that he does not have to search a long time for his preferred 
product. The consumer also wants to avoid purchasing the wrong product.239 The stronger the 
trademark, the better the consumer will know the qualities of the product, and the faster he 
will decide. This knowledge is stored in human memory, which can be seen as a cognitive 
network of nodes in which information is stored. The more links with different nodes there 
are, the stronger the information is stored in memory. When activating memory, a node lights 
up, which activates not only this specific information, but also the surrounding nodes it is 
linked to.240 If a trademark has a strong associative network, it can easily be recalled from 
memory.241 The consumer will then sooner choose this familiar trademark, so that in the end, 
it is the box of “Merci” chocolates that will fall in the shopping basket, rather than the 
adjacent but rather unknown chocolates.242 The perception of a trademark is based on the 
 
orange for alcoholic beverages; CTM registration 006258131 of July 31, 2008 (Deere & Company) for the 
colours green for the vehicle body and yellow for the wheels of agricultural and forestry machines; CTM 
registration 001079169 of September 14, 2004 (Orange Brand Services Limited) for the colour orange as a 
characteristic element of the trademark for telecommunication services. The colour blue was for instance 
accepted in the Benelux as a valid trademark for metal containers years ago: Benelux Court of Justice, judgment 
March 9, 1977, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1978, 416, comment LWH; Berichten Industriële Eigendom 1977, 60 
(Ahrendt/Leeferink; Camping Gaz). See for a more recent example: Court of Appeal, Brussels, judgment October 
21, 2013, Ing.-Cons. 2013, 845 (Maes/Jupiler). See also Senftleben (2013b), p. 803. 
239 Bradford (2008), p. 1260; Garbarino and Edell (1997), pp. 147, 148. 
240 Jacoby (2001), pp. 1018-1019; Swann (2002), pp. 607-608, 622-623; Morrin and Jacoby (2002); Van Horen 
et al. (2006-2007), p. 167; Collins and Lotus (1975), pp. 407-428; Gangjee (2013), p. 6; Keller (1993), pp. 1, 2.  
241 Jacoby (2001), p. 1024: “For example, suppose a consumer is asked: ‘I’m thinking of a particular beer that 
costs around $4,95 a six-pack. What can you tell me about that beer?’ The consumer would be unable to tell 
much about the beer beyond the price. […] Suppose, instead, the consumer is asked: ‘I’m thinking of a particular 
beer. Its name is Budweiser®. What can you tell me about that beer?’ Most adult Americans might be able to 
provide a great deal of information, including: (1) the approximate price; (2) the name of the manufacturer […]” 
(Eight other features are mentioned). A sign has acquired distinctiveness through use in trade (at 1029): ‘when a 
“substantial,” “appreciable,” or “significant” proportion of the relevant consuming public develops cognitive 
networks for a product or service, and these networks possess one or more nodes capable of serving to uniquely 
identify that product or service as coming from a particular (albeit anonymous) source, then, from a 
psychological perspective, that node (or nodes) may be said to have acquired distinctiveness” or achieved 
“secondary meaning”’. 
242 Van Horen (2010), pp. 27, 29, 87: Consumers do not always prefer the chocolates of “Merci” above the 
unknown trademark “Voilà”, because they recognise the trademark. When a ‘copycat’ (an imitation based on 
associations) imitates the distinctive features that are strongly and uniquely associated with the leader brand, 
such as when the unknown trademark “Voilà” are placed in the shelves nearby the chocolates of “Merci”, it is 
more likely that a distinct representation of the leader brand will be activated, resulting in contrast. Nevertheless, 
when consumers are uncertain about which choice to make and the chocolates of “Voilà” show many similarities 
53 
 
network of links in the memory of the relevant consumer group, and it leads to certain 
thoughts, feelings and behaviour when consumers are confronted with the appearance of the 
trademark. Catching sight of an advertising mast on the freeway with the “M” for McDonalds 
might for instance result in the consumer taking the first exit. These perceptions, thoughts, 
decisions and actions are driven by the brain, partly by the conscious part of the brain, but 
largely by the unconscious, so that people tend to respond automatically.243  
 In order to achieve distinctive power a trademark must have strong, positive and 
unique associations.244 The strength of an association is primarily determined by the way 
information is encoded and stored in memory. The strength of the association is determined 
by the quantity of product information, i.e. how often information about the trademark is 
offered and how often consumers think about this trademark, together with the quality of 
product information, i.e. how intensely consumers think about this information.245 Slogans 
that invite people to think have a higher chance of being stored in memory. For example, the 
slogan of Nestlé “Have a break…have a Kit Kat” has strong associations, because the slogan 
has both a literal and figurative meaning which gives consumers food for thought. 
 Secondly, a trademark must have positive associations, such that consumers are 
convinced that the trademark has certain features and advantages which satisfy their needs. 
This might involve particular features of the product, or the image that a product user has of 
himself.246  
 In addition, people’s attitudes can be based on affective reactions to the object. What 
matters is not what they know, but what they feel.247 A distinction can be made between an 
approach aimed at the “mere exposure effect” and an approach aimed at the conditioning 
process.248 The “mere exposure effect” refers to the fact that the mere repeated exposure of an 
individual to a stimulus object will enhance his attitude towards it. Humans easily develop 
strong preferences for an object that has become familiar through repeated exposure.249 A 
 
with those of “Merci”, and the well-known chocolates cannot be found on the shelves, consumers may make a 
positive evaluation of the copycat. Furthermore, imitating abstract themes is a more effective imitation strategy 
than imitating distinctive perceptual features. Feature-based copycats heighten awareness of the insincere tactics 
being used, due to which this type of copycat is evaluated more negatively than theme-base copycats. Awareness 
of persuasion tactics is however low in theme-based copycats. In addition, theme-based copycats give rise to 
pleasant feelings induced by something that feels familiar, so that theme imitation is more effective.  
243 Lakoff (2008), p. 197; Bargh (2014), pp. 32-39; Dijksterhuis (2010); Jones and Goldsmith (2005), pp. 438-
439; Bechara and Damasio (2005), p. 340; Damasio (1994), pp. 193-94; Bradford (2008), pp. 1237, 1260-1261; 
Slovic et al. (2002), p. 332; Pinker (1997), pp. 370-374; Zajonc (1980), p. 157; Bargh (1997). 
244 On the other hand it must be noted that trademark owners are probably not the only sources of the meaning of 
a sign. Although producers initially associate a particular sign with an object, in the end the public has to accept 
these associations as a component of the interpretive community if the sign is to survive. Consumer studies point 
out that brands are social constructs driven by individuals at a personal level and communities at a social level. 
For example, new brand propositions can fail despite the best efforts of marketers and expensive campaigns. See 
Gangjee (2013), p. 8; Desai (2012). 
245 Keller (1993), p. 5; van Horen et al. (2006-2007), p. 167.  
246 Keller (1993), p. 5. 
247 Slovic et al. (2007), pp. 1334-1336.  
248 Hoeken (2008), p. 39.  
249 Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980), pp. 557-558; Bradford (2008), p. 1267; Zajonc (1968), p. 23: “The balance 
of the experimental results reviewed and reported in this paper is in favor of the hypothesis that mere repeated 
exposure of an individual to a stimulus object enhances his attitude toward it.” See also Moreland and Beach 
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trademark owner can influence the attitude of a consumer towards a product by combining it 
with an attractive image, even if the consumer does not read the text, because he will later 
recognise the product, and might therefore be biased towards buying it.250 Consumers 
attribute the positive feeling caused by the ease with which they recognise the product to the 
product’s features.251 The mere exposure effect might even occur when people perceive 
objects subliminally.252 The only condition is that the stimulus may not have a pre-existing 
negative image.  
 In addition, positive feelings can also be conditioned. Examples include choosing a 
particular word combination or combining words and music, as in the slogan “Always Coca-
Cola”, or using attractive images of famous people recommending the product in question, 
such as George Clooney recommending Nespresso in a commercial by saying “What else?” 
Consumers will associate the pleasurable feelings evoked by the attractive images with the 
product advertised. If consumers repeatedly associate pleasurable feelings with a particular 
product, they will develop a positive attitude towards this product.253  
 Thirdly, the association must be unique to the trademark. To ensure uniqueness, a 
trademark should not share more than a few associations with other competing trademarks.254 
The more a trademark has strong, positive and unique associations, the stronger it will be 
stored in memory. In other words, trademark owners can teach consumers to recognise signs 






(1992): This research demonstrated that the participants developed the strongest preferences for the student who 
had come most often to the course. At the end of the course the participants were confronted with pictures of the 
students who came to the course. All the four students were equally attractive, but not all the students came 
equally frequently to the course.  
250 Bradford (2008), p. 1268; Hoeken (2008), p. 39.  
251 Novemsky et al. (2007); Reber et al. (2004); Song and Schwarz (2009); Bradford (2008), p. 1234.  
252 An experiment demonstrated, for example, that people who were exposed very briefly, for one millionth of a 
second, to Chinese signs, found these signs more attractive, even though these people were not aware of the fact 
that they had seen these signs before. Another experiment demonstrated the same effect. A subject had a 
discussion with two unfamiliar persons. The subject had subliminally seen one of these persons before, but he 
did not know it. The experiment demonstrated that the subject thought the person whom he had seen 
subliminally was friendlier than the other person and he agreed with him more often, without knowing the reason 
for his own behaviour. See Bornstein (1992).  
253 Stuart et al. (1987). In several experiments is indicated that attitudes towards for example words, non-words 
and writing pens can be influenced by stimuli, such as annoying music, electric shocks and hard noises. These 
stimuli evoked a negative reaction, such that the attitude towards the object becomes negative too. See Gorn 
(1982); Cacioppo et al. (1992); Hoeken (2008), p. 183; Zanna et al. (1970); Staats et al. (1962). A number of 
researches indicated that the frequent linking of neutral objects, such as person names, country names and non-
words with words that have a clearly positive or negative affective meaning, can influence the attitude for these 
names and words. See Berkowitz and Knurek (1969); Kuykendall and Keating (1990); Staats and Staats (1958).  
254 Swann (2002).  
255 See also Bradford (2008), p. 1235: “The emotion literature suggests, in contradiction to the claims of dilution 
regulation proponents, that much of the ‘selling power’ of famous marks is due primarily to their familiarity and 
not any specific benefit, tangible or intangible, of the product”. 
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3.3.5 The Distinctiveness of Shapes and Colours per se 
 
But how do consumers perceive shapes and colours? Just as with words and images, the 
acquired distinctiveness of shapes and colours depends on the extent to which the information 
is stored in memory and the strength of the associative network.  
 If a particular shape or colour is frequently linked with a trademark, the association 
will be strong enough for the matching trademark to be efficiently recalled when the 
consumer perceives the shape or colour in question. Similarly, a positive attitude can be 
developed with respect to shapes, for example, by designing the shape in such a way that it is 
both convenient in use and attractive,256 or by presenting a product in such a way that the 
stimuli are linked to pleasurable feelings, for example by using advertising. Colours are for 
instance very suitable for evoking feelings. Warm colours, such as red and yellow, are 
experienced as being stimulating, while cold colours, such as blue and green, have a calming 
effect.257 In addition to the universally natural colours, colours also differ per culture, so that 
it is possible to use colours to evoke different associations.258 In such situations, a colour can 
have a very strong degree of distinctiveness, especially if a trademark owner chooses another 
colour than that which is normally used for a specific product category.  
 For example, Pepsi has chosen the colour blue to distinguish its product, while the 
colour normally used to distinguish soft drinks in America is red. The colour blue gives a 
strong signal to the consumer about where to find this particular product among other soft 
drinks. As far as shapes are concerned, their uniqueness is even easier to achieve, because 
shapes are three-dimensional, while images only have two dimensions. Therefore, shapes 
provide more opportunities for distinctiveness.259  
In addition, the motivations and goals of consumers also determine product 
perception. Consumers use a number of strategies to achieve their goals. This requires 
attention. Only the information that is necessary to achieve the goal will be processed and 
noted. Consumers will focus on the specific aspect of a product which meets their goal, so 
that only the associations that fit their goals will become accessible. If the shape of a product 
is essential to a particular purpose, the consumer will turn his attention to this shape with the 
consequence that this shape will acquire distinctiveness with respect to other shapes. The 
message recipient is by no means passive: he selects, interprets and reformulates information, 
and draws conclusions from this exercise that can differ from the purpose of the sender.260  
Furthermore, the characteristics of consumers are also important. According to Petty 
and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM),261 consumers process information on 
one of two ways: thoroughly or superficially.262 These two routes to persuasion are connected 
with cognitive capacity, i.e. whether the recipient is able to process information, and whether 
 
256 Van Horen et al. (2006-2007), p. 167.  
257 Bellizzi et al. (1983). 
258 Kreitler and Kreitler (1972): the colour yellow, for example, is associated with hate in the West, while it 
refers to trust in China.  
259 Van Horen (2006-2007), p. 167.  
260 Balcetis and Dunning (2006), p. 613; Pol et al. (2007), p. 46.  
261 Petty et al. (2004); Petty and Cacioppo (1986).  
262 See also Bradford (2008), p. 1262; Slovic (2004), p. 973; Slovic et al. (2002), p. 330.  
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he has the opportunity and the motivation to do so. The assumption is that people generally 
wish to have correct attitudes. If consumers are able to process the message, and if they have 
the opportunity and the motivation to do so, and they have a high degree of involvement with 
the message, they will choose a central route to persuasion. A central route to persuasion 
involves high-order cognitive activity whereby the consumer in question “draws upon prior 
experience and knowledge in order to carefully scrutinize all of the information relevant to 
determining the central merits of the position advocated.”263 People thoroughly process 
information when they have a high need for cognition, i.e. a tendency to think.264 A person 
with this kind of need for cognition wishes to control the situation. He or she will therefore try 
to collect as much information as possible. Such consumers tend to focus on specific 
characteristics, as a result of which they will certainly notice a special shape. In particular if a 
consumer thinks the shape of a product is important, he will be highly involved and will 
thoroughly process the message, so that the shape will definitely be distinctive.  
 However, people’s motivation and ability to process are often low, resulting in 
consumers following the peripheral route. The peripheral route to persuasion refers to the fact 
that “it is neither adaptive nor possible for people to exert considerable mental effort in 
thinking about all of the media communications to which they are exposed”.265 People must 
sometimes act as “lazy organisms” or “cognitive misers” and evaluate with simpler tools if 
they want to function well in current society.266 For example, the familiarity of a trademark 
can be a heuristic, but so can the heuristic “if it is scarce it must be of value.”267 People who 
have a high need for structure will usually process information less thoroughly. They are very 
motivated to gain an overview of the entire situation and will therefore use wide, general 
categories. They are unlikely to notice the special features of a product. A relatively 
unimportant factor such as colour preference will have more impact on a consumer’s decision 
if he is processing it superficially than if he is processing it thoroughly. In the case of cheap 
products, consumers will have a low degree of attention, so that a different colour may well 
be enough to attract the consumers’ attention. For example, even if a consumer did not read 
the accompanying text, the colour information may well have made it into memory.268  
In view of the above, it is unclear why shape and colour marks should be judged 
differently, i.e. using a stricter test, than word marks and figurative marks, since the 
perception of the consumer depends entirely on the circumstances. Perception depends on the 
associations evoked by the trademark, i.e. whether these associations are strong, positive and 
 
263 Petty et al. (2009), p. 132. 
264 Perloff (2003), pp. 211-220.  
265 Petty et al. (2009), p. 135.  
266 Bradford (2008), p. 1260; Garbarino and Edell (1997), p. 148; Slovic (2004), p. 973; Schwarz (2002), p. 539.  
267 Slovic et al. (2002), p. 332: “Using an overall, readily available affective impression can be easier and more 
efficient than weighing the pros and cons of various reasons or retrieving relevant examples from memory, 
especially when the required judgment or decision is complex or mental resources are limited. This 
characterization of a mental short-cut has led us to label the use of affect a ‘heuristic’”; Pol et al. (2007), p. 36; 
Bradford (2008), p. 1268: “To avoid incongruence, people tend to interpret information in line with initial 
expectations. Once a consumer has formed a positive impression of a familiar brand, she will feel more 
positively towards subsequent exposures, such as advertisements. The information from advertising also 
indirectly impacts purchasing decisions”. 
268 Grossman and Wisenblit (1999), pp. 85-86.  
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unique. Perception also depends on factors such as the goals and characteristics of the 
consumer. In addition, the eyes that observe shapes, colours, words, and pictures, are very 
sensitive sensory organs: people can perceive a difference in brightness of less than two per 
cent.269 Colour features are essential to shapes. After all, as long as there is light, humans are 
able to perceive objects, but also words, precisely because they have colour. For example, 
colours are a good tool for remembering objects.270 A number of cones and rods in the retina 
allow people to perceive colour and light. The light that is transmitted by the source is 
invisible and only becomes visible on particles or drops of water. It is the reflected colour, for 
instance on the page of a book, that allows people to perceive light. Almost everything 
reflects light, but it is the way in which it is reflected that makes all the difference. White 
surfaces are composed of molecules or atoms that do not absorb any of the visible colours of 
light. Our eyes perceive this reflected combination as the colour white. However, dark 
surfaces are composed of molecules or atoms that can absorb any of the visible colours of 
light, so that the light will be darker. For example, grass is green because only the green part 
of the colours of the spectrum is reflected. Text, titles or person names can only be observed if 
there is colour, for example black letters on a white background. Light is a colour stimulus: 
once the light reaches our eyes, it is converted into nerve impulses to the retina. These nerve 
impulses are conducted to the cerebral cortex where colour perception arises.  
 A change in the amount of light therefore leads to a change in colour perception.271 
Colours are therefore easy to perceive, and they are clearly visible from a distance, in contrast 
to words. Furthermore, with regard to services consumers quickly recognise colours as an 
identifier of commercial source because by nature services do not have colour.272 In addition, 
colours can better function as identifier of commercial source than word marks if the 
trademark is addressed to a public that has difficulties with reading or that cannot read at all, 
for example children.273 However, the context in which the shape or colour of an object is 
presented is very important to the perception of these stimuli.274 If similar products are placed 
together, the consumer really has to focus his attention to perceive how these products differ. 
The shapes and colours of products that are very distinctive attract most attention if they are 
placed with more neutral products. 
As shown above, consumers do not by definition experience more difficulties in 
perceiving shapes and colours. The consequence is that the efforts of enterprises turn out in 
practice to be effective: consumers can clearly perceive both colours and shapes and recognise 
them as an identifier of commercial source.275 In addition, it turns out that consumers do not 
by definition have to make more efforts to recognise colour marks and shape marks. 
Therefore, the assumptions made by the CJEU to keep certain signs free from trademark 
protection could be an additional facilitating factor that allows trademark owners to 
 
269 Dijksterhuis (2010), p. 54.   
270 Siple and Springer (1983); Davidoff (1991); Boynton and Dolensky (1979).   
271 Schwarz (1968), pp. 11-12. See also Casiday and Frey (2000).  
272 Cohen Jehoram et al. (2010), p. 162.  
273 Purcell (2003), p. 341. 
274 Van Horen et al. (2006-2007), p. 167. 
275 Senftleben and Anemaet (2013), p. 249. See also Kabel (2005), p. 25: “When the interests of the public are 
not of primary importance with regard to the implementation of a legal standard, it is also understandable that 
actual research on public opinions may not be really relevant to the opinion of the judge.” (transl.)  
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monopolise signs.276 While the CJEU may believe that the threshold of the possibility of 
acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade is high enough to have a deterrent effect on 
traders, it may well be that this possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade in 
fact stimulates certain traders to invest in these particular signs, especially if an increasing 
number of traders succeed in linking in the minds of consumers a specific shape or colour to 
their enterprise as the origin of goods or services. Traders may think that if they invest enough 
in these particular signs, they will overcome the quite high threshold of distinctiveness and 
thus achieve exclusive rights on a sign that represents a positive attribute of a good which 
gives them an unfair economic advantage because of the limited availability of standard 
product packaging and colours. The CJEU may therefore paradoxically create dysfunctional 
incentives.  
 
3.3.6 Are Normative Purposes More Important Than Actual Assumptions? 
 
The consequence of the CJEU’s approach277 in relying on the threshold of distinctiveness 
rather than on a much more normative test that excludes non-traditional signs from trademark 
protection even if they have acquired distinctiveness through use in trade is that it is less 
difficult for traders to register a non-traditional sign, because the option of registering shapes 
and colours per se is kept open. If the CJEU really wants to keep standard product packaging 
and colours per se in the public domain, it would be a loss to the public domain if a trademark 
owner was to succeed in registering a shape mark or a colour mark. This is particularly 
relevant in view of the fact that a trademark owner can endlessly renew the trademark 
registration.278 Actually, it would be fairer and more convincing if the CJEU took into 
consideration that it actually wants to preserve colours per se and shapes in the public domain 
rather than considering that consumers are not ‘in the habit’ of perceiving such signs as a 
badge of origin.279  
Similar problems arise with regard to descriptive signs. Contrary to suggestive, 
fanciful or arbitrary marks, descriptive signs are deemed not to be capable of distinguishing 
the goods or service of a given undertaking. Descriptive signs can only acquire distinctiveness 
over time through use in trade. According to the CJEU:  
 
Accordingly, signs and indications which may serve in trade to designate the 
characteristics of the goods or service in respect of which registration is sought are, by 
 
276 The extent to which trademark owners can monopolise shapes and colour marks is discussed in Sect. 4. 
277 CJEU, judgment February 12, 2004, Case C-218/01 (Henkel), para. 49; CJEU, judgment October 7, 2004, 
Case C-136/02 P (Mag Instrument/BHIM), para. 31; CJEU, judgment January 12, 2006, Case C-173/04 P 
(Deutsche SiSi-Werke/BHIM), para. 31; CJEU, judgment May 6, 2003, Case C-104/01 (Libertel); CJEU, 
judgment June 24, 2004, Case C-49/02 (Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH), para. 39. 
278 Article 18 of the TRIPS Agreement. Although the registration of a trademark that is no longer used in the 
marketplace may be cancelled after an uninterrupted period of at least three years of inexcusable non-use (Art. 
19 of the TRIPS Agreement), in practice another third party will use the free sign. See for example, CJEU, 
March 11, 2003, Case C-40/01 (Ajax/Ansul). 
279 Total exclusion from trademark protection of the shape of products or packaging is however not possible 
because Art. 15 TRIPS Agreement requires that all forms of signs capable of distinguishing goods or services 
must be accepted for registration as marks. 
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virtue of Regulation No 40/94, deemed incapable, by their very nature, of fulfilling the 
indication-of-origin function of the trade mark, without prejudice to the possibility of 
their acquiring distinctive character through use under Article 7(3) of Regulation No 
40/94.280 
 
Furthermore, the CJEU considers that  
 
By prohibiting the registration as Community trade marks of such signs and 
indications, Article 7(1 )(c) of Regulation No 40/94 pursues an aim which is in the 
public interest, namely that descriptive signs or indications relating to the 
characteristics of goods or services in respect of which registration is sought may be 
freely used by all.281 […] In order for OHIM to refuse to register a trade mark under 
Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, it is not necessary that the signs and 
indications composing the mark that are referred to in that article actually be in use at 
the time of the application for registration in a way that is descriptive of goods or 
services such as those in relation to which the application is filed, or of characteristics 
of those goods or services. It is sufficient, as the wording of that provision itself 
indicates, that such signs and indications could be used for such purposes. A sign must 
therefore be refused registration under that provision if at least one of its possible 
meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned.282 
 
The CJEU combines actual assumptions about consumer perception of the 
distinctiveness of descriptive signs, namely that signs are deemed incapable by their very 
nature, with normative considerations, i.e. that descriptive signs should be refused because of 
public interest.283 The consideration that “it is sufficient that such signs and indications could 
be used for such purposes” says nothing about how consumers perceive the particular sign at 
that moment. Moreover, the CJEU does not test the degree of distinctiveness of the 
descriptive sign, but formulates tests about the degree of descriptiveness to conclude that a 
descriptive sign is not distinctive284:  
 
Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a trade mark 
consisting of a neologism composed of elements each of which is descriptive of 
characteristics of the goods or services in respect of which registration is sought is 
itself descriptive of the characteristics of those goods or services for the purposes of 
that provision, unless there is a perceptible difference between the neologism and the 
mere sum of its parts: that assumes that, because of the unusual nature of the 
 
280 CJEU, judgment October 23, 2003, Case C-191/01 P (Doublemint), para. 30.  
281 CJEU, judgment October 23, 2003, Case C-191/01 P (Doublemint), para. 31. 
282 CJEU, judgment October 23, 2003, Case C-191/01 P (Doublemint), para. 32. 
283 See also guidelines on the criteria for the examination of trademarks on absolute grounds composed by the 
Benelux Office for Intellectual Property (www.biopt.int), paragraph 5.2: “Article 2.11, paragraph 1, sub b, BCIP 
is an ‘umbrella provision’. Signs that must be refused by virtue of the criteria of article 2.11, paragraphs 1, sub c 
and sub d, also fall under the criterion of article 2.11, paragraph 1, sub b. Descriptive (c) and customary (d) 
designations lack distinctiveness by definition”.  
284 See also Lee et al. (2009), p. 9.   
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combination in relation to the goods or services, the word creates an impression which 
is sufficiently far removed from that produced by the mere combination of meanings 
lent by the elements of which it is composed, with the result that the word is more than 
the sum of its parts.285 
 
Although the CJEU looks at the semantic meaning of the word in relation to the goods 
and services referred to in the application for registration, the Court does not judge the sign 
“in relation to or considering the distinctive style, font, or presentation of that word in the 
commercial context of the label used by the would-be trademark owner.”286 Remarkably, 
empirical studies show that descriptive marks used in a typical trademark-use context are no 
less source-indicating than suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks.287 Research points out 
that it is the non-linguistic signs that make descriptive marks highly source-indicating.288 This 
means that consumers perceive both descriptive signs and suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful 
marks when entering a supermarket, because these signs are often offered in a trademark-use 
context, namely presented as a trademark in a way that consumers expect.289 
These results are in line with theories of consumer psychology.290 As mentioned, 
consumer perception is not passive: it is a cyclical process that consists of a recursive 
interaction between memory, visual inputs, and the context of the visual scene.291 Consumers 
have a “perceptual schema”, a visual mental model of the world, which facilitates the process 
of perception and interpretation. This perceptual schema consists of consumer experiences of 
observing product packages in the marketplace, expectations of how products are likely to be 
encountered in their market context, and what trademarks look like. This perceptual schema is 
evoked before consumers read the semantic meaning of the word marks on the packaging.292 
Consumers direct subsequent eye fixations toward what may be called the “trademark spot” 
on the package where they expect trademarks to be found, and they compare this with their 
memory schema for trademarks. If the observations match the memory schema, the sign is 
marked as a source-identifier.293  
In other words: semantic meaning is not the most important factor in judging a sign to 
be source-indicating; non-lexical elements make both descriptive signs and suggestive, 
arbitrary, and fanciful marks source-indicating because of the perceptual schema that guides 
 
285 CJEU, judgment February 12, 2004, Case C-265/00 (Biomild), para. 43; CJEU, judgment February 12, 2004, 
Case C-363/99 (Postkantoor), para. 104. However, according to CJEU, judgment April 19, 2007, Case  C-
273/05 P (Celltech), para. 80 it does not follow from the Courts’ case law that the prior analysis of each of the 
elements of which a mark is composed is an essential step which must be considered to assess the 
descriptiveness of the mark as a whole.    
286 Lee et al. (2009), p. 11.  
287 Lee et al., pp. 46, 49.  
288 Lee et al., p. 52. 
289 Descriptive signs can thus also be distinctive if certain graphical elements are attached that make the sign 
appear as a trademark. 
290 Lee et al. p. 29; Neisser (1976); Balcetis and Dunning (2006), p. 613.  
291 Neisser (1976); Enns and Austen (2007); Pieters and Wedel (2007).  
292 Scene and image perception is genetically much older than reading and semantic meaning perception with the 
consequence that the perception of non-lexical elements is easier and quicker: Pieters and Wedel (2004), pp. 36, 
39; Tushnet (2008), p. 529. See with regard to consumer’s responses to advertising: Scott (1994), p. 464.  
293 Lee et al. (2009), p. 32.  
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consumers. Thus, the assumptions of the CJEU regarding trademark perception are incorrect; 
the same conclusion applies to the current registration practices that examine trademarks on 
absolute grounds on the basis of the EU trademark law. Consumers are definitely able to 
recognise descriptive and non-traditional signs as identifiers of commercial source. The 
incorrect assumptions of the CJEU regarding consumer perception also apply to descriptive 
signs based on normative purposes rather than on empirical data. However, the consequence 
of this normative approach is that the threshold for acquiring distinctiveness does not really 
protect the public domain: trademark owners can in practice teach consumers to perceive any 
sign if the sign is used in a typical trademark-use context.294 This means that we need a more 
normative test. In the next chapter I argue that the existing balancing tools are not sufficient to 
dispel these concerns regarding the threshold for acquiring distinctiveness.  
 
3.4 Are the Existing Balancing Tools within the EU Trademark Law System 
Sufficient? 
 
3.4.1 Utilitarian and Aesthetic Functionality 
 
An important instrument within EU trademark law for preserving the functional 
characteristics of goods in the public domain are shape exclusions. In general, similar rules 
apply to shapes so that these signs too must distinguish the goods of one undertaking from 
other undertakings. However, with regard to shapes, additional requirements apply. Shapes 
cannot be registered, even if the sign has acquired distinctiveness through use in trade, if they 
exclusively consist of a shape that results from the nature of the goods, is necessary to obtain 
a technical result, or gives substantial value to the goods.295 In the Philips/Remington Case the 
CJEU has explained the rationales of the refusal grounds of Art. 3(1)(e) TMD [Art. 4(1)(e) 
TMD 2015]:  
 
The rationale of the grounds for refusal of registration laid down in Article 3(1)(e) of 
the Directive is to prevent trade mark protection from granting its proprietor a 
monopoly on technical solutions or functional characteristics of a product which a user 
is likely to seek in the products of competitors. Article 3(1)(e) is thus intended to 
prevent the protection conferred by the trade mark right from being extended, beyond 
signs which serve to distinguish a product or service from those offered by 
competitors, so as to form an obstacle preventing competitors from freely offering for 
sale products incorporating such technical solutions or functional characteristics in 
 
294 Exclusive rights on descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs give trademark owners unfair economic 
advantages on the sign as such, which is something that should be avoided. As the analysis shows, consumers are 
also able to recognise such signs as a trademark, as long as trademark owners invest enough in marketing 
campaigns educating consumers to perceive these signs as a source identifier. If we really want to prevent 
trademark owners from generating unfair economic advantage from a sign as such, we should exclude these 
signs from protection from the very beginning. If signs cannot acquire distinctiveness through use in trade, 
competitors will also not invest heavily in these signs, and consumers would not be confused. 
295 Article 3(1)(e)(i)-(iii) TMD [Art. 4(1)(e)(i)-(iii) TMD 2015] and Art. 7(1)(e)(i)-(iii) CTMR [Art. 7(1)(e)(i)-
(iii) EUTMR].  
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competition with the proprietor of the trade mark.296  
 
In addition to preventing a monopoly on technical solutions or the functional 
characteristics of a product, this provision aims to prevent the extension via trademark 
protection of other rights that the EU legislature has sought to limit in time.297  
In several cases, the refusal grounds of shapes were substantially broadened. Most 
shape marks need to acquire distinctiveness through use in trade, which is a particularly 
substantial hurdle for Community trademarks, because the acquisition of distinctiveness needs 
to be shown for all EU Member States.298 In addition, if the shape significantly departs from 
the norm or customs of the sector, protection may be refused because the trademark consists 
exclusively of a shape that gives substantial value to the goods. Furthermore, with regard to 
functional signs (Art. 3(1)(e)(ii) TMD) [Art. 4(1)(e)(ii) TMD 2015] the CJEU argues that the 
fact that there are other shapes that could achieve the same technical result cannot overcome 
the refusal ground.299 This results in more shapes being affected by this refusal ground.  
Furthermore, the CJEU has ruled that even if an attractive shape has acquired 
distinctiveness through use in trade and its attractiveness is attributed to the reputation and 
recognition of the trademark and not to the aesthetic appearance of the product, the shape can 
still not be registered because of Art. 3(1)(e)(iii) TMD [Art. 4(1)(e)(iii) TMD 2015].300 
Trademark owners can therefore not overrule the substantial value criterion by educating 
consumers in perceiving their signs as a badge of origin. Furthermore, in the Bang & Olufsen 
Case the General Court has further extended the substantial value exception. Under Benelux 
law301 the chosen shape could not be protected as a trademark if the attractiveness value is of 
major importance in view of the nature of the goods. For example, an attractive shape for 
chocolates may be registered because it does not have a real influence on the intrinsic value of 
 
296 CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2002, Case C-299/99 (Philips/Remington), para. 78. 
297 CJEU, judgment of September 14, 2010, Case C-48/09 P (Lego Juris/BHIM), para. 45. Nevertheless, a sign 
that consists exclusively of the shape of the product where that sign enjoys protection under the law relating to 
designs, or where it consists exclusively of the shape of a decorative item is not systematically excluded from 
trademark protection. The refusal ground can only be applied when objective and reliable evidence show that the 
consumer’s decision to purchase the product in question is based to a very large extent on one or more 
characteristics of the shape in question (CJEU, judgment of April 23, 2020, Case C-237/19 (Gömböc), paras. 59, 
62). 
298 In the Lindt Case the CJEU nevertheless ruled as follows: “As for the appellant’s argument that since the 
Community trade mark has a unitary character, the assessment of acquisition by a mark of distinctive character 
through use cannot be based on individual national markets, it should be noted that, even if it is true, in 
accordance with the case-law recalled at paragraph 60 of this judgment that the acquisition by a mark of 
distinctive character through use must be proved for the part of the European Union in which that mark did not, 
ab initio, have such character, it would be unreasonable to require proof of such acquisition for each individual 
Member State.” (CJEU, judgment May 24, 2012, Case C-98/11 P (Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprungli 
AG/OHIM).  
299 CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2002, Case C-299/99 (Philips/Remington), para. 81; CJEU, judgment of 
September 14, 2010, Case C-48/09 P (Lego Juris/BHIM), para. 53.   
300 CJEU, judgment of September 20, 2007, Case C-371/06 (Benetton/G-Star), para. 28.  
301 Leading cases were: Benelux Court of Justice, judgment of April 14, 1989, NJ 1989, 834 annotated by 
Wichers Hoeth, BIE 1989 at 329 annotated by Steinhauser, IER 1998, 30 (Burberry I) and Benelux Court of 
Justice, judgment of December 16, 1991, NJ 1992, 596, annotated by Verkade (Burberry II). 
63 
 
the product.302 However, in the Bang & Olufsen case regarding loudspeakers, the Court has 
ruled that the design is a crucial element in the consumer’s choice even if the consumer also 
takes into account other characteristics of the goods in question. Thus, independently of other 
characteristics of the relevant goods, the shape for which registration was sought is considered 
to add substantial value to the goods concerned.303  
The CJEU has made it even more difficult to register shapes following the 
Stokke/Hauck Case about the “Tripp Trapp” children’s chair.304 The CJEU had to explain two 
refusal grounds: the provision concerning signs that consist exclusively of the shape resulting 
from the nature of the goods themselves (Art. 3(1)(e)(i) TMD) [Art. 4(1)(e)(i) TMD 2015] 
and signs that give substantial value to the goods (Art. 3(1)(e)(iii) TMD) [Art. 4(1)(e)(iii) 
TMD 2015]. Both exclusion grounds have been interpreted broadly by the CJEU. According 
to the CJEU the first ground should not be interpreted as applying only to signs that consist 
exclusively of a shape that is indispensable to the function of the product in question. Rather it 
should be interpreted more broadly, so that it also applies to signs that consist exclusively of a 
shape with one or more characteristics that are essential to the function of that product and 
that consumers may look for in the products of competitors.305 Furthermore, only trade mark 
applications are valid which relate to the shape of goods in which another element, such as a 
decorative or imaginative element, that is not inherent to the generic function of the goods yet 
plays an essential role.306 For example, the grip of a toothbrush shaped as a fairy-tale 
character may not be refused under this ground.307 Since the “Tripp Trapp” chair does not 
contain any important decorative or imaginative elements but it does have essential functional 
characteristics, such as safety, comfort and reliability, the registration of this trademark will 
probably be refused.308  
With regard to the substantial value criterion the CJEU has proceeded with the line of 
reasoning in the Bang & Olufsen Case. The CJEU has confirmed that if the shape of a product 
is regarded as adding substantial value to that product, it does not mean that other 
characteristics may not also give the product significant value. Otherwise the provision would 
apply only to products that have a solely artistic or ornamental value while the provision 
could not be evoked for goods that contain both aesthetic and functional elements, with the 
consequence that the proprietor of a trademark would still have the monopoly on essential 
characteristics of such products.309 The CJEU further argues that the presumed perception of 
 
302 Cohen Jehoram (2002), p. 53.  
303 General Court of the European Union, judgment of October 6, 2011, Case T-508/08 (Bang & Olufsen/OHIM), 
paras. 73 and 76.   
304 CJEU, judgment of September 18, 2014, Case C-205/13 (Stokke/Hauck).  
305 CJEU, judgment of September 18, 2014, Case C-205/13 (Stokke/Hauck), para. 27. 
306 CJEU, judgment of September 18, 2014, Case C-205/13 (Stokke/Hauck), para. 22 See also CJEU, judgment 
of September 14, 2010, Case C-48/09 P (Lego Juris/BHIM), paras. 68-70. 
307 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar of May 14, 2014, in Case C‑205/13, para. 64.  
308 The Dutch Supreme Court referred the Stokke/Hauck Case to the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam: Dutch 
Supreme Court, judgment of November 27, 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3394 (Stokke/Hauck). The final judgment 
is pending.  
309 CJEU, judgment of September 18, 2014, Case C-205/13 (Stokke/Hauck), paras. 29-32. The refusal ground 
must be based on ‘an objective analysis, intended to demonstrate that the shape in question, on account of its 
characteristics, has such a great influence on the attractiveness of the product that restricting the benefit of the 
shape to a single undertaking would distort the conditions of competition on the market concerned.’ Therefore, 
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the sign by the average consumer is not a decisive element in assessing whether the shape 
adds value to the goods. This is in line with the other permanent refusal grounds, such as 
grounds of public policy or principles of morality and signs of high symbolic value, in which 
the perception of the consumer is also not leading.310  
In the KitKat Case the CJEU followed a stricter interpretation of the second refusal 
ground of Art. 3(1)(e) TMD [Art. 4(1)(e) TMD 2015]. The CJEU confirmed that signs 
consisting exclusively of the shape of goods that is necessary to obtain a technical result must 
be interpreted as referring only to the manner in which the goods in question function and 
does not apply to the manner in which the goods are manufactured.311 It also repeated that 
each of the refusal grounds listed in Art. 3(1)(e)(i-iii) TMD [Art. 4(1)(e)(i-iii) TMD 2015] 
must be applied independently of the others so that trademark protection cannot be refused by 
combining the grounds for refusal.312  
These aesthetic and functional refusal grounds seem to offer a sound safeguard for 
keeping shapes free from trademark protection. However, this does not eliminate all concerns 
regarding the threshold for the distinctiveness requirement. That the threshold for the 
distinctiveness requirement is unreliable has already been shown with regard to signs of 
cultural significance. It is true that EU trademark law provides for the possibility of an 
outright exclusion of official signs, signs of high symbolic value and religious signs.313 
 
objective and reliable evidence must show that ‘a consumer’s decision to purchase the goods in question is, to a 
very great extent, determined by one or more features of the shape which alone forms the sign.’ (CJEU, 
judgment of April 23, 2020, Case C-237/19 (Gömböc), paras. 40-41). A shape can also give a product a 
substantial value when the shape becomes the tangible symbol of a mathematical discovery (CJEU, judgment of 
April 23, 2020, Case C-237/19 (Gömböc), paras. 43). 
310 Furthermore, the Court has provided some criteria that have to be taken into account in assessing whether the 
shape adds substantial value to the goods: the presumed perception of the sign by the average consumer, the 
nature of the category of goods concerned, the artistic value of the shape in question, its dissimilarity from other 
shapes in common use on the market concerned, a substantial price difference in relation to similar products, and 
the development of a promotion strategy that focuses on accentuating the aesthetic characteristics of the product 
in question. CJEU, judgment of September 18, 2014, Case C-205/13 (Stokke/Hauck), paras. 33-35. The factor of 
dissimilarity from other shapes in common use on the market concerned might be particularly relevant when 
assessing whether a sign gives a substantial value to the trademark (CJEU, judgment of April 23, 2020, Case C-
237/19 (Gömböc), paras. 44, 46).  
311 CJEU, judgment of September 16, 2015, Case C-215/14 (Société des Produits Nestlé SA/Cadbury UK Ltd), 
para. 57.   
312 CJEU, judgment of September 16, 2015, Case C-215/14 (Société des Produits Nestlé SA/Cadbury UK Ltd), 
para. 48. In the Gömböc case, the CJEU further argued that the assessment of whether a sign consists exclusively 
of the shape of goods that is necessary to obtain a technical result does not have to be restricted to the graphical 
representation of that sign. Information other than that relating to the graphic representation alone, such as the 
perception of the relevant public, could be used to establish the essential characteristics of the sign at stake. The 
identification of whether these characteristics also fulfil a technical function of the goods in question needs to be 
based on objective and reliable sources and may not include the perception of the relevant public (CJEU, 
judgment of April 23, 2020, Case C-237/19 (Gömböc), para. 37).  
313 An outright exclusion means that it cannot be overcome, even if the sign has acquired distinctiveness through 
use in trade. For example, functional shapes which are refused registration under Art. 3(1)(e) of the Trademark 
Directive [Art. 4(1)(e) TMD 2015] can never acquire a distinctive character for the purposes of Art. 3(3) [Art. 
4(4) and (5) TMD 2015] by the use made of it (CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2002, Case C-299/99, 
Philips/Remington). See Arts. 3(1)(h), 3(2)(b),(c) and 3(1)(e) of the Trademark Directive [Art. 4(1)(h), 4(3)(b), 
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However, this outright exclusion cannot guarantee that traders will not remove cultural signs 
from the public domain. Several cultural signs without high symbolic value are not covered 
by this outright exclusion and can be registered. For example, the first notes of Beethoven’s 
Für Elise were registered,314 despite the objection of Advocate General Colomer  
 
that a creation of the mind, which forms part of the universal cultural heritage, should 
be appropriated indefinitely by a person to be used on the market in order to 
distinguish the goods he produces or the services he provides with an exclusivity 
which not even its author's estate enjoys.315 
 
Moreover, the prohibition against the registration of signs that are considered immoral 
or a threat to public order is not easily applied by EU courts.316 As a consequence, many 
cultural signs are registered as a trademark,317 from the name and self-portrait of painter 
Rembrandt being used to indicate the origin of cheese and milk products to the self-portrait of 
the musician Mozart indicating the origin of roasted coffee products.318  
 
(c) and 4(1)(e) TMD 2015]. For example, van Woensel has argued for the necessity of adopting this optional 
requirement with regard to religious signs in The Netherlands (van Woensel 2007).  
314 Benelux registration 0551849 of October 7, 1994 (Shield Mark); expiration date: October 7, 2014. 
315 CJEU, judgment of November 27, 2003, Case C-283/01, Shield Mark/Kist and Opinion of Advocate General 
Colomer of April 3, 2003, in Case C-283/01, para. 52. 
316 Senftleben (2013b), p. 814. 
317 CTM 000934760, ARCHIMEDES; CTM 000032102, BEATRIX POTTER; CTM 001081314, 
BEETHOVEN; CTM 008560245, CHOPIN; CTM 001025386, WINSTON CHURCHILL; CTM 000531624 
COLUMBUS; CTM 000945774, DESCARTES; CTM 001593128, EINSTEIN; CTM 003805942, GOETHE; 
CTM 001358621, VINCENT VAN GOGH; CTM 000071712, MICHELANGELO; CTM 005468996, MONA 
LISA; CTM 007088156, MONDRIAAN; CTM 000021071 MOZART; CTM 000000662, NEWTON; CTM 
001334036, PICASSO; CTM 000143115, PLATO; CTM 000215921, PYTHAGORAS; CTM 000186932, 
MARCO POLO; CTM 000119354, REMBRANDT; CTM 004278214, SHAKESPEARE; CTM 000047365, 
VERMEER, CTM 000996199, LEONARDO DA VINCI; CTM 004179198, WILLEM II. See also Dutch 
Supreme Court, judgment of March 5, 1999, Case no. 16812, C97/291, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2000, no. 306 
(Route 66 III). In a case concerning the registration of a portrait photograph of the actress Marlene Dietrich, the 
German Federal Court of Justice invoked the requirement of distinctiveness to refuse trademark protection 
although this cultural sign can acquire distinctiveness through use in trade (German Federal Court of Justice, 
April 24, 2008, Case I ZB 21/06, Marlene-Dietrich-Bildnis, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 1093, 
2008). The German Federal Patent Court followed the same line of reasoning with regard to the registration of 
Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa (German Federal Patent Court, November 25, 1997, Case 24 W (pat) 188/96, 
Mona Lisa, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1021, 1023, 1998).  
318 The scope of protection against confusion, however, is probably narrower with regard to signs with high 
cultural significance. For example, in the case Picasso/Picaro the Court concluded that the relevant public 
inevitably sees in the sign Picasso a reference to the painter (CJEU, judgment of January 12, 2006, Case C-
361/04 P). However, signs that are not well-known do not have such strong cultural connotations. This means 
that the scope of protection against confusion and dilution after establishing reputation will be broader, such as 
in the case of the sign ‘Nike’ that originally referred to the Greek goddess of Victory. Furthermore, trademark 
law can be used by the copyright-holder to perpetuate protection beyond the limited term of copyright. See for 
example Dutch District Court Haarlem, judgment of January 25, 1983, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984,  121 
(Dik Trom); Dutch Court of Appeal Amsterdam, judgment of July 26, 2001, AMI 2002, 1 (Tarzan); Dutch 
District Court Amsterdam, judgment 28, 2004, AMI 2005-2, 3 (Standaard/Het Gele Teken c.s.). Therefore, EU 
trademark law may create incentives to invest in cultural signs without high symbolic value, encourage a form of 
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However, reforms to the EU’s trademark system319 in which the exclusion provision 
for shape marks are broadened so that signs that consist exclusively of (i) a shape or another 
characteristic that results from the nature of the goods themselves; (ii) a shape or another 
characteristic of goods that is necessary to obtain a technical result; or, (iii) a shape or 
another characteristic that adds substantial value to the goods will be excluded from 
trademark protection may prevent the removal of abstract colours, cultural and descriptive 
signs from the public domain. Although this sounds promising, such a provision will not have 
far-reaching consequences. It is not for nothing that the functionality doctrine aims to prevent 
a monopoly on technical solutions or functional characteristics of products, such that only 
characteristics of the goods that are inherently connected to these goods will be excluded.  
Thus, the wording “or another characteristic” can hardly be interpreted broadly, i.e. in 
such a way that these new refusal grounds would make it possible to not only exclude original 
shapes, but also colour marks, sound marks, figurative marks or word marks. And of course, 
if we accept that a shape is a characteristic of the goods (“a shape” or another characteristic), 
a colour can also be a characteristic of the goods, as in the case of the red sole of a pump or a 
yellow banana keeper.320 The Burberry tartan pattern, the three-stripe figurative marks owned 
by Adidas or the Nike swoosh could then also be viewed as a characteristic and add 
substantial value to the goods: a characteristic of Burberry raincoats is the tartan pattern inside 
the coats, a characteristic of the sports and leisure garments are the three vertical, parallel 
stripes of equal width that feature on the sides of sports and leisure garments in a colour that 
contrasts with the basic colour of those garments, and a characteristic of Nike shoes is the 
Nike swoosh attached to them. According to this line of reasoning even the word mark 
“Cotton” on a T-shirt could be a characteristic that results from the nature of the goods if it 
does not have other essential decorative elements.  
 However, this line of reasoning is incorrect. The rationale of the functionality doctrine 
is to prevent trade mark protection from granting a monopoly on technical solutions or 
functional characteristics of a product which a user is likely to seek in the products of 
competitors. Therefore, only characteristics that are inherently connected to the goods will be 
excluded. Thus, if the red sole of a pump, the shape of a loudspeaker or the sound of a motor 
bike is inherently connected to the goods in question, it can be marked as a characteristic of 
these goods. For example, although the requirement of graphical representation will be erased, 
the sound of the motorbike Harley Davidson could be refused because the sound may fall 
under “another characteristic” resulting from the nature of the goods themselves or necessary 
to obtain a technical result. Signs such as the Nike swoosh, the three stripes of Adidas, or the 
word mark “Apple” are not inherently connected to the goods and therefore do not fall under 
 
free riding on the sign’s positive cultural connotations, and ultimately result in unfair competitive advantages. 
See also Senftleben (2013b), p. 815.  
319 Council of the European Union, 8 June 2015, 2013/0088 (COD), Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark; 
Council of the European Union, 8 June 2015, 2013/0089 (COD), Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (Recast). 
320 District Court of The Hague, judgment April 1, 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:3731 (Christian 
Louboutin/Van Haren Schoenen).  
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the functionality doctrine.321 Furthermore, these signs are mainly intended to function as 
indicators of origin and not as decoration. Conversely, the Burberry tartan pattern or the 
stitches on a pair of jeans are both inherently connected to the goods and originally used not 
as an indicator of origin, but as decoration.322 Therefore, the impact of this provision will be 
minimal under this interpretation.323  
Furthermore, the strength of this safeguard depends on the height of the threshold for 
the substantial value requirement. It is unclear whether this requirement can easily be met. 
The CJEU has provided assessment criteria in the Stokke/Hauck Case, but no explanation of 
these criteria. For example, how important is the criterion regarding the nature of the category 
of goods concerned? A red sole might add substantial value to the goods, but the lilac colour 
of the Milka chocolate bar probably does not. Does a portrait of Rembrandt really add 
substantial value if it is attached to a bottle of wine or a set of paintbrushes? Furthermore, 
signs must consist exclusively of a shape or another characteristic of the goods, such that it is 
possible to register the grip of a toothbrush shaped as Mona Lisa. Service marks can also fall 
outside the scope of the provision; the provision mentions “goods” but not “services”. This 
means for example that the abstract colour magenta for the telecommunication services of the 
Deutsche Telekom can be registered. Furthermore, attractive music used in marketing 
campaigns will often be separated from the goods in question and therefore not excluded by 
this provision. In other words, under Art. 3(1)(e) TMD [Art. 4(1)(e) TMD 2015], the EU 
trademark legislation offers good possibilities to exclude signs, but the impact of this 
provision is not far-reaching enough to prevent the misappropriation of signs: many signs of 
cultural significance, colours, musical signs and descriptive signs cannot be permanently 
blocked under this provision.  
 
3.4.2  Limitations on Descriptive Use 
 
Another important instrument within EU trademark law for preserving descriptive use in the 
public domain are limitations on descriptive use. For example, a trademark owner is not 
allowed to prohibit a third party from using indications concerning the kind, quality or other 
characteristics of products in the course of trade.324 Other traders can even use indications of 
product characteristics as a trademark if the user of the descriptive sign is not found to be 
unfairly competing with the proprietor of the trademark.325 Furthermore, the general public 
and other competitors cannot be prohibited from using their own name or address in the 
course of trade,326 or where necessary indicating the intended purpose of a product or service, 
in particular with accessories or spare parts.327 However under these provisions the use of the 
sign is only justified if it is in accordance with honest commercial practices. This principle 
 
321 However, it cannot be excluded that such signs may also be seen as decoration in future since there is no big 
difference between these signs and the Burberry tartan pattern.  
322 See also Gielen (2014), p. 166. 
323 Although it might thus have some impact with regard to surface decoration. 
324 Article 6(1)(b) TMD [Art. 14(1)(b) and (2) TMD 2015] and Art. 12(b) CTMR [Art. 14(b) EUTMR].  
325 CJEU, judgment January 7, 2004, Case C-100/02 (Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co).  
326 Article 6(1)(a) TMD [Art. 14(1)(a) and (2) TMD 2015] and Art. 12(a) CTMR [Art. 14(a) EUTMR].  
327 Article 6(1)(c) TMD [Art. 14(1)(c) and (2) TMD 2015] and Art. 12(c) CTMR [Art. 14(c) EUTMR].  
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constitutes in substance the expression of a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate 
interests of the trade mark owner.328 Further exceptions are the provision of exhaustion, which 
stipulates that a trademark owner is not entitled to prohibit the use of the mark in relation to 
goods that have been put on the market in the EU under that trademark by the proprietor or 
with his consent, unless there are legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further 
commercialisation of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or 
impaired after they have been put on the market.329 Furthermore, third parties can invoke a 
due cause defense to legalise the act of informing consumers about alternative offers in the 
marketplace.330 Besides, other traders are also allowed to use a trademark in permissible 
comparative advertising if the use fulfills all the conditions following from EU legislation 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising.331  
Although EU trademark law provides several counterbalances to keep descriptive and 
referential use freely available for other competitors on the market, it is questionable whether 
the counterbalances are sufficient to prevent the misappropriation of signs, especially with 
regard to the gradual expansion of trademark rights as protection against dilution and unfair 
free-riding.332 Actually, trademark owners have far-reaching control over the use of the 
protected sign in unrelated contexts, while on the other hand the requirement of the 
availability of signs does not count as a relevant factor for determining whether the use of the 
sign takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or reputation of 
the trade mark.333 Furthermore, the requirement that the use of the trademark be in accordance 
with honest practices can lead to legal uncertainty. In the Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co 
Case about mineral water, for instance, the CJEU has argued that circumstances such as the 
shape and labeling of the bottle to which the word mark is attached determine whether the use 
of a geographical name can be seen as unfairly competing with the trademark owner.334  
Besides, even if Art. 6 TMD [Art. 14 TMD 2015] expresses the availability 
requirement, the availability requirement cannot in any circumstances constitute an 
independent restriction of the effects of the trade mark in addition to those expressly provided 
for in Art. 6(1) TMD [Art. 14(1) and (2) TMD 2015].335 For instance, a third party only has 
the right to use a particular indication according to Art. 6(1) TMD [Art. 14(1) and (2) TMD 
2015] if the indication relates to one of the characteristics of the goods marketed or the 
service provided by that third party. If the sign provides no indication concerning one of the 
characteristics of those goods, third parties cannot invoke Art. 6(1) TMD [Art. 14(1) and (2) 
TMD 2015]. For example, in the Opel/Autec Case about the use of the Opel logo on toys the 
CJEU has decided that  
 
 
328 CJEU, judgment February 23, 1999, Case C-63/97 (BMW/Deenik), para. 61.  
329 Article 7 TMD [Art. 15 TMD 2015] and Art. 13 CTMR [Art. 15 EUTMR].  
330 CJEU, judgment September 22, 2011, Case C-323/09 (Interflora/Marks & Spencer), para. 91. 
331 CJEU, judgment June 12, 2008, Case C-533/06 (O2/Hutchison), para. 45; CJEU, judgment June 18, 2009, 
Case C-487/07 (L’Oréal/Bellure), para. 54.  
332 Dinwoodie (2009), p. 152; Senftleben (2015). 
333 CJEU, judgment April 10, 2008, Case C-102/07 (adidas/Marca), para. 43. 
334 CJEU, judgment January 7, 2004, Case C-100/02 (Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co), para. 26. 
335 CJEU, judgment April 10, 2008, Case C-102/07 (Adidas/Marca), para. 47.  
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the Opel logo does not in any way indicate the kind, quality or other characteristics of 
the scale models. […] However, the affixing of a sign which is identical to a trade 
mark registered, inter alia, in respect of motor vehicles to scale models of that make of 
vehicle in order to reproduce those vehicles faithfully is not intended to provide an 
indication as to a characteristic of those scale models, but is merely an element in the 
faithful reproduction of the original vehicles.336 
 
A year later, the CJEU argued with regard to the stripes motif on sport garments: 
 
In the present case, according to the decision making the reference and the 
observations submitted to the Court by the competitors of adidas, the latter rely on the 
purely decorative nature of the two-stripe motifs at issue to justify their use. It follows 
that the placing by those competitors of motifs with stripes on their garments is not 
intended to give an indication concerning one of the characteristics of those goods.337 
 
The consequence is that other competitors on the market are not allowed to decorate 
their products with tartan patterns, red soles, lilac chocolate packaging or stripe motifs 
because these signs are not intended to give an indication concerning one of the 
characteristics of the goods. For example, a third party is also not justified in using the 
cultural sign “Rembrandt” for their painting materials because this cannot be classified as an 
indication concerning the quality of the product according to Art. 6(1)(b) TMD [Art. 14(1)(b) 
and (2) TMD 2015], while at the same time the trademark owner does profit from the 
connotation of high quality attached to this cultural sign.338 Although such signs already have 
several meanings and connotations, they cannot be used freely by third parties because of the 
rights of a trademark owner who has invested enough to let consumer perceive this particular 
sign as an indication of origin.  
 In other words, these limitations do not give other traders a full guarantee that they 
will be allowed to use descriptive and non-traditional signs, because the use of these signs 
must for example be in accordance with honest practices the outcome of which completely 
depends on the circumstances and the use of the sign must also fulfill the other requirements 
of Art. 6 TMD [Art. 14 TMD 2015], such as that the use is intended to give an indication 
concerning one of the characteristic of the goods. But even if third parties can invoke many 
limitations, and these limitations will be broadened in the EU trademark reform with the 
exception of referential use in general, we still do not know whether third parties can actually 
make use of their rights. A trademark registration of descriptive or non-traditional signs could 
have a deterrent effect on descriptive and referential use. Third parties may decide in advance 
 
336 CJEU, judgment January 25, 2007, C-48/05 (Opel/Autec), paras. 41 and 44.  
337 CJEU, judgment April 10, 2008, Case C-102/07 (Adidas/Marca), para. 48.  
338 Nevertheless, recital 27 TMD 2015 (recital 21 EUTMR) might offer some room for a broader interpretation 
of the trademark limitation since it stipulates that ‘this Directive should be applied in a way that ensures full 
respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the freedom of expression’. However, a cultural 
sign must also be used fairly and in accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial matters. If the 
use of a cultural sign falls under a broader interpretation of the trademark limitations, the competitor also has to 
prove that their use is honest, which is more difficult when the trademark is highly well-known. 
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to use another sign to avoid a costly legal procedure, especially if a trademark owner follows 
an aggressive enforcement strategy. For example, in the Kinder Case, third parties had to 
litigate to the highest German Court in order to be able to use a descriptive sign in relation to 
their goods and services, a fact which illustrates that third parties do not necessarily have the 
right to use this descriptive sign.339 Therefore, it cannot be said that these limitations fully 




This chapter thus shows that we need a far more normative test. The reforms of the EU legal 
system and the broader interpretation of the shape exclusions by the CJEU are all very 
welcome, but they are not enough. In view of the situation with regard to suggestive, 
arbitrary, and fanciful marks, we most certainly need a more normative approach to 
descriptive, cultural, generic and non-distinctive signs. This chapter also shows that the 
assumptions of the CJEU regarding trademark perception do not reflect what we know of 
consumer perception on the basis of scientific and medical research. Consumers are definitely 
able to recognise descriptive and non-traditional signs as an identifier of commercial source. 
The incorrect assumptions of the CJEU regarding consumer perception are in fact based on 
normative purposes. Actually, the CJEU prefers to treat descriptive and non-traditional signs 
differently not because consumers are not “in the habit” of perceiving such signs as a badge of 
origin, but because the CJEU really wants to keep these signs in the public domain due to a 
public interest in not unduly restricting the availability of these signs for the other traders on 
the market. However, these attempts by the CJEU to keep certain signs free from trademark 
protection may encourage trademark owners to monopolise signs and could paradoxically be 
held responsible for creating dysfunctional incentives. Whereas the CJEU may believe that 
the threshold of the possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade is high enough 
to have a deterrent effect on traders, it may well be that this possibility of acquiring 
distinctiveness through use in trade makes it attractive for traders to invest in these particular 
signs, especially if an increasing number of traders succeed in linking in the minds of 
consumers a descriptive sign, specific shape or colour with their enterprise as the origin of 
goods or services. The reward for these marketing efforts is worthwhile: they will achieve 
exclusive rights on a sign that represents a positive attribute of a good and thereby obtain an 
unfair economic advantage because consumers easily understand what the trademark stands 
for, and the availability of these signs for other traders on the market is not unlimited. In other 
words: the distinctiveness requirement is unpredictable and risky. Trademark owners can 
influence whether these signs acquire distinctiveness and invest as needed until they acquire 
control of their preferred sign. We should therefore think about possible ways of restricting 
the space that trademark owners currently have to misappropriate descriptive, cultural and 
non-traditional signs, and reconsider whether it is desirable that these signs can acquire 
distinctiveness through use in trade. An outright exclusion of cultural signs without high 
symbolic value, descriptive signs and abstract colours that cannot be overcome through 
 
339 German Federal Supreme Court, judgment of September 20, 2007, GRUR 2007, 1066, 1071, (Kinder II). 
71 
 
acquiring distinctiveness as a result of use in trade would in any case guarantee the 
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4 The Many Faces of the Average Consumer: Is It Really So Difficult to 
Assess Whether Two Stripes Are Similar to Three? 
 
This chapter shows the necessity of including policy concerns, in particular the need to keep 
signs available for competitors, when assessing a likelihood of confusion. In the 
Adidas/Marca case, the CJEU ruled that the need to keep signs freely available for other 
economic operators cannot be a relevant factor in the infringement analysis. This is 
particularly problematic in relation to appealing signs such as stripe motifs. These signs not 
only serve as a source identifier, but also appeal to consumers and therefore give trademark 
owners an advantage over competitors on the market. In order to offer sufficient room for the 
concerns of trademark owners and competitors (and ultimately also consumers), it is essential 
to apply normative corrections not only in favour of trademark owners but also in favour of 
competitors. The current confusion analysis in EU trademark law already contains a 
normative correction in favour of trademark owners. From an empirical perspective, the more 
distinctive the trademark, the less likely consumers are to be confused when confronted with a 
similar sign. The CJEU, however, assumes that consumers are more likely to be confused 
when confronted with signs that are similar to a highly distinctive trademark. In a trademark 
system where this normative correction is possible in favour of trademark owners, similar 
steps should be taken to give sufficient weight to the interests of competitors. In this light, this 
chapter concludes that the Adidas/Marca decision should be overruled. 
 
Keywords Likelihood of confusion · Consumer perception · Court of Justice of the 




Do national courts – in line with CJEU jurisprudence – assess a likelihood of confusion only 
factually (empirical approach focusing on consumer perception), or do they leave room for 
assumptions on how consumers ought to behave in the marketplace (normative approach)?340 
The branded goods industry has the capacity to invest in expensive marketing campaigns to 
educate consumers to perceive a sign as a source identifier. This industry can also invest in 
expensive empirical studies to demonstrate a distinctive character and a likelihood of 
confusion.  
One might therefore expect that over-reliance on empirical findings in the likelihood-
of-confusion assessment serves the interests of trademark proprietors. Teaching consumers in 
 
* This chapter is based on: Anemaet, L (2020) The Many Faces of the Average Consumer: Is It Really So 
Difficult to Assess Whether Two Stripes Are Similar to Three? IIC 51:187–213. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-
020-00907-0.  
340 Dinwoodie and Gangjee (2016), p. 345. For example, the CJEU’s assumption that consumers are not in the 
habit of perceiving colours and shapes as trademarks is in fact a normative correction of the factual 
circumstances. See, for example, CJEU, judgment of 12 February 2004, case C-218/01 (Henkel), para 49; CJEU, 
judgment of 7 October 2004, case C-136/02 P (Mag Instrument/BHIM), para 31; CJEU, judgment of 12 January 
2006, case C-173/04 P (Deutsche SiSi-Werke/BHIM), para 31; CJEU, judgment of 6 May 2003, case C-104/01 
(Libertel); CJEU, judgment of 24 June 2004, case C-49/02 (Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH), para 39. 
76 
 
advertising to recognise a specific sign as a trademark, they can shape consumer perception in 
accordance with their desired scope of trademark protection. With an empirical approach, the 
trademark system seems at risk of becoming a self-servicing mechanism for the branded 
goods industry.  
Despite this risk, the CJEU held in the Adidas/Marca case that the consumer’s 
perception should be decisive for the outcome of the infringement analysis; the Court was 
reluctant to introduce normative corrections of empirical findings, lend weight to the need to 
keep signs free in the confusion analysis and attach importance to the argument that 
competitors may also need freedom to use similar signs to decorate their products.341 
  The rejection of the need to keep free as a normative impact factor in the infringement 
analysis could have serious consequences for competitors seeking to enter into meaningful 
competition with the trademark owner. After all, consumer protection is not the only goal of 
trademark law. The EU trademark system also seeks to ensure undistorted competition and 
market transparency, which means that in addition to protecting consumers against confusion, 
it is also supposed to create fair competition and guarantee the proper functioning of markets.  
 In light of the general debate about the gradual expansion of trademark rights,342 the 
Adidas/Marca decision raises the question whether the likelihood-of-confusion assessment is 
still working properly. Is it appropriate to rely almost exclusively on empirical findings 
concerning the public’s perception when assessing whether a likelihood of confusion exists? 
Or does the CJEU create dysfunctional incentives and encourage traders to invest in 
marketing and branding campaigns concerning design elements that should better be kept free 
for competitors?  
 This chapter shows that the Adidas/Marca decision is problematic. The CJEU’s focus 
on consumer perception without normative corrections in the likelihood-of-confusion 
assessment is questionable. What the CJEU is actually protecting as a result of this 
jurisprudence is trademark owners’ investments; the Court is less concerned with protecting 
consumers against confusion. It is time to reconsider the concept of likelihood of confusion: 
in the assessment, the likelihood-of-confusion question should only constitute one factor 
alongside other factors, such as the need to keep signs freely available for competitors on the 
market.  
 
341 CJEU, judgment of 10 April 2008, case C‑102/07 (Adidas/Marca). The EU General Court recently ruled that 
Adidas’ figurative mark representing three parallel stripes was invalid. Adidas’ evidence of use of white stripes 
on black clothing could not be used to prove that the three-stripe mark had acquired distinctiveness through use 
in trade because Adidas had registered a logo with black stripes on a white background. The reverse of the 
colour scheme, in the General Court’s view, could not be seen as an insignificant variation as compared to the 
registered form. This decision could open a more critical approach concerning a too broad protection mechanism 
of design elements in general, such as stripe motifs. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the CJEU will 
also follow the General Court’s strict interpretation. Furthermore, it cannot be said that brand owners such as 
Adidas lost power with regard to infringement proceedings. Of all Adidas cases, the Adidas/Marca case still 
holds true. A more critical approach towards the scope of protection of the three-stripe motif is therefore also 
desirable with regard to the infringement assessment. See: General Court, judgment of June 19, 2019, case 
T‑307/17 (Adidas/Shoe Branding), paras 77-78. 
342 See, for example, Gangjee (2013); Senftleben (2013); Ramsey (2003), p. 1096; Wilf (1999), p. 17; McKenna 
(2007), pp. 1841, 1899. 
77 
 
This chapter therefore argues that if we believe trademark owners should not have a 
potentially unlimited monopoly on design elements, with far-reaching possibilities for 
protection, the CJEU should allow national courts to make normative corrections not only in 
favour of trademark owners but also in favour of competitors in the likelihood-of-confusion 
assessment.  
I first give an overview of literature and case law demonstrating that trademark law is 
not only about protecting trademark owners but also about ensuring undistorted, fair and 
meaningful competition. I argue that the current infringement analysis in the confusion 
context is imbalanced since the CJEU has ruled in the Adidas/Marca case that no normative 
corrections should be made in favour of third parties’ interests. In Section 3, I give an 
overview of literature that points out that the CJEU does offer broader protection against 
confusion in the case of highly distinctive marks, which is a normative correction in favour of 
trademark owners. Section 4 discusses national case law concerning the three-stripe motif of 
Adidas to illustrate that decisions were more balanced before than after the Adidas/Marca 
case. Section 5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Balancing Between Preserving the Public Domain and Protecting Consumers 
Against Confusion 
 
The reason to grant trademark owners an exclusive right is the belief that this form of market 
regulation ensures market transparency. In a transparent market, consumers can easily 
individualise different products and express their preference by selecting a specific product or 
service on the basis of trademarks. Signs that deceive consumers reduce the efficiency of the 
market because consumers inevitably purchase the wrong product. From an economic 
perspective, trademarks reduce search costs.343 Therefore, the primary purpose of trademark 
law is to indicate the commercial origin of goods and services offered in the marketplace: 
 
In that context, the essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of 
origin of the marked goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him, 
without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the goods or services from others 
which have another origin. For the trade mark to be able to fulfil its essential role in 
the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and 
maintain, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have been 
manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is 
responsible for their quality.344 
 
In order to fulfil this essential origin function, trademarks are protected against the use 
of identical or similar signs that are likely to cause confusion.345  
 
343 Griffiths (2008), p. 246; Bone (2006), p. 555; Strasser (2000), pp. 379-382; Carter (1990), p. 762; Landes and 
Posner (2003), p. 166-168; Dogan and Lemley (2004), p. 786; McKenna (2007), p. 1844; Kur and Senftleben 
(2017), pp. 6-7; Economides (1998), p. 526.   
344 CJEU, judgment of 12 November 2002, case C-206/01, paras 42, 48, 51 (Arsenal/Reed), para 48. 
345 At the international level, the concept of likelihood of confusion is regulated by Art. 16(1) TRIPS Agreement.  
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However, to achieve undistorted competition, trademark protection must be balanced 
against other core values, such as free expression enhancing consumer information and 
consumer choice,346 and free competition preventing unnecessary market entry barriers. The 
recognition of a need to keep signs freely available offers competitors equal access to 
communication tools that can be used to inform consumers about product characteristics and 
compete for market shares.347 
The fundamental principle of the need to keep free is reflected in several provisions in 
the Trade Mark Directive348 and the EU Trademark Regulation349 and recognised by the 
CJEU in several cases.350 For example, signs that fall under the grounds for refusal are 
excluded from trademark protection.351 Furthermore, it must be shown that the use of the sign 
is made “in the course of trade” and “in relation to goods or services”. These protection 
requirements ensure that trademark rights do not affect social and cultural forms of use. The 
likelihood-of-confusion provision is directly related to the preservation of fair and undistorted 
competition.352  
The trademark limitations also aim at a balance between trademark proprietor’s 
interests and free movement of goods and services within the internal market, and the 
competitor’s interests in using a sign for legitimate purposes in accordance with honest 
practices. For instance, third parties are allowed to use descriptive signs identical or similar to 
 
346 Choice implies that consumers have access to more variety in terms of style, price, and content. If people had 
no choices, their life would be almost unbearable. Variety in products leads to an increase in autonomy, control, 
and liberation, and it improves people’s life. However, more choice is not always good for consumers. In some 
situations, consumers are more likely to purchase something if they have fewer choices. Too many choices may 
demotivate consumers and lead to an information overload. Consumers who maximise their options may suffer 
from choice overload. They set high standards for themselves and want to make the best choice. Because they 
cannot examine all options, they may have doubts about making the best choice. In the end, ‘maximisers’ are 
less happy with their choice because they were not able to consider all alternative products. See Szmigin and 
Piacentini (2015), pp. 107-108; Schwartz (2004). 
347 Max Planck Institute (2011), p. 51; Phillips (2005), p. 392; Kur and Senftleben (2017), pp. 22-23; Senftleben 
et al. (2015); Sakulin (2011); Ramsey and Schovsbo (2013), p. 671; Simon Fhima (2013), p. 293; Burrell and 
Gangjee (2010), p. 544; Naser 2009, p. 188; McGeveran (2008); AG Poiares Maduro, Opinion of 22 September 
2009, cases C-236/08-238/08 (Google France and Google/Louis Vuitton et al.), para 102: ‘whatever the 
protection afforded to innovation and investment, it is never absolute. It must always be balanced against other 
interests, in the same way as trade mark protection itself is balanced against them. I believe that the present cases 
call for such a balance as regards freedom of expression and freedom of commerce.’ 
348 Council Directive 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, 2015 O.J. L336/1. 
349 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the EU trade 
mark, 2017 O.J. L154/1. 
350 CJEU, judgment of 4 May 1999, cases C-108/97, C-109/97 (Windsurfing Chiemsee), para 26; CJEU, 
judgment 14 September 2010, case C-48/09 P, paras 56-57 (Lego Juris/BHIM); CJEU, judgment of 22 June 
2006, case C-25/05 P (August Storck/BHIM), para 29; CJEU, judgment of 15 May 2014, case C-97/12 P (Louis 
Vuitton/BHIM); CJEU, judgment of 12 February 2004, case C-218/01 (Henkel), para 49; CJEU, judgment of 8 
April 2003, cases C-53/01-C-55/01 (Linde), para 49; CJEU, judgment of 6 May 2003, case C-104/01 (Libertel), 
para 55. 
351 Article 4 TMD 2015 and Article 7 EU Trademark Regulation. 
352 Senftleben (2015). In addition, protecting trademarks with a reputation beyond likelihood of confusion, 
namely against unfair advantage being taken of their distinctive character and reputation is justified because, and 
insofar as, this contributes to the creation and preservation of a system of undistorted competition.   
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protected trademarks or their components, where the trademark proprietor’s legitimate 
interests are not adversely affected.353  
In principle, trademark law and free competition do not conflict with one another. On 
the one hand, trademarks provide information about the commercial source of goods or 
services and enable consumers to repeat satisfactory purchases. Trademark owners are 
stimulated to keep the quality of their goods or services high and to invest in their goods and 
services. Competitors can choose a different sign if they want to freely offer their goods and 
services on the market.354  
However, in practice, competition can only be neutral if the appropriation of the sign 
as such does not grant trademark owners a competitive advantage from which third parties are 
excluded. This requirement is largely fulfilled with respect to (fantasy) word marks and other 
traditional forms of trademarks. These signs are often available in sufficient supply, such that 
third parties do not experience entrance barriers in competing with similar products and 
services.355  
On the other hand, appealing signs, such as the three-stripe motif of Adidas, are not 
available in unlimited numbers. Exclusive trademark rights on three-stripe motifs may affect 
the availability of design elements on the market and generate obstacles to competition. Stripe 
motifs contribute to the style and appearance of a specific product (i.e. sports clothing) and 
therefore give trademark proprietors a competitive advantage from the sign as such.356  
Trademark rights on appealing signs could hinder innovation and encourage 
standardisation.357 Competitors might be afraid of risking a legal procedure and as a result 
avoid using stripes on sports and leisure clothes altogether.358 In addition, a monopoly on 
appealing signs may also limit trademark owners’ creativity and lead to standardisation.359 
Brand owners have been obliged to use the same signs to keep the recognition level among 
consumers high. This could consequently lead to fewer investments in long-term product 
quality or developing new products.360 As long as non-distinctive signs can acquire 
distinctiveness through use in trade, trademark owners will invest in appealing signs which 
give them a competitive advantage. 
Despite the fact that the principle of undistorted competition requires an evaluation of 
trademark issues in the light of all interests at stake, the CJEU explicitly expressed that the 
need for a sign to be freely available for competitors is not a relevant factor in the likelihood-
of-confusion assessment. In the CJEU’s view, such public-interest considerations are related 
 
353 Senftleben (2015). 
354 Max Planck Institute (2011), p. 52. 
355 Max Planck Institute (2011), p. 52. 
356 Max Planck Institute (2011), p. 52. 
357 Calboli (2018). 
358 See also Calboli (2018), p. 293. In the absence of other stripe motifs, consumers may believe that all stripe 
motifs belong to Adidas and are possibly confused when they are confronted with similar stripe motifs. The 
more national courts give space to empirical factors in the infringement analysis, the more trademark owners are 
willing to support confusion claims with consumer studies, which will confirm that consumers are indeed 
confused when confronted with a similar sign. See also Gibson (2007), pp. 907-908, 912, 916. 
359 Calboli (2018). 
360 Calboli, p. 288. 
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to certain grounds for refusal of registration361 and the revocation of trademark rights,362 but 
not to the likelihood-of-confusion assessment. Ultimately, the likelihood-of-confusion 
assessment must be based on the public’s perception and, accordingly, on empirical findings 
concerning this perception. Hence, if consumers perceive signs as similar and are therefore 
confused, this should be decisive for the outcome of the case. This outcome should not be 
affected by the argument that competitors may need to use particular signs to decorate their 
products in order to enter into meaningful competition with the trademark owner.363  
As pointed out above, however, trademark law is not only about protecting trademark 
owners but also about ensuring undistorted, fair and meaningful competition. Therefore, at all 
levels – including the infringement analysis – trademark owners’ interests must be weighed 
against competitors’ interests and the general consuming public. In light of this, it is 
remarkable that in the Adidas/Marca case, the CJEU explicitly refused to consider the need to 
keep protected signs available when determining the scope of protection. The current 
infringement analysis in the confusion context is therefore imbalanced. Without the option of 
making normative corrections in the confusion assessment, other core values, such as 
safeguarding freedom of competition and (commercial) freedom of expression, might become 
jeopardised.  
 
4.3 Infringement Analysis in Confusion Cases: Imbalanced 
 
It is established CJEU practice to offer broader protection against confusion in the case of 
highly distinctive marks. For this purpose, the CJEU assumes that “the more distinctive the 
earlier mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion”.364 This, however, is a normative 
correction in favour of trademark owners. When we study empirical findings,365 it becomes 
obvious that the opposite is true: the more distinctive the mark, the easier for consumers to 
identify even small deviations from the protected sign. Despite the heavy criticism aimed 
against it in legal literature, the CJEU has never reconsidered its statement that likelihood of 
confusion increases as marks become more distinctive.366 However, the volume of literature 
arguing that the CJEU’s statement is wrong casts increasing doubt on the CJEU’s 
assumptions concerning consumer perception.  
For example, Annette Kur and Martin Senftleben pointed out that consumers are less 
likely to be confused when a third party uses a sign that is similar to a well-known trademark. 
A trademark that is well known to consumers is more likely to be remembered, and it is 
 
361 CJEU, judgment of 4 May 1999, case C-108/97, C-109/97 (Windsurfing Chiemsee), para 25; CJEU, judgment 
of 8 April 2003, cases C-53/01-C-55/01 (Linde), para 73; CJEU, judgment of 6 May 2003, case C-104/01 
(Libertel), para 53. 
362 See CJEU, judgment of 27 April 2006, case C-145/05 (Levi Strauss), para 19. 
363 CJEU, judgment of 10 April 2008, case C‑102/07 (Adidas/Marca), para 30. 
364 CJEU, judgment of 11 November 1997, case C-251/95 (Puma/Sabel), para 24; CJEU, judgment of 29 
September 1998, case C-39/97 (Canon v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer; Canon/Cannon), para 18; CJEU, judgment of 
22 June 1999; case C-342/97 (Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH/Klijsen Handel BV), paras 20, 28. 
365 See for example: van Horen (2010), p. 133. 




therefore less likely that consumers will have an “imperfect recollection”367 when confronted 
with a similar trademark.368  
Jeremy Phillips also argued that the CJEU ruling is in contradiction to reality. From an 
empirical perspective, it cannot be true that consumers are more likely to be confused the 
more distinctive a trademark is. The odds that consumers will not see the difference between 
one of the big market players like Coca-Cola and a similar sign is very low. In fact, 
consumers are far more likely to be confused and purchase the wrong product when it comes 
to less distinctive signs, such as “Eudermin” and “Eucerin” for body care products. The 
likelihood of confusion therefore decreases in proportion to how well-known the trademark 
is.369  
According to Burrell and Gangjee, it is therefore necessary to rediscover the 
fundamental principles on which trademark protection rests. It must be judicially 
acknowledged that there are times when the trademark’s strength will reduce the risk of 
consumer confusion. In Burrell and Gangjee’s view, some cases still justify offering 
additional protection. They argue that the reputation of a mark like “Viagra” might make it 
more likely that consumers will assume “Herbagra” is a brand extension for a similar but not 
identical product.  
Nevertheless, other types of cases exist where consumers are less likely to be 
confused. The authors point out that it would be more difficult for Nike to argue that the use 
of a brand like “Nice” for the retailing of sporting goods would be likely to cause confusion. 
According to Burrell and Gangjee, no reasonable consumer is going to believe that Nike has 
suddenly chosen to rebrand itself as “Nice”. Consumers will also not think that Starbucks has 
rebranded itself as “Charbucks” or that Louis Vuitton sells cheap toys for dogs under the 
“Chewy Vuiton” trademark.370 Brand owners would therefore undoubtedly have less success 
if judges assess the likelihood-of-confusion test empirically than if they follow an approach 
based on rules of experience stating that known marks must have a broader scope of 
protection.371  
Despite being more cautious, Tobias Cohen Jehoram, Constant van Nispen, and Tony 
Huydecoper nevertheless indicated that the CJEU ruling is perhaps incorrect when it comes to 
luxury and fashion articles. These products are usually bought by a “brand conscious” public 
 
367 CJEU, judgment of 22 June 1999; case C-342/97 (Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH/Klijsen Handel 
BV), para 26.  
368 Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 326. See also Fhima and Denvir (2015), p. 330.  
369 Philips (2003), p. 352. CJEU, judgment of 22 June 1999; case-342/97 (Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. 
GmbH/Klijsen Handel BV), Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2000, 375, case comment D.W.F. Verkade, para. 6. See 
also Griffiths (2008), pp. 260-261; Raβmann (1997), p. 589; Seibt (2002), p. 470; Boes and Deutsch (1996), p. 
168; Vierheilig (1982), p. 509; Zimmerli (1975), p. 138; David and Frick (2017), p. 250. See also OLG 
Düsseldorf, MuW 1912/XII, 259, Palmona/Baumona. See also the opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer expressed in Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Matthew Reed, case C-206/01 [2002] E.T.M.R. 975, fn. 22: 
“The stronger the distinctive character of a sign, the less will be the likelihood of confusion. Registration of the 
name COCO-COLO for refreshments, and subsequent commercialisation of the goods, does not give rise to any 
confusion with the drinks distributed by COCA-COLA, given the distinctiveness, penetration and reputation of 
that trade mark.” See also the opinion of Jacob LJ in Reed Executive v Reed Business Information [2004] EWCA 
Civ. 159, [2004] RPC (40) 767, paras 78 and 83. 
370 Burrell and Gangjee (2013). 
371  Kabel (2005), p. 23. 
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and this public will also note minor differences from that mark. However, Cohen Jehoram, 
van Nispen and Huydecoper argued that the legal theory of granting more protection to highly 
distinctive marks does follow practice, because the public does sooner associate with known 
marks than they do with unknown marks.  
Although associations with known marks could sooner be characterised as taking 
unfair advantage of (or being detrimental to) the brand than that these associations cause 
direct or indirect confusion, the authors argue nevertheless that the matter of whether the 
allegedly infringing sign evokes associations with a known mark still plays a role in 
determining the scope of protection in confusion cases. In the authors’ opinion, this shows 
that “the assessment of the likelihood of confusion is a legal test, not a factual test”.  
 They argued that the use of the sign “Anti-Monopoly” for a game should therefore not 
only be forbidden because the third party’s sign might take unfair advantage or be detrimental 
to the “Monopoly” brand (registered for games), but also because there is a likelihood of 
confusion, even if the majority of the public recognises that “Anti-Monopoly” competes with 
“Monopoly”.372  
Han, Nunes and Drèze indicated that some luxury products, particularly those at the 
high end of the product line, do not necessarily wear a clear and prominent brand. Less 
expensive, louder products are targeted to a different class of consumer than subtler, more 
expensive goods. With respect to this higher class of consumer, brand owners also develop 
subtle cues by which the consumer can identify the products even in the absence of an explicit 
logo or brand name. For example, a Porsche is a Porsche, with or without the emblem.373 The 
reputation of the trademark and the category of products, such as luxury, serve to make 
reasonable consumers less likely to be confused.  
Gert Jan van de Kamp also suggested that from an empirical perspective, it could be 
argued that the CJEU ruling is probably incorrect. However, in his view, the perception of the 
public should be assessed normatively. Empirical findings should not be by definition 
decisive; rather, what is relevant is what consumers ought to perceive.374  
Stefan Risthaus argued that because of the many associations evoked in the 
consumers’ brain, consumers might be confused when a third party’s sign displays fewer 
major differences and the product is only seen briefly. On the other hand, he also argued that 
slight differences between signs are more likely to be noticed because consumers remember 
the trademark so well. After all, an everyday clothing item is more likely to be confused with 
a similar item in a wardrobe than a fashionable design.375 Nevertheless, in Risthaus’ view, the 
protection of trademark owners’ investments in marketing and branding campaigns must 
override the empirical fact that consumers are perhaps less likely to be confused.376  
 
372 Cohen Jehoram et al. (2010), p. 285. 
373 Han et al. (2010), p. 27. 
374 van de Kamp (1999), p. 101. See for some older Dutch cases where the court ruled that the more known the 
trademark, the sooner the consumer will notice differences between signs: Court of Appeal of The Hague, 
judgment of 22 May 1933, confirmed by the Supreme Court, judgment of 11 July 1933, NJ 1933, p. 1702; BIE 
1933, p. 102 (Aspirin); Court of Appeal of Leeuwarden, judgment of 17 April 1957, BIE 1959, No. 16 
(Vredestein) and Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgment of 15 March 1967, BIE 1969, No. 102 (Bayer). 
375 Risthaus (2007), p. 92. 
376 However, the mere association that the public might make between two trademarks as a result of their 
analogous semantic content does not in itself provide sufficient grounds for concluding that there is a likelihood 
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Admittedly, information with strong associative links is more likely to be revoked 
when identifying and interpreting the incoming stimuli.377 For confusion between signs, there 
must be some familiarity with the trademark. If the trademark is not known, there will be no 
confusion.378  
However, because of their strong associative network, famous trademarks are much 
better stored in memory than weak trademarks,379 such that differences between signs are 
more likely to be noticed.380 According to Femke van Horen, it’s rather risky to imitate highly 
distinctive elements: not only because of the risk of legal proceedings, but because consumers 
might evaluate a similar product negatively because of the awareness of the insincere tactics 
used by the competitor: 
 
Given that extreme standards are more likely to be used as a comparison standard than 
are moderate standards, it is also likely that contrast will emerge when an extreme 
leader brand (standard) is imitated (e.g., Coca-Cola). Imitation of an extreme leader 
brand will immediately bring a distinct image of the leader brand directly to mind, 
independent of comparison mode. When the imitated leader brand is moderate 
however (e.g., Elsève shampoo), a less distinct leader will be brought to mind. This 
implies that it would be more effective for copycats to imitate moderate standards 
(weaker brands), than extreme standards (stronger brands).381  
 
of confusion. The decisive factor is whether there is a risk of direct or indirect confusion among consumers. See 
CJEU, judgment of 11 November 1997, case C-251/95 (Puma/Sabel), para. 26. Trademarks with a reputation 
can nevertheless be protected when the signs simply call to mind the protected mark, i.e. whenever there is a link 
between the signs, but then we are speaking of goodwill protection, not of protecting the origin function of the 
trademark. (See Art. 10(2) TMD [2015] and Art. 9(2)(c) EUTMR. See CJEU, judgment of 23 October 2003, case 
C-408/01 (Adidas/Fitnessworld), para 29; judgment of 18 June 2009, case C-487/07 (L’Oréal/Bellure), para 36). 
Rather than being based on a test of likelihood of confusion, this excludes any use that takes or might take unfair 
advantage of, or is or would be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the reputation of a mark, such that 
these signs are protected against blurring, tarnishment and unfair free-riding (See CJEU, judgment of 18 June 
2009, case C-487/07 (L’Oréal/Bellure), paras 34, 39-41). 
377 van Horen (2010), p. 20. Jacoby (2001), p. 1035. 
378 Jacoby (2001), pp. 1039-40: “Expectations and context can cause memory to do more than just ‘filling in’ 
missing gaps, including ignoring disconfirming information and even ‘overwriting’ stimuli.” Lee et al. found that 
a brand extension by a competitor of the senior mark increased likelihood of confusion. For example, consumers 
are significantly more likely to be confused by the introduction of a “Cadillac” brand notebook computer if they 
were already exposed to a “Mercedes-Benz” brand entry into that market. Under these circumstances, more 
sophisticated consumers (for example consumers who were familiar with the mark) were more likely to be 
confused because they were better able to perform the cognitive processes necessary to make a connection 
between the two marks. See Lee, DeRosia, Christensen (2008), pp. 948-499.  
379 See Szmigin and Piacentini (2015), pp. 136, 144-145, 178; Lee (2002), pp. 440-454. 
380 In Kimberlee Weatherall’s view, it is unlikely that consumers’ memories are reflecting the hypothetical state 
of the EU consumer’s mind. If a mark is famous, consumers’ memory may be perfect (Weatherall (2017), p. 75; 
fn. 113). Furthermore, according to Oneto and Sundie, counterfeit products may have limited social value, since 
those in the know (the wealthier consumers: parvenus and patricians) are likely to perceive counterfeit goods to 
be of inferior quality and judge counterfeit consumers accordingly. However, the quality of counterfeit products 
has increased greatly and the sophistication needed to distinguish counterfeit from original products has 
increased. See Szmigin and Piacentini, p. 192; Oneto and Sundie (2006); Han, Nunes, Drèze (2010), pp. 15-30; 
Gentry et al. (2006), p. 254.  




Foxman et al. also pointed out that consumers are more easily confused when the consumer’s 
familiarity, experience and involvement with the product were low.382 In an experiment, 
consumers were asked which of their particular products were related to the original brand. 
Two brands were investigated: the decongestant brand, which was a regionally distributed 
dealer brand and which was not very well known, and the ramen noodle soup brand, which 
was a nationally distributed manufacturing brand. More incorrect answers were given with 
respect to the less known decongestant brand.  
 Furthermore, consumer perception depends on the consumers’ goals. Attention is 
necessary to achieve a particular goal. Depending on the goal, some information will be 
processed and other information not. Attention will be afforded to information that is 
important for the consumer’s decision process. If the consumer has a specific purpose in 
mind, his or her attention will not only be selective but in addition, only specific associations 
that are related to this purpose will be evoked from memory. Depending on the consumer’s 
goal, attention will be focused on the particular aspect of the product representing this goal 
and associations will be made accessible that fit in with this goal. If the consumers’ goal is to 
buy a branded product, for instance Adidas clothing because of their fashionable stripe motif, 
the three-stripe-motif will be easily recalled from memory. At the moment that the three-
stripe-motif is important to the consumer, the stripe motif will draw the consumer’s attention 
and be noticed. The consumer will be highly involved and the information surrounding the 
stripe motif will be processed properly.383 
 The CJEU ruling that states that the more distinctive the trademark, the greater the 
likelihood of confusion, is thus doubtful. The more distinctive the trademark, the better the 
trademark is stored in memory. Consumers are more likely to notice differences between 
distinctive elements than non-distinctive elements. The underlying idea of granting broader 
protection to known marks is that brand owners would otherwise be penalised because 
consumers are likely to know every single detail of the brand: 
  
Hinter dem fingierten Einfluss der Kennzeichnungskraft auf die Verwechslungsgefahr 
steht folglich gerade nicht der Schutz des Verbrauchers vor tatsächlichen 
Verwechslungsgefahren. Vielmehr liegt diesem Prinzip der Gedanke des 
Leistungsschutzes zu Grunde. Der Markeninhaber soll durch die Gewährung eines 
gröβeren Schutzumfangs für die unternehmerische Leistung belohnt werden, die in der 
Auswahl einer von Haus aus besonders unterscheidungskräftigen Marke oder im 
kosten- und benutzungsintensiven Ausbau einer „normalen“ Marke zu einer 
kennzeichnungsstarken Marke verkörpert ist. […] Der EuGH hat durch dieses Dogma 
 
382 Foxman et al. (1990), pp. 170-189. 
383 van Horen et al. (2006-2007), pp. 168-170. Size and bright colours catch people’s attention, and people are 
sensitive “to stimuli that contrast with their background which are unusual or unexpected.” Desai (2018), p. 143; 
Hughes (2015), p. 1253; Creusen and Schoormans (2005), pp. 64-68. See also Veryzer and Hutchinson (1998), 
pp. 374-394; Bloch (1995), pp. 16-29; Solomon et al. (2008), pp. 88-89; Celsi and Olson (1988).  
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daher schon selbst normative Elemente in die Bestimmung der Verwechslungsgefahr 
eingeflochten.384 
 
In other words, the CJEU’s assumption that the more distinctive the trademark the greater the 
likelihood of confusion is not a rule of fact, but rather serves a normative purpose: to protect 
the trademark owners’ high investments in marketing and branding campaigns. The CJEU’s 
ruling is thus a legal fiction that replaces empirical proof to protect highly distinctive 
trademarks.385 The likelihood of confusion decreases the more distinctive and well-known the 
trademark is. However, the CJEU applies a normative correction to offer more protection for 
highly distinctive marks while at the same time refusing to consider the need to keep free for 
competitors (no normative corrections in favour of competitors). This may create 
dysfunctional incentives for traders to invest in marketing and branding campaigns 
concerning design elements that are better kept free for competitors. Exclusive rights on stripe 
motifs could impede competition because stripe motifs optimise the appearance of sports 
clothing. Trademark owners are therefore granted a competitive advantage from the sign as 
such.386 The assumptions of the CJEU could thus be an additional facilitating factor that 
allows trademark owners to monopolise signs. While the CJEU may believe that public 
interest considerations are unrelated to the likelihood-of-confusion assessment because the 
assessment is allegedly based on the public’s perception, in reality the public’s perception is 
not leading when it concerns highly distinctive marks. The anti-confusion assessment is 
therefore imbalanced and may generate dysfunctional incentives. 
 
4.4 National Case Law 
 
In ruling in the Adidas/Marca case that the need to keep signs free is not a relevant factor in 
confusion cases, the CJEU seems to have opted for a more investment-based approach. To 
explore whether national case law changed following Adidas/Marca, several cases 
surrounding the three-stripe motif of Adidas were investigated. The Adidas cases are of 
particular interest in this context because they all contain the same questions concerning 
likelihood-of-confusion and the need to keep signs freely available. The debate in each case 
 
384 Seibt (2002), p. 470. See also Kur and Senftleben (2017), p. 326; Ströbele (1991), p. 827: “Je besser eine 
Kennzeichnung dem Verkehr bekannt sei, desto geringer sei die Gefahr, bei Wahrnehmung einer anderen 
Erscheinung in den Irrtum zu geraten, die bekannte Marke vor sich zu haben. Insoweit könne der von der 
Rechtsprechung aufgestellte Satz, verkehrsbekannte Zeichen seien in besonderem Maβe Verwechslungen 
ausgesetzt, jedenfalls in dieser Allgemeinheit nicht anerkannt werden. Andererseits besteht allgemeine 
Übereinstimmung darin, daβ die ständige Spruchpraxis zur Verwechslungsgefahr bei starken und schwachen 
Zeichen im Ergebnis beizuhalten ist, weil ansonsten der rechtspolitisch unhaltbare Zustand einträte, daβ gerade 
kennzeichnungsschwachen, unbenutzten Zeichen ein weiterer Schutzbereich zugesprochen würde als gut 
eingeführten Marken, die in besonderer Weise des zeichenreichtlichen Schutzes bedürfen.” 
385 Sakulin (2011), p. 248; Albrecht (1991), pp. 58-59: “Nach der Gegenmeinung ist die Verwechslungsgefahr 
um so geringer, je deutlicher die Marke im Erinnerungsbild des Verbrauchers haftet, weil dieser Abweichungen 
dann eher wahrnimmt. § 8 Abs. 1 Ziff. 3 MarkenG, Art. 4 Abs. 3 und 4 Markenrichtlinie sowie die Einbeziehung 
der gedanklichen Verbindung zeigen allerdings eine gesetzgeberische Entscheidung zu Gunsten der älteren 
Marke.” 
386 Max Planck Institute (2011), p. 52. 
86 
 
centred on whether a specific stripe motif on clothing (the two/four-stripe motif) was similar 
to the Adidas trademark (the three-stripe motif).  
In some countries, the legal position of third parties may not have changed since 
Adidas/Marca. In Germany and in France, cases can be found where national courts 
specifically rewarded Adidas’ high investments in marketing and branding campaigns 
involving the three-stripe motif. In these cases, national courts highly emphasised the 
notoriety of the brand and the resulting likelihood of confusion among consumers while 
freedom-of-competition arguments were found irrelevant.  
For example, in Germany, the Cologne Higher Regional Court387 had already ruled in 
2005 (prior to the Adidas/Marca case in 2008) that Nike’s sports trousers bearing two parallel 
white stripes on the outside of the legs and the well-known ‘swoosh’ trademark were an 
infringement on the three-stripe mark of Adidas.  
Given the highly distinctive character of the three-stripe mark, consumers would 
interpret the defendant’s two stripes as an indication of origin, not as mere decoration. The 
‘swoosh’ trademark on the clothing would not preclude the stripes from also functioning as a 
trademark.388 In addition, there was at least average similarity between the signs. The 
‘swoosh’ was a purely figurative sign of inconspicuous size, such that the consumer would 
not perceive it as a dominant sign. Furthermore, a substantial number of consumers would not 
even see the ‘swoosh’ when it was covered by a matching jacket.389 Therefore, according to 
the Cologne Higher Regional Court, consumers were likely to be confused.390  
Therefore, freedom-of-competition arguments were overruled by investment-based 
arguments. Stripe patterns may be primarily seen as decoration, but after high investments in 
marketing and branding the three-stripe-motif, the Court said, consumers would perceive it as 
source identifier and no longer as pure decoration.391 According to the Court, similar stripe 
motifs would be perceived in the same way. The Court did not further discuss the argument 
that third parties may also need similar stripe motifs to decorate their products. 
In the same year, the Munich Higher Regional Court392 also ruled that a likelihood of 
confusion existed. The defendant Dolce & Gabbana sold black trousers made from stretch 
material embellished with two silver stripes on both sides. The trousers had a buckle with the 
trademark “D&G” on the waistband and one on a rear pocket.  
 
387 Cologne Higher Regional Court, judgment of 16 December 2005, case 84 O 74/05, [2006] E.T.M.R. 37, 
Adidas-Salomon AG v Nike International Ltd and Nike Retail BV. 
388 Ibid., paras 11-12. 
389 Ibid., paras 13-14. 
390 Ibid., paras 16-17. See also the Cologne Regional Court, which similarly argued that a likelihood of confusion 
existed. Because of the notoriety of the three-stripe motif, the consumer would perceive the two-stripe motif as a 
trademark and not as embellishment. The “swoosh” mark did not prevent the likelihood of confusion among 
consumers. First, the ‘swoosh’ was less eye-catching than the stripes. Second, consumers might believe that Nike 
and Adidas were in co-operation (Cologne Regional Court, judgment of 20 January 2005, case 84 0 74/04, 
[2005] E.T.M.R. 91, Adidas-Salomon AG v Nike International Ltd and Nike Retail B.V., paras 21-22). 
391 Cologne Higher Regional Court, judgment of 16 December 2005, case 84 O 74/05, [2006] E.T.M.R. 37, 
Adidas-Salomon AG v Nike International Ltd and Nike Retail BV, para 8.  
392 Munich Higher Regional Court, judgment of 10 November 2005, case 29 U 2238/05, [2006] E.T.M.R. 38, 
Adidas-Salomon AG v Dolce & Gabbana Germany GmbH, Alfonso Giuseppe Dolce. 
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Again, the judge concluded that consumers would perceive the stripes as a trademark. 
Because of the notoriety of the Adidas brand, the public was used to seeing an indication of 
origin in stripes on both sides of clothing. Consumers were also accustomed to secondary 
signs in addition to a famous mark. Moreover, consumers would not always see the D&G 
logo, for example when viewed from the side.393 The notoriety of the three-stripe motif was 
again a decisive factor in the likelihood-of-confusion assessment: 
 
In view of the exceptionally high distinctive character of the claimant’s marks and of 
the substantial proximity of goods – which results in comprehensive protection with 
respect to a trade mark only enjoying average distinctive character with the 
consequence of the necessity of a greater distance between signs to avoid a trade mark 
infringement – the differences in the two conflicting signs are not sufficient to 
preclude the likelihood of confusion. […] Moreover, experience has shown that signs 
of a distinctive character, in particular famous signs, will tend to be remembered more. 
The addressed public will therefore also tend to believe it recognises such signs it is 
familiar with in a different sign.394 
 
Furthermore, the Munich Higher Regional Court explicitly rejected that the need to keep free 
should be taken into account:  
 
The examination of conflict under trade mark law does not provide for a need to keep 
free. Outside the scope of Art. 23 of the [German] Trade Mark Act – which is not 
central here – the fact applies in infringement proceedings that the trade mark 
proprietor can take proceedings against uses of signs capable of confusion using the 
standard of the provision of trade mark law while asserting its monopoly position by 
the trade mark protection.395 
 
In other words, the Munich Higher Regional Court adopted the exact same approach as the 
CJEU in the Adidas/Marca decision. In the Adidas/Marca case, the CJEU ruled that the need 
for a sign to be freely available for competitors was not a relevant factor in the likelihood-of-
confusion assessment. Although the limitations and exceptions under Article 14(1)(b) TMD 
2015 gave expression to the requirement of availability, in the CJEU’s view, the likelihood-
of-confusion provision did not. The CJEU further argued that the requirement of availability 
could only restrict the effect of the trademark if this was expressly provided for in the 
limitations and exceptions under Article 14(1)(b) TMD 2015. With regard to the purely 
decorative nature of the competitors’ two-stripe motifs at issue, the CJEU ruled that this use 
 
393 Ibid., paras 21-26. 
394 Ibid., para 30. 
395 Ibid., para 32. See also Munich Higher Regional Court, judgment of 12 February 2004, case 26 U 5518/03, 
[2005] E.T.M.R. 2, Adidas Salomon AG v Dolce & Gabbana Germany GmbH, paras 12-15, which also argued 
that a likelihood of confusion existed. In this case, the judge also emphasised the notoriety of the brand, and held 
that the three-stripe motifs would be “exceptionally well-known marks, which is an obvious fact” (para. 14) and 
“[i]n view of the extremely high identifying power of the applicant's marks and the similarity of the goods, which 
is at least close, the differences in the two marks are not capable of eliminating the risk of confusion.” (para. 15). 
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was not intended to give an indication concerning one of the specified characteristics of the 
goods and was therefore not allowed.396 In the same way, Article 23 of the German Trade 
Mark Act, which prescribes defences for descriptive use, was probably not applicable. It 
therefore can be said that the Munich Higher Regional Court’s decision basically anticipated 
the CJEU’s later ruling.  
In an earlier case, the Munich Regional Court also referred to the exceptionally high 
degree of distinctiveness of Adidas’ three-stripe motif in the Adidas/C&A case.397 The Court 
concluded that everyone’s awareness of the claimant’s trademark could be assessed by the 
Court from its own knowledge, such that market studies were not necessary. The notoriety of 
the brand was a generally known fact.398 Nevertheless, a survey showed that 91.3% of market 
participants are aware of the three-stripe motif these days.399 The Court also emphasised the 
normative concept of the likelihood-of-confusion assessment but did not mention the need to 
keep free in this perspective:  
 
However, the claimants correctly point out that the examination of the legal concept of 
the risk of confusion does not mean a decision which forecasts whether consumers 
reach the assumption that they would purchase adidas products if they faced the 
attacked design, because solely a normative determination of the distance to be kept 
from the older design is involved.400 
 
 
396 CJEU, judgment of 10 April 2008, case C‑102/07 (Adidas/Marca), paras 47-48. 
397 Munich Regional Court, judgment of 26 July 2001, [2004] E.T.M.R. 3, Adidas AG v C & A Mode Co. 
398 Ibid., para 50. 
399 Ibid., para 53. 
400 Ibid., para 59. Considering the likelihood of confusion as a normative concept also meant that a likelihood of 
confusion could not be found when signs coincided only in descriptive or non-distinctive elements. For instance, 
in the Kinder case, the trademark owner tried to exclude third parties using the word ‘Kinder’ for chocolate on 
the basis of their composite trademark rights. The German Supreme Court argued that the trademark owner did 
not have an exclusive right on the word ‘Kinder’ used for chocolate. The word element ‘Kinder’ generally refers 
to the targeted customers of the goods (para. II 1 a cc (2)). A likelihood of confusion would only exist when the 
colour and graphic design of the trademark on the competitor’s products were similar to the figurative elements 
of the Kinder trademark, which was not the case (para. II 2 a aa). The fact that the competitors had used the same 
descriptive elements did not lead to the overall impression that a likelihood of confusion nevertheless existed 
(‘Allein die teilweise Übereinstimmung des schutzunfähigen Wortbestandteils “Kinder” mit der angegriffenen 
Bezeichnung vermag eine Zeichenähnlichkeit nicht zu begründen’(para. II 2 a aa)). Since the trademark owner 
could not prove that the word element ‘Kinder’ had acquired distinctiveness through use in trade, the word 
element ‘Kinder’ could not, in the court’s opinion, play a dominant role in the overall impression (paras. II 1 a 
dd (2-3)). See German Supreme Court, judgment of September 20, 2007, cases I ZR 6/05 and I ZR 94/04 – 
Kinder II. However, since the Hansson Case (CJEU, judgment of June 12, 2019, case C-705/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:481), the German Supreme Court had to change their more restricted approach in disregarding 
similarities between signs when the allegedly infringing sign only coincided for elements that were descriptive or 
non-distinctive. Consequently, in the Injekt/Injex case, the German Supreme Court overruled the decision of the 
German Federal Patent Court that held that there was no likelihood of confusion since the similar elements of the 
signs were descriptive for the registered goods (medical syringes). According to the German Supreme Court, the 
conflicting signs needed to be considered as a whole, including their descriptive elements. The German Federal 
Patent Court was therefore not allowed to exclude parts of the signs from the comparison and only consider the 
last letters of the signs (German Supreme Court, judgment of February 6, 2020, case I ZB 21/19, GRUR Int., 
70(6), 2021, 583-591, paras. 71, 74).  
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The Munich Regional Court thus explicitly chose to reward Adidas’ high investments. In the 
Adidas/Marca case, the CJEU rejected the need for signs to be freely available by saying that 
the likelihood-of-confusion assessment must be based on consumer perception.401 Contrary to 
the Adidas/Marca case, the Munich Regional Court admitted that consumers were not 
necessarily confused. Instead of hiding behind consumer perception rationales, the Munich 
Regional Court stated that their decision represented a normative determination of the 
desirable distance between parties on the market. Freedom-of-competition arguments were 
however not discussed. Because of the high awareness of the trademark, the Court said 
consumers would perceive the stripe motif as an origin indication and not as a mere 
adornment.402 It can be concluded that this case too was based unilaterally on trademark 
proprietors’ interests. 
Adidas was also successful in France, in the Cour d’Appel de Paris.403 The defendant 
had produced jackets bearing three parallel stripes in the same position, as well as along the 
waist and collar, together with the words “Navy”, “Taille Crayon” and “TC” and a red and 
blue flag on the garments, with the addition of the words “Taille Crayon Atlantic Dream” on a 
label inside the garment. The trousers were embellished with two stripes along the side of the 
leg. According to the Cour d’Appel de Paris, the textual inscriptions, which were fantasy 
words, did not eliminate the risk of confusion. First, Adidas itself often used inscriptions on 
its clothing. Second, the risk of confusion would be greater since the consumer was 
particularly familiar with the three-stripe motif.404 Again, freedom-of-competition arguments 
were not discussed in this case. 
The German and French cases illustrate that prior to Adidas/Marca, the courts’ 
arguments were already biased in favour of trademark owner’s interests. While the 
consumers’ factual perception was not decisive, assumptions on how consumers ought to 
behave did play a central role. The leading principle in these cases was that consumers were 
more likely to be confused because of the notoriety of the brand. As pointed out before, from 
an empirical perspective, the notoriety of the brand should rather be seen as a 
counterargument that undermines the conclusion that likelihood of confusion exists. 
Consumers are less likely to be confused the more distinctive the trademark is. Under the 
umbrella of consumer perception, the German and French courts were actually protecting 
Adidas’ investments. They did so not only by emphasising the notoriety of the brand and 
disregarding how consumers factually perceived signs, but also by bypassing freedom-of-
competition arguments. In some cases these courts explicitly ruled that freedom-of-
competition interests were not relevant in the likelihood-of-confusion assessment; in other 
cases they were simply ignored. These cases can be seen as precursors of the Adidas/Marca 
decision in 2008; an investment-based approach that perhaps already began with the 
Puma/Sabel decision.  
 
401 CJEU, judgment of 10 April 2008, case C‑102/07 (Adidas/Marca), para. 30. 
402 Munich Regional Court, judgment of 26 July 2001, [2004] E.T.M.R. 3, Adidas AG v C & A Mode Co., para 
59. 
403 Cour d’Appel de Paris (4th Chamber, Section A), judgment of 3 March 2004, [2005] E.T.M.R. 4, Adidas 
Sarragan France v Subo, Bauer. 
404 Ibid., para 7. 
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However, there are also national systems where a clear reversal can be seen following 
Adidas/Marca.405 For example, in the Netherlands, courts indeed seem to have followed a 
more investment-based approach since Adidas/Marca. In the most prominent case, in 2017, 
the District Court of The Hague concluded that H&M’s two-stripe motif used for sports 
clothes infringed on Adidas’ three-stripe motif.406  
In this case also, the Court focussed on the trademark’s highly distinctive character. 
According to the Court, the three-stripe motif was well-known among a significant portion of 
the relevant public: 80% in 1995, 84% in 2004, 78% in 2007, 61% in 2012, and 76% in 
2015.407 Examples were presented of catalogues, sales data, marketing budget, market studies, 
and information on the size of the company’s sponsoring activities. A market study of the 
defendant H&M also demonstrated that the three-stripe motif was well known.  
Furthermore, the Court argued that the two-stripe sign of H&M was visually highly 
similar to the three-stripe motif of Adidas. In the two-stripe sign, seven out of eight distinctive 
parts of the three-stripe mark could be found.408 The only difference was that two instead of 
three stripes were used. The number of stripes was not the most distinctive part of the three-
 
405 Although the Court of Appeal of The Hague took a surprisingly different direction in 2020 (Court of Appeal 
of The Hague, judgment of January 28, 2020, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2020:72 (H&M/Adidas). In this case, the judge 
argued that the gap between the two stripes was not visually more or less identical to the width of the stripes and 
therefore did not infringe on Adidas’ trademark rights (para. 26). Furthermore, the court stated that the two 
stripes did not form a pattern and that there was only a singular repetition of the stripe. Taking into account that a 
stripe in itself and also the random combination of two stripes was so simple and trivial, such that these did not 
have any distinctive character, they were only slightly determining to the overall impression to the trademark and 
the sign. In the court’s opinion, it was therefore the specific combination of the stripes and gaps (the pattern) that 
determined the overall impression. Therefore, the public, used to stripes on clothing, would perceive only the 
specific ‘Adidas combination’ of stripes and gaps as a trademark. As the number of stripes, the width of the gaps 
and the consequences thereof for the global impression were different from the Adidas combination, the court 
ruled that there was only a low degree of similarity between the trademark and the sign. As the similarity 
between the marks was so low and solely caused by the non-distinctive elements (stripes) in the trademark and 
the sign, the court ruled that despite the fact that Adidas was a well-known trademark with a great scope of 
protection, and the goods were similar, there was no likelihood of confusion (paras. 30-31). The market research 
did not change this verdict because the percentage of respondents who were likely to be confused when 
confronted with a similar stripe motif might have been affected by the fact that Adidas was a market leader in 
sport clothing (paras. 35, 44). Although the court did not refer to the need to keep free, they thus offered room 
for freedom-of-competition interests by emphasising the different width of the gap and the pattern of the stripes. 
By ruling that the similarity between the sign was low, the judge could set aside the factors of identical goods 
and the high distinctiveness of the trademark and the corresponding broader scope of protection. See also the 
Conclusion of the General Prosecutor B.J. Drijber, judgment of March 12, 2021, ECLI:NL:PHR:2021:244 
(Adidas/H&M) who advised to reject the appeal in cassation. 
406 District Court of The Hague, judgment of 8 November 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:12949 (Adidas/H&M). 
For a similar outcome of a previous case in the proceedings, see Court of Appeal of Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 
judgment of 1 December 2015, case 200.135.172/02, IER 2016/31. 
407 Ibid., paras 4.21-4.22. 
408 The Court noted that the trademark of Adidas consists of a motif of (i) three (ii) vertical and (iii) parallel 
stripes of (iv) equal width, in which (v) the gap between the stripes is visually more or less the same width as the 
stripes and (vi) the stripes are of the same colour, (vii) which contrasts with the basic colour of the garment. The 
stripes are also always applied (viii) along the entire length of the side of the shoulders, sleeves, side seams 
and/or trouser legs of a garment. According to the Court, the discussion was not only about three stripes, but 
about a trademark consisting of these eight distinctive elements. 
91 
 
stripe mark; rather the eight features were together responsible for the overall impression of 
the trademark. 
The Court further assumed a relevant public that consisted of consumers of everyday 
products, such as sports and leisure wear. This consumer would not be highly attentive when 
purchasing such clothing, and the Court took as a benchmark the average consumer who is 
reasonably well informed, observant, and circumspect.409  
Both parties supported their arguments with market studies on the likelihood of 
confusion, and both studies were criticised. The Court left the critical comments to the side 
and concluded that the outcome of both studies supported the assessment that a likelihood of 
confusion existed. According to the Court, percentages of 24% and 34% of confusion on the 
origin of the products were significant. The Court consequently concluded that H&M 
infringes on the rights of the trademark owner Adidas.410 
In this case, the Court was therefore clearly focused on the trademark owner’s high 
investments. The Court ruled that the distinctive character was high, which was supported by 
empirical facts. Consumers would be confused when confronted with similar stripe motifs 
because of the brand’s notoriety. Moreover, a market study of the likelihood of confusion also 
supported the decision. Normative considerations on the need to keep this specific stripe motif 
freely available for other competitors were not mentioned. Adidas’ efforts in marketing 
campaigns paid off.  
Remarkably, prior to Adidas/Marca, decisions can be found in which Dutch courts 
expressed a strong preference for freedom-of-competition arguments.  
For example, in 2005, the Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch411 ruled that H&M did 
not infringe Adidas’ trademark rights. Despite pointing out that the three-stripe motif was 
well known and therefore had a broad scope of protection, the judge emphasised that this did 
not mean that Adidas could also prohibit other stripe motifs. According to the Court, stripes 
and simple stripe motifs are not signs that are amenable to far-reaching monopolisation; they 
are common and must therefore be freely available to third parties, even when one specific 
stripe motif has acquired a strong distinctive character through use in trade.  
The judge admitted that some similarity between the trademark and the sign existed. 
However, according to the judge, the differences between the trademark and the sign were not 
marginal but essential because they would directly attract the attention of the consumer. The 
Adidas trademark consisted of three stripes, while the H&M stripe motif had two. This eye-
catching – and thus essential – difference, hindered the sign from being seen as confusingly 
similar to the trademark.412 Therefore, infringement could not be assumed.413 In this case the 
 
409 District Court of The Hague, judgment of November 8, 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:12949 
(Adidas/H&M), para 4.20. 
410 Ibid., paras 4.31-4.37.  
411 Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch, judgment of 29 March 2005, ECLI:NLGHSHE:2005:AT2596, BIE 
2005, 82 (Adidas/Marca c.s. and H&M). 
412 Ibid., para 4.20.  
413 Ibid., para 4.21. The judge also did not refer to market studies. Ibid., paras 4.22-4.24. Market studies were 
assessed under Article 2.20(1)(c) of the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property (BCIP) concerning 
trademarks with a reputation. The court of appeal, however, rejected the market studies because they could not 
prove that an economic link existed at the moment the infringement took place, namely in 1996.  
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judge thus explicitly referred to the need for competitors to freely use similar signs on the 
market.  
In 1999, the Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch414 had also ruled that there was no 
likelihood of confusion between the two stripes of H&M and the three stripes of Adidas. The 
judge argued that the average consumer of sports and leisure clothes was a smaller group than 
the average consumer. This group would sooner notice the distinction between the trademark 
and the sign, the pricing difference between H&M and Adidas (cheap versus expensive, 
respectively), the sales outlets of the clothes (H&M stores carry exclusively H&M products), 
the familiarity of the Adidas trademark, and the distinctive character of the trademark and the 
sign.415  
The fact that the trademark was well known did not lead the Court to conclude that a 
likelihood of confusion existed. Rather, the Court seemed to interpret the notoriety of the 
Adidas trademark as implying that consumers would not be confused.416 Besides, the judge 
argued that the results of the surveys in Belgium and Germany were insufficiently targeted 
and did not provide a decisive answer as to the likelihood of confusion.417  
Here we see that the factual circumstances meant that no likelihood of confusion 
existed. The judge decided not to take the consumer of everyday products as a benchmark, but 
rather a more brand-conscious consumer who is interested in sports and leisure clothes. This 
allowed the judge to give greater importance to freedom-of-competition arguments.  
 
414 Court of Appeal ’s-Hertogenbosch, judgment of 8 June 1999, case C9700988/BR (H&M/Adidas). 
415 Ibid., paras 4.11-4.12. The court of appeal had postponed the case in 1999 because of preliminary questions. 
In 2005, the same Court of Appeal ruled that the answers to the preliminary questions did not lead to a different 
outcome. According to the CJEU, association between the sign and the trademark is not sufficient to conclude a 
likelihood of confusion even in cases of a well-known mark. The likelihood of confusion needs to be positively 
affirmed. See Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch, judgment of 29 March 2005, 
ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2005:AT2596 (Adidas/Marca c.s. and H&M), para 6.5; CJEU, judgment 22 June 2000, case 
C-425/98 (Marca/Adidas), para 41. See also Benelux-Gerechtshof, 7 June 2002, ECLI:NL:XX:2002:AG7751, 
NJ 2003, 426 (Marca/Adidas), para 41. 
416 It was to be expected that the Court of Appeal would rather emphasise the reputation of the three-stripe motif, 
the high investments of Adidas, the similarity of the goods, and the similarity of the signs, and therefore 
conclude that a likelihood of confusion existed. These considerations, however, are reminiscent of the 
Picasso/Picaro case, in which the CJEU also ruled that the average consumer could have a particularly high 
level of attention at the time of purchasing the goods because of the nature of the goods in question—especially 
their price and highly technological character. A high level of attention could reduce the likelihood of confusion. 
The possibility that the consumer may on occasion have a lower level of attention—for example, when 
confronted with the sign unconnected with the act of purchase—was not relevant in this respect because “the 
existence of such a possibility does not prevent the taking into account of the particularly high level of attention 
exhibited by the average consumer when he prepares and makes his choice between different goods in the 
category concerned”. See CJEU, judgment of 12 January 2006, C-361/04 P (Picasso/Picaro), paras 39-41. 
417 Furthermore, although H&M argued that the two stripes were used merely decoratively, the judge ruled that 
this use must be weighed against Adidas’ use. Adidas had a right to protect its trademark because of the 
registration and the highly distinctive character that the trademark had acquired through intensive marketing 
campaigns. In other words, the judge explicitly recognised that the need to keep signs freely available should be 
weighed against the rights of the trademark owner. Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch, judgment of 29 March 
2005, ECLI:NLGHSHE:2005:AT2596, BIE 2005, 82 (Adidas/Marca c.s. and H&M), para 4.6. 
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In 1998, in the Fitnessworld/Adidas case418 the Court of Appeal of Arnhem also 
interpreted the relevant public as consumers who are more attentive than average. According 
to the judge, the relevant segment of the Adidas public are people who wish to be seen in 
exclusive and more expensive clothes. This public knows that Adidas uses a three-stripe motif 
and will therefore not be confused when confronted with clothes with two stripes attached in 
the same place, such as the Fitnessworld clothes. They will easily see the difference between 
two and three stripes, especially when purchasing clothes, because this is not as a rule done 
hastily or thoughtlessly.419  
In addition, the court of appeal believed that considering the overall impression, the 
three stripes were a distinctive and dominant element. Furthermore, it believed that Adidas 
tried to monopolise the stripes motif with its trademark. This monopolisation on the part of 
Adidas was not allowed in this case, in which the two-stripe motif was seen as a decorative 
feature and not a trademark, and the clothes considered had the trademark “Perfetto” in almost 
all cases.420 This shows that contrary to the Adidas/H&M case in 1999, the judge did more 
explicitly consider that the interest of the need to keep free must outweigh the interests of 
trademark owner Adidas.  
In 2006, Adidas lost against one of its big competitors in sports clothing: Nike. A 
strong preference for the need to keep free was evident. The District Court of The Hague421 
ruled that the public would interpret the two-stripe motif of Nike as a decorative feature and 
not as a trademark. The judge set aside Adidas’ evidence showing that consumers recognised 
the two-stripe motif as a trademark. In the Court’s opinion, Adidas had insufficiently refuted 
Nike’s criticism of the market studies.422  
But even if a small proportion of the relevant public recognised the two stripes as a 
trademark, according to the judge, particular decorative elements must remain freely 
available.423 Despite Adidas’ arguments, the judge considered that this was a factor that must 
be taken into account not only when assessing whether the trademark was suitable for 
registration, but also when determining the scope of protection. According to the judge, it 
would be in conflict with the system developed by the CJEU in the cases Chiemsee, Linde and 
Libertel424 – among others – not to weigh the need to keep signs freely available in the 
infringement assessment.425 In the Court’s logic, if that were the case, a trademark owner 
 
418 Court of Appeal of Arnhem, judgment of 18 August 1998, ECLI:NL:GHARN:1998:AK2233 (Fitnessworld/ 
Adidas). See also Supreme Court, judgment of 12 October 2001, ECLI:NL:PHR:2001:ZC3688 
(Adidas/Fitnessworld); CJEU, judgment of 23 October 2003, case C-408/01 (Adidas/Fitnessworld). 
419 Ibid., para 5.10. 
420 Ibid., para 5.11. 
421 District Court of The Hague, judgment of  5 July 2006, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2006:BA8987 (Adidas/Nike).  
422 Ibid., para 4.5.  
423 Ibid., para 4.8. 
424 CJEU, judgment of 4 May 1999, case C-109/97 (Chiemsee); CJEU, judgment of 8 April 2003, case C-53/01-
55/01 (Linde); CJEU, (judgment of 6 May 2003, case C-104/01 (Libertel). 
425 In the Windsurfing Chiemsee case, the CJEU explicitly recognised that descriptive signs or indications 
relating to categories of goods or services need to remain freely available because “it is in the public interest that 
they remain available, not least because they may be an indication of the quality and other characteristics of the 
categories of goods concerned, and may also, in various ways, influence consumer tastes by, for instance, 
associating the goods with a place that may give rise to a favourable response”. (CJEU, judgment of 4 May 
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could then prohibit the use of a sign through expanding the scope of protection which would 
normally not be registered because of reasons of general interest.426  
The district court also argued that the average consumer when confronted with the 
two-stripe motif would neither think of Adidas nor presume that the clothes belong to Adidas. 
Two stripes could be very easily distinguished from three. Furthermore, a consumer who was 
reasonably well informed could not be expected to be led exclusively by the two stripes. He 
would try to find out whether the clothes were indeed from Adidas, if the company came to 
his mind. Because of the familiarity of the three-stripe mark, when faced with two instead of 
three stripes, the consumer would more quickly question whether Adidas was involved with 
the origin. As soon as the consumer found out whether the hunch that the clothes might be 
from Adidas was right, however, he would immediately see the well-known Nike swoosh.  
According to the district court, it was inconceivable that the relevant public would 
think that Adidas and Nike could be economically related. An average consumer could not 
miss the fact that the two companies were major rivals. This fact, combined with the 
difference in the number of stripes, would distract the consumer from the thought that the 
companies could be economically related. According to the district court, there was no 
likelihood of confusion even if the consumer thought of Adidas.  
Moreover, expert studies also did not point to a likelihood of confusion.427 The 
interests of a third party to freely use a similar sign for similar goods therefore outweighed the 
interests of the trademark owner Adidas.428  
Contrary to the German court, the Dutch court left the way open for making normative 
corrections in favour of freedom-competition-arguments. In the German case, the CJEU’s 
ruling of granting more protection the more distinctive the trademark is could not be set aside, 
not even by the fact that the two-stripe-motif was combined with the highly well-known Nike 
swoosh mark. Trademark proprietors’ interests were dominant. The German court found the 
‘swoosh’ a purely figurative sign of inconspicuous size, such that the consumer would not 
perceive it as a dominant sign. A matching jacket would also hide the swoosh mark. In 
 
1999, case C-108/97, C-109/97 (Windsurfing Chiemsee), para 26). See also the conclusion of Advocate General 
Jacobs, para 63, case C-408/01 (Adidas/Fitness World).  
426 According to current EU trademark law, non-distinctive signs can acquire distinctiveness through use in 
trade: “Where signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or services, Members may 
make registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired through use.” (Art. 4(4) Trademark Directive, 
6quinquies(C)(1) Paris Convention and 15(1) TRIPS Agreement.) See also CJEU, judgment of 4 May 1999, 
cases C-108/97, C-109/97 (Windsurfing Chiemsee), paras 44–45). Unlike absolute grounds for refusal based on 
public policy or principles of morality and signs of high symbolic value, which cannot be overruled by 
demonstrating acquired distinctiveness through use in trade, non-distinctive, descriptive and generic signs can be 
registered if consumers perceive these signs as a badge of origin. 
427 District Court of The Hague, judgment of 5 July 2006, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2006:BA8987 (Adidas/Nike), paras 
4.9-4.10. 
428 For a contrary result, see the District Court of Amsterdam, judgment of 8 June 2006, 
ECLI:NLRBAMS:2006:BB7942 (Adidas/Scapa); Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, judgment of 8 November 
2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:BB7456 (Scapa/Adidas). It can be assumed that a competitor such as Nike does 
not need to profit from Adidas’ reputation. Nevertheless, Nike will not have chosen accidentally to bring its 




contrast to the swoosh mark, Nike’s two-stripes-motif would be perceived by consumers as an 
indication of origin, not as mere decoration.  
In the Dutch case, however, the court argued the other way around: the two-stripe-
motif of Nike was simply seen as a decorative feature. Furthermore, the Court explicitly 
indicated that even if some consumers perceived the two-stripe-motif as a trademark, 
freedom-of-competition arguments should outweighed trademark owners’ rights. In addition, 
the Dutch court stated that the notoriety of the Nike swoosh would prevent likelihood of 
confusion.  
In other words, both cases involved normative corrections: in the German case, 
normative corrections were made in favour of trademark owners’ high investments, in the 
Dutch case, normative corrections in favour of third parties’ need to keep signs freely 
available were decisive. However, the Dutch case particularly differed from the German case 
in that the court explicitly stated that normative corrections were justified without making 
assumptions about consumer perceptions alone.  
Lastly, in Denmark, one can also find decisions seeking to offer room for freedom-of-
competition arguments which preceded the CJEU decision in Adidas/Marca. The Højesteret 
(high court)429 ruled that the third party’s sign was not confusingly similar to the three-stripe 
motif of Adidas.430 The defendant sold jackets embellished with bands formed by four parallel 
stripes of equal width and length, and the bands were the same colour as the jacket. In the 
High Court’s opinion, consumers would generally know that Adidas’ trademark consists of 
exactly three and not four stripes. Furthermore, according to the High Court, the use of stripes 
on clothes was extremely common, especially on sports and leisure apparel. It was also 
common to place stripes along the side of the sleeves on a jacket.431 The High Court clearly 
followed a freedom-of-competition approach: “When determining the scope of protection for 
this trade mark, great emphasis must be put on the fact that other companies are not prevented 
from using stripes to embellish clothes to a further extent than what is necessary in order to 
protect the trade mark.”432 
 
The Danish high court thus explicitly expressed its concerns regarding the availability of signs 
on the market. The argument that the use of stripes on clothes was extremely common, 
especially on sports and leisure apparel, impacted the court’s decision. Adidas’ high 
investments in marketing and branding campaigns with respect to the three-stripe-motif could 
not overrule the fact that stripe motifs were extremely common. The likelihood-of-confusion 
assessment must be viewed in this light. 
As shown above, decisions preceding Adidas/Marca were more balanced in the 
Netherlands and Denmark than those following after the CJEU’s Adidas/Marca decision. In 
the cases following Adidas/Marca, the interests of the trademark owner Adidas were decisive. 
In these cases, courts ruled that consumers were more likely to be confused because of the 
notoriety of the brand. However, as pointed out earlier, from an empirical perspective, 
 
429 Højesteret (High Court), Second Division, judgment of 24 November 2005, [2006] E.T.M.R. 88, case 
361/2001, Adidas International B.V. v FDB. 
430 Ibid., para 72. 
431 Ibid., para. 70. 
432 Ibid., para. 71. 
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consumers are less likely confused when confronted with a high well-known mark. Therefore, 
courts made normative corrections in order to protect Adidas’ high investments.  
On the other hand, in cases preceding Adidas/Marca, courts also included the interests 
of third parties in their decision. In the court’s view, the need for other parties to freely 
compete with alternative products on the market was more important than the need to protect 
Adidas’ investments and consumers against confusion.  
As the cases before Adidas/Marca show, a different world with more room for 
freedom-of-competition arguments is plausible. Only when judges are able to implement 
normative corrections in favour of trademark owners as well as third parties is it possible to 
ensure an undistorted, fair and meaningful competition. Because appealing signs are not 
available in unlimited numbers, exclusive trademark rights on stripe motifs may affect the 
availability of design elements on the market and hinder competition. Stripe motifs contribute 
to the style and appearance of sports clothing and therefore give Adidas a competitive 
advantage from the sign as such.433 Therefore, it is necessary to also balance the third parties’ 
interests in the likelihood-of-confusion assessment as the Dutch and Denmark courts did 
before Adidas/Marca, particularly where appealing signs are concerned.  
The fact that the German and French courts clearly preferred to reward Adidas’ high 
investments without considering freedom-of-competition arguments makes their decisions 
less plausible. The more so since in these cases – with the exception of the Adidas/C&A case 
ruled by the Munich Regional Court – courts seem to hide their normative corrections in 
favour of trademark owners behind the rationales of consumer perception.  
The fact that national courts seem to have been veered towards a more investment-
based approach, particularly after Adidas/Marca, means other core values may become 
jeopardised, such as safeguarding freedom of competition and (commercial) freedom of 
expression. Ideally, therefore, the CJEU should change course and depart from the 
Adidas/Marca ban on the freedom-of-competition arguments in the infringement analysis.  
As a second-best solution, national courts could provide more room for the need to 
keep free under the current CJEU jurisprudence. The Dutch and Danish cases mentioned 
above can serve as an example. Within the present legal framework, judges could deviate 
from the pattern of automatically granting more protection when trademarks are very well 
known. They can emphasise the factual circumstances of the case, which indicate that 
consumers are not likely to be confused. Judges can interpret the concept of the average 
consumer flexibly. Instead of emphasising that the relevant public is an average consumer of 
everyday products who is not highly attentive – as the District Court of The Hague did in 
2017 – judges can also refer to an average consumer who is interested in sports clothes and is 
therefore highly attentive. Judges could also attach less value to consumer studies, particularly 
when the outcome of these studies is strongly criticised.  
The Picasso/Picaro case434 ruled by the CJEU may be used as a reference to make 
normative corrections in the likelihood-of-confusion assessment. The name “Picasso”, highly 
 
433 Max Planck Institute (2011), p. 52. 
434 CJEU, judgment of 12 January 2006, case C-361/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:25 (Picasso/Picaro). See Opinion of 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, judgment of 8 September 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:531 (Ruiz-Picasso 
and Others v OHIM), para 69: “Secondly, there is a certain general interest in protecting the names of great 
artists, which represent a universal cultural heritage, from insatiable commercial greed, in order to safeguard 
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well known among consumers as a painter, was also used as a trademark for cars. However, 
because the trademark was not so highly well known among consumers, the judge concluded 
that consumers would not likely be confused when confronted with the similar sign “Picaro”, 
also used for cars. From a conceptual perspective, the CJEU found the signs very different. 
This line of argument could also be used in the case of stripe motifs. Courts could make 
factual statements about the perception of consumers, for example that consumers usually 
perceive stripes as a decoration (as the CJEU did in the Picasso/Picaro case saying that 
consumers will particularly think of the painter). Under the umbrella of consumer perception, 
courts could reach a normative purpose, namely safeguarding free access to stripe motifs in 
the sports sector.435 
Furthermore, since the EU trademark law reform entered into force, the new 
limitations on non-distinctive signs might also provide room to consider the rights of third 
parties.436 This defence allows competitors to refer to the non-distinctiveness of the similar 
sign they use themselves. Competitors might argue that the similar stripe motif (i.e. two 
stripes) is not inherently distinctive, nor is it used to indicate origin, for example when the 
clothing bears the defendant’s own word mark.437 Although the three-stripe motif has 
acquired distinctiveness through use in trade on the market, the three-stripe-motif is also a 
design item that evokes associations which are inherent to the stripe motif itself. This original 
meaning should remain freely available for competitors.438  
However, it remains to be seen whether the new limitation will give competitors more 
freedom to use stripe motifs. Furthermore, under the new provision, the use of the sign is only 
justified if it is in accordance with honest commercial practices; a principle which constitutes 
in substance the expression of a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the 
trademark owner.439 Given the notoriety of the three-stripe motif, using a similar stripe motif 
 
their work from trivialisation. It is sad to think that the averagely informed, reasonably aware and perceptive 
consumer, who no longer links names such as Opel, Renault, Ford or Porsche with the outstanding engineers 
whose products were named after them, will, unfortunately, in the not-too-distant future be subjected to the same 
process in relation to the name Picasso.” 
435 See also Senftleben (2018), p. 324. Nevertheless, if courts follow this argument, they must ignore market 
studies that provide evidence that consumers are highly familiar with stripes and recognise them as a badge of 
origin. The difference with the Picasso case is that the three-stripe motif is very well known; the “Picasso” 
trademark for cars is less distinctive. Besides, stripe motifs do not have a clear meaning, while the word mark 
“Picasso” does have a clear reference to the painter Picasso. See, however, the Court of Appeal of The Hague, 
which argued that consumers were used to stripes on clothing, and that a stripe itself or the random combination 
of two stripes were so simple and trivial that they did not have any distinctive character. The court indeed found 
the market research not relevant to the case because it was at best a tool, and the questions were too vague and 
steering to yield reliable results (Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgment of January 28, 2020, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2020:72 (H&M/Adidas). 
436 Article 14(1)(b) TMD 2015; Article 14(1)(b) EU Trademark Regulation. 
437 See, for example, District Court of The Hague, judgment of 5 July 2006, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2006:BA8987 
(Adidas/Nike). See also CJEU, judgment of 10 April 2008, case C-102/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:217 
(Adidas/Marca), para 48: “In the present case, according to the decision making the reference and the 
observations submitted to the Court by the competitors of adidas, the latter rely on the purely decorative nature 
of the two-stripe motifs at issue to justify their use.” 
438 See Kur (2018), p. 89. 
439 CJEU, judgment of 23 February 1999, case C-63/97 (BMW/Deenik), para 61. 
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on sports clothing will probably be seen as unfairly competing with the trademark owner.440 
In addition, the use of a similar stripe motif cannot be seen as intended to give an indication 
concerning one of the specified characteristics of the goods.441 
The broadening of the limitation rights is very helpful, but it is not sufficient to 
safeguard third parties’ interests. The burden of proof lies with the defendant and the 
likelihood of confusion is still biased in favour of brand owners. A system where normative 
corrections can also be made in favour of third parties (like the former Dutch system) is to be 
preferred to a one-way system in which normative corrections are automatically made in 
favour of brand owners.442 The present legal framework would be apt to bring normative 
corrections both in favour of trademark owners and third parties under the umbrella of 
consumer perception. Ideally, the CJEU would change course and depart from the 




This chapter shows that it is necessary to also weigh policy concerns when making the 
likelihood-of-confusion assessment. Although it sounds empirically plausible to protect 
consumers against confusion, in reality this anti-confusion claim is based on normative 
considerations. The CJEU’s assumption that consumers are more likely to be confused when 
confronted with signs that are similar to a highly distinctive trademark is not correct. In fact, it 
is rather the other way around: the more distinctive the trademark, the less likely that 
consumers will be confused when confronted with a similar sign.  
The consequence is, however, that trademark owners’ marketing efforts are rewarded: 
the more they invest in a particular sign, the more protection they achieve. At the same time, 
competitors’ concerns may be disregarded because of Adidas/Marca.  
This is particularly problematic in relation to appealing signs such as stripe motifs. 
These signs not only serve as a source identifier, but also appeal to consumers and therefore 
give trademark owners an advantage over competitors on the market. Because Adidas is the 
only trademark owner who can use stripe motifs on sports and leisure garments, other 
competitors may be disadvantaged for a possibly unlimited period of time.  
This outcome could not have been the intent of the legislators who developed specific 
forms of protection for these signs, such as design protection or copyright protection, which 
expire within a limited period of time.443 Trademark proprietors should be encouraged to 
 
440 See also CJEU, judgment of 7 January 2004, case C-100/02 (Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co), para 26. 
441 CJEU, judgment of 10 April 2008, case C‑102/07 (Adidas/Marca), paras 47-48. 
442 The CJEU has actually already made normative corrections with regard to the public interests under the 
umbrella of consumer perception. Trademarks with a low degree of distinctiveness or market recognition often 
receive a strict scope of protection. Since consumers are more easily confused when trademarks are not so well-
known, this can also be seen as a normative correction against a too broad scope of protection. It would be 
against the trademark policy to grant more protection to trademark owners who have made fewer investments in 
market recognition or have chosen a common sign as a trademark. At the same time, by granting a strict scope of 
protection, public interests in keeping descriptive signs freely available to third parties on the market can be 
safeguarded. See Max Planck Institute (2011), p. 58; Ströbele (1991), p. 827. 
443 Unlike the classic trademark regimes, patent, industrial, and copyright law protect creative or innovative 
achievements as such for a limited period of time and later enrich the public domain after this period of time. On 
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invest in the quality and attractiveness of the goods or services and not be rewarded with 
competitive advantages from the sign as such.444  
Exclusive rights to appealing design items may also hinder innovation and stimulate 
standardisation.445 Competitors could be alarmed by Adidas’ enforcement strategy and avoid 
using stripes on sports and leisure clothes at all. As the cases illustrate, the competitors were 
big players – C&A, Marca Mode, H&M, and Nike – who are well-known among consumers. 
Moreover, the number of cease-and-desist letters that Adidas sent confidentially is unclear, so 
we do not know what in fact the impact of Adidas’ enforcement strategy has been.446  
As long as non-distinctive signs can acquire distinctiveness through use in trade, 
trademark owners will invest in appealing signs which give them a competitive advantage. An 
investment-based approach would further facilitate this process. Moreover, if national courts 
do not proactively refer to the need to keep signs freely available in their infringement 
assessment, the trademark system may finally develop into a self-servicing mechanism for the 
industry. In this marketplace, newcomers have less chance.  
As the case analysis surrounding the three-stripe motif illustrates, since Adidas/Marca, 
several courts seem to have followed this investment-based direction. Having said this, case 
law analysis for this article was restricted to three-stripe motifs. However, the same problem 
is conceivable with regard to other signs. Exclusive trademark rights on descriptive, cultural 
and non-traditional signs may also generate obstacles for competition, since these signs also 
give trademark proprietors a competitive advantage from the sign as such.447 
The confusion analysis must therefore be recalibrated. In order to provide enough 
room for the concerns of trademark owners and competitors (and ultimately also consumers), 
it is essential to apply normative corrections not only in favour of trademark owners but also 
in favour of competitors. The Adidas/Marca case must be revisited and the need to keep free 
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5 The Fairy Tale of the Average Consumer: Why We Should Not Rely 
on the Real Consumer When Assessing the Likelihood of Confusion 
 
The present chapter considers whether the confusion analysis in trademark law is at risk of 
being used strategically as a self-servicing mechanism by the industry to obtain trademark 
rights to descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs. In this context, two features of the 
trademark system are particularly worrisome. First, trademark owners can strengthen the 
distinctive character of their marks by investing in marketing and branding campaigns. 
Second, trademark owners can afford expensive surveys demonstrating the high 
distinctiveness of their marks and strengthening their position in an infringement case. A 
study of 189 Dutch cases reveals that in the likelihood-of-confusion assessment, the degree of 
a mark’s distinctiveness and corresponding empirical findings can have a deep impact. 
However, the study also shows that descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs were not 
often disputed. In practice, the risk of misappropriating these signs might therefore be limited. 
In some cases, however, trademark owners did succeed in achieving a broad scope of 
protection regarding descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs. Therefore, national courts 
should have more room to make normative corrections in favour of freedom-of-competition 
interests. This would allow judges to prevent trademark owners from achieving unjustified 




A central question in trademark infringement cases is whether the defendant’s sign is identical 
or similar to the claimant’s trademark and therefore likely to confuse the average consumer as 
to the origin of the goods or services.448 If the judge answers in the affirmative, the trademark 
owner can prohibit the defendant from using the sign that has been found to be confusingly 
similar. Because of the crucial role of consumer perception and its deep impact on the 
infringement analysis, it is of utmost importance to be clear about how we assess a likelihood 
of confusion.  
Should we assess consumer behaviour factually (empirical approach), or should we 
leave room for assumptions about how consumers ought to behave in the marketplace 
(normative approach)?449 In either approach, national courts have considerable freedom to 
 
* This chapter is based on: Anemaet, L (2020) The Fairy Tale of the Average Consumer: Why We Should Not 
Rely on the Real Consumer When Assessing the Likelihood of Confusion. GRUR Int 69(10):1008-1026. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/grurint/ikaa109. See also: Anemaet, L (2019) Beslissen in sub b zaken: hoe beoordelen 
rechters of een consument in verwarring is of niet? Berichten industriële eigendom 3:122-131. 
448 See para 16 of the Preamble of the TMD 2015 (Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] 
OJ L336/1). See also para 11 of the Preamble of the EUTMR (Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (codification) [2017] OJ 
L154/1). In practice, the anti-confusion provision has been the most frequently used tool in infringement cases 
(art 10(2)(b) TMD 2015 and art 9(2)(b) EUTMR). See Paul GFA Geerts and Anne Marie E Verschuur (eds), 
Kort Begrip van het Intellectuele Eigendomsrecht (13th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2018) 312. 
449 Graeme B Dinwoodie and Dev S Gangjee, ‘The Image of the Consumer in European Trade Mark Law’ in 
Dorota Leczykiewicz and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law (Hart Publishing 
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substantiate their decisions with normative considerations and empirical findings. After all, 
according to the CJEU, the judge must assess the likelihood of confusion globally, taking into 
account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case.450  
This chapter addresses the potential risk of overreliance on empirical findings. 
Without normative corrections, EU trademark law may become a self-servicing mechanism 
for the industry. The infringement analysis may especially become imbalanced if judges were 
only interested in empirical studies seeking to demonstrate the existence of a likelihood of 
confusion or the reputation of the trademark.451  
Trademark owners often have the financial resources necessary to invest in expensive 
marketing campaigns to educate consumers to perceive a sign as a source identifier. The more 
a trademark owner invests in advertising presenting a sign as an identifier of commercial 
source, the broader will be the scope of protection. Consumers will view a trademark more 
positively after repeated exposure.452 The more the trademark is seen as a symbol of a 
desirable lifestyle, the more willing consumers will be to pay extra for the brand image that 
the trademarked product evokes.453 The stronger a trademark, the easier it is to prove a 
likelihood of confusion.454 
 
2018) 345. For example, the CJEU’s assumption that consumers are not in the habit of perceiving colours and 
shapes as trademarks is a normative correction of the factual circumstances. See for example Case C-218/01 
Henkel ECLI:EU:C:2004:88, para 49; Case C-136/02 P Mag Instrument v BHIM ECLI:EU:C:2004:592, para 31; 
Case C-173/04 P Deutsche SiSi-Werke v BHIM ECLI:EU:C:2006:20, para 31; Case C-104/01 Libertel 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:244; Case C-49/02 Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2004:384, para 39. 
450 Case C-251/95 Puma v Sabel ECLI:EU:C:1997:528, para 22. For example, how a trademark is used (eg in a 
particular colour) plays a role in the global appreciation of the likelihood of confusion (Case C-252/12 
Specsavers ECLI:EU:C:2013:497, paras 38, 41). 
451 Recognition of a trademark on the market is first mentioned as a relevant infringement factor in para 16 of the 
Preamble of the TMD 2015. This may indicate the high value attached to the factor of distinctiveness. See also 
para 11 of the Preamble of the EUTMR.  
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Research suggests that the success of a well-known mark is primarily related to its 
familiarity and not so much to the characteristics of the product itself. Besides, consumers are 
also inclined to interpret information in line with their expectations. If a consumer has 
positive feelings towards a particular trademark, she/he will also interpret following 
exposures to the trademark positively. Familiarity is therefore a strong predictor of consumer 
decisions.455 Hence, there is the prospect of an attractive return on investment. Furthermore, 
trademark owners can invest in expensive empirical studies to demonstrate a highly 
distinctive character and the existence of a likelihood of confusion.  
A system biased towards trademark owners’ investments could harm competitors’ 
freedom of competition. Exclusive trademark rights on fantasy marks and other fanciful forms 
of marks need not create substantial entrance barriers for competitors, but descriptive, cultural 
and non-traditional signs do.456 These signs give trademark owners economic advantages that 
go beyond their own investment in the sign, and should be kept freely available for 
competitors on the market.457  
It is, however, unclear to what extent trademark owners strategically use the current 
trademark system to strengthen their own gains in this way. To bring light into the darkness, 
several cases will be analysed to explore how precisely national courts assess likelihood-of-
confusion questions in practice and whether they follow a more normative or empirical 
approach to consumer perception.  
I first discuss the rationales of trademark law in the following Section II. In Section 
III, I offer an overview of previous empirical studies of infringement cases. Section IV 
describes the methodology that was followed. In Section V, I present the results of the 
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empirical analysis of 189 Dutch cases. A more detailed analysis of the results follows in 
Section VI. I also discuss an exemplary study of UK cases (Section VII) to find out whether 
similar conclusions can be drawn from other trademark systems relying on CJEU 
jurisprudence. Section VIII concludes.  
 
5.2 Trademarks and Free Competition 
 
The main function of trademark law is to ensure market transparency. In a transparent market, 
distinctive signs exclusively indicate goods or services from a single source of origin. In such 
a marketplace, trademark proprietors can clearly identify their offer, and consumers can 
quickly identify and choose their preferred goods or services. Signs that deceive consumers 
reduce the efficiency of the market because consumers inevitably purchase the wrong product. 
From an economic perspective, trademarks reduce consumers’ search costs.458   
In addition, distinctive marks encourage trademark owners to keep investing in 
product quality. If trademark owners lower their products’ quality, consumers are likely to be 
disappointed and may subsequently purchase another product. In particular with regard to 
unobservable product features, consumers are dependent on trademarks. Without trademark 
protection competitors would mainly invest in product features that consumers can observe 
and consumers would only pick by chance their preferred product. Furthermore, a transparent 
market offers the public’s preferred goods and services and does so in sufficient supply.459  
In order to ensure market transparency, we therefore seem to need strong trademark 
protection that prevents competitors from producing confusingly similar signs. Broad 
trademark protection encourages trademark proprietors to massively invest in marketing and 
branding campaigns resulting in lower search costs for consumers, and sufficient quality of 
available products. From this perspective, granting strong trademark protection seems entirely 
unproblematic.  
However, to achieve undistorted competition, trademark protection must always be 
balanced against other core values, such as free expression that enhances consumer 
information and consumer choice,460 and free competition that prevents unnecessary market 
entry barriers. The recognition of a need to keep signs freely available offers competitors 
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equal access to communication tools that can be used to inform consumers about product 
characteristics and compete for market shares.461  
The fundamental principle of the need to keep free is reflected in several provisions in 
the Trade Mark Directive and the EU Trade Mark Regulation and recognised by the CJEU in 
several cases.462 For example, signs that fall under the grounds for refusal are excluded from 
trademark protection.463 Furthermore, it must be shown that the use of the sign is made ‘in the 
course of trade’ and ‘in relation to goods or services’. These protection requirements ensure 
that trademark rights do not affect social and cultural forms of use. The likelihood-of-
confusion provision is directly related to the preservation of fair and undistorted 
competition.464  
Trademark limitations also aim to strike a balance between trademark proprietor’s 
interests and free movement of goods and services within the internal market, and the 
competitor’s interests in using a sign for legitimate purposes in accordance with honest 
practices. For instance, third parties are allowed to use descriptive signs identical or similar to 
protected trademarks or their components, where the trademark proprietor’s legitimate 
interests are not adversely affected.465  
In principle, trademark law and free competition do not conflict with one another. 
Trademarks provide information about the commercial source of goods or services and enable 
consumers to repeat satisfactory purchases. Trademark owners are stimulated to keep the 
quality of their goods or services high and to invest in their goods and services. Competitors 
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can choose a different sign if they want to freely offer their goods and services on the 
market.466  
However, in practice, competition can only be neutral if the appropriation of the sign 
as such does not grant trademark owners a competitive advantage from which third parties are 
excluded. This requirement is largely fulfilled with respect to (fantasy) word marks and other 
traditional forms of trademarks. These signs are often available in sufficient supply,467 such 
that third parties do not experience entrance barriers in competing with similar products and 
services.468  
By contrast, descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs are not available in 
unlimited numbers. Exclusive trademark rights may affect the availability of these signs on 
the market and generate obstacles to competition.  
A trader who has acquired exclusive rights in a word that describes a positive feature 
of a good obtains an unfair economic advantage because consumers easily understand what 
this trademark stands for.469 The costs for competitors, by contrast, are higher. They must 
inform consumers of the fact that their goods have this same feature while not enjoying the 
freedom of using the descriptive word as a mark in their brand name or advertising.470 
Appealing signs, such as colours, patterns and shapes contribute to the style and appearance 
of a specific product and therefore also give trademark proprietors a competitive advantage 
that goes beyond the sign as such.471 Cultural signs may evoke positive associations which 
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they have as a result of their evolution in the literary and artistic domain. Adopting such a 
sign, the trademark owner can benefit from these pre-existing connotations.472 
Trademark rights on these signs are likely to hinder innovation and encourage 
standardisation.473 Competitors might be afraid of risking a legal procedure and as a result 
avoid using particular signs on their products.474 In addition, brand owners have been obliged 
to use the same signs to keep the recognition level among consumers high. This could 
consequently lead to fewer investments in long-term product quality and the development of 
new products.475 As long as descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs can acquire 
distinctiveness through use in trade,476 trademark owners will invest in these appealing signs 
which give them a competitive advantage.  
In light of this, it is worrisome to see trademark owners strategically using the current 
trademark system to achieve the desired degree of protection. This has been particularly true 
since the Adidas/Marca case, in which the CJEU explicitly refused to consider the need to 
keep signs freely available for competitors on the market in the context of the confusion 
analysis.477 As a result, national courts are not allowed to make normative corrections in 
favour of freedom-of-competition interests in the likelihood-of-confusion assessment. If 
trademark owners succeed in making descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs a source 
identifier, they achieve an overbroad competitive advantage over third parties. We must 
therefore be cautious when giving weight to empirical findings. Trademark owners can 
strengthen the distinctive character of their marks by investing in marketing and branding 
campaigns. If the infringement analysis automatically rewards these investments by granting 
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broader protection, we are quite close to a self-servicing mechanism that allows trademark 
owners to shape consumer perception in a way that makes it possible to claim trademark 
rights to descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs. Moreover, trademark owners can also 
afford expensive surveys demonstrating the high distinctiveness of their marks. In this way, 
they can strengthen their position during an infringement case. Again, this can create a self-
servicing mechanism within trademark law.  
 
5.3 Previous Studies 
 
Previous studies have shown that the most important factors were similarity of signs and 
goods or services. Consumer surveys were not used on a regular basis so the risk of biased 
decisions favouring trademark owners’ investments might be limited. Nevertheless, it cannot 
be excluded that trademark owners’ investments did influence the likelihood-of-confusion 
assessment. The distinctiveness factor might have played an indirect role in the assessment of 
similarity of signs. 
For example, in an empirical study conducted in the United States, Barton Beebe 
analysed 331 cases of federal district courts opinions during a five-year period from 2000 to 
2004, using a multifactor test for the likelihood of consumer confusion. Beebe found that a 
number of factors were decisive, while the rest was redundant.478 This study revealed that 
similarity of marks was by far the most influential factor. Two other factors were decisive: the 
defendant’s intent factor, but only when it favoured likelihood of confusion, and the proximity 
of the parties’ good factor, but only when it disfavoured likelihood of confusion.479 By 
contrast, survey evidence played a minor role: it was only submitted in 20% of court 
decisions.480 Furthermore, the inherent strength factor, i.e. the distinction between fanciful, 
arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive and generic marks was not important in the courts’ opinion. 
On this point, legal doctrine diverged remarkably from the investigated district court cases.  
 Nevertheless, where courts did address the strength factor, in particular inherent 
strength, there was a surprisingly strong correlation between inherent strength and success in 
the multifactor test. In addition, in order to win the multifactor test, it seems that the plaintiff 
must not lose the strength factor. In most cases where the plaintiff lost this factor, it also lost 
the overall test. This also seems to apply in reverse: in 90% of the 102 judgments that found a 
likelihood of confusion, the strength factor favoured this result.481 
In an empirical analysis of likelihood-of-confusion factors in European trademark law, 
Ilanah Fhima and Catrina Denvir analysed 136 General Court decisions during a three-year 
period from 2009 to 2012. Fhima and Denvir found that the most important factors were 
similarity of marks and goods: overall confusion was never found unless both the parties’ 
marks and their goods were similar.482  
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On the contrary, the distinctiveness factor was generally ignored, or deemed irrelevant. 
Inherent distinctiveness was not considered in 68% of the cases, and acquired distinctiveness 
was not addressed in 82% of the cases. Inherent distinctiveness only favoured confusion in 
7% of the cases where likelihood of confusion was found, as compared to 6% regarding 
acquired distinctiveness. Nevertheless, the authors suggested that the distinctiveness factor 
may have had a limited impact because it also played a key role in the similarity of mark 
analysis via the dominant elements of both parties’ signs. In the authors’ opinion, it may seem 
odd to displace the factors of similarity of signs and goods or services with an additional 
factor that is not fully understood.483 
In an empirical study conducted in Australia, Huang, Weatherall and Webster found 
that survey evidence was rarely used in Australian case law, namely in 10.4% of cases from 
1990 to 2010.484 Their analysis pointed out that surveys had only limited impact on the results 
of the cases surveyed.485 Graeme Austin also indicated that survey evidence rarely carried 
weight in trademark infringement cases in the United States.486 A Dutch survey among judges 
of preliminary relief487 further showed that in practice, the judges’ own perception was the 
most important basis for the infringement decision, while expert opinions and public studies 
did not rank very high. Actually, these judges were more likely to have a negative attitude 
towards empirical evidence because they believed this evidence might be manipulated and 
contained leading or poorly formulated questions.  
In other words, the risk of overreliance on empirical findings might be limited. In 
previous studies, market analyses were rarely used and seldom decisive to the outcome of the 
decision. Furthermore, the distinctiveness factor seems to have played a modest role. In these 
studies, similarity of marks, and goods or services, were the core factors in the likelihood-of-
confusion assessment. Nevertheless, the finding that the factor of distinctiveness was not 
considered in the majority of cases need not imply that it did not impact the outcome of the 
case. It may be that the distinctiveness factor was not mentioned because the high degree of 
distinctiveness was self-evident. Furthermore, the distinctiveness factor might have played an 
indirect role in the assessment of similarity of signs. The global appreciation of the visual, 
auditory or conceptual similarity of the marks in question must be based on the overall 
impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant 
components.488 The more distinctive the trademark, the more similar the marks will be, in 
particular if the defendant uses the same highly distinctive elements. Therefore, we cannot 
rule out that trademark owners’ high investments in marketing and branding campaigns may 
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To uncover the impact of the degree of a mark’s distinctiveness and corresponding empirical 
findings on the likelihood-of-confusion assessment, I performed a data analysis of Dutch 
cases. In comparison to other EU countries, Dutch cases are of particular interest because of 
their regional character. The trademark legislation applied by Dutch courts is drawn from a 
single Treaty – the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property (Trademarks and Designs) – 
which has direct effect in three EU Member States.  
Furthermore, Benelux law has traditionally been an important element in harmonising 
EU trademark law. The impact of the Benelux tradition can still be seen in the anti-confusion 
provision in the EU Trade Mark Directive, which states that ‘the likelihood of confusion 
includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark’.489 This phrase 
was the result of a political compromise.  
Traditionally, the Benelux countries adopted a requirement of association when 
assessing likelihood-of-confusion cases, which meant that likelihood of confusion was also 
assumed when consumers merely associated the use of a third party’s sign with a trademark. 
The final phrase in the EU Trade Mark Directive was the result of the efforts of the Benelux 
countries to include their association requirement in the anti-confusion provision. 
Nevertheless, the CJEU ruled in the Puma/Sabel case that risk of association was a relevant 
factor, but not sufficient to conclude likelihood of confusion.490  
Considering this interaction between harmonised Benelux and EU law, it can be 
deemed an important first step to look at court decisions following from harmonised Benelux 
law, as reflected in Dutch case law. Providing this groundwork, the current analysis can 
encourage further studies relating to the situation in other EU Member States.  
A total of 189 cases were used in this study. The infringement cases were found in the 
Dutch databases ‘Kluwer Navigator’, ‘Legal Intelligence’491 and ‘IE-Forum.nl’. The data for 
the study comprise cases decided by district courts and courts of appeal over the period from 
2006 to 2018. This period was chosen because of the availability of electronic sources. The 
cases were published in Bijblad Industriële Eigendom (BIE), Berichten Industriële Eigendom 
(BerichtenIE), domjur.nl, Tijdschrift Intellectuele Eigendom en Reclamerecht (IER), NJ 
Feitenrechtspraak (NJF), Rechtspraak.nl, Jurisprudentie Geneesmiddelenrecht (JGR), 
Jurisprudentie Burgerlijk Procesrecht (JBPR), Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ), Officiële 
Jurisprudentie (LJN/ECLI), Rechtspraak van de Week (RvdW), and IEF.  
For an initial selection, generic search terms were entered, such as 
‘verwarringsgevaar’ (English: ‘likelihood of confusion’), ‘inbreuk’ (English: ‘infringement’), 
‘verwarring’ (English: ‘confusion’) and so forth. However, this did not lead to a practicable 
result. Subsequently, a more refined search method was chosen. The search terms used were 
 
489 See Tobias Cohen Jehoram, Constant van Nispen and Toon Huydecoper, European Trademark Law. 
Community Trademark Law and Harmonized National Trademark Law (Kluwer International 2010) 268.   
490 Case C-251/95 Puma v Sabel ECLI:EU:C:1997:528, para 26.  
491 This is an application for third-party databases. I used the application through a license from the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. See <https://www.navigator.nl/> and <https://www.legalintelligence.com> accessed 6 
July 2020.  
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‘artikel 2.20 lid 1 sub b BVIE’492, ‘artikel 9 lid 1 sub b GMVo’,493 ‘artikel 9 lid 2 sub b 
UMVo’494 and variants (hereafter ‘sub b’). It can be presumed that courts mention these 
search terms when assessing the likelihood of confusion, which makes it highly likely that 
these search terms can be found in similarity cases.  
After entering search terms, double cases were filtered out, as were infringement cases 
that did not contain likelihood-of-confusion questions. For example, the judge did not discuss 
whether a likelihood of confusion existed. If preliminary questions were referred to the CJEU, 
the case was also not included. Moreover, Supreme Court cases were not included because the 
Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) is not a court that establishes new facts. Finally, 
bibliographic data were noted, such as the date and citation of the judgment, and the court. 
The claimant won when the infringement claim based on sub b was successful. A loss 
was when the infringement claim had no success. If the trademark owner lost the case because 
of a limitation of trademark rights, such as freedom of comparative advertising, this was also 
termed a loss. A win was also coded if the trademark owner won some part of the issues. For 
example, this scenario would arise where two aspects were claimed to be infringing under sub 
b, but only one aspect was found to be infringing. Furthermore, when considering court of 
appeal cases, I looked at the party who was the trademark owner. This was not per definition 
the same person as the claimant. It was only considered whether or not the anti-confusion 
claim was successful. The outcome did not say anything about the rest of the claim. 
The factors analysed in the present study were: comparison of signs, comparison of 
goods and services, relevant public and degree of attention, the distinctiveness of the earlier 
mark, and consumer studies. 
Signs were comparatively categorised as ‘identical’, ‘almost identical’, ‘similar’, 
‘insufficiently similar’, and ‘not mentioned’. ‘Identical’ was used when the signs were 
considered to be ‘identical’. ‘Almost identical’ was used when the court found a very strong 
similarity between signs. ‘Similar’ was used when the signs were found to be similar. 
‘Insufficiently similar’ was used when the signs were dissimilar or when the degree of 
similarity was low. This category was also selected when the judge found the sign to be 
insufficiently similar to cause confusion. ‘Not mentioned’ was used when the degree of 
similarity was unclear. When several signs were claimed to be infringing, and only one sign 
 
492 art 2.20(1)(b) of the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property (Trademarks and Designs) (hereinafter 
BCIP): ‘A registered trademark shall provide its holder with an exclusive right. Without prejudice to the possible 
application of ordinary law in matters of civil liability, the exclusive right to a trademark shall permit its holder 
to prohibit any third party, without its consent, from: […] b. using in the course of trade a sign in respect of 
which, because it is identical or similar to the trademark and the goods or services covered by the trademark and 
the sign are identical or similar, there exists on the part of the public a likelihood of confusion that includes the 
likelihood of association with the trademark.’ This provision implements the confusion provision of the EU 
Trade Mark Directive 2008 (Art 5(1)(b) of the Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2008] OJ 
L299/25). See also art 10(2)(b) of the TMD 2015. Since 1 March 2019 the likelihood-of-confusion provision can 
be found in art 2.20(2)(b) of the BCIP. The BCIP was reformulated in the context of the new TMD 2015 and the 
further harmonisation of EU trademark law. The essence of the likelihood-of-confusion provision as prescribed 
in former BCIP law has remained unchanged in the new provision.   
493 art 9(1)(b) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark 
[2009] OJ L78/1. 
494 art 9(2)(b) EUTMR. 
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was considered sufficiently similar, this degree of similarity was coded. When several signs 
claimed to be infringing, the highest degree of similarity was coded.  
The type of mark was also assessed. The analysis only includes trademarks that were 
assessed under sub b. If the defendant infringed on both the word mark and the figurative 
mark, but only the word mark was considered in the assessment, only the word mark was 
coded.  
In addition, the guideline that the global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual 
similarity of the marks in question must be based on the overall impression given by the 
marks, bearing in mind in particular their distinctive and dominant components,495 was 
researched. A ‘yes’ was coded when the court referred to this ruling in the likelihood-of-
confusion assessment. A ‘yes’ was also coded when a reference was made to the distinctive or 
dominant elements of the signs, or when a similar expression was used. I also investigated the 
guideline that the average consumer only rarely has the opportunity to make a direct 
comparison between the different marks and must therefore place his trust in the imperfect 
image of them that he has in his mind.496 Furthermore, the guideline of the Dutch Supreme 
Court stating that similarities between signs are more important than differences was 
explored.497  
With regard to the factor of relationship of the goods and services involved, this was 
categorised as ‘identical’, ‘almost identical’, ‘similar’ and ‘slightly similar’, ‘dissimilar’ and 
‘not mentioned’. An ‘identical’ was selected when the goods and services were considered as 
‘identical’. An ‘almost identical’ was selected when the goods and services were regarded as 
‘identical or similar’ or when the goods and services were defined as very similar. A ‘similar’ 
was coded when the goods and services were found to be similar. A ‘slightly similar’ was 
coded when the goods and services were less similar. A ‘dissimilar’ was coded when the 
goods and services were argued to be dissimilar. An ‘unspecified’ was selected when the 
judge did not explicitly reason whether there was sufficient similarity of goods and services. 
The ‘relevant public and degree of attention’ factor was also explored. When a 
reference was made to the average consumer a ‘yes’ was selected. Furthermore, it was 
explored whether the court used the measurement invented by the CJEU498 of the average 
consumer who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, or 
another consumer, for example an expert who is highly attentive or a consumer who is less 
intelligent. When the heuristic of the CJEU concerning the average consumer or a similar 
qualification was found in the reasoning, this was coded as a ‘yes’.  
 Furthermore, the degree of distinctiveness was analysed. The degree of distinctiveness 
was categorised as ‘highly distinctive’, ‘distinctive’, ‘slightly distinctive’, ‘not distinctive’, 
and ‘unspecified’. The category ‘highly distinctive’ referred to signs with a highly distinctive 
character or signs that were well-known. A trademark was coded as ‘distinctive’ when there 
was a normal or sufficient degree of distinctiveness. A ‘slightly distinctive’ was coded when 
 
495 Case C-251/95 Puma v Sabel ECLI:EU:C:1997:528, para 23. When an implicit reference was made, ie when 
the guideline was not directly mentioned, but references were made to ‘dominant parts’ or ‘distinctive elements’, 
or similar terms, this was coded separately. 
496 See Case C-342/97 Lloyd v Loints ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, para 26. 
497 Dutch Supreme Court, 16 April 1999, IER 1990, 161 ‒ Bigott-Batco/Doucal. 
498 Case C-342/97 Lloyd v Loints ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, para 26. 
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the judge explicitly considered that the scope of protection was restricted or, for example, that 
the degree of distinctiveness was not so great. An ‘unspecified’ was coded when the judge did 
not state whether or not the sign was distinctive. When several trademarks were invoked in 
respect of sub b, the highest degree of distinctiveness was coded. The CJEU guideline stating 
that the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion was also 
explored.499 A ‘yes’ was coded when the court referred to this ruling in the likelihood-of-
confusion assessment.  
When the judge referred to consumer studies in the assessment of likelihood of 
confusion, a ‘yes’ was coded. When consumer studies played a role somewhere else, for 
example to support the assessment of trademarks with a reputation or when there were no 
consumer studies, a ‘no’ was selected. These consumer surveys were used to assess 
likelihood-of-confusion questions. Consumer surveys can prove that a trademark is well 
known and therefore has a highly distinctive character. A high score regarding the factor 
‘distinctiveness of the trademark’ makes an allocation for the infringement claim more likely. 
These consumer studies were possibly also used to assess whether an infringement was made 
under sub c, but this was not coded. A reference to consumer studies was only coded when 




In the sample studied, trademark owners more often won (65%) than lost (35%) anti-
confusion cases falling under sub b of the infringement provision at the EU and Dutch 
level.500 Moreover, trademark owners were more successful when they filed cases before 
specialised courts in The Hague (74%)501 than elsewhere in the Netherlands (59%) (see Table 
1).502  
 
Table 1: Number of cases where infringement under sub b was ruled, categorised by court, 
2006-2018  
 





59 21 80 
% 73.8% 26.3% 100% 
 
499 ibid para 28; Case C-251/95 Puma v Sabel ECLI:EU:C:1997:528, paras 24-25.  
500 The confidence interval of winning 123 out of 189 cases is 58.5<p<70.4%. With 95% reliability, it can be 
assumed that trademark owners won slightly more cases than they lose. This means we can assume with 95% 
reliability that the odds of trademark owners winning a case were between 58.5% and 70.4%. In this sample, a 
percentage of 65% was found (123 cases). This percentage could thus also have been anything between 58.5% 
(111 cases) and 70.4% (133 cases), eg if a bigger sample had been chosen. See also Fhima and Denvir (n 482) 
327. In 60% of cases the General Court found a likelihood of confusion and in 40% of cases no likelihood of 
confusion was found. See also Lotte Anemaet, ‘Beslissen in sub b zaken: hoe beoordelen rechters of een 
consument in verwarring is of niet?’ (2019) 3 Berichten Industriële Eigendom 122. 
501 The confidence interval of winning 59 out of 80 cases is 63.2%<p<80.6% (with 95% reliability). 
502 The confidence interval of winning 64 out of 109 cases is 49.5%<p<65.9% (with 95% reliability).  
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Other Number of 
cases 
64 45 109 
% 58.7% 41.3% 100% 
Total Number of 
cases 
123 66 189 
% 65.1% 34.9% 100% 
 
As expected from previous studies, similarity of signs was indeed the most important factor. 
The degree of similarity of signs directly influenced the decision.  
 In most cases, the signs were sufficiently similar (127 cases: 67%).503 In 35% of the 
cases, the degree of similarity was even high.504 In the majority of cases a word mark was 
assessed in the sample used for the present study (see Table 2).505 Figurative marks were also 
frequently assessed.506 But again, in the majority of cases this concerned a figurative mark 
containing word elements.507 Purely figurative marks508 and shape marks509 were seldom 
assessed (see Table 3).510  
Trademark owners had a stronger claim not only when the defendant’s sign was partly 
descriptive, but also when the trademark was highly distinctive.511 The same applied in 
 
503 The confidence interval of selecting 127 cases with (sufficient) similar signs from 189 cases is 
60.6%<p<72.4% (with 95% reliability).  
504 The confidence interval of selecting 67 cases with identical or highly similar signs from 189 cases is 
29.2%<p<41.1% (with 95% reliability).  
505 The confidence interval of selecting 90 word marks from 189 cases is 41%<p<53.4% (with 95% reliability). 
506 The confidence interval of selecting 56 figurative marks from 189 cases is 23.7%<p<35.1% (with 95% 
reliability). 
507 The confidence interval of selecting 49 figurative marks containing word elements from 189 cases is 
20.3%<p<31.2% (with 95% reliability). 
508 The confidence interval of selecting seven purely figurative marks from 189 cases is 1.4%<p<6.2% (with 
95% reliability). 
509 The confidence interval of selecting six shape marks from 189 cases is 1.1%<p<5.5% (with 95% reliability). 
510 It must be noted that the number of cases where several trademarks were claimed was in fact slightly higher. 
The analysis only included trademarks that were assessed under sub b.  
511 Cases where the distinctiveness of the trademark directly influenced the classification of the degree of 
similarity of signs, in a way that similarity was found: District Court of The Hague, 7 May 2008, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BD1049 ‒ Microsoft/Unicaresoft; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 9 December 2008, 
ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2008:BI3896 ‒ Campina/Cabrima; District Court of Rotterdam, 7 May 2009, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2009:BI3272 ‒ Ruan/Lonsdale; District Court of The Hague, 21 August 2009, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BJ7097 ‒ Burberry/Sacha; District Court of Arnhem, 28 August 2009, 
ECLI:NL:RBARN:2009:BJ6313 ‒ De Zuivelhoeve/Lidl; District Court of The Hague, 14 July 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2010:BN4672 ‒ FOL; District Court of Leeuwarden, 28 September 2011, 
ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2011:BV7389 ‒ ’t Stokertje; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 5 June 2012, 
ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2012:BX0979 ‒ H&M/G-Star; District Court of The Hague, 18 April 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BZ7844 ‒ Louboutin/Van Haren; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 13 August 2013, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2013:2967 ‒ Talens; District Court of The Hague, 25 April 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:7104 ‒ Daamen/Maxguard; District Court of Rotterdam, 25 March 2015, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:2044 ‒ FKP/Spirits; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 22 March 2016, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2016:669 ‒ H&M/G-Star; District Court of The Hague, 1 June 2016, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:5999 ‒ Leatherman; District Court of Zeeland-West-Brabant, 20 July 2017, 
ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2017:4651 ‒ Poppodium 013/Podium 0113.  
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reverse: if the trademark consisted of descriptive elements, the judge was more likely to 
conclude that the signs were not confusingly similar, particularly if the defendant had also 
added their own distinctive elements to the sign.512  
Nevertheless, trademark owners did not always lose when the trademark consisted of 
descriptive elements. In some cases, the judge argued that the signs were similar because both 
signs referred to the same conceptual meaning.513  
The court often referred to the CJEU ruling stating that the global appreciation of the 
visual, auditory or conceptual similarity of the marks in question must be based on the overall 
impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant 
components (124 cases: 66%).514  
In these cases, the claimant frequently won when the trademark was distinctive or 
highly distinctive.515 However, claimants also won cases when the trademark was slightly 
distinctive, i.e. in cases where the application of the rule ought rather to have led to a loss 
because the trademark did not actually consist of highly distinctive elements.516 
 Another guideline of the CJEU about the average consumer was that he only rarely 
had the chance to make a direct comparison between the different marks but must place his 
trust in the imperfect picture of them that he holds in his mind.517 In some cases where this 
rule was found,518 the claimant won.519 
In addition, judges sometimes applied the Bigott-Batco/Doucal rule of the Dutch 
Supreme Court (43 cases: 23%).520 According to this rule, the similarities between the 
 
512 A result that can be expected from CJEU case law: Case C-251/95 Puma v Sabel ECLI:EU:C:1997:528, para 
23. 
513 District Court of The Hague, 17 April 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BC0952 ‒ EasyCar/EasyOto, para 4.10; 
District Court of The Hague, 27 August 2008, 312349 / KG ZA 08-680 ‒ Nedac Sorbo/VPG, para 4.6; District 
Court of Gelderland, 25 January 2010, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2010:BL2843 ‒ Connect/Connection, para 4.8; 
District Court of Gelderland, 23 July 2013, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2013:2404 ‒ Connect/ConAct, para 4.11; District 
Court of The Hague, 2 February 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:921 ‒ KFH/IJsvogel, para 4.14; District Court of 
The Hague, 17 March 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:2626 ‒ CMIB/NMIB, paras 4.11, 4.14; District Court of 
The Hague, 30 March 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:3174 ‒ High Five/HIIT45, paras 4.14-4.15; District Court 
of Gelderland, 4 April 2017, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2017:2433 ‒ Connect/Connect Professionals, paras 4.7, 4.10; 
District Court of Amsterdam, 6 June 2017, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:3912 ‒ Stichting Expertisecentrum 
Discriminatie/Artikel 1, para 4.5; District Court of Gelderland, 13 September 2017, 
ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2017:4976 ‒ ExcluFloorS/Exclu-Floors, para 4.22.  
514 In 82 cases the ruling was explicitly mentioned by the court. In the other cases a reference was made to the 
distinctive or dominant elements, or a similar expression was used.  
515 The confidence interval of selecting 60 win cases from 74 cases that concerned a (highly) distinctive 
trademark and a reference to the CJEU ruling was found is 70.6%<p<88.1% (with 95% reliability). 
516 In 13 cases (out of 29 cases), the claimant of a slightly distinctive trademark won, even though a reference to 
this rule was found. The confidence interval of selecting 13 win cases with slightly distinctive trademarks from 
29 cases is 25.9<p<58.3% (with 95% reliability)). 
517 See Case C-342/97 Lloyd v Loints ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, para 26. 
518 The confidence interval of selecting 29 cases with a reference to the CJEU rule from 189 cases is 
10.8%<p<19.8% (with 95% reliability).  
519 The confidence interval of selecting win 20 cases with a reference to the CJEU rule from 29 cases is 
48.6%<p<80.0% (with 95% reliability). 
520 The confidence interval of selecting 43 cases with a reference to the Bigott-Batco/Doucal rule from 189 cases 
is 17.4%<p<27.8% (with 95% reliability). Because of the similar parts of the signs, the average consumer will 
conclude that the products are connected with each other. 
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trademark and the sign are more important than the differences.521 When courts referred to 
this rule, it seems to have strengthened a trademark owner’s claim: in almost all cases in 
which this rule was found, the trademark owner won.522  
 
Table 2: Number of cases where sufficient similarity of signs was found under sub b, 2006-
2018 
 








Total Number of 
cases 
10 57 60 53 9 189 
% 5.3% 30.2% 31.7% 28.0% 4.8% 100% 
 
Table 3: Number of sub b cases, categorised by type of trademark, 2006-2018 
 


















Total Number of 
cases 
90 49 7 6 31 6 189 
% 47.6
% 
25.9% 3.7% 3.2% 16.4% 3.2% 100% 
 
Similarity of goods and services was also a relevant factor. In the majority of cases, the goods 
and services were sufficiently similar (137 cases: 72%),523 while being dissimilar in only a 
few cases (10 cases: 5%)524 (see Table 4).525 The claimant did not go to court with an anti-
confusion claim if the goods and services were clearly dissimilar. In many cases, similarity of 
 
521 Dutch Supreme Court, 16 April 1999, IER 1990, 161 ‒ Bigott-Batco/Doucal.  
522 The confidence interval of selecting 37 win cases with a reference to the Bigott-Batco/Doucal rule from 43 
cases is 71.6%<p<92.2% (with 95% reliability).  
523 The court did not consider the degree of similarity of goods and services in 42 cases. The judge may have 
found it self-evident and thus not relevant in assessing the degree of similarity of goods. Another reason could be 
that the court had already decided that there was no likelihood of confusion based on other factors (the 
confidence interval of selecting 42 cases without a classification of goods and services from 189 cases is 
16.9%<p<27.3%, with 95% reliability).  
524 The confidence interval of selecting ten cases with dissimilar goods and services from 189 cases is 
2.6%<p<8.2% (with 95% reliability). 
525 In the Canon v Cannon case the CJEU ruled that a lesser degree of similarity between goods and services can 
be compensated for by a greater degree of similarity between marks (Case C-39/97 ECLI:EU:C:1998:442, para 
17). The CJEU ruling was sometimes mentioned, but odds were slim that a small degree of similarity of goods 
and services would be compensated for. The judge considered the goods and services to be highly similar in 
many cases but slightly similar in only a few cases. 
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the goods and services was even high or identical. Nevertheless, trademark owners did not 
necessarily win more often when the goods and services were highly similar.526  
 
Table 4: Number of cases where infringement under sub b was ruled, categorised by degree 
of similarity of goods and services, 2006-2018 
  
    Win Loss Number of 
cases 
Degree of similarity  Identical Number of 
cases  
52 13 65 






25 6 31 
    % 80.6% 19.4% 100% 
  
Similar Number of 
cases 
33 5 38 






2 1 3 
  
 
% 66.7% 33.3% 100% 
  
Dissimilar Number of 
cases 
0 10 10 






11 31 42 
    % 26.2% 73.8% 100% 
Total Number of 
cases 
123 66 189 
% 65.1% 34.9% 100% 
 
In most cases, the judge referred to the average consumer with a standard degree of attention. 
In 87 cases (46%) (see Table 5),527 the judge referred explicitly to the average consumer, 
while in 29% of the cases, the judge mentioned that the average consumer was reasonably 
well informed, observant and circumspect.528 Only in some cases did the judge explicitly refer 
 
526 The confidence interval of selecting 77 win cases with identical or highly similar goods and services from 96 
cases is 71.2%<p<85.8% (with 95% reliability). The confidence interval of selecting 35 win cases with (slightly) 
similar goods and services from 41 cases is 70.4<p<91.8% (with 95% reliability).  
527 The confidence interval of selecting 87 cases with a reference to the average consumer from 189 cases is 
39.4%<p<51.8% (with 95% reliability). 
528 The confidence interval of selecting 54 cases with a reference to the average consumer who is reasonably well 
informed, observant and circumspect from 189 cases is 22.7%<p<34% (with 95% reliability).  
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to a consumer with a higher or lower degree of attention.529 Judges might be unwilling to label 
consumers as being of limited competence.530  
  
Table 5: Number of cases that mention the average consumer under sub b, 2006-2018 
 
      The average consumer 
is mentioned 
The average consumer 
is not mentioned 
Number of 
cases 
Total Number of 
cases 
87 102 189 
% 46.0% 54.0% 100% 
 
The distinctiveness of the trademark, however, was an important factor. In most cases, the 
trademark was sufficiently distinctive (148 cases: 78%) (see Table 6).531 The degree of 
distinctiveness of the trademark was often high or average (107 cases: 57%),532 while in 22% 
of the cases the trademark was slightly distinctive.533 In a third of the cases, the trademark 
was considered to be highly distinctive,534 a factor that helped the trademark owner win 
significantly more often.535 Conversely, trademark owners lost (slightly) more often when the 
trademark was averagely536 or slightly distinctive.537  
Furthermore, courts did not often explicitly refer to the rule that consumers are more 
easily confused when confronted with a highly distinctive trademark.538 However, if the 
 
529 This is in line with CJEU case law: Case C-342/97 Lloyd v Loints ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, para 26. The 
confidence interval of selecting 27 cases with a reference to a consumer with a higher of lower degree of 
attention from 189 cases is 9.9%<p<18.6% (with 95% reliability).  
530 Fhima and Denvir (n 482) 337. The judge found that the consumer was less experienced in the following 
cases: District Court of Amsterdam, 4 June 2014, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:3882 ‒ Studio 100/Flappelientje; 
District Court of The Hague, 10 June 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:7508 ‒ ’t IJs van Columbus; District Court 
of The Hague, 7 September 2011, HA ZA 09-589 ‒ TUC/Apéro; District Court of Gelderland, 23 July 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2013:2404 ‒ Connect/ConAct; District Court of Oost-Brabant, 11 July 2016, 
ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2016:3653 ‒ De Vries/Bakx. 
531 The confidence interval of selecting 148 cases with sufficiently distinctive trademarks from 189 cases is 
72.3%<p<82.7% (with 95% reliability). In 38 cases the court did not mention the degree of distinctiveness. 
However, the degree of distinctiveness was not always unclear. When infringement was ruled, it can be 
presumed that the trademark was sufficiently distinctive. The judge apparently found it not necessary to assess 
the degree of distinctiveness in all cases. 
532 The confidence interval of selecting 107 cases with (high) distinctive trademarks from 189 cases is 
49.9%<p<62.2% (with 95% reliability). 
533 The confidence interval of selecting 41 cases with slightly distinctive trademarks from 189 cases is 
16.4%<p<26.7% (with 95% reliability). In a few cases the trademark was defined as not distinctive.   
534 The confidence interval of selecting 57 cases with highly distinctive trademarks from 189 cases is 
24.2%<p<35.6% (with 95% reliability). 
535 The confidence interval of selecting 50 win cases with highly distinctive trademarks from 57 cases is 
76.1%<p<92.9% (with 95% reliability).  
536 The confidence interval of selecting 35 win cases with averagely distinctive trademarks from 50 cases is 
55.6%<p<78.8% (with 95% reliability). 
537 The confidence interval of selecting 18 win cases with slightly distinctive trademarks from 41 cases is 
28.5%<p<55.5% (with 95% reliability). 
538 Case C-251/95 Puma v Sabel ECLI:EU:C:1997:528, paras 24-25; Case C-342/97 Lloyd v Loints 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, para 28. 
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trademark was indeed highly distinctive, this strengthened the trademark owner’s position. 
Out of 25 cases,539 the trademark owner won 21 cases540 and lost only four.541 
Moreover, judges frequently concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion by 
emphasising the highly distinctive character, for instance in their final conclusion (‘Given the 
high degree of distinctiveness, it can be concluded that consumers are likely to be confused’). 
When judges did so, they actually followed the CJEU rule542 without explicitly mentioning 
it.543  
 
Table 6: Number of cases where sufficient distinctiveness of the trademark was found under 
sub b, 2006-2018 
  
    Win Loss Number of 
cases 




50 7 57 
distinctiveness %  87.7% 12.3% 100% 
 
Distinctive Number of 
cases 
35 15 50 






18 23 41 
    % 43.9% 56.1% 100% 
  
Not distinctive Number of 
cases 
0 3 3 
  
 
% 0.0% 100.0% 100% 
  
Unspecified Number of 
cases 
20 18 38 
    % 52.6% 47.4% 100% 
Total Number of 
cases 
123 66 189 
% 65.1% 34.9% 100% 
 
 
539 The confidence interval of selecting 25 cases with a reference to the CJEU rule from 189 cases is 
9%<p<17.4% (with 95% reliability). 
540 The confidence interval of selecting 21 win cases with a reference to the CJEU rule from 25 cases is 
62.5%<p<91,8% (with 95% reliability). 
541 Of the 25 cases in which the judge explicitly referred to this rule, this rule was also applied. In the four cases 
in which the claimant lost, the trademark was not (sufficiently) well known, or despite the notoriety of the 
trademark, likelihood of confusion could not be presumed because the defendant’s sign was insufficiently similar 
to the trademark. 
542 Case C-251/95 Puma v Sabel ECLI:EU:C:1997:528, paras 24-25; Case C-342/97 Lloyd v Loints 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, para 28. 
543 In at least 57 cases the trademark was highly distinctive. In 39 cases this rule was not found. In 33 win cases 
the notoriety of the trademark may have strengthened the claim. In six cases the trademark owner lost even 
though the trademark was well known. The confidence interval of selecting 33 win cases with highly distinctive 
trademarks from 39 cases is 69%<p<91.3% (with 95% reliability). 
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The number of cases where empirical evidence was used was 24, i.e. 13% of the cases (see 
Table 7).544 In most cases the claimant presented a consumer study to the court. The consumer 
studies were related to the market strength of the trademark as well as to likelihood-of-
confusion questions. In this sample, trademark owners more often won cases when they 
presented consumer studies to the court.545  
 
Table 7: Number of cases where consumer surveys were referred to under sub b, 2006-2018 
 
      Reference to consumer 
surveys  




Total Number of 
cases 
24 165 189 










544 The confidence interval of selecting 24 cases with a reference to consumer surveys from 189 cases is 
8.5%<p<16.8% (with 95% reliability). See District Court of Groningen, 14 February 2007, 
ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2007:AZ8277 ‒ DHA/Van der Laan; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 23 August 2008, 
ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2007:BC0670 ‒ Bacardi/Food Brokers; District Court of Arnhem, 28 November 2007, 
ECLI:NL:RBARN:2007:BC0196 ‒ Pointer/Point Bike; District Court of Amsterdam, 7 May 2009, 
ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2009:BI3273 ‒ TROS/RTL; District Court of The Hague, 15 July 2009, 294029 / HA ZA 07-
2704 ‒ Red Bull/Osborne; District Court of The Hague, 21 August 2009, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BJ7097 ‒ 
Burberry/Sacha; District Court of Arnhem, 28 August 2009, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2009:BJ6313 ‒ De 
Zuivelhoeve/Lidl; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 26 January 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BL1936 ‒ 
IKEA/Serboucom; District Court of The Hague, 9 August 2011, 398829 / KG ZA 11-848 ‒ G-Star/C&A; District 
Court of The Hague, 7 September 2011, HA ZA 09-589 ‒ TUC/Apéro; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 20 
September 2011, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BS8933 ‒ Red Bull/Osborne; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 5 June 
2012, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2012:BX0979 ‒ H&M/G-Star; District Court of Amsterdam, 12 June 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:6541 ‒ Chanel/Glamorous; District Court of Midden-Nederland, 12 March 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2014:1369 ‒ Armaturen; District Court of The Hague, 2 April 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:5261 ‒ Stichting Paperclip/NCRV; Court of Appeal of Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 1 
December 2015, 200.135.172/02 ‒ H&M/Adidas; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 22 March 2016, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2016:669 ‒ H&M/G-Star; District Court of The Hague, 20 July 2016, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:8293 ‒ Fleurop/Topbloemen; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 14 March 2017, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:561 ‒ Red Bull/Leidseplein Beheer; District Court of The Hague, 5 July 2017, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:7178 ‒ G-Star/Topstreetwear; District Court of The Hague, 8 November 2017, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:12949 ‒ Adidas/H&M; District Court of The Hague, 16 November 2017, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:13293 ‒ Diesel/CK; District Court of Midden-Nederland, 25 April 2018, 
ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2018:1768 ‒ IT-Staffing/Staffing it; District Court of Overijssel, 9 August 2018, 
ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2018:2957 ‒ Dealerdirect/WijKopenAutos.  
545 However, it is difficult to draw conclusions because the confidence interval of selecting 14 win cases with a 





5.6.1 Risk of Overbroad Protection 
 
As the results show, some patterns underpinning the studied cases indeed confirm that judges 
possibly favour trademark owners’ investments in anti-confusion cases.  
In the sample studied, trademark owners more often won than lost anti-confusion 
cases falling under sub b of the infringement provision at EU and Dutch level. Moreover, not 
all cases ended up in court because the overwhelming majority were settled amicably.546 In 
practice, wealthier litigants had more resources for sustaining a dispute,547 so that the odds of 
winning might have been even higher had the settled disputes also been included. 
Furthermore, trademark owners won more cases when they invested in a particular 
sign. In a third of the cases, the trademark was considered to be highly distinctive, a factor 
that helped the trademark owner win significantly more often. Conversely, trademark owners 
lost (slightly) more often when the trademark was averagely or slightly distinctive. By 
comparison, trademark owners did not necessarily win more often when the goods and 
services were highly similar.548  
CJEU case law also illustrates the impact of the trademark’s market strength on the 
confusion analysis. In some cases, courts explicitly referred to and applied the rule that 
consumers are more easily confused when confronted with a highly distinctive trademark.549 
If the trademark was indeed highly distinctive, this strengthened the trademark owner’s 
position.550 
 
546 Huang, Weatherall and Webster (n 484) 192; William M Landes, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual 
Property Litigation: Some Preliminary Results’ (2004) 41 Houston Law Review 749. See for a similar result in 
patent litigation: Fiona Rotstein and Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘Filing and Settlement of Patent Disputes in the 
Federal Court: 1995-2005’ (2007) 68 Intellectual Property Forum 65. 
547 Huang, Weatherall and Webster (n 484) 192; George L Priest and Benjamin Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes 
for Litigation’ (1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
548 For example, In the Tommy/Tel Sell case involving home trainers, the judge found that consumers were not 
likely to be confused because the sign ‘Vita Dual Bike’ was not similar to the trademark VITARID-R. The word 
element ‘Vita’ was used for fitness machines and therefore slightly descriptive. Although the goods were 
identical, the trademark owners still lost because the degree of distinctiveness and the similarity of signs were 
not very high (District Court of The Hague, 8 November 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:12687 ‒ Tommy/Tel 
Sell.   
549 Case C-251/95 Puma v Sabel ECLI:EU:C:1997:528, paras 24-25; Case C-342/97 Lloyd v Loints 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, para 28. 
550 See for example the following winning cases where the trademark was inherently not very distinctive but 
acquired distinctiveness through use in trade because of marketing investments: District Court of The Hague, 25 
October 2006, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2006:BB2076 – Substral/Substra(flores); District Court of Overijssel, 14 
August 2007, ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2007:BC2582 – de Telegraaf; District Court of The Hague, 21 August 2009, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BJ7097 – Burberry/Sacha; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 24 November 2009, 
105.005.269/01 / KG ZA 06/288 – Orange/Otip; Court of Appeal of Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 1 December 2015, 
200.135.172/02 – Adidas/H&M; District Court of Midden-Nederland, 30 August 2017, 
ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2017:4442 – WSM/Ouderenbond; District Court of The Hague, 8 November 2017, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:12949 – Adidas/H&M; District Court of Midden-Nederland, 25 April 2018, 
ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2018:1768 ‒ IT-Staffing/Staffing it. The trademark owner also sometimes lost even though 
the trademark had acquired distinctiveness through use in trade: District Court of Noord-Nederland, 14 February 
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Furthermore, not only did a high degree of distinctiveness play a role as a separate 
factor in the global assessment, it also impacted the assessment of similarity between signs. 
The CJEU namely prescribed that the global appreciation of the visual, auditory or conceptual 
similarity of the marks in question must be based on the overall impression given by the 
marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components.551 Because 
of the notoriety of the trademark, the trademark naturally consists of distinctive and dominant 
elements. When judges referred to this rule, they often labelled signs as confusingly similar 
when the trademark was (highly) distinctive.  
If judges also applied the Bigott-Batco/Doucal rule of the Dutch Supreme Court,552 
stating that the similarities between the trademark and the sign were more important than the 
differences, this further strengthened trademark’s infringement claim. In almost all cases in 
which this rule was found, the trademark owner won. 
In addition, in the majority of cases judges referred to the average consumer with a 
normal level of attention.553 It may have been easier to conclude that such an average 
consumer was more likely to be confused when seeing signs similar to a highly distinctive 
trademark than a more experienced consumer with a higher degree of attention. Experts who 
are highly attentive are likely to notice even slight differences if the stakes are high.  
Furthermore, survey evidence also strengthened the trademark claim. Trademark 
owners more often won than lost when consumer studies were presented to the judge. 




The analysis also suggests that the situation is not alarming. In practice, in the majority of 
cases the assessment concerned a word mark. Figurative marks were also frequently assessed, 
but again, in the majority of cases this concerned a figurative mark containing word elements. 
Purely figurative marks and shape marks were seldom assessed.554 The same applied to 
descriptive555 and cultural signs.556  
 
2007, ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2007:AZ8277 – DHA/Van der Laan; Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 17 February 
2009, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BH3125 – Davidoff/Coscentra; Court of Appeal of The Hague, 24 February 
2009, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2009:BH6459 – Reckitt/Action. 
551 Case C-251/95 Puma v Sabel ECLI:EU:C:1997:528, para 23. 
552 Dutch Supreme Court, 16 April 1999, IER 1990, 161.  
553 This is in line with CJEU case law: Case C-342/97 Lloyd/Loints ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, para 26. Cohen 
Jehoram, Van Nispen and Huydecoper also argue that there is a tendency that only in very specific cases does 
the judge assume another consumer than the general public ((n 489) 148). Fhima and Denvir found a similar 
result: Fhima and Denvir (n 482) 336. 
554 This is in line with CJEU case law. The CJEU has made it more difficult to register non-traditional signs: 
Case C-53/01-C-55/01 Linde ECLI:EU:C:2003:206, para 48; Case C-218/01 Henkel ECLI:EU:C:2004:88, para 
52; Case C-136/02 P Mag Instruments ECLI:EU:C:2004:592, paras 30-31; Case C‑205/13 Hauck v Stokke 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2233; Case C-104/01 Libertel ECLI:EU:C:2003:244, para 55; Case C-299/99 Philips v 
Remington ECLI:EU:C:2002:377; Case C-48/09 P ECLI:EU:C:2010:516 Lego Juris v BHIM, paras 56-57; Case 
C‑30/15 P Simba ECLI:EU:C:2016:849.  
555 The opposite of descriptive is ‘not distinctive’. The number of ‘not distinctive’ cases can be found under the 
‘degree of distinctiveness’ factor. Judges seldom assessed that a trademark was not distinctive.  
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Granting broad protection to fanciful word and figurative marks also seems consistent. 
A strong and firm protection encourages trademark proprietors to maintain the high quality of 
their product, thereby protecting their reputation. Strong trademark rights ensure that 
consumers are protected against confusion and have lower search costs. In addition, the 
appropriation of fanciful signs and figurative marks, as already discussed above, does not as 
such grant trademark owners a competitive advantage over third parties. From this 
perspective, a broad protection might be justified. 
In addition, in some cases, both parties had enough financial resources to afford the 
often expensive studies. For example, in the G-Star/H&M case,557 both parties presented 
consumer studies to the court, such that there was no imbalance between the litigants. 
Nevertheless, we do not know how many cases were settled amicably. It may well be that 
parties with enough financial resources were more likely to go to court. 
Furthermore, the mechanism of granting more protection the higher the trademark 
owner’s investments did not necessarily apply. For example, in the Red Bull/Leidseplein 
Beheer case558 concerning energy drinks, the court did not apply the rule that well-known 
marks have a broader scope of protection. This also influenced the question of whether the 
signs were similar. The court argued that there was no similarity between the RED BULL 
trademark and ‘The Bulldog’ sign.  
Firstly, the court argued that there were no major visual similarities between the signs. 
According to the judge, the RED BULL trademark also included a picture of a bull and the 
word elements ‘Krating-Daeng’ and ‘Red’ which were elements that could not be neglected 
even though they were less distinctive than ‘bull’. ‘The Bulldog’ sign did not have these 
elements.  
In the case of ‘The Bulldog’ sign, the court argued that ‘dog’ was as important as 
‘bull’, while the element ‘The’ could not be ignored from a visual perspective. The RED 
BULL trademark did not have the elements ‘dog’ and ‘the’.559 In the court’s opinion, the fact 
that the words ‘Krating-Daeng’ were displayed in a smaller font in the REDBULL trademark 
did not alter the fact that these words were spoken. Therefore, the court argued, the emphasis 
placed on the element ‘bull’ was less auditory than visual. The court argued that the auditory 
similarity was even less relevant than the already fragile visual similarity.560  
 
556 The judge did not assess whether the trademark was a cultural sign. A cultural sign was disputed in the 
following cases: District Court of The Hague, 26 March 2009, 329321 / KG ZA 09-115 ‒ Einstein/Van 
Bokhoven; Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 7 July 2009, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BJ7367 ‒ Bavaria/AP; District 
Court of Noord-Nederland, 28 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2011:BV7389 ‒ ’t Stokertje; District Court of 
Noord-Nederland, 15 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2012:BV9716 ‒ ’t Stokertje; District Court of The Hague, 
10 June 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:7508 ‒ ’t IJs van Columbus; District Court of The Hague, 13 September 
2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:10421 ‒ Sita/Sina. 
557 Court of Appeal of The Hague, 22 March 2016, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2016:669 ‒ H&M/G-Star.  
558 Court of Appeal, 14 March 2017, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:561 ‒ Red Bull/Leidseplein Beheer. See also 
previous cases: Case C-65/12 Leidseplein/Beheer/Red Bull ECLI:EU:C:2014:49; Dutch Supreme Court, 13 
February 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:292 ‒ Leidseplein Beheer/Red Bull. See also: Court of Appeal of The Hague, 
20 September 2011, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BS8933 ‒ Red Bull/Osborne. See also Anemaet (n 500) 125. 
559 Court of Appeal of The Hague, 14 March 2017, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:561 ‒ Red Bull/Leidseplein Beheer 
BV, para 4.1. 
560 ibid para 4.2. 
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Furthermore, the court ruled that the word ‘Bulldog’ had a fixed and clear meaning, 
namely referring to a dog breed. A bull and a dog were, it said, different species of animals. In 
the court’s opinion, the average consumer would not think of a bull when confronted with the 
word ‘bul(l)dog’ or a picture of a bulldog. This was also supported by market studies by the 
claimant. Therefore, the court said, the difference from a conceptual perspective was such that 
the minimal visual and auditory similarities between the signs were entirely suspended. 
Furthermore, the court argued, the considerable conceptual difference would ensure that the 
average consumer would not be confused by the visual and auditory similarities.561  
Although the goods were identical (energy drinks) and the degree of distinctiveness 
was high, consumers were not likely to be confused because the signs were not, or not 
sufficiently similar. 
Interestingly, the court did not refer to the CJEU guideline stating that the more 
distinctive the earlier mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion. This would have favoured 
Red Bull because the trademark was very well-known amongst average consumers. 
Remarkably, another CJEU guideline was also not mentioned, namely that account should be 
taken of the fact that the average consumer only rarely has the opportunity to make a direct 
comparison between different marks but must place her/his trust in the imperfect picture of 
them kept in her/his mind.562  
If the court had applied these guidelines, it might have concluded that the ‘Krating-
Daeng’ and ‘The’ elements were not noticed even though the ‘Krating-Daeng’ element was 
part of the trademark as registered. From an empirical perspective, the odds were even higher 
that this element would not be noticed by the average consumer. The fact that the court itself 
referred to the RED BULL trademark versus the ‘Bulldog’ sign in its reasoning may suggest 
that indeed such elements as ‘Krating-Daeng’ and ‘The’ can be neglected. The degree of 
similarity between signs would have been higher. Given the highly distinctive character of the 
trademark and the identity between goods, the judge could even have ruled that consumers 
were likely to be confused. That consumer studies pointed to a different conclusion could 
have been declared irrelevant in this respect by emphasising, in the case of a highly distinctive 
mark, a likelihood of confusion had to be assessed normatively.  
This case illustrates that judges did not always grant more protection when the 
trademark was very well known. When necessary, judges were able to block the automatism 
of granting more protection the more distinctive the trademark was. When judges found that 
the freedom of third parties was jeopardised, they could simply say that the signs were not 








561 ibid paras 4.3-4.4. This consideration was a reference to the Picasso v Picaro case where the CJEU ruled that, 
because of the strong conceptual meaning of the word, ‘Picasso’ may neutralise the visual and aural similarities 
between the signs (Case C-361/04 P Picasso v Picaro ECLI:EU:C:2006:25, para 27). 
562 Case C-342/97 Lloyd v Loints ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, para 26. 
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5.6.3 Risk Areas 
 
This does not mean there is no risk of overbroad grants of protection. The study of Dutch case 
law indicates that trademark owners do sometimes succeed in achieving a broad scope of 
protection with regard to descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs.563 
 
5.6.3.1 Non-Traditional Signs 
 
For example, in the De Zuivelhoeve/Lidl case,564 the judge found that the defendant Lidl with 
their product packaging for yoghurts had infringed the trademark rights of De Zuivelhoeve. 
The claimant’s consumer study played a key role. The consumer study showed that 78.6% of 
respondents had used or seen claimant’s transparent bucket with yoghurt and fruit. In answer 
to the question whether respondents knew what was normally mentioned on the transparent 
bucket, 66.7% of respondents (51.7% of all respondents) answered De Zuivelhoeve.565 
According to the judge, the shape mark consisting of yoghurt and fruit separated in different 
layers in a transparent bucket had acquired distinctiveness through use in trade and was to a 
certain extent well known.566 The judge argued that Lidl’s product packaging was highly 
similar to the shape mark of De Zuivelhoeve. The most striking elements of De Zuivelhoeve’s 
shape mark were, also in view of the consumer study, the shape and image of the transparent 
bucket filled with yoghurt. These specific elements were also found on the Lidl packaging. 
Combined with the fact that Lidl used their product packaging for identical goods, i.e. 
yoghurt, the judge argued that a likelihood of confusion existed.567  
De Zuivelhoeve therefore not only succeeded in educating consumers in perceiving the 
shape of a transparent bucket with yoghurt and fruit in separate layers as a source identifier, 
they also succeeded in getting protection against a similar transparent bucket because they had 
taught their consumers so well. The court strongly based its decision on empirical findings. 
The prospect of an attractive return on investment was fulfilled. Competitors who also wanted 
to present their yoghurt in a transparent bucket had to come up with something else, even 
though the shape mark was, in actual fact, a mere property of the product concerned. 
Arguably, a transparent bucket as product packaging is functional and should not have been 
registered at all. Consumers could easily see the content of the bucket since it was transparent. 
Therefore, De Zuivelhoeve did in fact obtain an unfair competitive advantage.  
 
563 District Court of Rotterdam, 9 November 2006, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AZ3045 ‒ Tijgernootjes; District 
Court of Amsterdam, 1 November 2007, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2007:BB6923 ‒ G-Star/New Yorker; District Court 
of The Hague, 2 April 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BD9703 ‒ Watervalkranen; District Court of Gelderland, 
28 August 2009, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2009:BJ6313 ‒ De Zuivelhoeve/Lidl; Court of Appeal of ‘s-Hertogenbosch, 
20 April 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2010:BM2895 ‒ Stabilo/Beifa; District Court of The Hague, 18 April 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BZ7844 ‒ Louboutin/Van Haren; The Hague District Court, 10 June 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:7508 ‒ ’t IJs van Columbus; District Court of Noord-Nederland, 28 September 2011, 
ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2011:BV7389 ‒ ’t Stokertje; District Court of Noord-Nederland, 15 March 2012, 
ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2012:BV9716 ‒ ’t Stokertje.  
564 District Court of Gelderland, 28 August 2009, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2009:BJ6313 ‒ De Zuivelhoeve/Lidl. 
565 ibid para 4.5. 
566 ibid paras 4.7, 4.19. 
567 ibid paras 4.16-4.17.  
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Interestingly, in the Dyson case, the CJEU used similar reasons to reject Dyson’s 
request for trademark registration on a transparent collecting bin for a vacuum cleaner.568 
Admittedly, the Dutch case scenario was slightly different from the Dyson case, where the 
application concerned not a particular type of a transparent collecting bin, but rather, in a 
general and abstract manner, all conceivable shapes of such a collecting bin.569 De 
Zuivelhoeve’s trademark, on the other hand, concerned a particular shape570 of transparent 
bucket with yoghurt and fruit in separate layers depicted with their word mark and several 
figurative elements. Nevertheless, although De Zuivelhoeve did not register a transparent 
bucket in a general and abstract manner, in fact, the registration of a specific transparent 
bucket consisting of yoghurt and fruit in separate layers with a word mark and print on the 
cover led to a similar result – a monopoly on a mere property of the product concerned.  
If the judge had ignored the fact that both buckets were transparent, it remains to be 
seen whether he would also have ruled that this was a case of infringement. The yoghurt 
layers were different as was the size of the buckets. Furthermore, Lidl’s bucket had no print 
on the side. Another important difference was that the buckets had different word marks and 
different prints on the cover.571 If the judge had considered these elements in isolation, he 
would probably not have concluded that this was an infringement. Therefore, although De 
Zuivelhoeve did not register the transparent bucket as such, in the infringement proceedings 
we see that registering a combination of elements as a trademark still allows a trademark 
owner to monopolise a single element.572  
In other words, it can be risky to follow a generous approach towards registering non-
traditional signs. Once a trademark has been registered, trademark owners can invest 
 
568 Case C-321/03 Dyson ECLI:EU:C:2007:51, para 38. 
569 ibid para 19.  
570 See also: Case C‑421/13 Apple Inc v Deutsches Patent‑ und Markenamt ECLI:EU:C:2014:2070, para 31, 
where the Court says that these specific signs are registrable.  
571 Another point was that the Lidl buckets were exclusively sold in Lidl supermarkets (para 4.17). 
572 Despite these concerns, the CJEU recently ruled in the Hansson case, that it cannot be assessed in advance 
that descriptive elements of conflicting signs must be excluded from the assessment of similarity between signs 
(CJEU, judgment of June 12, 2019, case C-705/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:481, para. 49). According to the Court, the 
likelihood-of-confusion assessment must be as much as possible in accordance with the real perception of the 
relevant public (para. 47). In the Court’s view, descriptive, non-distinctive or low distinctive elements of a 
complex trademark generally have a limited impact on the analysis of similarity between signs in comparison to 
highly distinctive elements that are much better equipped to dominate the overall impression of the trademark 
(para. 54). However, this principle will not apply to all cases, the Court said, such that a disclaimer that in 
advance excludes descriptive elements from the assessment of similarity between signs could cause a likelihood 
of confusion among the public, which must be avoided (para. 56). According to the Court, the establishment of 
likelihood of confusion also only protects certain combinations of elements, and not a single descriptive element 
(para. 58). Furthermore, the refusal grounds and the trademark limitations should sufficiently safeguard that 
descriptive elements remain freely available to competitors on the market (paras. 59-60). However, the analysis 
above and in the following shows that the rulings of the Court are doubtful. Registering a combination of 
elements as a trademark does enable trademark owners to circumvent the difficulties they would normally 
experience when registering a single element, which was a transparent bucket in De Zuivelhoeve/Lidl case. See 
also Max Planck Institute (n 456), paras. 2.47, 2.49, which proposed to anchor explicitly in the Preamble of the 
Trade Mark Regulation and the Trade Mark Directive the fact that the likelihood of confusion assessment must 
not be based on elements that are not distinctive or otherwise ineligible for protection, although they also 
suggested that these elements could be protected once they become distinctive through use in trade. 
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substantially in marketing and branding their trademark and then claim a broad scope of 
protection. Since the CJEU rejected the need to keep signs freely available as a factor in the 
confusion analysis,573 judges are not allowed to make normative corrections in favour of 
third-party interests. If consumers perceive the transparent bucket as a source identifier, the 
judge must take this into account. Other CJEU rulings further encourage the judge to grant a 
broad scope of protection. According to the CJEU, judges must focus on the distinctive 
elements and not so much on the less distinctive elements. Since consumers were specifically 
educated to perceive the transparent bucket as a source identifier, this was the most distinctive 
part. From this perspective, the other elements, such as different sizes, word marks and prints 
were less distinctive and therefore less important. The Bigott-Batco/Doucal ruling of the 
Dutch Supreme Court, stating that similarities are more important than differences, further 
contributed to the judge focusing on the fact that both buckets were transparent.574  
Furthermore, colours, patterns or shapes can also be claimed via a figurative mark. An 
example is the IKEA/Serboucom case.575 Serboucom exploited a chain of hardware stores 
where construction materials, tools and decoration articles could be purchased. IKEA had a 
figurative mark with blue and yellow elements and a similar mark but with ‘IKEA’ in blue 
letters. The court of appeal ruled that given the strong reputation, both of the figurative 
elements as words were equally distinctive.  
Serboucom used a similar logo but with the words ‘multimate’ and 
‘(service)bouwmarkt’. According to the judge, these words had little distinctive character. The 
consumer would interpret the signs ‘multimate’ as referring to an assortment of several 
devices and thus not as a badge of origin. Therefore, the average consumer would perceive the 
blue and yellow elements of Serboucom’s logo as most distinctive. Because of the similar 
colours, Serboucom’s sign was similar to the IKEA trademark. This outcome was not changed 
by the fact that the colours were not exactly the same (the colours had a different PMS 
number).576  
The judge used empirical findings, such as the high degree of distinctiveness of the 
IKEA trademark on the one hand, and the lack of distinctiveness of the defendant’s sign on 
the other hand to argue that this was a case of infringement. It is questionable whether real 
consumers were confused when seeing the ‘Multimate’ logo. Because of the strong reputation 
of the IKEA logo real consumers would know that ‘Multimate’ was not connected with 
IKEA, but with a third party. Although IKEA did not register a colour mark, they could still 
 
573 Case C‑102/07 Adidas v Marca ECLI:EU:C:2008:217, para 30. 
574 District Court of Gelderland, 28 August 2009, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2009:BJ6313 ‒ De Zuivelhoeve/Lidl, para 
4.16. In recent years, the CJEU has taken a more cautious approach to protecting non-traditional marks. It could 
be argued that this case originated from a more generous period and the trademark might not have been 
registered if the current CJEU rulings were applied. However, because the trademark consists of a combination 
of several elements the refusal grounds probably still do not apply. The sign does not consist exclusively of a 
shape, or another characteristic which results from the nature of the goods themselves, or which is necessary to 
obtain a technical result or which gives substantial value to the goods. For example, the transparent bucket also 
has essential decorative elements that are not inherent to the generic function of the goods. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether consumers would specifically buy this transparent bucket just because of the substantial 
value of the shape. 
575 The Hague Court of Appeal, 26 January 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BL1936 ‒ IKEA/Serboucom.  
576 ibid para 22.  
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prevent Serboucom from using similar colours because of their trademark rights on the 
figurative mark with blue and yellow elements.  
Again, this case illustrates how trademark owners can avoid normative restrictions 
regarding the need to keep signs free during the registrations process. Via the backdoor of a 
figurative mark, trademark owners acquired protection on particular elements that would 
otherwise have been rejected had trademark owners asked for a single registration of an 
abstract colour mark or a shape.577  
Similarly, in the TUC/Apéro case,578 the trademark owners only had a trademark right 
on a logo for salted crackers. According to the court, the defendant’s sign, which was also 
used for salted crackers, was confusingly similar to the trademark owner’s logo because of the 
similarity of the colours on the packaging. Given the high investments in marketing 
campaigns, market share, brand recognition and the long-term use of the trademark, the court 
argued that it was more likely that consumers were confused, even though the words were 
completely different.579 The court also stated that the product concerned was a supermarket 
product that consumers would purchase without thorough evaluation. Therefore, the consumer 
would more easily be influenced by the visual impact of the trademark they were looking 
for.580  
In addition, the court emphasised that the similarities were more important than the 
differences and that the differences (such as deviation in colour, letter type, layout, and word 
marks) were of minor importance.581 The district court further rejected the argument that the 
trademark owner was unduly monopolising colours with regard to salted crackers. The 
colours used were not common for salted crackers.582  
The judge also attached some value to the trademark owner’s consumer study. 
Although the trademark owner TUC seemed to have had a market leadership position, such 
that this actually should have been filtered out by a control group, the judge nevertheless 
found the results gave some indication that consumers were likely to be confused.583  
Trademark owners have not always succeed in claiming colours via a figurative mark. 
For example, in the Reckitt/Action case,584 the court ruled that the VANISH trademark for 
detergents was very distinctive and well known among the relevant public because of massive 
marketing campaigns.  
However, the court also argued that the trademark owner Reckitt could not claim any 
rights on the colour pink for detergents. This particular colour was only one element of their 
figurative marks. According to the judge, colours are normally not more than a characteristic 
 
577 See also Kur and Senftleben (n 457) 315.  
578 District Court of The Hague, 7 September 2011, HA ZA 09-589 ‒ TUC/Apéro. 
579 ibid para 4.14. 
580 ibid para 4.9.  
581 ibid paras 4.9-4.10. 
582 ibid para 4.13. 
583 ibid paras 4.15-4.16. See also District Court of The Hague, 21 August 2009, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BJ7097 
‒ Burberry/Sacha; District Court of The Hague, 8 November 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:12949 ‒ 
Adidas/H&M. For a similar outcome of a previous case in the proceedings, see: Court of Appeal of Arnhem-
Leeuwarden, 1 December 2015, case 200.135.172/02, IER 2016/31 ‒ H&M/Adidas.   
584 Court of Appeal of The Hague, 24 February 2009, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2009:BH6459 ‒ Reckitt/Action. See 
also Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 17 February 2009, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BH3125 ‒ Davidoff/Coscentra.  
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of the goods and are used on a large scale because of their attractiveness. In the court’s 
opinion, people are generally aware of the fact that detergents are presented in multi-coloured 
packaging. Consequently, the average consumer would not perceive the colour pink on the 
label as a badge of origin, in spite of the fact that they had been consistently presented with 
the appearance of the product to which the VANISH trademark was attached.  
Given this fact, the judge argued that only a minimal degree of distinctiveness could 
be assigned to the colour pink. Accordingly, the fact that the colour pink dominated the 
trademarks could not have a significant impact on the overall impression. According to the 
judge, the average consumer who was used to the fact that detergents were presented in multi-
coloured packaging would not pay special attention to the colour pink and therefore would not 
remember this particular colour as a badge of origin.585  
It is, however, doubtful whether these assumptions are true. Consider, for instance, the 
widespread recognition of the lilac colour of Milka and the colour magenta of Deutsche 
Telekom; these examples show us that consumers are able to recognise an abstract colour as 
an identifier of commercial source after intensive use in trade.586 There are more reasons to 
believe that consumers do not by definition experience more difficulties in perceiving colours. 
For example, colours are easy to perceive, and they are clearly visible from a distance, in 
contrast to words. Colours are a good tool for remembering objects.587 Furthermore, with 
regard to services, consumers quickly recognise colours as an identifier of commercial source 
because by nature services do not have colour.588 In addition, colours can better function as 
identifier of commercial source than word marks if the trademark is addressed to a public that 
has difficulties with reading or that cannot read at all.589  
However, the court probably used these assumptions, i.e. consumers will not recognise 
the colour of the label as an identifier of commercial source, to reach a normative purpose: 
colours should remain available to other users on the market. If the court had empirically 
assessed the perception of the consumer, the trademark owner Reckitt would have expanded 
their figurative mark rights to a right on an abstract colour (pink) used for detergents. Because 
of the attractiveness of a colour and the fact that the number of colours is limited, an 
 
585 Court of Appeal of The Hague, 24 February 2009, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2009:BH6459 ‒ Reckitt/Action, paras 
9-11. The same was concluded with regard to the purple colour used for a detergent (see para 17). 
586 CTM registration 000031336 of 27 October 1999 (Kraft Foods) and CTM registration 000212787 of 3 August 
2000 (Deutsche Telekom). See also CTM registration 000747949 of 23 March 2007 (MHCS) for the colour 
orange for alcoholic beverages; CTM registration 006258131 of 31 July 2008 (Deere & Company) for the 
colours green for the vehicle body and yellow for the wheels of agricultural and forestry machines; CTM 
registration 001079169 of 14 September 2004 (Orange Brand Services Limited) for the colour orange as a 
characteristic element of the trademark for telecommunication services. The colour blue was for instance 
accepted in the Benelux as a valid trademark for metal containers years ago: Benelux Court of Justice, 9 March 
1977, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1978, 416, comment LWH; Berichten Industriële Eigendom 1977, 60 
(Ahrendt/Leeferink; Camping Gaz). See for a more recent example Court of Appeal, Brussels, 21 October 2013, 
Ing.-Cons. 2013, 845 ‒ Maes v Jupiler. See also Senftleben (n 457) 803.  
587 Patricia Siple and Robert M Springer, ‘Memory and preference for the colors of objects’ 34 Perception and 
Psychophysics 363 (1983); Jules Davidoff, Cognition through Color (MIT Press 1991); Robert M Boynton and 
Stanley Dolensky, ‘On Knowing Books by their Colors’ (1979) 48 Perceptual and Motor Skills 479. 
588 Cohen Jehoram, Van Nispen and Huydecoper (n 489) 162. 
589 Neil AJ Purcell, ‘Kleurmerken: ja, maar… Beschouwing van HvJ EG 6 mei 2003 (IER 2003, 50 m.nt. ChG, 
Libertel/BMB)’ (2003) 6 Intellectuele Eigendom en Reclamerecht 335, 341. 
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expansion must be justified. For example, the threshold to achieve a trademark right on an 
abstract colour is much higher simply because of these normative considerations. The 
trademark owner must prove that the sign has acquired distinctiveness through use in trade if 
it wants to register an abstract colour as a mark. Conversely, a figurative mark does not have 
to pass this high threshold.590  
This case therefore illustrates that judges sometimes did make normative corrections 
when the filtering mechanisms of the registration process did not function properly. In light of 
the CJEU case law,591 judges could argue that the colour pink was not particularly dominant 
and could be ignored. High investments in the VANISH brand were not enough to overrule 
the normative objections towards keeping colours freely available for competitors.592  
However, the fact remains that judges do have a range of rules at their disposal that 
favour trademark owners’ investments. Even though the number of cases involving non-
traditional signs was limited and judges did not always take a generous approach towards 
granting trademark protection, it was possible to circumvent normative restricting regarding 
the need to keep signs free during the registration process via the registration of a figurative 
mark. 
 
5.6.3.2 Descriptive and Cultural Signs 
 
Similar problems could arise with regard to descriptive signs. Although there were only a few 
cases in which the court ruled that a trademark was not distinctive, this did not mean that a 
trademark could not consist of descriptive elements.  
For example, in the IT-Staffing/Staffing it case,593 the court found that the third party’s 
sign ‘Staffing it’ had infringed the trademark rights on the figurative mark ‘IT-Staffing’. Both 
parties used their signs for employment services. Considering the many similarities, the court 
said, the small differences (such as another colour and font, a hyphen and several tiny figures 
surrounding the letter ‘I’) failed to give weight to the similar overall impression.594 In 
addition, the court argued that the trademark had a highly distinctive character which was 
supported by several consumer studies, so that it was more likely that consumers were 
confused.595  
The fact that the public consisted of professionals specialised in the IT field did not 
alter this conclusion. In addition, the relevant public not only consisted of companies who 
outsourced IT work to self-employed parties but also of self-employed parties operating in the 
IT field. These self-employed parties could not be expected to be more cautious because they 
 
590 See Chapter 3.  
591 Case C-104/01 Libertel ECLI:EU:C:2003:244; Case C-49/02 Heidelberger Bauchemie ECLI:EU:C:2004:384. 
592 The court followed a similar line of argument with regard to the shape of the bottle that Reckitt wanted to 
protect via a figurative mark. The court concluded that the shape was not distinctive. Furthermore, according to 
the judge, consumers were not used to perceiving shapes as a source of origin. Shapes must be significantly 
different from the norm in the sector. This applied all the more to shapes that constituted part of a figurative 
mark. See: Court of Appeal of The Hague, 24 February 2009, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2009:BH6459 ‒ Reckitt v 
Action, paras 19-21. 
593 District Court of Midden-Nederland, 25 April 2018, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2018:1768 ‒ IT-Staffing/Staffing it.  
594 ibid paras 4.11-4.12.  
595 ibid paras 4.13-4.17. 
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did not generally have a particular interest in knowing who was responsible for assigning the 
contract.596  
Despite the fact that IT-Staffing was quite descriptive, the trademark owner succeeded 
in getting trademark protection. Empirical findings concerning the highly distinctive character 
of the trademark mainly determined the outcome of the case. Again, a figurative mark 
(containing word elements) was used to register elements that were not particularly distinctive 
and could have been refused if only the single words were registered.  
In addition, the ’t IJs van Columbus case597 illustrates that a cultural meaning does not 
necessarily overrule the mechanism that grants more protection if a trademark has a highly 
distinctive character. Instead of limiting scope of protection, the judge argued that the name 
‘Columbus’ contributed to the trademark’s distinctive character because the name would be 
more easily brought to mind owing to the associations the cultural name evoked. The 
defendant’s sign also contained the name ‘Columbus’. Given the dominant position of the 
name ‘Columbus’ in the figurative mark, the sign could therefore be seen as similar.598  
Moreover, trademark owners did not even always have to invest heavily in their 
trademark to receive protection.599 For example, in the LIEF!/LIEFDIER case,600 the court 
found that the defendant IJsvogel c.s. infringed the trademark rights of KHF c.s. on LIEF!, 
which was registered for pet accessories by using the sign LIEFDIER also for the same goods 
and services. Firstly, the court argued that the LIEF! trademark had a distinctive character. 
The fact that (the adjective) LIEF (English: ‘sweet’) referred to the standard meaning of 
‘sweet’, the court said, did not mean that the trademark was descriptive of the registered 
goods, namely dog and cat pillows.601  
 
596 ibid para 4.18. 
597 The Hague District Court, 10 June 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:7508 ‒ ’t IJs van Columbus.  
598 ibid, paras 4.10-4.13. Interestingly, this does not comply with the Picasso/Picaro case, where the AG 
Colomer ruled that names of great artists must be protected ‘from insatiable commercial greed’ (Case C‑361/04 
P, Picasso v OHIM ECLI:EU:C:2005:531, Opinion of AG D Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, para 69). See also Case 
C‑361/04 P Picasso v Picaro ECLI:EU:C:2006:25, para 32. However, in the Einstein/Van Bokhoven case, the 
court ruled that the figurative mark containing the portrait of Einstein, the famous formula ‘E=Mc2’ and the 
word ‘Einstein’ only reminded the public of the famous professor. The words ‘Etablissment’ and ‘Terras – 
Eetcafé – Bar’ were also not distinctive with respect to the goods and services for which the trademark was used 
within the catering sector. Because the defendant’s sign only contained the word ‘Einstein’, the judge concluded 
that the sign was not confusingly similar. However, in this case, the trademark was not very well known. See: 
District Court of The Hague, 26 March 2009, 329321 / KG ZA 09-115 ‒ Einstein/Van Bokhoven. 
599 See n 513 for more cases. 
600 District Court of The Hague, 2 February 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:921 ‒ KFH/IJsvogel.  
601 According to the judge, the fact that a dog basket can be described as ‘sweet’ if it is soft and fluffy does not 
provide a sufficiently direct and concrete link. ‘Sweet’ is not a general characteristic of dog and cat pillows, but 
perhaps only of those that are soft and fluffy. The court argued that soft and fluffy was also not a direct meaning 
of sweet and it was not recorded under that meaning in the dictionary. The judge ruled that the Caffè Nero case 
(Case T‑29/16 Caffè Nero ECLI:EU:T:2016:635) did not apply in this case. The sign ‘caffè nero’ was found to 
be descriptive of coffee-related products and services. In the court’s opinion, the link in this case was, however, 
more direct and concrete than the link between pet accessories and ‘sweet’. On this basis, the trademark was 
found distinctive and not descriptive (paras 4.6-4.7). 
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Secondly, the court argued that there was a likelihood of confusion.602 According to 
the judge, the most obvious similarity between the trademark and the sign was the identical 
element LIEF. According to the judge, because LIEF in LIEF DIER was placed in front, and 
DIER (English: animal) must be categorised as descriptive for pet accessories, LIEF was a 
dominant element in LIEF DIER, or at least, it was an element with an independent place in 
the word combination. In the court’s opinion, this suggested a high degree of auditory and 
visual similarity between the trademark and the sign. LIEF in LIEF DIER also had a specific 
meaning, the court said, because it usually referred to (a characteristic of) the animal for 
which the accessory was intended. According to the judge, the trademark LIEF! could be 
interpreted in a similar way. Therefore, the court argued, there was also a conceptual 
similarity between the trademark and the sign.  
The registration of a quite descriptive term could therefore also have serious 
consequences for competitors on the market. Because of its descriptive character, the 
trademark indirectly informed consumers about a characteristic of the animal for which the 
accessory was intended. This could give trademark owners KFH c.s. an unfair advantage on 
competitors on the market. Defendant IJsvogel c.s. was no longer allowed to use a similar 
term for their product. Furthermore, the specific meaning that the trademark LIEF! evoked by 
its descriptiveness was used against the defendant when assessing likelihood of confusion. 
Because the trademark LIEF! usually referred to a characteristic of the animal for which the 
accessory was intended – pets are usually associated with such terms as sweet, soft and fluffy 
– there was also a conceptual similarity.  
While the court found the link between pet accessories and sweet to be insufficiently 
direct to deprive the trademark owner of his rights, this link was, however, direct enough to 
conclude that the trademark and sign were conceptually similar. Instead of limiting the scope 
of protection by emphasising the differences between the trademark and the sign, such as the 
interspace between LIEF and DIER, the different look and feel, and the exclamation mark, the 
judge looked at the similarities instead of the differences and labelled these as dominant. 
Because judges need to consider the overall impression created by marks, slightly distinctive 
trademarks could be considered dominant and distinctive if the defendant’s sign did not 





602 Although the sign LIEFDIER was used as a single word, the judge ruled that the average consumer would 
perceive the sign as LIEF DIER (with two words). It argued that this could be derived from the logo and from a 
Facebook post in which the defendants had written about the ‘LIEF DIER collection’ (para 4.14). 
603 A more restricted approach would involve looking at the various elements in isolation. Courts could deny any 
similarity between signs if the elements coinciding in two conflicting signs were not protectable as such. 
Although the infringement claim could also have been successful under this approach since the LIEF trademark 
was found to be distinctive, in some other cases it would have led to the claim being rejected. For example, in 
the Connect/Connect Professionals case involving employment agencies, the trademark was slightly distinctive. 
If the judge had assessed the elements ‘Connect’ and ‘Professionals’ in isolation, the judge might have argued 
that the trademark CONNECT was slightly distinctive and therefore the slightest difference between the marks 
(like ‘Professionals’) could have been enough to reject the infringement claim. District Court of Gelderland, 4 





As shown above, in practice, the automatism of granting more protection in response to 
heavier investments in marketing and branding did not often appear when dealing with 
descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs. From this perspective, the situation was not 
alarming.  
Nevertheless, in some cases, trademark owners still succeeded in achieving broad 
protection for descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs. In particular, figurative marks 
formed a risk. When trademark owners invested heavily in their logo, the elements concerned, 
such as particular colours, automatically became very well known to consumers. When a 
defendant used similar colours in their logo, this could lead to infringement even if the 
defendant added a different word mark. Since judges are not allowed to make normative 
corrections towards third-party interests and trademark owners can avoid normative 
restricting during the registrations process, trademark owners with deep pockets may have a 
free hand in achieving broad trademark protection with regard to descriptive, cultural and 
non-traditional signs.604 
It is true that in some cases courts blocked this automatism of granting more protection 
to highly distinctive trademarks. Courts simply argued that the signs were not similar or 
emphasised the fact that consumers were not used to perceiving colours as a badge of origin. 
Nevertheless, there were also cases in which courts did not deviate from the pattern of 
granting more protection to highly distinctive signs. Trademark owners sometimes did not 
even have to invest heavily in their trademark to achieve broad protection. In some cases, the 
CJEU rulings were enough to conclude that the signs were similar, for example because both 
signs started with the same and therefore eye-catching elements.  
 
5.7 An Exemplary Study of UK Case Law 
 
To check whether similar conclusions could be drawn for other EU Member States, an 
exemplary study was done of UK case law. A small sample of UK cases605 seems to confirm 
these findings. In the UK cases, the claimant also won more often than he lost.606 Similarity 
 
604 Even under the new limitations, the use of the sign would probably still not be justified since it would have to 
be in accordance with honest commercial practices. Given the notoriety of the colours, i.e. as in the 
IKEA/Serboucom case, using similar colours would probably be seen as unfairly competing with the trademark 
owner. Because of the notoriety of the colours, consumers will automatically think of IKEA when confronted 
with similar colours; irrespective of the question whether the defendant used their own trademark or not. The use 
of similar colours can also not be seen as intended to give an indication concerning one of the specified 
characteristics of the goods. See Case C-63/97 BMW v Deenik ECLI:EU:C:1999:82, para 61; Case C-100/02 
Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co ECLI:EU:C:2004:11, para 26; Case C‑102/07 Adidas v Marca 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:217, paras 47-48. 
605 The database darts-ip.com was used for selecting this sample. I used the application through a license from 
the Max Planck Institute of Innovation and Competition in Munich. See <www.darts-ip.com> accessed 6 July 
2020. I opted for ‘Case law’ > ‘Trade mark’ > ‘Search by Court/Date/Reference’ > ‘Europe’ > ‘United 
Kingdom’. Thereafter I chose ‘Points of law’ > ‘Conflict between trade marks’ > ‘Likelihood of confusion’. I 
selected ‘Infringement Action’ and ‘Cases’. I analysed cases that were selected by Darts-ip from 2014-2018. The 
sample consisted of 20 cases.   
606 The confidence interval of winning 17 out of 20 cases is 59.9<p<92.9% (with 95% reliability). 
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between signs played a crucial role in the likelihood-of-confusion assessment. This factor was 
discussed in all cases, in contrast to factors of similarity of goods and services and degree of 
distinctive character. In most cases the consumer had an average degree of attention, and only 
in a few cases the UK courts deviated from the benchmark of the average consumer.607 
Consumer surveys also played a modest role in the UK cases.608 Instead, witness statements 
were frequently used as evidence of actual confusion.  
Furthermore, in the majority of cases, the degree of distinctive character was average 
or high. A high degree of distinctive character was in some cases even explicitly rewarded 
with a winning claim.609 Furthermore, the rule stating the more distinctive the earlier mark is, 
the greater will be the likelihood of confusion, was well known among judges and regularly 
found in the beginning of the decision, where judges outlined the legal framework. In other 
words, in UK case law, infringement factors also seemed to favour trademark owners’ 
investments.  
Nevertheless, in practice, in UK case law, the risk of misappropriating descriptive, 
cultural and non-traditional signs also seems to be limited. The majority of cases concerned 
word marks and figurative marks containing word elements.610 In one case, involving the 
shape of a London taxi, the trademark owner even lost. The court found that the trademark 
was invalid. Consumers would have difficulties recognising shapes as a source of origin and 
because of the Regulation for London taxis, consumers would think that there was only one 
kind of London taxi.611  
However, in some UK cases, trademark owners succeeded, via a figurative mark. For 
example, in the Enterprise/Europcar case, the trademark owner’s high investments in 
marketing and branding campaigns were awarded. Both parties used the letter ‘e’ in their 
logos. The judge considered that the letter ‘e’ was an extremely commonplace letter, and it 
was widely used in both descriptive and denominative contexts.612 However, the judge also 
argued that the letter ‘e’ was not widely used in logos to denote providers of vehicle rental 
services in the UK, thus the logo had inherent distinctive character. Furthermore, the court 
argued that the ‘e’ logo had an enhanced distinctive character as a result of its use for vehicle 
rental services.613 This high distinctive character and the fact that both parties used their logos 
for identical services supported a likelihood of confusion even though a low similarity 
 
607 The confidence interval of selecting 16 cases referring to the average consumer with a normal degree of 
attention out of 20 cases is 59.9<p<92.9% (with 95% reliability). 
608 The confidence interval of selecting 19 cases without a reference to consumer surveys out of 20 cases is 
71.8<p<98.2% (with 95% reliability). 
609 Enterprise v Europcar [2015] EWHC 17 (Ch), [2015] 16 ETMR 364, para 216; Comic Enterprises v 20th 
Century Fox [2016] EWCA Civ 41, [2016] 22 ETMR 476, para 91; Titanic Spa v Stanley Dock & Others [2016] 
EWHC 3103 (Ch), [2017] 12 ETMR 274, para 80; Design Elements v DesignElements [2017] EWHC 1400 
(IPEC), [2017] 34 ETMR 803, paras 78, 88; Frank v Nike [2018] EWHC 1893 (Ch), [2019] 4 ETMR 42, para 
117.  
610 The confidence interval of selecting 19 cases concerning word or figurative marks out of 20 cases is 
71.8<p<98.2% (with 95% reliability).  
611 LTC v FNR [2017] EWCA Civ 1729, [2018] 7 ETMR 142, paras 66-69. 
612 Enterprise v Europcar [2015] EWHC 17 (Ch), [2015] 16 ETMR 364, para 183. 
613 ibid paras 183-198. 
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between the logos was found and in fact granted the trademark owner a monopoly on a single 
letter with regard to vehicle rental services.614  
Finally, in the Thomas Pink/Victoria’s Secret case, the claimant had registered the 
word ‘PINK’ with pink lines making up the letters for clothing and other accessories.615 The 
defendant, Victoria’s Secret, launched a sub-brand called ‘PINK’, also used for clothing. The 
court found that the trademark had acquired a distinctive character through use, but argued 
that pink was a colour,616 so it did not have an enhanced, but only a normal, level of 
distinctive character.617 Nevertheless, the use of PINK emblazoned on the defendant’s items 
of clothing still created a likelihood of confusion among consumers since the goods were 
identical and the signs were very similar. The same applied to the use of PINK in slogan and 
device format.618 Although the claimant did not use a colour mark, he still managed to (partly) 
claim the colour pink via the logo.  
As these UK cases show, it can pay off to invest heavily in marketing and branding 
campaigns. In the majority of cases, trademark owners won the case while the degree of 
distinctiveness was often average or high. Nevertheless, the risk of misappropriating 
descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs seems to be limited since in most cases, this 
concerned a word mark or a figurative mark. However, the UK cases also illustrate that this 
type of mark may be a risk for the trademark system. Via the registration of a figurative mark, 
trademark owners received protection for the letter ‘e’ for vehicle rental services and the 
colour pink for clothing and other accessories. Without these investments and additional 




This chapter considers whether there is a risk of trademark law being strategically used as a 
self-servicing mechanism by the industry. In this respect, two features of the trademark 
system are particularly worrisome. First, trademark owners can strengthen the distinctive 
character of their marks by investing in marketing and branding campaigns. Second, 
trademark owners can afford expensive surveys demonstrating the high distinctiveness of 
their marks thus strengthening their position in an infringement case.  
As shown above, the EU trademark system indeed encourages and rewards trademark 
owners’ investments in several ways. An empirical study of Dutch case law demonstrates that 
trademark owners more often win than lose. Furthermore, trademark owners more often win 
the more they invest in their trademark. In addition, when a court applies the CJEU rule 
stating that consumers are more easily confused when confronted with a highly distinctive 
 
614 ibid paras 7, 216. Interestingly, two of the claimant’s registrations were subject to disclaimers of the right to 
the exclusive use of a letter ‘E’.  
615 Thomas Pink v Victoria’s Secret [2014] EWHC 2631 (Ch), [2014] 57 ETMR 1129. 
616 ibid 151. ‘If a consumer asks for a “pink shirt” they may mean to refer to the claimant or they may simply be 
referring to the colour of the item.’  
617 ibid para 151. 
618 ibid paras 169-170. However, no likelihood of confusion existed with regard to the swing tags and garment 
labels on clothing. The sign PINK was not distinctive enough to retain a distinctive role independently of the 
well-known brand VICTORIA’S SECRET when used on swing tags and labels in the retail context in the 
defendant’s PINK stores (para 178). 
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trademark, trademark owners also win most cases. Furthermore, judges are more likely to 
label signs as similar if a trademark is highly distinctive. Moreover, consumer surveys further 
strengthen trademark claims.  
The analysis also illustrates, however, that cases involving attempts to monopolise 
descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs (where trademark protection may endanger 
freedom of expression and freedom of competition) are not widespread. Granting broad 
protection to fantasy marks and other fanciful forms of marks does not seem inconsistent in 
light of the rationales underlying trademark law. In addition, in some cases both parties had 
enough financial resources to afford the often expensive studies. Besides, judges did not 
always give more protection when the trademark was very well known. When necessary, 
judges simply stated that the signs were not similar.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no risk at all of granting overbroad 
protection against confusion when it comes to descriptive, cultural or non-traditional signs. 
The study of Dutch case law indicates that trademark owners indeed sometimes succeed in 
achieving a broad scope of protection with regard to descriptive, cultural and non-traditional 
signs. In particular, figurative marks may form a risk. Since they allow trademark owners to 
circumvent normative restrictions when registering a figurative mark, and judges, in line with 
the CJEU decision in Adidas/Marca,619 are not allowed to make normative corrections 
towards third-party interests on the basis of a need to keep signs freely available on the 
market, trademark owners with deep pockets can go very far in infringement cases. 
Consequently, this may lead to an unbalanced market situation with, on the one hand, 
trademark owners enjoying broad trademark rights and competitive advantages from the sign 
as such, and on the other hand, third parties being excluded from using these appealing signs 
and being forced to use less effective trademarks because these signs are not available in 
sufficient supply. 
As long as the CJEU persists in refusing to consider the need to keep signs freely 
available to competitors on the market as a relevant factor in the likelihood-of-confusion 
assessment, trademark owners will invest heavily – and sometimes be rewarded – with a 
broad scope of protection. If we want to further reduce the risk of descriptive, cultural and 
non-traditional signs no longer being freely available to competitors on the market, we must 
recalibrate the confusion analysis and allow judges to make normative corrections in favour of 
third parties’ freedom of expression and freedom of competition. In this way, judges will be 
better equipped to weigh trademark owners’ interests against the interests of competitors and 
the general consuming public. Accordingly, judges should be able to permit unauthorised uses 
of trademarks even when this might lead to likelihood of confusion among consumers. 
Consumers would not be confused about the commercial origin of goods or services if 
enterprises were not able to invest in these non-distinctive signs in the first place.620 
 
619 Case C‑102/07 Adidas v Marca ECLI:EU:C:2008:217, para 30. 
620 If these signs were definitely excluded from trademark protection, enterprises would not be interested in 
investing in marketing campaigns aimed at educating consumers about the role of these signs as identifiers of 
commercial source. This would in turn reduce the need for protecting consumers against potential confusion by 
awarding trademark protection. See also Lotte Anemaet, ‘The Public Domain Is Under Pressure – Why We 
Should Not Rely on Empirical Data When Assessing Trademark Distinctiveness’ 47 Int Rev Intellect Prop 
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Therefore, the fact that consumers are likely to be confused should not prevent judges from 
refraining from a cause of action that may lead to an imbalanced anti-confusion assessment 






































Compet Law 303 (2016) 308-309; Ramsey (n 457) 1100, 1150; McKenna (n 458) 1899. See also William 
McGeveran and Mark P McKenna, ‘Confusion Isn’t Everything’ 89 Notre Dame Law Review 253 (2013).  
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6 Which Honesty Test for Trademark Law? Why Traders’ Efforts to 
Avoid Trademark Harm Should Matter When Assessing Honest 
Business Practices 
 
This chapter argues that the honest practices proviso should be more empirically based. 
Judges should focus on the efforts made by the competitor to avoid detriment to the trademark 
and on whether consumers perceive the potentially infringing sign differently because of these 
efforts. If the defendant has taken sufficient measures to minimise possible harm to the 
trademark owner but some confusion still exists or some advantage is taken, the use of the 
trademark should be allowed when these side effects are outweighed by overarching market 
values, such as furthering freedom of competition and enhancing consumer information and 
consumer choice. This conduct-based approach ensures that not only the legitimate interests 
of the trademark owner but also those of third parties are taken into account. In this way, 
trademark owners cannot prevent honest use of the trademark if the defendant has taken 
sufficient efforts to minimise harm, and at the same time third parties must respect trademark 




Trademark rights are not absolute. At the international level, Art. 17 of the TRIPS Agreement 
allows for the adoption of limited exceptions in national legislation.621 On the basis of this 
international provision, Art. 14 of the Trade Mark Directive (TMD 2015) and Art. 14 of the 
European Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR) enable the reconciliation of the interests of the 
trademark owner with competing interests of other traders and the public at large.  
Following the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), these 
provisions ‘seek to reconcile the fundamental interests of trade mark protection with those of 
free movement of goods and freedom to provide services in the common market in such a 
way that trade mark rights are able to fulfil their essential role in the system of undistorted 
 
* This chapter is based on: Anemaet, L (2021) Which Honesty Test for Trademark Law? Why Traders’ Efforts 
in Avoiding Trademark Harm Should Matter When Assessing Honest Business Practices, GRUR Int 70  
(forthcoming). 
621 Annette Kur and Martin RF Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law. A Commentary (Oxford University Press 
2017) 53-55, 406-407; Lisa P Ramsey and Jens Schovsbo, ‘Mechanisms for Limiting Trade Mark Rights to 
Further Competition and Free Speech’ (2013) 44 IIC 671, 688-689; Annette Kur, ‘Of Oceans, Islands, and 
Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations under the Three-Step Test’ (2009) 8 Rich J 
Global L & Bus 287, 309; Graeme B Dinwoodie, ‘Lewis & Clark Law School Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture: 
Developing Defenses in Trademark Law’ (2009) 13 Lewis and Clark Law Review 99, 102; Nicolas Dontas, 
‘Permitted use under international law’ in Jeremy Phillips (eds), Trade Marks at the Limit (Edward Elgar 2006) 
6-9; Martin RF Senftleben, ‘Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights? WTO 
Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark 
Law’ (2006) 37 IIC 407, 407-438; WTO Panel, 15 March 2005, WTO Document WT/DS174/R, ‘European 
Communities – Protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs’, 
paras 7.647, 7.650-7.651; based on complaints by the United States (WT/DS174) and Australia (WT/DS290).  
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competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain’.622 The CJEU further 
emphasises that, in general, the EU trademark legislation in the field of limitations of 
protection aims ‘to strike a balance between the interest of the proprietor of a trade mark to 
safeguard its essential function, on the one hand, and the interests of other economic operators 
in having signs capable of denoting their goods and services, on the other’.623 Similarly, the 
CJEU indicated regarding an exhaustion dispute that ‘a balance must be struck between, on 
the one hand, the legitimate interest on the part of the licensee of the right to the trade mark 
constituted by the shape of the composite bottle and the proprietor of the marks affixed to that 
bottle in profiting from the rights attached to those marks and, on the other, the legitimate 
interests of purchasers of those bottles, in particular the interest in fully enjoying their 
property rights in those bottles, and the general interest in maintaining undistorted 
competition’.624 
Therefore, use of a sign must be tolerated if the societal interest in unauthorised use by 
prohibiting such use given the circumstances, in particular, cuts into freedom of (commercial) 
expression and freedom of competition, turns out to be more harmed than the impact on the 
trademark owner’s rights.625 
Article 14(1) TMD 2015 and Art. 14(1) EUTMR enumerate three specific situations626 
in which the unauthorised use of a trademark is in principle allowed: (a) use of one’s own 
name and address; (b) use of indistinctive signs and use for descriptive purposes; and (c) use 
of a sign referring to goods or services as those of the trademark owner, in particular where 
that is necessary to indicate the intended purpose. The reference in Art. 9(3)(f) EUTMR and 
Art. 10(3)(f) TMD 2015 respectively to Directive 2006/114/EC627 further indicates that the 
terms under which comparative advertising is permitted are also applicable in the context of 
trademark law. Compliance with the harmonised requirements for comparative advertising, 
however, prevents a finding of prima facie infringement. 
 
622 Case C-22/03 Gillette/L.A.-Laboratories ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, para 29; Case C-63/97 BMW/Deenik 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:82, para 62; Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen ECLI:EU:C:2004:11, para 16.  
623 Case C-482/09 Budějovický Budvar ECLI:EU:C:2011:605, para 34; Case C-145/05 Levi Strauss 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:264, paras 28-29.  
624 Case C-46/10 Viking Gas/Kosan Gas ECLI:EU:C:2011:485, para 31.  
625 Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 407. 
626 The list of limitations on trademark rights is a closed one. Nevertheless, when determining the scope of 
intellectual properties, there is a tendency in EU intellectual property law to refer to constitutional and treaty 
obligations to safeguard freedom of speech and the freedom to conduct business. The EU trademark law reform 
has also broadened the intended purpose defence to a more general referential use defence. Any use of a 
trademark ‘for the purpose of identifying or referring to goods or services as those of the proprietor of the trade 
mark’ is allowed as long as it complies with the provision. Currently, the provision also covers referential use 
that honestly indicates the resale of genuine goods bearing the trademark. Fair referential use ‘for the purpose of 
artistic expression’ seems also to be permitted as long as it complies with honest business practices. The 
preambles of the TMR (recital 27) and EUTMR (recital 21) further indicate that defences ‘should be applied in a 
way that ensures full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the freedom of expression’. 
See Ramsey and Schovsbo (n 621); Lionel Bently and others, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2018) 114; Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 408; Martin RF Senftleben, ‘Adapting EU Trademark 
Law to New Technologies – Back to Basics?’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Constructing European Intellectual 
Property. European Intellectual Property Institutes Network Series (Edward Elgar 2013) 137, 167-175.     
627 Directive 2006/114 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning 
misleading and comparative advertising [2006] OJ L376/21 (27 December 2006) (MCAD).  
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The limitations listed in the first paragraph of Art. 14 only apply if the use of the 
trademark complies with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters (Art. 14(2) 
TMD 2015 and EUTMR). This requirement is also included in recital 27 TMD 2015 and 
recital 21 EUTMR. As it directly impacts the operation of limitations, an appropriate 
interpretation of this legal condition is essential.  
In Gerolsteiner Brunnen, the CJEU ruled that the condition of ‘honest practice’ 
constitutes in essence the expression of a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate 
interests of the trademark owner.628 Drawing up the concept of ‘honest practices’, the CJEU 
explained in the Gillette case – clearly inspired by the conditions of legitimate comparative 
practices629 – that a third party’s use is not in accordance with honest practices if ‘it is done in 
such a manner as to give the impression that there is a commercial connection between the 
third party and the trade mark owner; it affects the value of the trade mark by taking unfair 
advantage of its distinctive character or repute; it entails the discrediting or denigration of that 
mark; or where the third party presents its product as an imitation or replica of the product 
bearing the trade mark of which it is not the owner’.630  
 On the subject of honest practices regarding the use of trade names allegedly 
conflicting with an earlier trademark,631 the CJEU mentioned as factors in Anheuser Busch 
and Céline the extent to which the use of the third party’s trade name would be understood by 
the relevant public as indicating a link between the third party’s goods and the trademark 
proprietor, and the extent to which the third party ought to have been aware of this fact. 
Another factor mentioned was whether the trademark concerned enjoyed a reputation of 
which the third party sought to take advantage without due cause.632  
With regard to keyword advertising, the CJEU argued in Portakabin/Primakabin that 
an advertiser who used the trademark of a competitor as a keyword for sponsored search 
results could not, as a rule, rely on the trademark defences.633 The CJEU assumed that the 
advertiser would as a rule not be acting fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the 
trademark owner: ‘in the event that the national court finds that the ad does not enable 
average internet users, or enables them only with difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods or 
services referred to by the ad originate from the trade mark proprietor or from a third party, it 
is unlikely that the advertiser can genuinely claim not to have been aware of the ambiguity 
thus caused by its ad. It is the advertiser itself, in the context of its professional strategy and 
with full knowledge of the economic sector in which it operates, which chose a keyword 
corresponding to another person’s trade mark and which, alone or with the assistance of the 
 
628 Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen/Putsch ECLI:EU:C:2004:11, para 24. 
629 art 4 of the MCAD. 
630 Case C-228/03 Gillette ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, para 49.  
631 The own name defence has changed under the new legislation. Currently, art 14(1)(a) TMD 2015 and art 
14(1)(a) EUTMR explicitly state that the own name defence only concerns natural persons using their own 
name. In these cases the CJEU ruled – contrary to the Council and Commission opting for a limited 
interpretation – that the defence was not limited to personal names but also included trade names.   
632 Case C-245/02 Anheuser-Busch ECLI:EU:C:2004:717, para 83; Case C-17/06 Céline ECLI:EU:C:2007:497, 
para 34. See further: Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 432; Annette Kur, Thomas Dreier and Stefan Luginbuehl,  
European Intellectual Property Law. Text, cases and materials (2nd edn, Edward Elgar 2019) 266-267. 
633 Case C-558/08 Portakabin/Primakabin ECLI:EU:C:2010:416, para 72.  
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referencing service provider, designed the ad and therefore decided how it should be 
presented.’634 
 Based on these CJEU rulings, the Commission’s proposal for a reform of trademark 
law suggested that the use of a sign conflicting with a trademark should be deemed not to 
comply with honest practices if it gives the impression of a commercial connection between 
the sign and the mark, or if it takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or reputation of the trademark without due cause.635 However, this proposal was 
criticised for being inappropriate and potentially dangerous since it almost literally repeated 
the infringement criteria, thereby resulting in a circular line of reasoning and leaving the 
limitations practically moot.636 If the Commission’s proposal had been implemented, it would 
indeed have had undesirable consequences. However, some argue that the situation has hardly 
improved since the standard for assessing honest practices has remained unspecified and the 
leading CJEU case law still relies heavily on the same criteria that have been applied to 
establish prima facie infringement.637 As Jennifer Davis notes: 
 
‘the interpretation of specific limitations, such as what constitutes descriptive use or 
what falls within the “spare parts” defence, has advanced very little from the early 
days of the first Directive. And in the case of descriptive use, once a descriptive word 
has become distinctive, it is difficult to see how a defence of descriptive use by a third 
party would succeed in any event. As for cases concerned with freedom of expression, 
there have been, since the Directive, instances in member states where the courts have 
been asked to choose between free political speech and trademark protection, but again 
they are surprisingly few.’638 
 
Furthermore, she emphasises that ‘if the limitations to trademark infringement have had any 
effect, it has been to help balance the interests of (often powerful) competitors rather than to 
create a protected public domain for freedom of expression’.639 
 If trademark limitations are supposed to balance the interests of traders and enhance 
freedom of competition and freedom of (commercial) expression, the honest practices proviso 
has to be interpreted differently than it has been so far. Merely repeating the infringement 
 
634 ibid para 70.  
635 Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 432; Kur, Dreier and Luginbuehl (n 632) 267. 
636 Martin RF Senftleben and others, ‘The Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard Freedom of Expression 
and Undistorted Competition: Guiding Principles for the Further Development of EU Trade Mark Law’ (2015) 
37 EIPR 337, 339; Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 432; Bently and others (n 626) 1135; Ilanah Simon, ‘Nominative 
Use and Honest Practices in Industrial and Commercial Matters – A Very European History’ (2007) Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 117, 127; Grace Smith, ‘Honest commercial use in light of the ECJ’s Gerolsteiner Ruling’ in 
Jeremy Phillips (ed), Trade Marks at the Limit (Edward Elgar 2006) 142; Dinwoodie (n 621) 112; Kur, Dreier 
and Luginbuehl (n 632) 267.  
637 Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 432; Kur, Dreier and Luginbuehl (n 632) 267. 
638 Jennifer Davis, ‘Limitations to Trademark Protection’ in Irene Calboli and Jane C Ginsburg (eds), The 
Cambridge Handbook of International and Comparative Trademark Law (Cambridge University Press 2020) 
558-570, 569. 
639 ibid 570.  
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analysis when interpreting the honest practices proviso could hinder freedom of competition 
and (commercial) freedom of expression.640  
The question then is how to interpret the honest practices proviso without merely 
repeating the infringement analysis. Should judges view the honest competitor from a 
normative perspective (according to ethical standards concerning behavioural norms of 
fairness and decency in a given society or sector of trade)? Or should they adopt an empirical 
perspective (considering the measures taken by competitors to reduce trademark harm and 
how consumers perceive these measures)?  
This chapter argues that the honest practices proviso should be more empirically 
based. Judges should focus on the efforts made by competitors to avoid detriment to the 
trademark and on whether consumers perceive the potentially infringing use differently 
because of these efforts. If the defendant has taken sufficient measures to minimise possible 
harm to the trademark owner but some confusion still exists or some advantage is taken, the 
use of the trademark should be allowed if these side effects are outweighed by overarching 
market values, such as furthering freedom of competition (and commercial expression) and 
enhancing consumer information and consumer choice.  
This conduct-based approach takes into account not only the legitimate interests of the 
trademark owner but also those of third parties. In this way, trademark owners cannot prevent 
unauthorised use of the trademark if the defendant has made sufficient efforts to minimise 
harm, and at the same time third parties must respect trademark owners’ interests to the 
largest extent possible if they want the trademark limitations to apply. Accordingly, the 
limitations are no longer a mere repetition of the infringement criteria, but become true 
counterbalances and efficient safeguards against overbroad protection. 
I first discuss Art. 10bis of the Paris Convention (PC) since it is from this provision that 
the expression ‘honest practices in industrial and commercial matters’ is derived (Section 
2).641 I then analyse whether there is room for a broader interpretation of the concept of honest 
practices under CJEU case law (Section 3). In Section 4, I give some examples to illustrate 








640 Although non-distinctive, descriptive and generic signs will not be registered because of their lack of 
distinctiveness, these signs can however acquire distinctiveness through use in trade and subsequently be 
registered. See arts 4(4) Trademark Directive, 6quinquies(C)(1) Paris Convention and 15(1) TRIPS Agreement. See 
also Case C-108/97, C-109/97 Windsurfing Chiemsee ECLI:EU:C:1999:230, paras 44-45. The refusal grounds 
alone are therefore not sufficient to keep the trademark system balanced. Furthermore, as soon as a sign becomes 
highly well known, it is difficult for competitors to prove that they used the sign descriptively because the sign, 
for example ‘Chiemsee’, has in fact ‘been robbed of its descriptive character, as far as its market use is 
concerned’. See Davis (n 638) 562, 564.  
641 See: para 41 of the Preamble of the TMD 2015. See also: Christopher Wadlow, The Law of Passing-Off. 
Unfair competition by misrepresentation (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 51; Case C-2/00 
Hölterhoff/Freiesleben ECLI:EU:C:2001:468, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 59.  
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The exact meaning of the expression ‘honest practices in industrial and commercial matters’ 
is not provided in Art. 14(2) TMD 2015 and Art. 14(2) EUTMR. Since this concept was 
derived from Art. 10bis PC, you would expect this provision to provide some guidance 
concerning the meaning of ‘honest business practices’.642 Article 10bis PC is the basic 
international standard in the area of unfair competition law that addresses the question of the 
right demarcation between fair competition and inappropriate competitive conduct. The Paris 
Convention dates back to 1883.643 
In 1900, at the Brussels Conference for the Revision of the Paris Convention, the 
repression of unfair competition was recognised as part of industrial property protection at the 
international level. The Conference agreed with the insertion of Art. 10bis PC that ‘[n]ationals 
of the Convention […] shall enjoy, in all States of the Union, the protection granted to 
nationals against unfair competition’.644 The provision was merely intended to stop 
discrimination that existed in some countries between foreigners and nationals concerning 
protection against unfair competition, and extend the principle of national treatment of Art. 2 
PC.645  
Eleven years later, in 1911, the Revision Conference of Washington went a step further by 
agreeing on an obligation among Convention countries to ensure effective protection against 
unfair competition.646 At the 1925 Revision Conference of The Hague, this obligation was 
 
642 Although the exact intended meaning of Art. 10bis PC may be difficult to pinpoint: ‘Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention obligates the member states to enact a general clause against any act of competition contrary to 
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. This was a rather bold move that, to this day, has not 
resulted in a uniform implementation, let alone interpretation of what protection against unfair competition 
actually entails.’ See: Anselm Kamperman Sanders, ‘Dilution and Damage beyond Confusion in the European 
Union’ in Calboli and Ginsburg (n 638) 499-510, 500.  
643 This Convention was negotiated in Paris in 1880, signed there in 1883 and ratified in 1884. See George HC 
Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as 
revised at Stockholm in 1967 (BIRPI 1968) 9; Sam Ricketson, ‘The Trademark Provision in the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property’ in Calboli and Ginsburg (n 638) 3-26; Louis Altman and 
Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies (4th edn, Thomson Reuters 2020) 
para 27:2; Rogier W de Vrey, Towards a European Unfair Competition Law. A Clash Between Legal Families. 
A comparative study of English, German and Dutch law in light of existing European and international legal 
instruments (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 12; Frauke Henning-Bodewig, ‘International Unfair Competition 
Law’ in Reto M Hilty and Frauke Henning-Bodewig (eds), Law Against Unfair Competition. Towards a New 
Paradigm in Europe? MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, vol 1 (Springer 2007) 53. 
See further: <https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/> accessed 18 May 2021. 
644 See ‘Union internationale pour la protection de la propriété industrielle,’ Actes de la conférence réunie à 
Bruxelles du 1er au 14 décembre 1897 et du 11 au 14 décembre 1900, Berne 1901, 164 (proposal by France), 
187-188, 301, 382-383 (discussion and adoption).  
645 Stephen P Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights. National and International Protection, vol 3 
(Harvard University Press 1975) 1678. 
646 See ‘Union internationale pour la protection de la propriété industrielle,’ Actes de la conférence réunie à 




strengthened by introducing a definition and including examples of acts of unfair competition 
in Art. 10bis PC.647 The 1934 London Conference improved the provisions,648 and an 
additional example of acts of unfair competition was included at the Revision Conference of 
Lisbon in 1958 (Art. 3(3) PC).649 As a result of the last revision conference in Stockholm in 
1967, Art. 10bis PC now reads as follows: 
‘(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such countries effective 
protection against unfair competition. 
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters 
constitutes an act of unfair competition. 
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited: 
1. All acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with the 
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor; 
2. False allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit the establishment, 
the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor; 
3. Indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to mislead the 
public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for 
their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods.’ 
The current text of Art. 10bis PC reflects the described historical development of the provision. 
The first paragraph prescribes the duty to ensure effective protection against unfair 
competition. The second paragraph defines unfair competition as ‘[a]ny act of competition 
contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters’. The third paragraph includes 
three examples650 of cases which must especially be forbidden: the causing of confusion 
regarding a competitor’s establishment, goods or activities (para. 1); the discrediting of a 
competitor’s establishment, goods or activities (para. 2); and the misleading of the public as to 
the nature or other characteristics of one’s own goods (para. 3). This section is added in Art. 
 
647 See ‘Union internationale pour la protection de la propriété industrielle,’ Actes de la conférence réunie à La 
Haye du 8 octobre au 6 novembre 1925, Berne 1926, 252, 255 (proposal), 348, 351, 472, 478, 525, 546-547, 
578, 581 (observations and adoption).  
648 The London Conference expanded the scope of protection by replacing the reference to competitors’ products 
with the formula ‘the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities of a competitor’. A 
proposal by Germany aimed at prohibiting some forms of comparative advertising was dismissed. See ‘Union 
internationale pour la protection de la propriété industrielle,’ Actes de la conférence réunie à Londres du 1er mai 
au 2 juin 1934, Berne 1934, 197-198 (proposal), 287-290, 417-422, 469-470, 519 (observations and adoption). 
649 See ‘Union internationale pour la protection de la propriété industrielle,’ Actes de la conference réunie à 
Lisbonne du 6 au 31 octobre 1958, Geneva 1963, 725, 784 (proposal by Austria), 106, 118, 725-727, 789-790, 
852 (discussion and adoption). See also: Bodenhausen (n 643) 142-143; Frauke Henning-Bodewig, 
‘International Protection Against Unfair Competition – Art. 10bis Paris Convention, TRIPS and WIPO Model 
Provisions’ (1999) 2 IIC 166, 171-173; Altman and Pollack (n 643) para 27:12, p 33. 
650 Bodenhausen (n 643) 145. Gerhard Schricker and Frauke Henning-Bodewig (eds), Neuordnung des 
Wettbewerbsrechts / 11. Ringberg-symposium des Max-Planck-Institutes für ausländisches und internationales 
Patent-, Urheber- und Wettbewerbsrecht, 14. bis 18. Juni 1997, Schloß Ringberg, Tegernsee (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft 1998/1999) 27, 31. The general clause in the second paragraph refers to ‘any act of 
competition’, which means that acts of competition that do not fall under the cases specified in the third 
paragraph could also be contrary to honest practices. Frauke Henning-Bodewig, Unfair Competition Law. 
European Union and Member States. Kluwer Law International (Kluwer Law International 2006) 20.  
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10ter PC, which provides for legal remedies for effectively restraining acts of unfair 
competition.  
Art. 10bis PC constitutes a flexible, open minimum level of protection against unfair 
competition. The duty to ensure effective protection does not require the promulgation of 
specific legislation.651 In implementing the treaty obligations, countries are permitted to 
maintain their own traditions and historical sources regarding unfair competition law.652 A 
similar obligation exists under Art. 2 of the TRIPS Agreement, according to which members 
of the World Trade Organisation must comply with Art. 10bis PC.653 
 
6.2.2 Meaning of ‘Honest Practices’ 
 
The leading standard for protection against unfair competition under the Paris Convention is 
based on the concept of ‘honest practices in industrial or commercial matters’, which is 
included in the definition of acts of unfair competition in Art. 10bis (2) PC. ‘Practices’ refers 
to the actual practices; the stipulation that these practices must be ‘honest’ reveals a normative 
requirement. The meaning of honest practices is basically influenced by the norms of the 
protecting country in question because a transnational, universally accepted standard has not 
evolved yet.654 In the event of an international case, however, the national interpretation must 
be supplemented with accepted international norms to the extent to which these norms can be 
derived from the status quo reached at the international level.655  
For international standards in the field of protection against unfair competition to have 
some harmonising effect across countries and territories, arguably, at least a minimal 
objective standard at the international level is necessary.656 As, however, the meaning of 
honesty mainly depends on the sociological, economic, moral and ethical concepts of a 
specific society, it may differ between Paris Union countries. Standards of ‘honesty’ further 
change with time and new acts of unfair competition are continuously identified.657  
 
651 Bodenhausen (n 643) 143; Ladas (n 645) 1686; Wadlow (n 641) 55, 61. 
652 For example, in Denmark, Germany and China, the legislation contains a general clause prohibiting all 
competitive acts contrary to honest practices or to good morals, and these general clauses are complemented by 
more specific provisions. In countries with a civil law system, such as France and the Netherlands, general tort 
provisions are used as the legal basis. In countries with a common law system, such as the United Kingdom, 
actions for passing off are invoked to ensure protection, and often combined with statutes or regulations 
governing specific areas of fair trading. See: Xiao Y Chen, ‘The Status of International Protection Against 
Unfair Competition’ (1997) 8 EIPR 421, 421-422. See for more countries: WIPO, Protection Against Unfair 
Competition. Analysis of the Present World Situation (WIPO 1994) 20-21. 
653 de Vrey (n 643) 18-19; Schricker and Henning-Bodewig (n 650), 35-66, 44.  
654 See also: WTO Panel, 28 June 2018, WTO Document WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/R, WT/DS458/R, 
WT/DS467/R, ‘Australia – Certain measures concerning trademarks, geographical indications and other plain 
packaging requirements applicable to tobacco products and packaging’, paras. 7.2671-7.2672.  
655 Bodenhausen (n 643) 144; Henning-Bodewig (n 649) 177; Altman and Pollack (n 643) para 27:12, pp 32-33; 
de Vrey (n 643) 14. WTO Panel, 15 March 2005, WTO Document WT/DS174/R, ‘European Communities – 
Protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs’, paras 7.647, 
7.650-7.651 
656 Wadlow (n 641) 64; Schricker and Henning-Bodewig (n 650) 31; Axel Beater, Unlauterer Wettbewerb (Mohr 
Siebeck 2011) 145; de Vrey (n 643) 13-14. 
657 WIPO (n 652) 23. See also: Ladas (n 645) 1685, 1689, 1691; Henning Harte-Bavendamm and Frauke 
Henning-Bodewig (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) (CH Beck 2004) 579; Wilhelm 
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Notwithstanding the differences between countries, certain aspects of practices can 
however be marked as ‘fair’ or ‘unfair’. Obvious acts of unfair behaviour are explicitly 
enumerated in Art. 10bis (3): causing confusion,658 discrediting and the use of misleading 
indications. These examples do not restrict the scope of the general definition of honest 
practices covered in para. 2,659 but they certainly reflect the contours of the concept of honest 
practices. For example, these acts have in common that traders succeed in competition 
without relying on their own achievements in terms of the quality and pricing of their goods 
and services. Rather, they profit unduly from the work of another trader or affect consumer 
demand with false or misleading statements.660  
 
6.2.2.1 Normative Approach 
 
Traditionally, the concept of honest practices referred to ethical standards concerning 
behavioural norms of fairness and decency in a given society. In literature, it has been shown 
that these norms were inspired by French legal tradition.661 A normative approach based on 
 
Nordemann, ‘Der verständige Durchschnittsgewerbetreibende – Zum Begriff der “guten Sitten” in § 1 UWG’ 
[1975] GRUR 625, 628. 
658 The first example, for instance, illustrates the great value the Convention States attach to protection against 
confusion regarding a competitor’s establishment, goods or activities, while the Paris Convention includes 
specific obligations to protect typical business and product identifiers, such as trademarks, service marks and 
trade names. Marcus Höpperger and Martin RF Senftleben, ‘Protection Against Unfair Competition at the 
International Level’ in Hilty and Henning-Bodewig (n 643) 65-66. See also: Anselm Kamperman Sanders, 
‘Badges of Trade. The protection of trade marks and related intangibles in unfair competition law’ (Intellectual 
Property Law Unit of the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of 
London 1995) 55, 78: ‘the principles of the Paris Convention are covered in all countries described. The 
paradigm of the common norm is the prevention of the creation of confusion or avoidable confusion in the 
marketplace.’  
659 Actes de La Haye, 547; Bodenhausen (n 643) 145; Henning-Bodewig (n 649) 177. 
660 WIPO (n 652) 24.  
661 Eugen Ulmer and Rudolf Kraßer, Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den Mitgliedstaaten der 
Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Band IV (CH Beck 1967) 66-67; Eugen Ulmer, Das Recht des 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Band I. 
Vergleichende Darstellung mit Vorschlägen zur Rechtsangleichung (CH Beck/Heymann 1965) 42-43; Schricker 
and Henning-Bodewig (n 650) 31; Beater (n 656) 145. See also Rudolf Callmann, who argued that ‘die Frage 
nach der Zulässigkeit einer Wettbewerbshandlung hat grundsätzlich mit der Wirkung dieser Handlung auf die 
Allgemeinheit nichts zu tun, sie ist nach rein wettbewerbsrechtlichen, privatrechtlichen Gesichtspunkten zu 
prüfen. […] Mit vollem Recht suchen deshalb die Gerichte „nach der bösen Absicht des Täters“, denn der 
subjektive Tatbestand ist Grundlage unsere Beurteilung im Anschluß an § 1 UnlWG.’ Callmann rejected the 
argument that unfair competition could be tolerated as long as it promotes the well-being of the general public: 
‘Vollends unannehmbar erscheint mir der Grundsatz, ein Sittenverstoß im Sinne des § 1 UnlWG sei „immer 
dann zu verneinen, wenn die Wettbewerbshandlung der Gesamtwirtschaft dienen kann“. Der Skrupellose 
Wettbewerber, der ausgeht auf die Vernichtung seiner Konkurrenten, dem zur Erreichung dieses Zieles kein 
Mittel zu unanständig ist, der Wohltäter der Allgemeinheit wider Willen! Er ein Teil jener Kraft, die stets das 
Böse will und stets dat Gute schafft! […] Nochmals, der Wettbewerb durch billigeres Angebot von Waren oder 
Leistungen ist nicht nur keine Unsittlichkeit, sondern die treibende Kraft in der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. 
Hier zeigt sich die erzieherische Bedeutung des Wettbewerbes. Der Vertragsbrüchige und Unanständige aber als 
Erzieher! Ein unerträglicher Gedanke. So wie nicht alles, was volkswirtschaftlich schädlich ist, deshalb 
sittenwidrig ist, so ist etwas nicht deshalb sittlich einwandfrei, weil es der Allgemeinheit nützt oder ihr in 
gewissen Nebenwirkungen Nutzen bringt.’ See Rudolf Callmann, ‘Unlauterer Wettbewerb zum Wohl der 
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ethical standards can, however, be criticised as imprecise since the establishment of relevant 
behavioural standards is strongly influenced by the customs and habits of a given trade 
circle.662 Actually, trade circles stipulate the de facto guidelines for honest practices by which 
a competitor’s conduct will be judged,663 such that defining honest practices by reference to 
the way honest traders actually compete might lead to a certain degree of circularity:  
 
 ‘Gegen die spezifische Anknüpfung an Konventionalnormen zur Konkretisierung der 
 großen Generalklausel spricht ferner, dass die Entscheidung über Art und Maß 
 „anständiger Gepflogenheiten“ im Geschäftsverkehr nicht denen überlassen bleiben 
 darf, die diese Gepflogenheiten im Wege tatsächlichen Verhaltens herausbilden und 
 mit einem sozialen, verbandsrechtlichen oder ähnlichem Geltungsanspruch unterlegen. 
 Sonst könnten diese Kreise letztlich über die an sie anzulegenden rechtlichen 
 Maßstäbe selber bestimmen.’664 
 
 
Allgemeinheit?’ [1927] Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 378, 381. See also: Rudolf Callmann, Der Unlautere 
Wettbewerb. Kommentar zum Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb und zu den materiellrechtlichen 
Vorschriften des Gesetzes zum Schutze der Warenbezeichnungen (J Bensheimer 1929) 39.  
662 Harte-Bavendamm and Henning-Bodewig (n 657) 580; Höpperger and Senftleben (n 658) 64; Ulmer (n 661) 
249; Ladas (n 645) 1685; Ulmer and Kraßer (n 661) 67; Wadlow (n 641) 63; Ulrich Loewenheim,  
‘Suggestivwerbung, unlauterer Wettbewerb, Wettbewerbsfreiheit und Verbraucherschutz’ [1975] GRUR 99, 
103. 
663 Harte-Bavendamm and Henning-Bodewig (n 657) 580-581; Höpperger and Senftleben (n 658) 64. See also 
Wadlow (n 641) 66. 
664 ‘Another argument against the specific link to contractual norms for the concretisation of the broad general 
clause is that the decision on the type and extent of ‘honest practices’ in commercial trade must not be left to 
those who articulate these practices by way of actual conduct and subject them to a claim to validity under social 
or association law, or a similar kind of law. Otherwise, these circles could ultimately determine for themselves 
the legal standards to be applied to them.’ (transl.). Harte-Bavendamm and Henning-Bodewig (n 657) 580-581. 
For example, if it is common use to sell at dumping prices or to invade consumers’ privacy rights, this conduct 
would be seen as honest. If no external ethical correction takes place, bigger enterprises could simply refer to 
their business practices and stipulate that their behaviour is honest even though smaller firms will not survive the 
competition in the long term. See also: WIPO (n 652) 24-25. For instance, in Decca/Holland Nautic the Dutch 
Supreme Court ruled that profiting from Decca’s navigation system could not be seen as a wrongful act. The fact 
that the competitive act was not in accordance with ethical norms in a given trade circle was not without interest, 
but not decisive. The fact that other competitors, like Philips, paid a reasonable fee to ensure that the radio 
navigation system was safeguarded did not automatically lead to the conclusion that Holland Nautic had to do 
this too. The Supreme Court did not find that the interest of Decca in maintaining and improving the navigation 
system should outweigh the interests of ship owners in having the opportunity to purchase Holland Nautic’s 
radio receiver, which had the same functionalities as the Decca receiver but was substantially cheaper and had an 
enhanced technical capacity. In other words, if the Supreme Court had ruled the case normatively, i.e. according 
to the norms in a given trade, it would not have allowed Holland Nautic to offer alternative radio receivers 
without paying a reasonable fee for the maintenance and improvement of the navigator system. If so, Decca’s 
35-year monopoly position on the market would in fact have been extended even though they had never had any 
intellectual property rights on what they had created (Dutch Supreme Court, 27 June 1986, 
ECLI:NL:PHR:1986:AD7158, Holland v Nautic). Although the notion of the ‘reasonable man’ enables courts to 
reject any practices that might be in line with market practice in the sector concerned but be dishonest in some 
extrinsic sense: Wadlow (n 641) 66.  
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Clearly there are also no objective standards of feelings, instincts or attitudes toward a certain 
conduct, which makes it extremely difficult to provide specific prescriptions concerning a 
uniform evaluation of specific acts.665  
 Even if judges try to find and specify pre-existing norms for the community at large, 
there is a risk that their decision may consciously or unconsciously align with their own moral 
sensitivities. Since conflicts in competition are so versatile and complicated, the clarity 
needed for a moral reaction might also be lacking.666 This normative approach could further 
be criticised because of its arbitrariness and counterproductive effects: 
 
‘In Verbindung mit dem Abstellen auf den „Gesamtcharakter“ der 
Wettbewerbshandlung und mit der Heranziehung „beweglicher Elemente“ bei seiner 
rechtlichen Bewertung erweckt die Anstandsformel den Eindruck einer gewissen 
Beliebigkeit, warum im konkreten Fall die Argumentationstopoi gerade so und nicht 
anders selektiert und kombiniert werden. Dies bedeutet letztlich einen „Verzicht auf 
ein rechtsystematisch vermitteltes Verständnis“ der großen Generalklausel überhaupt. 
Wegen der praktisch unbeschränkten Verfügbarkeit der Anstandsformel konnte sie im 
Zuge nationalsozialistischer „Rechtserneuerung“ zum dogmatischen Vehikel selbst 
dazu avancieren, unter erklärter Absage an den Primat der Rationalität 
(wettbewerbs)rechtliche Entscheidungen schlicht im Wege „göttlich geoffenbarter 
Intuition“ treffen zu können.’667 
 
Furthermore, the fact that traders profit from their acts of competition or cause financial loss 
to another competitor is not in itself unlawful. The saying ‘no one should reap where he has 
not sown’668 should be applied in a more refined manner. If traders are prohibited from using 
other traders’ work or experience, progress would be hindered and monopoly would become 
common use.669  
 
665 Ladas (n 645) 1685; Loewenheim (n 662) 103; Harte-Bavendamm and Henning-Bodewig (n 657) 581; Ulmer 
and Kraßer (n 661) 67.  
666 Gerhard Schricker, ‘Unfair Competition and Consumer Protection in Western Europe’ (1970) 4 IIC 415, 422; 
Harte-Bavendamm and Henning-Bodewig (n 657) 580-581. 
667 ‘In conjunction with the reference to the “overall character” of the competitive act and the use of “flexible 
elements” in making a legal assessment, the standard of decency gives the impression of a certain arbitrariness as 
to why the topoi of argumentation are selected and combined in precisely this and not that way in a specific case. 
This ultimately means “refraining from a legally systematically acquired insight” of the major general clause in 
the first place. Because of the practically unlimited applicability of the standard of decency, in the context of 
National Socialism it was used to advance “legal renewal” and become a dogmatic vehicle for making 
(competition) legal decisions simply by way of “divinely revealed intuition”, with a declared rejection of the 
primacy of rationality.’ (transl.). Harte-Bavendamm and Henning-Bodewig (n 657) 580, 609. See also 
Nordemann (n 657) 628, who argued that ethical norms could be influenced: ‘Das ganze wäre auch nicht weiter 
bemerkenswert, wenn es nicht einen eminent politischen Bezug hätte: Mit den herrschenden Anschauungen läßt 
sich in Zeiten politischer Unvernunft Unrecht judizieren, ohne daß äußerlich ein Bruch in der Rechtsprechung 
erkennbar würde.’ 
668 International News Service v. Associated Press 248 US 215, 239-240 (1918).  
669 Ladas (n 645) 1689. 
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Rather, traders should be stimulated to compete for the custom of the public on the 
most favourable terms. The focus should be on whether competitors use fair and lawful 
means.670 An act might be untactful or tasteless yet still not be dishonest.671  
A normative approach (in the sense of ‘ethical’) is also not urged by a reading of the 
Paris Convention itself, and it seems to be contrary to the circumstances in which the current 
text of Art. 10bis (2) PC was adopted at the expense of the French proposal at the 1925 Hague 
Conference.672  
Furthermore, the defendant’s state of mind does not seem to be relevant.673 This is also 
implied by the full formulation ‘contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial 
matters’, which refers to a generally accepted standard by honest traders. If individual traders 
do not satisfy these standards, their being in good faith does not impact the standard of 
liability.674 This is also implicitly indicated by the three examples of Art. 10bis (3) PC, none of 
which refers to any overt mental element or any reservation for bona fide conduct.675  
In addition, the negotiating history shows that Art. 10bis PC does not distinguish acts 
carried out with a certain form of dishonest intent. At the 1925 Hague Conference, Italy 
apparently suggested explicitly limiting the proposed text to acts done ‘dans le but de 
détourner la clientèle d’un concurrent’, but did not find sufficient support at the 
Conference.676 Article 10bis (3)(2) as adopted was also explicitly aimed to be free from any 
criterion of intention to impair: ‘la notion de dénigrement […] n’implique pas une intention 
injurieuse’.677  
 
670 Ulmer and Kraßer (n 661) 66; Ulmer (n 661) 58.  
671 Ladas (n 645) 1689.  
672 At the 1925 Hague Conference there was little opposition regarding the general clause stating ‘constitue un 
acte de concurrence déloyale tout acte contraire aux usages honnêtes en matière industrielle ou commerciale’ 
with the exception of France opting for a more explicit definition of ‘tous les actes contraires à la loi, aux 
usages commerciaux ou à l’équité’. Both proposals were rejected, however, because they were found to be too 
vague and indeterminate for implementation in an international convention by a number of delegations, such as 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Working Party was therefore unable to submit any 
general clause against unfair competition. However, when the French delegate M. Maillard suggested leaving 
Art. 10bis unchanged instead of enumerating a few specific forbidden acts, after the Programme’s proposal was 
revivified by the Dutch delegation, all delegations supported this Franco-Dutch proposal, with the United States 
(with the support of the United Kingdom) only asking to include as clarification that only commercial acts of 
competition were concerned. Following another important reservation made by Belgium, the proviso was finally 
accepted unanimously. See: Actes de la Haye (1926) 475; Wadlow (n 641) 66, 85-86. 
673 The term ‘honest’ might suggest that a certain form of subjectivity as ‘fault’ or ‘bad faith’ is required. See 
Wadlow (n 641) 64, WIPO (n 652) 24; Harte-Bavendamm and Henning-Bodewig (n 657) 578: ‘Der Mensch ist 
– sozialethisch gesehen – nicht für die Reinheit seiner Gesinnung verantwortlich, sondern für die Qualität seiner 
Handlungen unter Einbeziehung auch der Handlungsfolgen.’ See also: WTO Panel, 28 June 2018, WTO 
Document WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/R, WT/DS458/R, WT/DS467/R (n 654), para. 7.2714, arguing with regard 
to Art. 10bis (3)(1) PC that ‘it follows from the phrase “of such nature” that it is not determinative whether an act 
of that type was committed in good faith.’ 
674 Wadlow (n 641) 64. 
675 ibid 65. 
676 Actes de la Haye (1926) 350; Wadlow (n 641) 65; Bodenhausen (n 643) 145. 
677 See Wadlow (n 641) 65. For example, in the Spanish law of 1991, the objective approach is explicitly 
expressed in the legislation: ‘any act against good faith in an objective sense’. WIPO (n 652) 24; Ladas (n 645). 
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Subjective elements could, however, be relevant when establishing an applicable 
sanction, although Member States must always ensure that effective sanctions are taken 
against repetitive future acts irrespective of the defendant’s state of mind.678 The merits of 
adding subjective elements to the equation will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
6.2.2.2 Empirical Approach 
 
More recently, the concept of honest practices has been interpreted in light of the goal of 
safeguarding the efficient operation of competition as a main instrument of market 
economies.679 Since unfair competition law was created as a special law to safeguard the 
interests of the honest businessman, the starting point for assessing honesty is the 
businessman’s standard of behaviour. If a practice is seen as unacceptable by all businessmen, 
it is difficult to define this conduct as a fair act of competition.680  
Nevertheless, some practices might be broadly accepted within a certain branch of 
business while still being perceived as ‘improper’ by other market participants, i.e. 
consumers.681 An empirical approach lending weight to consumer perception could therefore 
reintroduce ethical standards, such as personal responsibility for market actions with respect 
to the interests of other market participants, and respect for the equality of rights in the 
marketplace.682  
In addition, some practices might at first glance not harm other businessmen or 
consumers, while still having a detrimental effect on the economy at large. For instance, 
selling at dumping prices might in the long term ruin small and medium-sized companies and 
therefore harm free competition. Such behaviour is often viewed as ‘unfair’.683  
It further seems more consistent to interpret the general definition of honest practices 
in Art. 10bis (2) PC not only in view of protecting competitors’ interests but also with an eye 
 
678 Wadlow (n 641) 65. 
679 Höpperger and Senftleben (n 658) 64-65; Harte-Bavendamm and Henning-Bodewig (n 657) 591-592; Ulmer 
(n 661) 58-59; Nordemann (n 657) 628-631; Carl Baudenbacher, ‘Machtbedingte Wettbewerbsstörungen als 
Unlauterkeitstatbestände Zugleich Beitrag zum Verhältnis von UWG und GWB’ [1981] GRUR 19, 21-22; Eike 
Ullman ‘Das Koordinatensystem des Rechts des unlauteren Wettbewerbs im Spannungsfeld von Europa und 
Deutschland’ [2003] GRUR 817, 821-822; Loewenheim (n 662) 103-104; Rolf Sack ‘Lauterer und 
leistungsgerechter Wettbewerb durch Wettbewerbsregeln’ (1975) 6 GRUR 297, 301-302; Beater (n 656) 145; 
Kamperman Sanders (n 658) 68, 82: ‘To escape from the circular reasoning that results from the attempts to 
justify the monopolies that result from the application of a general norm of unfair competition, a functional 
approach towards unfair competition law has to be adopted. This results in a mode of establishing legal rule by 
taking into account the economic reality of the competitive process, the distortion of it and the nature of the 
relationship between parties. This entire factual set of circumstances then needs to be viewed against the general 
clause of unfair competition.’ 
680 WIPO (n 652) 24-25.  
681 ibid 25. The standard of ‘honesty’ must however be a realistic one. The field of reference is trade or 
commerce, where the standards might be lower than in other fields such as liberal professions. Moreover, it may 
well be that actual market behaviour is a bit rougher than traders are willing to admit. See Wadlow (n 641) 63. 
Susie Middlemiss, ‘Permitted use under European law: the framework’ in Jeremy Phillips (ed), Trade Marks at 
the Limit (Edward Elgar 2006) 12-13.  
682 Höpperger and Senftleben (n 658) 65; Harte-Bavendamm and Henning-Bodewig (n 657) 608; Ulmer (n 661) 
42-43.  
683 WIPO (n 652) 25.  
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to safeguarding consumers’ interests. One example684 that particularly highlights acts of 
unfair competition and defines the meaning of the honest practices provision concerns 
protection against acts that mislead the public and thus also refer to consumer interests.685  
Furthermore, the scope of Art. 10bis PC need not be restricted to acts of direct 
competition. Although several references to the goods and services ‘of a competitor’ are 
included in this article and seem central to its analysis,686 a competitive relationship between 
traders in different branches of industry or trade or an indirect competitive relationship may 
suffice. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wording ‘of a competitor’ more 
restrictively as requiring a direct competitive relationship between the party guilty of unfair 
competition and the party whose interests are impaired.687  
The 1996 WIPO Model Provisions on Protection against Unfair Competition, a non-
binding legal instrument that is nevertheless of legal influence as an international 
recommendation,688 also indicates that ‘omission of the requirement that the act be an act of 
competition makes it clear that consumers also are protected’.689 The Provisions also no 
longer require a competitive relationship between parties. The WIPO Model Provisions 
further extend examples of prohibited acts from three to five: in addition to the risk of 
confusion, disparagement and misleading acts, they also include damaging goodwill or 
reputation and the protection of trade secrets. These classic forms of prohibited acts are 
further elaborated into subcategories. 
 In other words, the assessment of honest practices should not be limited to a moral 
judgement, but rather take all factors into account. According to Schricker: 
 
‘Moral standards alone may be sufficient for Gustav Freytag’s romantic nineteenth 
century description of the business world in Soll und Haben; but they are no longer able to 
resolve complicated conflict situations in the world of competition. Admittedly, the ethical 
basis for competition law should be retained, but it must be built upon. Here the 
jurisprudence of “interests and values” has something to offer. […] It permits us to change 
 
684 Para 3(3); included at the 1958 Lisbon Conference. 
685 See: Höpperger and Senftleben (n 658) 67. See also: Ladas (n 645) 1687, 1689; Schricker (n 666) 430; 
Wadlow (n 641) 60. However, de Vrey argues that this ‘type of unfair competition, as dealt with in Article 10bis 
of the Paris Convention, is – again – mainly directed at the protection of (honest) competitors. The Paris 
Convention, therefore, does not emphasize the protection of the consumer in this respect. The introduction of 
consumer protection within the realms of unfair competition law took place at a later date.’ See de Vrey (n 643) 
15. 
686 In para 2 of the general definition, as well as in the first and second example of prohibited acts from 
paragraph 3. 
687 See also: Bodenhausen (n 643) 144; Wadlow (n 641) 62; de Vrey (n 643) 13; Ladas (n 645) 1687; Höpperger 
and Senftleben (n 658) 65. 
688 Höpperger and Senftleben (n 658) 72-73; Schricker and Henning-Bodewig (n 650) 38; Ansgar Ohly, ‘Unfair 
Competition (Basic Principles)’ in Jürgen Basedow and others (eds), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European 
Private Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 1713. WTO Panel, 28 June 2018, WTO Document WT/DS435/R, 
WT/DS441/R, WT/DS458/R, WT/DS467/R (n 654), para. 7.2684: ‘We do not, however, read the omission of 
the word “act” from paragraph 1 as extending the scope of Article 10bis beyond acts of unfair competition as 
defined in paragraph 2.’  




over from indirect interest weighing immanent in ethical evaluation to a direct balancing 
of interests. The modern “interestjurisprudence” (Interessenjurisprudenz) allows the 
weighing of interests of all parties involved and the making of a decision based upon 
norms from the constitution and the entire legal system.’690 
 
In practice, the notion of unfair competition has also increasingly turned into a balancing of 
interests.691 Differences in interpretation of the notions of ‘fair’ or ‘unfair’ are further 
reflected in the different focus on the various interests at stake. For instance, the terms might 
be interpreted differently in countries where the traditional law of unfair competition 
underlines the interests of the honest businessman than in countries where consumer interests 
or the public at large are particularly emphasised.692  
Nevertheless, when assessing the interests of all the parties involved, judges, who are 
themselves consumers, should be cautious not to be too easily convinced by consumer-
friendly arguments. Otherwise, the individual legal protection of the competitor will be 
pushed to the background and freedom of competition will ultimately suffer.693 Consumer 
protection should not be used as a pretence for promoting other interests. Protection against 
unfair competition under general clauses, such as Art. 10bis PC, should only protect consumers 
when this protection is necessary to safeguard fair, undistorted competition. However, it 
should not be used to shelter consumers at the expense of freedom of competition and 
commercial expression.694 The same applies to the interests of the public at large, since 
consumer interests could easily be equated with public interest and consumers are by far the 
largest proportion of the population.695  
 
6.3 CJEU Case Law 
 
The analysis of Art. 10bis PC illustrates that three types of cases should be specifically 
forbidden: causing confusion, discrediting, and using misleading indications. In light of this it 
is justifiable that in assessing honest business practices, as provided by Art. 14(2) TMD 2015 
and Art. 14(2) EUTMR, the CJEU refers to the risk that consumer decisions are impacted by 
 
690 Schricker (n 666) 443. 
691 See also: Ladas (n 645) 1676-1677; Schricker (n 666) 443, 446; WTO Panel, 28 June 2018, WTO Document 
WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/R, WT/DS458/R, WT/DS467/R (n 654), para. 7.2680. 
692 WIPO (n 652) 25. See also: Schricker and Henning-Bodewig (n 650) 31. For example, in France, the ‘action 
en concurrence déloyale’ serves solely the interests of businessmen and the protection of consumers remains out 
of consideration. By contrast, in Germany, where a statute has been established specifically directed towards 
regulating unfair competition, which is headed by a broad general clause, the integration of general and 
consumer interests has been easier. See: Henning-Bodewig (n 649) 170; Schricker (n 666) 416-417. Schricker 
and Henning-Bodewig (n 650) 24.  
692 Sigmar-Jürgen Samwer, ‘Verbraucherschutz und Wettbewerbsrecht’ [1969] GRUR 326, 328.  
693 ibid 328. 
694 Schricker (n 666) 445. 
695 ibid 435. See also Nordemann (n 657) 628 ‘Aber wer Ibsens „Nora“ kennt, weiß, daß die Meinung der 
Mehrheit keine verläßliche Größe ist, und unsere Gerichte wissen das auch. Schon in besten Friedenszeiten 
(1901) mußte das RG – wie eingangs zitiert feststellen, daß im Handelsverkehr tatsächlich aufgekommene 
Praktiken eine Unsitte sein könnten […].’   
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the suggestion of commercial links. This category of commercial tort governing the general 
structure of trademark law is clearly in line with Art. 10bis (3)(1) PC.  
However, the other two categories which the CJEU identified in its case law, the 
potential ‘unfairness’ of free-riding and the risk of impairment to the inherent value of the 
trademark, cannot be found in the primary text of the PC. Substantive protection standards 
specifically for trademarks are only barely sketched in the PC, which merely establishes an 
international obligation to provide for protection against origin confusion.696 Moreover, the 
notion of confusion in Art. 10bis PC must be interpreted autonomously:  
 
‘This lies in combatting unfair acts of competition, not in conferring protection to a 
 “property right” as constituted by the mark. To the extent that it concerns the 
 confusability of goods with identical or similar designations, the risk of mistaken 
 identity must thus indeed exist among the public with respect to attributing the product 
 to a specific source. Protection going beyond this may be acceptable by the virtue of 
 normative standards in trademark law, but not in competition law.’697 
 
Despite having much in common with competition law, trademark law does not have the same 
objective of protection, and the concept of risk of confusion therefore need not necessarily be 
interpreted in exactly the same way.698 Art. 10bis PC seeks to prevent unfair acts of 
competition and does not aim to grant protection to the ‘property right’ conveyed in a 
trademark.699 The other two acts the CJEU aims to protect against, i.e. risk of free-riding and 
damage in the form of dilution, can especially be seen as forms of enhanced protection that go 
beyond protection of the origin function of the trademark.700 
Nevertheless, the protection level of Art. 10bis PC only constitutes an international 
minimum standard which, arguably, no longer fulfils the current conditions of unfair 
competition law. The examples enumerated in the third paragraph may appear for instance too 
narrow from this perspective.701 The first paragraph refers to acts that involve confusion with 
a competitor, but in principle does not seek to prevent consumers from being deceived. The 
second paragraph only protects competitors against statements that are clearly untrue. The 
third paragraph protects consumers against misleading acts with regard to goods but does not 
mention services.702 Besides, Art. 10bis PC provides for certain minimum standards of 
 
696 art 6bis PC regulates the exemption of well-known marks from national registration requirements, and art 
6septies PC protects traders against unauthorised registration of trademarks by unfaithful agents and 
representatives.  
697 Henning-Bodewig (n 649) 176.  
698 Although the current legal standard of the average consumer appears in both fields. See for trademark law: 
Case C-342/97 Lloyd Schuhfabrik v Klijsen Handel Bv ECLI:EU:C:1999:323 and for unfair competition: Case 
C-210/96 Gut Springenheide ECLI:EU:C:1998:369. See also: de Vrey (n 643) 312. 
699 Henning-Bodewig (n 649), 175-176. 
700 Dev Saif Gangjee, ‘Property in brands’ (LSE Working Papers 8:1-27) 13; Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 16; 
Kamperman Sanders (n 642) 505-509. 
701 Schricker and Henning-Bodewig (n 650) 32-33; Beater (n 656) 145-146; Höpperger and Senftleben (n 658) 
67.  
702 Further acts that are not explicitly included include misappropriation of trade secrets (although see art 39 
TRIPS) and the regulation of comparative advertising. Free-riding on the efforts of competitors, such as dilution 
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protection that all nationals of Member States are entitled to claim, ‘but there is nothing to 
prevent a particular member of the Union legislating more generously than Art. 10bis requires 
(whether in terms of substantive law, or in terms of the rights and remedies made available) 
and in that case the foreign ressortissant cannot be denied the more generous protection of 
national law’.703 
 Indeed, the second paragraph of Art. 10bis contains a broad and comprehensive 
definition of unfair competition which is further illustrated by the three examples enlisted in 
the third paragraph. As the word ‘notamment’ in the third paragraph of Art. 10bis PC indicates, 
the listed acts are only some examples of what should be prevented. All dishonest acts in 
commercial and industrial matters therefore fall under the definition and should be 
prevented.704  
Moreover, the WIPO Model Provisions further extend the categories of prohibited acts 
from three to five: in addition to risk of confusion, disparagement and misleading acts, the 
Provisions also include damaging goodwill or reputation and trade secrets. These non-binding 
provisions carry a certain political weight since they have the unanimous support of all WIPO 
and Paris Union members.705  
Since EU trademark law also provides protection that goes beyond confusion,706 it 
therefore makes sense to interpret the concept of ‘honest practices’ in light of the current 
broader approach when applying trademark limitations,707 and refer not only to the risk of 
 
and slavish imitation, are also not mentioned. For an outline of acts not explicitly enumerated in art 10bis, see 
WIPO (n 652) 48-68. 
703 Wadlow (n 641) 55. See also: Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 31. 
704 Ladas (n 645) 1683.  
705 Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 21. See for critical comments: Henning-Bodewig (n 649) 185. See also: de Vrey 
(n 643) 21-22. Cornish is critical, however, about the extensive protection offered by the Model Provisions: ‘The 
Model and its proponents have perforce to acknowledge that there is much in it which can only be read into 
Article 10bis by the most wildly sanguine interpretation.’ In his view, the Model would favour ‘a very extensive 
view of activities which should constitute unfair competition’. The protection provided by the Model Provision 
seems to be in some aspects similar to European trademark law, ie offering goodwill protection irrespective of 
any confusion. See William R Cornish, ‘Genevan bootstraps’ (1997) 19(7) EIPR 336, 337.  
706 art 10(2)(c) TMD 2015 and art 9(2)(c) EUTMR. At the international level, art 16(1) TRIPS also stipulates that 
owners of a registered trademark have the exclusive right to prevent any unauthorised third parties from using in 
the course of trade signs for goods or services that are identical or similar to those in respect of which the 
trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. Regarding use of identical 
signs for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. With respect to art 6bis PC, the 
protection of well-known marks has been broadened on a number of fronts. Most importantly, the scope of 
protection of well-known marks has been extended to dissimilar goods, provided that the trademark use indicates 
a connection between goods and services and the owner of the well-known mark and that the trademark owner’s 
interests are damaged by such use (art 16(3) TRIPS). Enhanced protection of reputable trademarks is further 
anchored in EU trademark law and other jurisdictions. See also: Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 48, 21. 
707 The concept of dilution has its origins in an old German case held by the Landgericht of Elberfeld in 1924 
(Odol). In order to bypass the requirement for likelihood of confusion, the court based its decision on principles 
of tort laid down in the German civil code. In doing this the court created a new doctrine, now commonly known 
as the dilution doctrine. According to this doctrine, actions were tortious if they violated ‘guten Sitten’ or good 
morals, which was in line with the Roman legal principle of ‘boni mores’, and in turn allowed courts to 
anticipate new and unforeseen circumstances (Kamperman Sanders (n 642) 502-503; Civil Court of Elberfeld 
(1925) 25 Juristische Wochenschrift 502). Since current trademark law is closely interwoven with unfair 
competition principles, it therefore makes sense to also expand the trademark limitations to acts of dilution. 
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confusion but also to the potential ‘unfairness’ of free-riding and the risk of impairment of the 
inherent value of the trademark.708  
Inevitably, the exclusive rights needed to secure protection against confusion also 
safeguard the investments made in the creation of a favourable trademark image. By granting 
basic protection against confusion, the exclusive link between an enterprise and its trademark 
is secured, as are the investments made in the evocation of brand-related associations in the 
consumers’ minds.709 The WTO Panel discussing EC protection for trademarks and 
geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs describes this protection 
reflex in the following way:   
 
‘The function of trademarks can be understood by reference to Article 15.1 [TRIPS] as 
distinguishing goods and services of undertakings in the course of trade. Every 
trademark owner has a legitimate interest in preserving the distinctiveness, or capacity 
to distinguish, of its trademark so that it can perform that function. This includes its 
interest in using its own trademark in connection with the relevant goods and services 
of its own and authorized undertakings. Taking account of that legitimate interest will 
also take account of the trademark owner’s interest in the economic value of its mark 
arising from the reputation that it enjoys and the quality that it denotes.’710 
 
Nonetheless, granting more protection in addition to the protection reflex inherent in basic 
protection against confusion is not unproblematic. Based on the dilution doctrine, trademark 
 
708 It can, however, be questioned whether harmonisation of unfair competition law, as undertaken by the CJEU 
through its case law on EU trademark law, is desirable in the first place. Some have argued that by doing so the 
CJEU might exceed its mandate. The broad concept of ‘free-riding’ as ruled by the CJEU in L’Oréal/Bellure 
could be seen as exemplifying the European concept of unfair competition. While some Dutch commentators 
(DJG Visser, Comment on Case C-487/07 L’Oréal/Bellure ECLI:EU:C:2009:378, IEF 7974) may have 
welcomed the case, English commentators (Darren Meale and Joel Smith, ‘Enforcing a trade mark when 
nobody’s confused: where the law stands after L’Oréal and Intel’ (2010) 5 JIPLP 96) had more trouble 
reconciling the case with the tort of passing off. See Anselm Kamperman Sanders, ‘Unfair competition: 
complementary or alternative to intellectual property in the EU?’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Constructing 
European Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2013) 329-339, 336. See also Björkenfeldt, who argued that the 
case was highly controversial and pointed out that its outcome may be highly beneficial to brand owners but may 
also lead to a lower standard of competition and less consumer choice (Mats Björkenfeldt, ‘The genie is out of 
the bottle: the ECJ’s decision in L’Oréal/Bellure’ (2010) 5 JIPLP 105). Therefore, the concept of dilution should 
be interpreted rather strictly. See Kamperman Sanders (n 708) 338; de Vrey (n 643) 312; Kamperman Sanders (n 
642) 499-510, 509-510: ‘The CJEU has consistently used its mandate based on the trademark Directive and the 
EUTMR to harmonize the law against unfair competition under the guise of trademark law. […] With every new 
function of the trademark the CJEU comes up with and deems worthy of protection, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to see where the limits of protection of trademark rights lie and where unfair competition law begins. 
What is worrying in this regard is that the law against unfair competition, although not harmonized and subject 
to national law in the EU member states, is often subject to very different policy considerations that find 
justification in the preservation of a competitive market as a whole, rather than the protection of individual 
trader’s interests.’  
709 Senftleben (n 621), p. 141. 




owners acquire control over the use of a trademark across all markets711 irrespective of 
whether consumers are confused.712 Under CJEU case law, even damage is not required713 
when proprietors claim that a third party has taken a free ride on their trademark’s 
reputation.714 As a result, trademark owners are increasingly rewarded for their investments.  
Justification is required to approximate trademark protection to the exploitation rights 
known from copyright and patent law in this way.715 While the primary purpose of trademark 
law is to ensure market transparency with the consequence that protection may last forever – 
 
711 If the trademark has a reputation, the trademark owner can prevent the use of identical and similar signs used 
for all kinds of goods and services irrespective of whether this occurs in a competitive or non-competitive 
context. Whether a likelihood of association exists must be assessed globally considering all the circumstances 
of the case (Case C‑252/07 Intel/Intelmark ECLI:EU:C:2008:655, paras. 41, 62). Other requirements are that the 
defendant has taken unfair advantage (‘free-riding’) or has acted to the detriment of the distinctive character 
(‘blurring’) or the reputation of the trademark with a reputation (‘tarnishment’). The trademark owner needs to 
show damage to the trademark with a reputation. This is however a high threshold: with regard to blurring, the 
trademark owner must show evidence of ‘a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the 
goods or services for which the earlier mark was registered consequent on the use of the later mark, or a serious 
likelihood that such a change will occur in the future’ (Case C‑252/07 Intel/Intelmark ECLI:EU:C:2008:655, 
para. 77). In Environmental Manufacturing/OHIM, the CJEU confirmed that there must be indeed a serious risk 
of such detriment, allowing the use of logical deductions. These deductions must be founded on ‘an analysis of 
the probabilities and by taking account of the normal practice in the relevant commercial sector as well as all the 
other circumstances of the case’ (Case C‑383/12 P, Environmental Manufacturing/OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2013:741, 
paras. 42-43). If there is no harm, the trademark owner could argue that the defendant has taken advantage in a 
unfair way, that is ‘where that party seeks by that use to ride on the coat-tails of the mark with a reputation in 
order to benefit from the power of attraction, the reputation and the prestige of that mark and to exploit, without 
paying any financial compensation, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of the mark in order to 
create and maintain the mark’s image.’ (Case C-487/07 L’Oréal/Bellure ECLI:EU:C:2009:378, para. 50). See 
also Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 337.  
712 Although trademark owners cannot prohibit competitors from using a similar sign in case of ‘due cause’ (art 
10(2)(c) TMD 2015 and art 9(2)(c) EUTMR).  
713 Which can be seen as a consequence of the fact that EU trademark law does not require detriment to 
demonstrate that advantage has been taken. Nevertheless, in Interflora/Marks & Spencer, the CJEU argued that 
when the defendant uses a similar sign for the purpose of informing consumers about an alternative product that 
is not a mere imitation, and this is detrimental to the distinctive character of the trademark or the repute, or 
adversely affecting the functions of the trademark, this can be qualified as use with due cause (Case C‑323/09 
Interflora/Marks & Spencer, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604, para. 91). These factors exclude the possibility of a due 
cause defence when harm is done to the trademark in case of commercial speech. See Kur and Senftleben (n 
621) 364. 
714 Case C-487/07 L’Oréal/Bellure ECLI:EU:C:2009:378. 
715 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘The economics of trademark law’ (1988) 78 The Trademark 
Reporter 267, 275; Senftleben (n 626) 143; Dominic Scott, Alex Oliver and Miguel Ley-Pineda, ‘Trade Marks as 
Property: a Philosophical Perspective’ in Lionel Bently, Jennifer Davis and Jane C Ginsburg (eds), Trade Marks 
and Brands – An Interdisciplinary Critique (Cambridge University Press 2008) 296-297; Mark A Lemley, ‘The 
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1687, 1694-1696; Robert 
G Bone, ‘Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law’ (2006) 86 Boston 
University Law Review 547, 619-621; Mark P McKenna, ‘The normative foundations of trademark law’ (2007) 
82 Notre Dame Law Review 1839, 1845-1846. Nevertheless, it can be argued that anti-dilution protection, with 
its case-by-case analysis, is much closer to unfair competition than to patent or copyright law (See Annette Kur, 
‘What to protect, and how? Unfair competition, intellectual property, or protection sui generis’ in Nari Lee and 
others (eds), Intellectual property, unfair competition and publicity convergences and development. European 
Intellectual Property Institutes Network series (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited) 20).   
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because consumers would be confused if trademark protection ended at some point – 
copyright law and patent law seek to offer an incentive and reward for the creation of 
intellectual property and the disclosure and dissemination of works or inventions respectively 
to enrich the public generally.  
Furthermore, branded goods are not necessarily high-quality products. Broad brand 
protection might encourage traders to improve the advertising and persuasive value of their 
marks instead of maintaining and improving the quality of the product in question.716 In 
addition, the CJEU may consistently emphasise the fact that the function of origin is the most 
important and essential function of a mark,717 but in practice the advertising, investment and 
communication functions have a higher economic relevance.718  
As a result, trademark owners can hide behind the protection of the consumer that 
results from the origin function719 while in fact seeking to protect their own investments in the 
marketing of branded goods. Implementing concepts that go beyond the origin function in the 
honest business practices proviso would stimulate this process further. 
Given this weak theoretical foundation, we need to be careful when extending 
trademark protection beyond the core function of protecting trademarks as source identifiers. 
This cautious approach is necessary not only when establishing prima facie infringement but 
also when assessing defence arguments in light of the honest practices proviso. In Interflora, 
Advocate General Jääskinen explained:  
 
‘I find this very problematic from the point of view of competition because the Court 
is actually stating that the trade mark proprietor is entitled to use his right to prohibit 
the use of a sign in circumstances where this would result in a move away from a 
Pareto optimal situation. The situation of the trade mark proprietor would not improve 
as he by definition would not suffer any detriment because of the use, but the 
competitor’s situation would worsen because he would lose a part of his business. 
 
716 See Jamil Ammar, Think Consumer: The Enforcement of the Trade Mark Quality Guarantee Revisited, A 
Legal and Economic Analysis (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2011) 1, 13, 18. Andrew Griffiths, ‘A Law-and-
Economics perspectives on trade marks’ in Bently, Davis and Ginsburg (n 715) 253; Jessica Litman, ‘Breakfast 
with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1717; Jonathan Aldred, 
‘The economic rationale of trade marks: an economist’s critique’ in Bently, Davis and Ginsburg (n 715) 271, 
274; Ralph S Brown, ‘Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols’ (1999) 108 Yale 
Law Journal 1619, 1635-1637; Glynn S Lunney, ‘Trademark Monopolies’ (1999) 48 Emory Law Journal 367, 
437-439.  
717 See for example Case C-206/01 Arsenal/Reed ECLI:EU:C:2002:651, paras 42, 48, 51; Case C-299/99 
Philips/Remington ECLI:EU:C:2002:377; Case C-40/01 Ansul/Ajax ECLI:EU:C:2003:145.   
718 Tobias Cohen Jehoram, Constant JJC van Nispen and Tony JLRA Huydecoper, European Trademark Law. 
Community Trademark Law and Harmonized National Trademark Law (Kluwer International 2010) 36. From a 
legal perspective, the accessory functions are not necessarily more important than the origin and quality 
functions, as the CJEU does not provide any rulings in that direction. 
719 This applies to cases where the CJEU interprets the origin function broadly, i.e. when courts rule that a 
likelihood of confusion exists where a highly distinctive trademark or post-sale confusion is concerned. In both 
cases it can be questioned whether consumers are really confused.    
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Also the situation of the consumers who had not been misled by the ad but consciously 
preferred to buy the competitor’s products would be impaired.’720 
 
Remarkably, the CJEU apparently subjected the limitations to trademark protection to an 
honest practices test based on the same terms as those used to identify infringement, thereby 
making the defences quite ineffective in practice.721 As trademark protection gradually 
expands, the trademark limitations should adapt to these changes. Therefore, some argue that 
‘[t]he only way to make sense of the wording would be to clarify that although the basic 
concepts (likelihood of confusion, abuse of reputation) informing the evaluation of honest 
business practices are the same as those governing infringement, their application is different 
in that the leeway for using a basically conflicting mark is much broader where applications 
or limitations apply, thereby confining the proprietor’s right to oppose such use to cases of 
disproportionate harm’.722  
 The interpretation of the honest practices standard must thus be carried out in a more 
‘fine-grained fashion: thoroughly informed by the countervailing interests underlying the 
different limitations’.723  
Interestingly, if we look at the CJEU case law more carefully, it also seems to offer 
room for declaring a use honest even if it causes some trademark harm. For example, in 
Gerolsteiner Brunnen,724 the CJEU did not rule that the third party’s use was dishonest 
although a likelihood of (aural) confusion existed. In this case, the owner of the ‘GERRI’ 
trademark for mineral water claimed that the defendant made an infringement by marketing 
soft drinks bearing labels with the words ‘Kerry Spring’. The defendant argued that the drinks 
were made with water from a source in County Kerry in Ireland. This natural source was 
included in the list of recognised sources of mineral water.725 Since the sign was an indication 
of the geographical origin of goods, the defendant’s use of it could be allowed if it was in 
accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.726 The fact that the sign 
was used as a trademark did not preclude its use being in accordance with honest practices.727 
 
720 Case C-323/09 Interflora/Marks&Spencer ECLI:EU:C:2011:604, para 94. See also Daniel Klerman, 
‘Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing’ (2006) 74 Fordham Law Review 1759, 1771: ‘If the 
junior user benefits (as evidenced from its desire to use the mark), but there is really no harm (no confusion, no 
blurring, no tarnishment), then it is socially desirable for the junior user to use the mark. In fact, allowing the use 
is Pareto superior – the junior user and its customers benefit, and no one is harmed. Giving the senior user the 
right to enjoin the use either blocks beneficial transactions or, if the parties negotiate a license, adds transaction 
costs.’ 
721 The CJEU did not invent these criteria but derived them from Art. 4 MCAD. See Bently and others (n 626) 
1134. 
722 Senftleben and others (n 636) 339. 
723 Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 433.  
724 Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen/Putsch ECLI:EU:C:2004:11. 
725 ibid paras 20-21.   
726 ibid para 18; art 14(1)(b) TMD 2015 and art 12(1)(b) EUTMR. To fall within the scope thereof it is enough 
for a sign to be used as an indication concerning one of the characteristics set out therein (para 19).  
727 Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen/Putsch ECLI:EU:C:2004:11, paras 14-15. See also AG Stix-Hackl (para 
25), who argued that since art 5 (art 10 TMD 2015) can only operate when a mark is used as a trademark, art 6 
(art 14 TMD 2015) must also apply when a third party’s sign is used as trademark. Otherwise the provision 
would become ineffective (Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen/Putsch ECLI:EU:C:2003:408, Opinion of the 
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The CJEU argued that ‘[t]he mere fact that there exists a likelihood of aural confusion 
between a word mark registered in one Member State and an indication of geographical origin 
from another Member State is therefore insufficient to conclude that the use of that indication 
in the course of trade is not in accordance with honest practices’.728  
 According to the CJEU, the question of whether the trademark owner had a right to 
forbid such signs had to be assessed according to standards of unfair competition. It was for 
the national courts to carry out an overall assessment of all the relevant circumstances, i.e. the 
shape and labelling of the bottle, and not whether a likelihood of confusion existed.729  
The reference to shape and labelling may indicate that the CJEU was prepared to 
assume that the test of honest practices required a more subjective assessment, a duty to not 
deliberately damage the trademark’s reputation or seek to take advantage of it. The overall 
presentation of the product could expose the defendant’s real intentions.730 In any case, the 
CJEU seems to have accepted that the unauthorised use of a trademark can be honest despite 
causing some (aural) confusion.  
The Anheuser-Busch case731 might also be interesting in this respect. Admittedly, the 
own name defence has been changed under the new legislation. Art. 14(1)(a) TMD 2015 and 
Art. 14(1)(a) EUTMR explicitly state that the own name defence only covers natural persons 
using their own name. This current legal situation differs from the approach taken in the past 
– prior to the 2015 trademark law reform – where despite a Council and Commission 
declaration supporting a limited interpretation, the CJEU had ruled that the defence was not 
limited to personal names but also covered trade names.732 The amendment, with its clear 
reference to natural persons, puts an end to this extension of the scope of the provision in 
previous case law. However, it does not impact the guidance which the CJEU provided in 
Anheuser-Busch with regard to the overarching requirement of honest business practices. In 
this latter regard, the Anheuser-Busch decision still provides valid guidance. 
The factual background was as follows: the owner of the BUDWEISER mark for beer 
claimed that the defendant’s beer mark BUDVAR infringed its trademark rights by importing 
BUDVAR beer into Finland. The defendant’s beer was labelled with the BUDVAR mark 
together with the text that the beer had been ‘brewed and bottled by the brewery Budweiser 
Budvar national enterprise’, which was printed in much smaller lettering.733  
The own name defence allows a third party to make use of a trademark when it is done 
in good faith, which is, the CJEU argued, an expression of the duty to act fairly in relation to 
the legitimate interests of the trademark owner.734 According to the CJEU, in assessing 
 
AG Stix-Hackl). However, the effect of the Gerolsteiner decision could be that trademark owners who opt for a 
brand that falls under art 14(1)(b) TMD 2015 are better able to maintain a uniform brand across the market. See: 
Smith (n 636) 140-141.  
728 Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen/Putsch ECLI:EU:C:2004:11, para 25.  
729 ibid para 26.  
730 Smith (n 636) 142. 
731 Case C-245/02 Anheuser-Busch ECLI:EU:C:2004:717.  
732 ibid paras 78-81. See also Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 410. 
733 Case C-245/02 Anheuser-Busch ECLI:EU:C:2004:717, para 31. 
734 ibid para 82. Although the CJEU only referred to the legitimate interests of the trademark owner, it 
nevertheless also argued that the condition of honest practices was essentially the same as set forth in art 17 of 
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whether the condition of honest practice is satisfied, account must be taken of ‘the extent to 
which the use of the third party’s trade name is understood by the relevant public, or at least a 
significant section of that public, as indicating a link between the third party’s goods and the 
trade-mark proprietor or a person authorised to use the trade mark, and secondly of the extent 
to which the third party ought to have been aware of that. Another factor to be taken into 
account when making the assessment is whether the trade mark concerned enjoys a certain 
reputation in the Member State in which it is registered and its protection is sought, from 
which the third party might profit in selling his goods.’735 
 The CJEU added that the national court must provide an overall assessment of all the 
relevant circumstances, including the labelling of the bottle, to find out whether the 
defendant’s use of a similar trade name is unfairly competing with the trademark owner.736  
In the CJEU’s opinion, it is thus not only relevant whether a likelihood of confusion 
exists, but also to what extent a third party can be expected to have been aware of this. If a 
likelihood of confusion exists but a third party was not and cannot be expected to have been 
aware of the commercial link, the use of the trademark may still be allowed.737 The overall 
assessment of all relevant circumstances, such as the presentation of the product, could give 
an indication of the honesty of the third party’s conduct. If the trademark is highly reputable, 
it is probably also more likely that a defendant was aware of the commercial link and their use 
of the trademark was dishonest.738 This case also illustrates that the assessment of honest 
practices must go further than simply reiterating the infringement criteria, and it must allow 
judges to take a more conduct-based approach.739 
The Gillette case may also have left some leeway for traders to influence the honest 
practices assessment with precautions that they take to prevent harm to the trademark. In this 
 
the TRIPS Agreement. It is unclear whether the CJEU thought that interests of third parties should also be 
included in the test of honest practices.  
735 ibid para 83. 
736 ibid para 84.  
737 The question of dishonesty may also depend on when a third party is supposed to have become aware of a 
likelihood of confusion, i.e. was the infringement made in the period when the product was first put on the 
market, or when the product was introduced in the market? See: Smith (n 636) 144. See also: Ashley Roughton, 
‘Permitted infringing use: the scope of defences to an infringement action’ in Jeremy Phillips and Ilanah Simon 
(eds) Trade Mark Use (Oxford University Press 2005) 193.  
738 Po Jen Yap, ‘Honestly, neither Céline nor Gillette is defensible!’ (2008) 30 EIPR 286, 289. It is doubtful, 
however, whether this was the CJEU’s intention. The CJEU argued that national courts should merely look at 
whether the earlier trademark had a reputation that could be taken advantage of, rather than whether the third 
party had actually profited or sought to profit from the trademark’s reputation. This does not seem to suggest that 
the CJEU envisaged considering whether the defendant was deliberately seeking to profit from the reputation of 
the trademark (Ilanah Simon, ‘Nominative Use and Honest Practices in Industrial and Commercial Matters – A 
Very European History’ (2007) Intellectual Property Quarterly 117)). Kamperman Sanders (n 658) 136, 149 
argues that knowledge is key to assessing whether a trader can be found liable for ‘malign competition’. The 
defendant must have been able to assess the risk of a legal action after reaping the benefits. The higher the 
degree of cognisance, the more likely it is that the defendant can be held liable for malign competition. In the 
case of a well-known trademark, the defendant can be expected to have been aware of the existence of the 
trademark or to have made efforts to make inquiries about existing marks in the market.   
739 In the Céline case the CJEU repeated the factors put forward in the Anheuser-Busch case, which also involved 
an appeal to the own name defence. See: Case C-17/06 Céline ECLI:EU:C:2007:497, paras 33-35. See also: Jaap 
Bremer, ‘Verwijzen of verwarren? Over refererend merkgebruik in de praktijk’ (2013) 1 BMM Bulletin 76, 78. 
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case, the claimant Gillette registered ‘Gillette’ and ‘Sensor’ as a trademark for razors. Gillette 
sued the defendant Parason for selling blades under its mark ‘Parason Flexor’ with a sticker 
on the packaging indicating that Gillette razor handles were compatible with Parason blades. 
Such a use of the trademark may be permitted if it is necessary to indicate the intended 
purpose of a product and this is in accordance with honest practices.  
In the CJEU’s view, the trademark use is necessary when it is the only way in practice 
to inform the public clearly and fully of the intended purpose, such that the undistorted system 
of competition in the market for that product can be maintained.740 The CJEU offered a rather 
narrow interpretation of ‘necessary’.741 This case is therefore not seen as particularly 
beneficial to competitors relying on the limitation of trademark rights.742 Under the amended 
EU trademark legislation, however, the strict necessity-based interpretation with regard to the 
specific purpose of indicating the intended purpose of a good or service (that may be derived 
from Gillette) does not apply to other forms of referential use, such as use for the purpose of 
comparative advertising,743 informing consumers about the resale of genuine goods after the 
exhaustion of rights, informing consumers about alternative products, parody and artistic 
expression, or criticism and review.744 Furthermore, the ‘necessity test’ does not impact the 
interpretation of ‘honest practices’.  
Regarding the honest practices standard, the CJEU ruled that the third party’s use is 
not in accordance with honest practices if ‘it is done in such a manner as to give the 
impression that there is a commercial connection between the third party and the trade mark 
owner; it affects the value of the trade mark by taking unfair advantage of its distinctive 
character or repute; it entails the discrediting or denigration of that mark; or where the third 
party presents its product as an imitation or replica or the product bearing the trade mark of 
which it is not the owner’.  
Admittedly, the CJEU implemented the infringement factors as criteria for assessing 
honest practices, i.e. absence of confusion, unfair advantage, blurring and tarnishing.745 The 
CJEU even went a step further in emphasising that these ‘factors’ operated as conditions,746 
making it more difficult for third parties to invoke defences. 
However, in Céline,747 where the CJEU was asked to rule on a dispute concerning 
identical trade names, the CJEU did not refer to Gillette, in which it had recently ruled that the 
factors must be seen as conditions.748 It is therefore unclear whether the honest practices 
 
740 Case C-228/03 Gillette ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, paras 35-36.  
741 Bently and others (n 626) 1141; Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 419.  
742 Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 419. See also: Ramsey and Schovsbo (n 621) 676-677. 
743 This defence is a more theoretical option, however, since appropriate comparative advertising does not even 
lead to a prima facie infringement after the trademark law reform. Comparative advertising is not included in art 
14(1)(c) TMD 2015 and art 14(1)(c) EUTMR, but implemented in art 10(3)(f) TMD 2015 and art 9(3)(f) 
EUTMR as a specific category of infringing use. See also: Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 421. 
744 Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 420-421; Kur, Dreier and Luginbuehl (n 632) 266.  
745 Case C-228/03 Gillette ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, para 49. See: Bently and others (n 626) 1135; Kur and 
Senftleben (n 621) 432; Yap (n 738) 289-290. 
746 Case C-228/03 Gillette ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, para 46.  
747 Case C-17/06 Céline ECLI:EU:C:2007:497. 
748 Case C-228/03 Gillette ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, para 46. 
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factors are merely factors or conditions in all cases where the limitations of trademark rights 
are invoked as defences.  
Furthermore, the CJEU also explained that the overall presentation of a third party’s 
product should be considered, in particular the way in which the trademark was displayed in 
that presentation. Other factors to be taken into account included the extent to which the third 
party’s sign differed from the trademark, and the effort made by the third party to ensure that 
consumers could distinguish the third party’s products from the trademarked products.749  
National courts thus need to take into account the overall presentation and the efforts 
made by a third party to avoid confusion among consumers, which can be seen as empirical 
factors since they measure how consumers perceive the products in question in reality. Since 
the infringement assessment is quite abstract,750 these additional circumstances can potentially 
overrule the conclusion based on assessment factors repeating prima facie infringement 
criteria. Quite clearly, Gillette thus established not only a necessity test. In addition, the 
decision opened a back door for including individual measures taken by the defendant to 
prevent trademark harm in the analysis.  
For example, overall presentation can indicate that consumers may not be confused 
even though the signs and goods are similar and the trademark is well known. If a third party 
makes a reasonable effort to avoid confusion, the court can still conclude that some 
consumers may be confused, but not the average consumer. This means any benefits a third 
party generates are not necessarily unfair.751  
Furthermore, in the context of the ‘due cause’ defence regulated under Art. 10(2)(c) 
TMD 2015 and Art. 9(2)(c) EUTMR, the CJEU argued in Interflora that if an advertiser 
offers its products as an alternative to the products of the trademark owner and refrains from 
offering a mere imitation of the trademark owner’s products, causing dilution or tarnishment 
 
749 ibid. 
750 Robert Burrell and Dev Saif Gangjee, ‘Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression: A Call for Caution’ (2010) 
41 IIC 544, 556; Ansgar Ohly, ‘A Fairness-Based Approach to Economic Rights’ in Bernt Hugenholtz (ed), 
Copyright reconstructed: rethinking copyright's economic rights in a time of highly dynamic technological and 
economic change. Information law series (Wolters Kluwer 2018) 11; Ansgar Ohly, ‘Interfaces between trade 
mark protection and unfair competition law: Confusion about confusion and misconceptions about 
misappropriation?’ in Nari Lee and others (eds), Intellectual Property, Unfair Competition and Publicity 
Convergences and Development. European Intellectual Property Institutes Network series (Edward Elgar 2014) 
41-42. For example, in Arsenal, the infringer had clearly informed consumers that the fan articles were not 
officially licensed by the football club. The CJEU ruled that this disclaimer did not change the conclusion that a 
likelihood of confusion existed. See also: Ansgar Ohly, ‘Trademark Law and Advertising Law in the European 
Union: Conflicts and Convergence’ in Calboli and Ginsburg (n 638) 323-336, 324, 327-329, 336. There has, 
however, been a ‘significant recent trend towards convergence’ between EU trademark law and unfair 
competition law. Ohly shows that the trademark confusion analysis ‘has arguably become less formal and more 
context-sensitive and has, hence, adopted some characteristics of unfair competition methodology’.  
751 For example, in Siemens/VIPA, the CJEU ruled that the advertiser did not take unfair advantage of the 
reputation of the distinguishing trademark because the advertising was intended for a specialised public and 
associations with the trademark were avoided by the presentation of the advertising (para 27). The CJEU 
considered that the benefit of comparative advertising to consumers must necessarily be taken into account in 
determining whether an advertiser is taking unfair advantage of the reputation of a trademark, trade name or 
other distinguishing marks of a competitor and that the benefit an advertiser derives from comparative 
advertising is not leading when assessing whether the advertisers’ behaviour is lawful (paras 24-25). See: Case 
C-59/05 Siemens/VIPA ECLI:EU:C:2006:147.  
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and affecting the trademark’s functions, the advantage resulting from such use is not unfairly 
taken from the reputation of the proprietor’s trademark. In the CJEU’s opinion, such use falls 
within the ambit of fair competition in the sector for the goods or services involved. As a 
result, the CJEU did not immediately reject the due cause defence after concluding that free-
riding was involved, under the assumption that some beneficial effect generated by a third 
party should be tolerated if undertaken for legitimate reasons.752 
In other words, the foregoing examples of CJEU jurisprudence show that the Court 
leaves room for assessing the proviso of honest business practices (and the comparable 
question of sufficient precautions against harm when invoking the due cause defence) more 
empirically. Moral standards alone are not decisive. Based on purely ethical standards, it may 
be postulated that an honest trader should stop causing the trademark owner any harm. There 
would be no room for allowing any confusion, dilution or free-riding since this would go 
against the basic emotive feeling753 that ‘you shall not reap where you have not sown’.754  
Avoiding this purely ethical standard, the CJEU interprets ‘honesty’ from a broader 
perspective and takes all the interests of the parties involved into account. For example, in 
Gerolsteiner Brunnen, the CJEU had to consider that the drinks were made with water from a 
 
752 Case C-323/09 Interflora ECLI:EU:C:2011:604, para 91. In Leidseplein, the CJEU ruled that pursuant to the 
concept of ‘due cause’ within the meaning of that provision, proprietors of a reputable mark may be obliged to 
tolerate the use of a similar sign if it is shown that that sign was being used before that mark was registered and 
the use is in good faith. If this is the case, national courts must consider whether the sign has been accepted by, 
and what its reputation is with, the relevant public; the degree of proximity between the goods and services for 
which that sign was originally used and the product for which the reputable mark was registered; and the 
economic and commercial significance of the use for that product of the sign that is similar to that mark (Case 
C-65/12 Leidseplein ECLI:EU:C:2014:49, para 60).  
753 Dirk JG Visser, ‘Misrepresentation and Misappropriation’ in Ansgar Ohly (ed), Common Principles of 
European Intellectual Property Law (Mohr Siebeck 2012) 251.  
754 See: Case C-487/07 L’Oréal/Bellure ECLI:EU:C:2009:378, para 49: ‘where a third party attempts, through 
the use of a sign similar to a mark with a reputation, to ride on the coat-tails of that mark in order to benefit from 
its power of attraction, its reputation and its prestige, and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation 
and without being required to make efforts of his own in that regard, the marketing effort expended by the 
proprietor of that mark in order to create and maintain the image of that mark, the advantage resulting from such 
use must be considered to be an advantage that has been unfairly taken of the distinctive character or the repute 
of that mark’. This is a rather emotive ruling that does not really fit in the trademark law system and has 
therefore been repeatedly criticised. See: Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 20. See, however, Callmann, who argued 
that two types of unfair competition should be distinguished, ‘competition embracing constructive effort and 
competition embracing non-constructive effort’. In his eyes, the former should always be permitted, while the 
latter should be prohibited. Constructive effort (‘Leistungswettbewerb’ or ‘competition on one’s own merits’) is 
‘the effort of a man who strives to obtain commercial advantages only by the honestly exercised means of his 
own strength, his own ingenuity, skill, and capital. Constructive effort is a subjective conception, which means 
that the business man’s effort is called constructive, not because, from an objective point of view, the effect of 
his endeavor is beneficial to the general economy, especially not because he considers his competitive effort 
beneficial for the whole, but because the means of his business activity display those of his powers which are 
from a reasonable standpoint necessary in order to do the best possible job within his ability.’ Following this 
approach, trademark owners have stronger trademark protection since traders must take the necessary steps to 
avoid interference with the trademark owner’s rights even though these additional efforts would lead to less 
competition and a lower level of well-being for the public. See: Rudolf Callmann, ‘What is Unfair Competition’ 
(1940) 28 Geo L J 585, 600-601; Rudolf Callmann, ‘He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust 
Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition’ (1942) 55 Harv L Rev 595, 612. See for a critical comment: 
Gustavo Ghidini, ‘“Competition on the merits”: a pseudo-concept?’ (2016) 1 Luiss Law Review 84, 85.  
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source in County Kerry in Ireland, which was included in the list of recognised sources of 
mineral water. The trademark owner’s right to prevent confusion among consumers had to be 
weighed against the competitor’s right to indicate the geographical origin of the drink.  
In Gillette, for instance, the CJEU had to balance the defendant’s interest in using the 
trademark to provide the public with comprehensible and complete information about the 
intended purpose of the product, i.e. the fact that the Gillette handles were compatible with 
the defendant’s blade, against the trademark owner’s right to prevent confusion among the 
public and safeguarding its trademark reputation. In both situations, the trademark use might 
be justified in light of third-party interests. 
Following this approach, whether the defendant’s use of the trademark can be 
prohibited ultimately depends on the defendant’s conduct, which has to be determined by 
making an overall assessment of all the relevant circumstances, i.e. the shape and labelling of 
the product. The presentation of the product could indicate not only whether a likelihood of 
confusion indeed exists (given the factual circumstances), but also to what extent a third party 
can be expected to have been aware of this. For example, if a trademark is highly well known, 
it is more likely that a trader would be aware of the commercial link. Furthermore, the 
presentation of the product could reveal the effort made by the competitor to ensure that 
consumers could distinguish the competitor’s products from the trademarked products.755 
This means that the decisive factor in assessing whether the defendant’s conduct is 
honest is based on a combination of objective and subjective elements.756 If a trader 
deliberately causes confusion, this conduct cannot be seen as fair. A reasonable honest trader 
would have made sufficient efforts to avoid confusion instead of deliberately causing 
confusion. The defendant’s state of mind – becoming manifest in measures taken to prevent 
harm – thus might be a relevant factor, although it is not decisive. Otherwise, companies 
would deliberately not make any effort to determine whether the signs they have chosen are 
already used by other traders. What is important is what a reasonable trader ought to have 
known or done to avoid confusion.757  
 
755 See also in this sense with regard to unlawful imitations: de Vrey (n 643) 311. Under German and Dutch 
unfair competition law the claimant has to prove that the confusion was ‘needless’. If the defendant proves that 
despite having taken reasonable measures he was unable to avoid confusion, for example because he obtains the 
same technical effect, the act is not unlawful. The English tort of passing offers broader protection without the 
requirement that the misrepresentation of the defendant’s product should be ‘needless’. German law (but also 
English law) would be preferable in so far as it considers whether the defendant clearly followed another 
product’s overall appearance, for example by attaching its own marks to the product or using different 
packaging. 
756 These elements can be described as empirical as well as normative. Empirical because they are related to the 
question of how consumers really perceive signs and whether consumers believe that the products are connected 
with each other. Did the honest trader make sufficient efforts to reduce real consumer confusion? Normative 
because assessment factors ultimately serve a higher, normative goal: to ensure that the prevention of unfair acts 
of competition leads to a transparent and properly functioning market.   
757 Nevertheless, it could be argued that the trademark owner’s conduct could also be a relevant factor in the 
assessment of honest practices. If the claimant is limited in exercising trademark rights (think of absence of 
confusion, fair comparison or protection beyond confusion), efforts to avoid harm might offer an unfair 
advantage if a claimant attempts to enforce its trademark rights irrespective of these efforts. If the claimant does 
not have a strong case, fewer efforts to reduce possible trademark harm might therefore be sufficient. This 
argument refers to the issue of ‘clean hands’, which means that a claimant may be without remedy if the judge 
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Furthermore, it could be argued that a broader interpretation of the general definition 
of honest practices is in line with Art. 10bis PC. Currently, the reference frame for developing 
the concept of honest practices need not be restricted to a businessman’s standard of 
behaviour but can also include other overarching values, such as safeguarding the efficient 
operation of competition as a main instrument of market economies.758 As already explained 
above, a value-based approach may offer room for accepting some detriment to the trademark 
as long as this detriment is outweighed by benefits for society, such as a well-functioning 
market with a high degree of freedom of competition. As also explained, acceptance of this 
final outcome would still depend on the individual conduct of the competitor using the 
trademark. Only if the competitor takes steps to avoid harm to the greatest extent possible can 
the detriment to the trademark be justified.759  
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the described conduct-based approach seems to be 
detached from Art. 10bis PC. In particular, the defendant’s state of mind – and resulting efforts 
to prevent harm – is not included in the definition or the examples mentioned in Art. 10bis PC.  
In a trademark context, however, the concept of honest business practices must 
necessarily be interpreted in light of the full spectrum of current trademark norms, including 
limitations of trademark rights, such that, despite having its origins in unfair competition law, 
it might not be so problematic if the honest practices proviso is given a slightly different 
meaning when applied in trademark law.  
Moreover, if the scope of trademark protection expands, it makes sense to devise 
defences that develop in parallel.760 The Paris Convention does not provide for any specific 
rules concerning the subject matter and scope of trademark protection, such that limitations 
are also not required as a counterbalance. At the international level, limitations in trademark 
law were stipulated for the first time in Art. 17 TRIPS. Considering the recognition of a 
 
believes him to have brought forward a case without ‘pure hands and a pure conscience’ (see: Fetridge v Wells 
13 How. Pr. 385, 389 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857)). The claimant’s conduct must thus be intentional and directly related 
to the case, such that the trademark owner is not unjustifiably deprived of relief. Furthermore, the refusal of an 
infringement claim must be balanced against the public interest in protecting consumers against confusion. If the 
judge rejects the trademark claim because of the claimant’s illegal conduct, the defendant could continue to sell 
similar products, which might cause confusion among consumers. For example, if the claimant retains their 
trademark registration by false or fraudulent representations, a ‘clean hands’ defence might be successfully 
invoked. See: ‘The Besmirched Plaintiff and the Confused Public: Unclean Hands in Trademark Infringement’ 
(1965) 65 Colum L Rev 108 (Notes section). See further: Altman and Pollack (n 643) paras 23:14-20. 
758 The meaning of honest practices is basically influenced by the norms of the protecting country in question, 
and by EU legislation. In an international case, international norms can further influence the concept of honest 
practices.  
759 For example, whether a third party advertising repair services for BMW or Volkswagen is allowed to use 
their logo depends on the concrete circumstances of the case. The use might be justified if the reference is small 
or is used in combination with other trademarks. If that is the case, the consumer might be expected to 
understand that there is no commercial link between the third party and the trademark owner, especially if the 
website contains a clear and visible disclaimer stating that the third party is not economically linked to the 
trademark owner. Furthermore, the defendant could reduce the suggestion of a commercial link by attaching its 
own trademark and could place the BMW or Volkswagen logo in a non-prominent position in the advertisement. 
See also: Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 419; Montiano Monteagudo and Núria Porxas, ‘Repairs and other specialist 
services in the light of the ECJ’S BMW ruling’ in Jeremy Philips (ed), Trade Marks at the Limit (Edward Elgar 
2006) 117-119. 
760 See also: Ramsey and Schovsbo (n 621); Dinwoodie (n 621).   
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broader set of trademark rights in Art. 16 TRIPS, limitations can be seen as a countermove to 
the grant of broader protection. Compared to the limitation clauses in copyright (Art. 13 
TRIPS), industrial designs (Art. 26(2) TRIPS) and patent law (Art. 30 TRIPS), however, Art. 
17 TRIPS provides relatively broad leeway to TRIPS members to provide for trademark 
limitations.761  
In light of this international flexibility, a conduct-based approach that accepts some 
degree of harm to the trademark can be reconciled with international protection standards as 
long as the competitor seeks to minimise the harm flowing from use of the trademark on the 
basis of a limitation of trademark rights, and the harm itself is outweighed by overall benefits, 
such as enhanced freedom of competition and freedom of (commercial) expression. This 
conduct-based approach also has important advantages in an EU context. When it is applied in 
accordance with the guidelines which can be derived from CJEU case law, it becomes 
possible to extend limitations beyond a simple repetition of the infringement criteria and 
really take the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties into 
account. A trader can be justified in causing some harm to the trademark if he can show that 
he took sufficient measures to minimise harm and if tolerating trademark use is in the interests 
of overarching goals, such as safeguarding undistorted competition. The duty to act fairly also 
points to a need for the honest practices assessment to be more conduct-based. 
 
6.4 National Case Law 
 
The differences between a normative approach (based on ethical findings) and a more 
empirical approach (based on actual consumer perception, reflecting the efforts made by the 
alleged infringer to reduce consumer confusion and association with the trademarked products 
in question) can be aptly illustrated by discussing national case law.  
For instance, the Court of Appeals of The Hague was asked to decide a dispute 
between two manufacturers of crisps, Kettle Foods and Intersnack.762 Kettle Foods had 
registered the word mark ‘KETTLE’ for snacks in the Benelux and in the EU. Kettle Foods 
had erased their US trademark registrations after the District Court of California had decided 
that ‘kettle cooked’ was descriptive. The manufacturing process of crisps by Kettle Foods was 
generally called ‘kettle cooked’.763  
Intersnack marketed crisps on the Dutch market under a different mark, ‘CHIO’. The 
words ‘Kettle Cooked’ appeared in the middle of the packaging under their own trademark 
‘CHIO’ and the word ‘Chips’. The words ‘Kettle Cooked’ were shown in a similar colour of 
writing on the same red ground, and starting with a capital letter, but in a style which was 
different from the trademark. The defendant’s packaging also contained pictures of a kettle 
 
761 For instance, art 17 TRIPS does not state that exceptions must be limited to ‘certain special cases’. It only 
states that Member States may provide ‘limited exceptions’ to the trademark owner’s rights. In addition, art 17 
TRIPS does not require that the limitations ‘not conflict with the normal exploitation’, but refers to descriptive 
use as an example of a permitted exception. art 17 TRIPS further states that account must be taken of ‘legitimate 
interests of the right holder and of third parties’; cf WTO Panel, 15 March 2005, WTO Document WT/DS174/R 
(n 621); Kur and Senftleben (n 621) 54; Dontas (n 621) 7. 
762 Court of Appeal of The Hague, 15 July 2014, Case 200.133.706/01 – Kettle Foods v Intersnack.  
763 ibid para 1. 
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and crisps in the background. Kettle Foods brought an action for trademark infringement and 
unfair competition.  
The Court ruled in favour of the defendant on the grounds that the words ‘Kettle 
Cooked’ were used in compliance with honest practices.764 Interestingly, the Court did not 
discuss whether a likelihood of confusion – and thus prima facie infringement – existed 
among consumers, but directly assessed whether the descriptive use defence was applicable. 
By discussing the limitation of trademark rights in favour of descriptive use, the judge in fact 
also agreed that an infringement was made without actually assessing the criteria for 
establishing a likelihood of confusion.  
This latter assessment could easily have been done by comparing the signs in isolation 
instead of considering the overall appearance of the two packages. The Court must have been 
aware of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity between the signs as well as the fact 
that the goods were identical and that the trademark was sufficiently distinctive. The public 
consisted of a general average consumer interested in a general consumer good765 and was 
therefore more likely to be confused. Since the Court directly discussed the limitations on 
descriptive use, its reasoning with regard to a finding of prima facie infringement can only be 
guessed at.  
Instead of declaring the descriptive use defence inapplicable by simply repeating the 
infringement criteria, thereby assessing the case more normatively,766 the Court developed a 
different line of argument based on the infringer’s conduct. The Court considered the overall 
impression the two packages left on the general public. The defendant’s own trademark 
clearly appeared on the packaging and would be interpreted by the consumer as a source 
identifier. As the term ‘Kettle’ was not highly well known, the consumer who was used to 
English terms on the packaging of snacks would perceive the words ‘Kettle Cooked’ as a 
description of the way the crisps were produced. The manufacturing process could also be 
found on the defendant’s packaging. In addition, the Court included the defendant’s intention 
in the assessment. The fact that the defendant did not use English terms on the packaging 
intended for German or French consumers indicated that the defendant did not wish to free-
ride on the claimant’s coat-tails.767  
The Hague Court thus approached the case more empirically by considering all the 
relevant circumstances of the case. The fact that the defendant’s own trademark clearly 
appeared on the packaging showed that the defendant had made sufficient efforts to minimise 
harm and did not intend to free-ride on the trademark owner’s goodwill. The fact that the 
trademark was not highly well known also suggested that it was less likely that consumers 
would be confused or that the defendant intended to profit from the claimant’s investments. 
 
764 The Court also found that the words ‘Kettle Cooked’ had not been used as a trademark, but only in a 
descriptive sense (para 7.3). 
765 ibid para 7.2. 
766 When the court compares the signs in isolation and assesses the likelihood of confusion question in an 
abstract way, this can be seen as a more normative assessment. In such cases the judge does not seek to find out 
whether consumers are really confused in practice. An honest trader should not seek to cause confusion even if 
the consumers are not actually confused.  
767 ibid para 7.13. 
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Moreover, the fact that the packaging intended for German and French consumers did not 
contain English terms also indicated that the defendant’s intentions were not dishonest.   
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the Court would have reached the same 
conclusion if the trademark had been reputable or even highly well-known. The Court 
specifically based its decision on empirical data, including an online survey on ‘awareness of 
Kettle chips’ conducted among 2000 Dutch respondents,768 and turnover figures, sales 
numbers, market shares, advertising expenditure and so forth, none of which were sufficient 
to convince them.769 If the Kettle trademark had been highly well known, this would probably 
have impacted the Court’s decision. Consumers would have recognised the Kettle trademark 
and may have believed that the two products were economically linked.  
If this was the case, the Court would probably have found that the defendant had not 
made sufficient efforts to avoid a likelihood of confusion. The colours of the packaging and 
the letters were similar and the capitalised first letters could have been perceived as a 
reference to the trademark. It would have been better if the defendant had written the words 
‘Kettle Cooked’ in small letters in a different colour and font, using a smaller font size. The 
pictures of crisps and the kettle also conceptually referred to the trademark and did not 
necessarily dispel the similarities between the two packages. The description ‘Kettle Cooked’ 
was also placed in the middle of the packaging, where consumers probably expected to find a 
trademark.  
The Court would presumably have allocated the trademark owner’s claim despite the 
fact that the defendant’s own mark appeared prominently on the packaging. In Anheuser-
Busch, the CJEU argued that high distinctive character is a factor to be considered in the 
honest practices test. Consumers are more likely to be confused the more distinctive the 
trademark is, and the defendant should be aware of that. If the trademark had been well 
known, the Court would probably have ruled that the defendant should have done more to 
minimise harm. This would be in accordance with the conduct-based approach as distilled 
from CJEU case law: if the trademark is well known, a defendant who claims to be an honest 
trader should be aware of this and take more measures to reduce consumer confusion. 
In a similar case, the UK Chancery Division had to resolve an issue concerning the 
defendant’s use of the word ‘Supreme’ in connection with animal foods.770 The claimant had 
registered the word mark ‘Supreme’, a stylised version and a trademark consisting of a ribbon 
device with the word element ‘Supreme’ for animal food. The Court ruled that the defendant’s 
use of the sign ‘Supreme’ for animal food was in accordance with honest practices since the 
sign was used as an indication of the quality of the feed. Even if the average consumer 
perceived this element as partly distinctive, it could not be denied that it was still a common 
descriptor or at least laudatory epithet.771 
In this case too, the Court could have ruled that there was infringement if it had only 
assessed the word ‘Supreme’ in isolation. The sign was visually, aurally and conceptually 
identical to the UK word mark and the word elements were similar in terms of figurative 
marks. Both signs were also used for identical products. Instead of using a schematic 
 
768 ibid para 7.6. 
769 ibid para 7.8. 
770 Supreme Petfoods Ltd v Henry Bell & Co (Grantham) Ltd [2015] ETMR 20.  
771 ibid paras 204, 206. 
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assessment, the Court considered the concrete circumstances and emphasised that the 
similarities were based on non-distinctive elements. Furthermore, even if any likelihood of 
confusion existed, this would have been negated by the context since the defendant’s use of 
the word ‘Supreme’ was always subsidiary to the prominent and well-known ‘MR 
JOHNSON’s’ brand.772  
The Court ruled that the defendant’s use of the word ‘Supreme’ was a case of honest 
concurrent use since the sign had been used for over twenty years with no evidence of any 
actual confusion.773 Furthermore, the judge said that the claimant’s correspondence with the 
defendant’s predecessors would have implied that the claimant did not object to the 
defendant’s use of the sign ‘Supreme’ per se, but only to particular presentations of the 
sign.774 In the judge’s opinion, there was also no indication that the defendant knew that a 
likelihood of confusion existed or that the trademark’s reputation had been affected.775 The 
defendant had a good justification for using the sign as a common descriptor or laudatory 
epithet.776  
In other words, the defendant made sufficient efforts to avoid confusion among 
consumers by clearly attaching his own trademark to the packaging. Furthermore, the 
circumstances showed that the defendant did not intend to cause the trademark owner any 
harm. Since the trademark was not highly distinctive, it was also not very likely that a 
likelihood of confusion existed.  
In contrast to the previous cases, in Heksenkaas/Kühlmann, the defendant did not 
make particular efforts to avoid harm to the trademark.777 In this case,778 the trademark owner 
claimed that the defendant, a former producer of an important ingredient for the claimant’s 
HEKS’NKAAS, produced, after the collaboration ended, a similar dip of which the product 
packaging infringed on their trademark.779  
The packages of the dips both consisted of transparent plastic containers with a lid 
with an overlapping edge, and cardboard wrappings which were attached to both containers. 
The size of both containers and wrappings were approximately the same. Besides, both 
cardboard wrappings were characterised by cartoonishly styled pictures in similar colours of 
the dip’s ingredients (vegetables) which could be found on the product packaging. However, 
the word marks on both packages were completely different. 
The Dutch District Court of Gelderland argued that the word element ‘Dip & 
Smeer’m’ on the defendant’s packaging did not impact the overall impression since it was 
purely descriptive for a dip product and therefore could not be seen as a dominating or eye-
catching element.780 In the judge’s view, the defendant had exceeded the limits of what was 
acceptable and had done so deliberately. It was relatively simple to depict the different 
elements of the product packaging in a different colour and/or in a graphically different way. 
 
772 para 154.  
773 para 183.  
774 para 199.  
775 paras 201-202. 
776 para 204. 
777 District Court of Gelderland, 12 March 2020, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2020:1714 – Heksenkaas v Kühlmann. 
778 ibid.  
779 ibid paras 2.3-2.5.  
780 ibid para 4.8. 
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The defendant could have done this without impairing the functionality and attractiveness of 
the product packaging of its own dip.781 In the Court’s eyes, the defendant deliberately tried to 
profit from the success of the claimant’s dip on the market.782  
If the judge had discussed any limitations, the new defence on descriptive and 
indistinctive use might have applied. Article 14(1)(b) TMD 2015 and Art. 14(1)(b) EUTMR 
also apply to the use of ‘signs or indications which are not distinctive’.783 Nevertheless, it is 
doubtful whether it would have mattered if the judge had assessed these limitations of 
trademark rights. Both approaches would probably have led to the same outcome. Admittedly, 
it could be argued that the product was sold under a clearly different name, with a different 
logo and background. The pictures of the ingredients were different. Moreover, where the 
HEKS’NKAAS logo evoked strong associations with witches and magic, the ‘Dip & 
Smeer’m’ carried a simple message: take it and dip away.  
However, as noticed by the Court, the defendant revealed a lack of effort to minimise 
possible harm. The trademarked product was well known784 and the defendant ought to have 
been aware of this. Moreover, the defendant knew the claimant’s reputation since he was the 
former producer of the claimant’s dip. The packaging of the defendant’s dip also showed that 
the defendant had intended to ride on the coat-tails of the claimant’s mark. It is true that a 
trademark owner is not allowed to monopolise a transparent container or particular colours, 
but there were enough options for a different product which did not look so much like the 
claimant’s dip. The five-pointed stars and the strangers’ fingers on the packaging were small 
details that could easily be overlooked by consumers; however, they seemed to indicate the 
defendant’s real intentions: to evoke associations with the ‘HEKS’NKAAS’ trademark. The 
defendant should have done more to remove the impression that he wished to free-ride on the 
trademark owner’s reputation; the addition of a different trademark was not enough.  
In Hema/Lacoste, the defendant’s conduct was also found slightly dishonest. The 
Dutch Court of Appeal of The Hague was asked to resolve a dispute between the trademark 
owner Lacoste and the company Hema, which deals in retail and non-retail sales of consumer 
goods.785 Hema marketed two sets of children’s underwear. The grey coloured shirt and 
 
781 para 4.9. 
782 para 4.10. 
783 Individual elements, such as the shape, the transparency of the container, the lid, the wrapping, the colours, 
the descriptions and the pictures, were indistinctive as such, but they were registered because of their 
combination. The high percentage of respondents who recognised the HEKS’NKAAS product packaging was 
only due to the combination of these elements; it did not prove that the separate elements were highly distinctive 
as such. The fact that the individual elements themselves were not distinctive was also signalised by the Court. 
But even if the individual elements had become distinctive, it could be argued that the trademark defence should 
apply. Otherwise, trademark owners would not only bypass normative considerations on third parties’ need to 
keep signs freely available when registering a combination mark, but also be able to set aside limitations because 
they taught their consumers so well to recognise non-distinctive elements as a trademark. See also: Kur and 
Senftleben (n 621) 417-418; Annette Kur, ‘Yellow Dictionaries, Red Banking Services, Some Candies, and a 
Sitting Bunny. Protection of Color and Shape Marks from a German and European Perspective’ in Irene Calboli 
and Martin RF Senftleben (eds), The Protection of Non-Traditional Trademarks. Critical Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press 2018) 102-103. 
784 Studies showed that approximately 50% of respondents recognised the HEKS’NKAAS packaging without its 
wordmark as the original HEKS’NKAAS dip. 
785 Court of Appeal of The Hague, 11 August 2020, Case 200.254.842/01, IEF 19365 – Lacoste v Hema. 
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underpants contained pictures of several different crocodiles in the colours blue and green. On 
the blue-coloured shirt, one single small green-coloured crocodile appeared at breast height; 
the blue underpants were offered without a print.786  
The Court concluded that a likelihood of confusion existed. Regarding the blue shirt, 
the Court ruled that the signs were highly similar from a visual and conceptual perspective. 
Regarding the grey underwear, the Court indicated that the two crocodiles with an open 
mouth were visually and conceptually highly similar to the trademark since they were the 
same crocodile as the one on the blue shirt. The other crocodiles were visually slightly similar 
but conceptually highly similar. Given the identity between the goods, the notoriety of the 
brands and their large scope of protection, and the results of a market study conducted by 
Lacoste, the Court ruled that a likelihood of confusion existed.787  
Once again, the judge did not discuss any trademark limitations, but if they had done 
so, it is questionable whether the conduct-based approach would have helped the defendant 
much.788 Nevertheless, this does not make the analysis less interesting, since a discussion of 
the limitations sheds light on which considerations may have played a role in following a 
conduct-based approach.  
For example, it is questionable whether Hema made sufficient efforts to distance itself 
from Lacoste’s trademark. Consumers might not have been confused when purchasing the 
underwear, but a closer look reveals that Hema must in any case have been highly inspired by 
the Lacoste logo. The similarities between the crocodiles might indicate that Hema wished to 
free-ride on Lacoste. It is quite a coincidence that the crocodile was not very big, that its 
mouth was on the right side, open and at approximately the same angle as Lacoste’s crocodile 
and that it appeared on the blue shirt at breast height where trademarks are usually placed. On 
the grey underwear, the crocodiles, which were highly similar, were typically placed in the 
middle of the underwear. Because of the notoriety of the Lacoste brand, Hema must have 
been aware of the similarities with the Lacoste logo. If the court had taken a conduct-based 
approach, the defendant would probably also have failed to invoke trademark limitations. The 
defendant should therefore have done more to minimise any trademark harm; the 
circumstances indicate that the defendant deliberately crossed the boundaries of what was 
acceptable.  
Finally, with regard to keyword advertising cases, this conduct-based approach also 
seems to be consistent. As recognised by the CJEU in Interflora,789 courts need to take a 
broader approach by not immediately rejecting defences after concluding a prima facie 
 
786 ibid para 1.4. 
787 paras 39-41, 55-58. 
788 Admittedly, the CJEU ruled that the purely decorative use of a two-stripe motif on sports garments was not 
intended ‘to give an indication concerning one of the characteristics of those goods’ (Case C-102/07 
Adidas/Marca ECLI:EU:C:2008:217, para 48). If a claimant convinces the judge, for example with empirical 
evidence, that a likelihood of confusion exists, no further balancing of interests will in principle take place. 
Nonetheless, in recital 27 TMD 2015 (recital 21 EUTMR) it is explained that ‘the exclusive rights conferred by a 
trade mark should not entitle the proprietor to prohibit the use of signs or indications by third parties which are 
used fairly and thus in accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial matters’. Furthermore, it 
says that ‘this Directive should be applied in a way that ensures full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, 
and in particular the freedom of expression’. 
789 Case C-323/09 Interflora ECLI:EU:C:2011:604. 
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infringement. Offering a commercial alternative to the trademarked goods and services could 
be justified in view of promoting undistorted competition and consumer choice. Following a 
more normative approach based on ethical standards, third parties are probably not allowed to 
use similar signs as keywords for their advertisements. Furthermore, courts should take all the 
relevant factors into account when finding out which measures a third party should have taken 




This chapter suggests that a more empirical approach should be adopted when assessing 
compliance with the requirement of honest practices in cases where limitations of trademark 
rights are invoked. On the one hand, the honest practices test should be based on a conduct-
based inquiry that focuses on the efforts made by the defendant to avoid detriment to the 
trademark. On the other hand, the assessment should raise the question whether these efforts 
enable consumers to make a distinction between the products bearing the competitor’s 
potentially infringing sign and the original products of the trademark proprietor.  
If the defendant takes measures to minimise possible harm to the trademark owner but 
some confusion still exists or unfair advantage is still taken, the use of the conflicting sign can 
nonetheless be allowed as long as the detriment caused to the trademark is outweighed by 
overarching benefits for society, such as enhanced freedom of competition and freedom of 
(commercial) expression, and enhanced consumer information and consumer choice.  
This conduct-based approach ensures that not only the legitimate interests of the 
trademark owner but also those of third parties are taken into account. Trademark owners 
cannot prevent unauthorised use of the trademark if the defendant has made sufficient efforts 
to minimise harm and the defendant’s use contributes to the achievement of the 
aforementioned overarching societal values. At the same time, competitors must respect the 
interests of the trademark owner to the largest extent possible and take appropriate and 
available measures to avoid harm if they want trademark limitations to apply.  
In addition to benefits accruing from enhanced freedom of competition and freedom of 
(commercial) expression, the described conduct-based approach offers an alternative 
assessment scheme for the inquiry into honest practices that can help to overcome the 
unsatisfactory approach taken by the CJEU, which simply repeats assessment criteria that 
have already been used to establish prima facie infringement. Thus, the conduct-based 
approach also has the advantage of giving the limitations of trademark rights a more 
independent role in the analysis. As a result, the limitations become true counterbalances and 















The foregoing analysis aimed at exploring consumer perception as a central factor in EU 
trademark law. Given its close connection to the basic criterion of distinctiveness, consumer 
perception informs decisions on when to grant trademark protection and deeply impacts the 
infringement analysis. Hence, it was of utmost importance to be clear about its correct 
assessment: to which extent should a normative or empirical approach to consumer perception 
prevail to ensure fair competition, consumer protection, and the proper functioning of 
markets?  
To create a basis for discussing this research question, Chapter 2 investigated the 
rationales of the trademark law system. Addressing the objectives underlying trademark law 
made it possible to determine the grounds for reliance on consumer perception as a central 
yardstick for registration and infringement decisions in EU trademark law. The study also 
discussed the tension between a normative and an empirical assessment of consumer 
perception.  
With this theoretical basis in mind, Chapters 3-6 addressed the impact of a normative 
or empirical analysis of consumer perception on decisions concerning trademark registration 
and the establishment of infringement. These chapters explored whether current EU 
trademark law on the acquisition (Chapter 3) and scope (Chapters 4-6) of protection was 
primarily grounded in normative considerations or in empirical findings, and whether this was 
problematic in view of the overarching objectives of EU trademark law.  
The outcome of this research was applied as a starting point in proposing new 
solutions that may eliminate dysfunctional incentives and safeguard a proper balance between 
trademark rights and the interests of consumers, competitors and the public at large. In this 
final chapter, I offer some recommendations concerning the right combination of empirical 
and normative approaches in the framework of trademark registrations and infringement cases 
(following section 7.2).  
 
Chapter 2 discussed the rationales of trademark protection. It showed that the primary goal of 
trademark protection is to ensure market transparency. In a transparent market where 
distinctive signs are exclusively connected with products originating from an individual 
commercial source, traders can easily distinguish their products, and consumers can quickly 
choose between the products offered and express their preference by purchasing the desired 
product. This also ensures that the right products are produced and sold on the market.  
This chapter further indicated that the origin function relates to the consumer search 
costs rationale. By safeguarding the identifier of commercial source, trademark law prevents 
consumers from becoming confused. It also facilitates a trading climate in which consumers 
can rely on source identifiers. The assurance that the information concerning the commercial 
source is correct helps to lower consumers’ search costs, which can be understood as the costs 
of acquiring information about products or reducing the risks of uncertainty.  
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However, the strong focus on consumer protection and the corresponding search costs 
rationale may have contributed to the expansion of trademark rights. Modern trademark law 
greatly depends on consumer perception. With the help of marketers trained in influencing 
consumer perceptions, trademark owners have systematically generated broader trademark 
rights. An empirical approach to consumer perception may have further exacerbated this 
process. 
This chapter also analysed the arguments put forward to justify the additional 
functions of trademark protection related to the protection of brand goodwill. I pointed out 
that the justification for additional protection going beyond the original function of the 
trademark is rather weak. Nevertheless, it was argued that simply denying legal protection 
was not an option since the economic reality has been that the perception of the consumer has 
developed into a core element of trademark protection. Instead of rejecting additional 
trademark protection, I argued that it would be better to focus on creating breathing space for 
countervalues, such as (commercial) freedom of expression and undistorted competition.  
 
Chapter 3 argued that we need a far more normative test. The reforms of the EU legal system 
and the broader interpretation of the shape exclusions by the CJEU were all seen as very 
welcome, but not sufficient. Given the position of suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks, it 
is necessary to include a more normative approach to descriptive, cultural, generic and non-
distinctive signs.  
Chapter 3 also revealed that the assumptions of the CJEU regarding trademark 
perception do not reflect what we know about consumer perception from scientific and 
medical research. Consumers are most certainly capable of recognising descriptive and non-
traditional signs as an identifier of commercial source. The incorrect assumptions of the CJEU 
concerning consumer perception factually rely on normative objectives.  
It was argued that the CJEU chose to approach descriptive and non-traditional signs 
differently not because consumers are not used to interpreting such signs as identifiers of 
commercial source, but because the CJEU really wanted to keep these signs in the public 
domain due to a public interest in not unduly restricting the availability of these signs for 
competitors on the market.  
However, this chapter discussed that these attempts by the CJEU to keep certain signs 
free from trademark protection might have encouraged trademark owners to monopolise signs 
and could paradoxically be held responsible for creating dysfunctional incentives. Whereas 
the CJEU may have trusted that the threshold for acquiring distinctiveness through use in 
trade was high enough to have a deterring effect on competitors, it may well have been that 
this possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade made it attractive for traders 
to invest in these particular signs, particularly if a growing number of traders successfully 
connected in the consumers’ minds a descriptive sign, specific shape or colour with their 
business as the origin of goods or services.  
The reward for these marketing efforts would be great: traders could acquire exclusive 
rights to a sign that reflected a positive feature of a good and thereby obtain an unfair 
economic benefit because consumers would quickly learn what the trademark represented, 
and the availability of these signs for competitors on the market would not be unrestricted. 
Therefore, this chapter concluded that the distinctiveness requirement could be seen as 
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unpredictable and risky. Trademark proprietors may be able to influence these signs acquiring 
distinctiveness and invest as much as necessary until they acquire control over their preferred 
sign. 
This chapter argued that we should consider possible ways of limiting the leeway that 
trademark owners currently have for misappropriating descriptive, cultural and non-traditional 
signs, and reconsider whether we really want these signs to acquire distinctiveness through 
use in trade. An outright exclusion of cultural signs without high symbolic value, descriptive 
signs and abstract colours that could no longer be overcome through acquiring distinctiveness 
through use in trade would in any event ensure the preservation of these signs.  
 
Chapter 4 pointed out the necessity of including policy concerns, in particular the need to 
keep signs available for competitors, when assessing likelihood of confusion. It may sound 
empirically plausible to safeguard consumers against confusion, but this study illustrated that 
in fact the likelihood-of-confusion provision rests on normative considerations. The CJEU’s 
ruling that consumers are more likely to be confused when confronted with signs that are 
similar to a highly distinctive trademark was considered to be incorrect from an empirical 
perspective. Actually, the opposite is true: the more distinctive the trademark, the less likely 
consumers are to be confused when confronted with a similar sign.  
The analysis showed that trademark owners’ marketing efforts are remunerated under 
current trademark infringement standards: the more they invest in a given sign, the more 
protection they obtain. Meanwhile, competitors’ interests may be neglected because of the 
CJEU’s Adidas/Marca ruling. This is potentially troublesome with regard to appealing signs 
such as stripe motifs. These signs can function not only as a badge of origin, but also attract 
consumers’ attention and thus offer trademark owners an advantage over their competitors. If 
Adidas is exclusively entitled to use stripe motifs on sports and leisure garments, competitors 
may be disadvantaged for a potentially infinite period of time. It was further argued that 
trademark proprietors should be stimulated to invest in the quality and attractiveness of their 
products instead of being rewarded with competitive advantages from the sign as such. 
Another point of discussion was that exclusive rights to appealing design items can 
also restrain innovation and encourage standardisation. Competitors might stop using any 
stripes on sports and leisure clothing because of risky trademark proceedings. As long as non-
distinctive signs are allowed to acquire distinctiveness through use in trade, trademark owners 
will invest in appealing signs that give them a competitive advantage. An investment-based 
approach further facilitates this process. Moreover, it was concluded that if national courts do 
not proactively refer to the need to keep signs freely available in their infringement 
assessment, the trademark system may ultimately turn into a self-servicing mechanism for the 
brand industry. In such a marketplace, newcomers will have fewer chances.  
This study illustrated that indeed, since the Adidas/Marca ruling, several courts seem 
to have followed an investment-based direction. Therefore, the importance of recalibrating the 
confusion analysis was pointed out. In order to provide sufficient room for the concerns of 
trademark owners and competitors (and ultimately also consumers), it is essential to apply 
normative corrections not only in favour of trademark owners but also in favour of 
competitors. In this light, the chapter concluded that the Adidas/Marca case must be revisited 




Chapter 5 confirmed that the EU trademark system stimulates and rewards trademark 
proprietors in many ways when it comes to the likelihood-of-confusion assessment. Chapter 4 
focused solely on case law related to three-stripe motifs. However, the same problem has 
arisen with regard to other signs. In this study, two features of the trademark system were 
argued to be particularly troublesome. First, trademark owners could strengthen the distinctive 
character of their marks by investing in marketing and branding campaigns. Second, 
trademark owners could afford expensive surveys demonstrating the high distinctiveness of 
their marks and strengthening their position in an infringement case.  
A study of 189 Dutch cases revealed that in the likelihood-of-confusion assessment, 
the degree of a mark’s distinctiveness and corresponding empirical findings could have a deep 
impact. This empirical study pointed out that trademark owners win more often than they 
lose. Besides, the more trademark proprietors invest in their trademark the more likely they 
are to win. In addition, when courts applied the CJEU rule stipulating that consumers were 
more easily confused when confronted with a highly distinctive trademark, trademark owners 
also won most cases. Furthermore, judges were more willing to assess signs as similar if a 
trademark was highly distinctive. Finally, consumer surveys further enhanced trademark 
claims.  
This research study also revealed, however, that descriptive, cultural and non-
traditional signs were not often disputed. In practice, the risk of these signs being 
misappropriated may therefore be limited. Granting broad protection to fantasy marks and 
other fanciful mark forms did not seem inconsistent in view of the rationales underlying 
trademark law. Furthermore, in some cases both parties had sufficient financial means to 
afford the often expensive surveys. Besides, judges did not always provide broader protection 
when a trademark was very well known. When necessary, judges simply said that the signs 
were not similar.  
This is not to say that there is no risk involved in granting overbroad protection against 
confusion with regard to descriptive, cultural or non-traditional signs. The study of Dutch case 
law showed that in some cases trademark owners were successful in achieving an enhanced 
scope of protection with regard to descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs. In particular, 
figurative marks could be risky. Not only do they enable trademark owners to circumvent 
normative restrictions when registering a figurative mark, but given the CJEU ruling in 
Adidas/Marca, judges are also not permitted to make normative corrections towards third-
party interests based on the need to keep signs freely available on the market. As a result, 
trademark owners with deep pockets may achieve a lot in infringement cases. This can further 
lead to an unbalanced market situation with, on the one hand, trademark owners enjoying 
broad trademark rights and competitive advantages from the sign as such, and on the other 
hand, third parties being excluded from using these appealing signs and being forced to use 
less effective trademarks because these signs are not available in sufficient supply. 
As long as the CJEU refuses to consider the need to keep signs freely available to 
competitors on the market as a relevant factor in the likelihood-of-confusion assessment, 
trademark owners may decide to invest heavily – and sometimes be rewarded with an 
enhanced scope of protection. This chapter therefore argued that if we want to further 
minimise the risk of descriptive, cultural and non-traditional signs no longer being freely 
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available to competitors on the market, we must recalibrate the confusion analysis and allow 
courts to make normative corrections in favour of third parties’ freedom of expression and 
freedom of competition. This would make judges better equipped to weigh trademark owners’ 
interests against the interests of competitors and the general consuming public.  
Hence, this chapter recommended that judges should permit unauthorised use of 
trademarks even if doing so might lead to likelihood of confusion among consumers. 
Therefore, national courts should have more room to make normative corrections in favour of 
freedom-of-competition interests. This would allow judges to prevent trademark owners from 
achieving unjustified economic advantages arising from these signs. 
 
Chapter 6 considered how the honest practices proviso should be interpreted when assessing 
trademark limitations. Looking at the Commission’s proposal for a reform of trademark law 
and the CJEU case law on which this proposal was based, one might think that the honest 
practices proviso should be interpreted strictly.  
According to this proposal the use of a sign conflicting with a trademark would not 
comply with honest practices if it gave the impression of a commercial connection between 
the sign and the mark, or if it took unfair advantage of, or was detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or reputation of the trademark without due cause. This proposal was highly 
criticised for being inappropriate and possibly risky. It suggested an almost literal repetition 
of the infringement criteria, thereby resulting in a circular line of reasoning and making the 
trademark limitations factually meaningless. 
This chapter analysed whether there was sufficient room for interpreting the concept 
of honest business practices under CJEU case law more broadly. To lay the groundwork for 
the discussion, the chapter explored Art. 10bis PC since it is in this provision that the 
expression ‘honest practices in industrial and commercial matters’ originates. Traditionally, 
this concept of honest practices has been interpreted according to ethical standards with 
respect to behavioural norms of fairness in a given circle of traders.  
This normative approach could however be criticised for being imprecise since the 
determination of appropriate behavioural norms could be highly influenced by the customs 
and habits of a given trade circle. Defining honest business practices by referring to how 
honest traders actually compete may lead to a certain degree of circularity since trade circles 
factually determine the guidelines for honest practices by which a competitor’s conduct is 
assessed.  
Therefore, more recently, the concept of honest practices has been interpreted in light 
of the goal of safeguarding the efficient operation of competition as a main instrument of 
market economies. An empirical approach lending weight to consumer perception could re-
establish ethical standards, such as personal responsibility for market actions concerning the 
interests of other market participants, and respect for the equality of rights in the marketplace.  
It was stated that the honest business proviso should be interpreted more empirically 
and CJEU case law offers sufficient room for interpreting the honest practices standard in this 
way. The honest practices proviso should concentrate on the efforts made by the competitor 
and whether these efforts lead consumers to perceive the potentially infringing sign in a 
different way. If a third party takes reasonable steps to reduce potential harm to the trademark 
owner but some confusion still occurs or unfair advantage is taken, the use of the trademark 
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should be permitted to provide breathing space to market values such as furthering 
competition and improving consumer choice.  
This conduct-based approach would safeguard not only the legitimate interests of the 
trademark owner but also those of third parties. In this way, trademark owners could no 
longer prohibit honest use of a trademark if a competitor took reasonable efforts to reduce 
harm, while third parties are forced to take trademark owners’ interests in consideration if 




A correct combination of empirical findings and normative corrections is necessary to ensure 
not only that trademark owners are protected, but also that other core values are preserved, 
such as safeguarding freedom of competition and (commercial) freedom of expression. At all 
levels of trademark development and trademark protection, trademark owners’ interests must 
be weighed against the interests of competitors and the general public.  
There are a number of legal tools to keep the EU trademark law system balanced. In 
the first phase, when a decision on the registration as a trademark must be taken, several 
grounds for refusal allow the categorical exclusion of signs from registration and protection 
irrespective of whether a likelihood of confusion exists among consumers (strict normative 
approach). Use of the sign by other traders and the general public remains entirely free if no 
trademark rights are granted. This approach implies that in cases were signs are indeed 
distinctive, consumers might be confused. Irrespective of how much trademark owners have 
invested in a trademark, the sign will not be registered.  
On the other end of the spectrum is the option to rely on a low threshold of 
distinctiveness that can easily be overcome with some marketing efforts (relaxed empirical 
approach). This option has the advantage of following the demands of the actual market 
situation. If consumers perceive a sign as a trademark, the sign functions as a badge of origin 
and can therefore be protected under this approach. The registration of signs is left to the 
efforts of trademark owners to invest in teaching consumers to perceive a sign as a badge of 
origin.  
In the second phase, when assessing infringement cases, courts could merely base their 
decision on empirical findings, such as consumer studies. In this scenario, consumers would 
be strongly protected against confusion. This interest of preventing consumer confusion does 
not however have to be in line with trademark owners’ interests in protecting their 
investments in the creation of a desired brand image. Brand owners with highly distinctive 
trademarks will probably have less success in anti-confusion cases if judges assess the 
likelihood-of-confusion test empirically. Given the highly distinctive character of the mark, 
consumers will easily identify deviations and hardly ever confuse the well-known mark with 
similar signs. If, by contrast, judges follow an approach based on rules of experience stating 
that known marks, by definition, must have a broader scope of protection, the highly 
distinctive character of the mark at issue suddenly becomes a factor weighing in favour of a 
finding of confusion. 
On the other end of the spectrum, courts could opt for making normative corrections 
and refusing the infringement claim even though some confusion might exist. If courts 
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embrace this option, third parties’ interests in freedom of competition and the enhancement of 
consumer choice would be better safeguarded, but some consumers might be confused.  
In the third phase, when assessing trademark exceptions, courts could interpret the 
concept of honest practices more normatively, i.e. according to ethical standards with respect 
to behavioural norms of fairness in a given circle. When judges assess the case according to 
ethical norms, they mainly safeguard the investments of the trademark owner. If some 
confusion exists or harm is done to the trademark owner, this behaviour cannot be seen as 
fair. This would reduce the possibility for traders to offer alternative products on the market. 
It would also impact consumer choice and the interests of the general public to freely criticise 
and comment on reputable trademarks. 
On the other hand, if courts interpret the concept of honest practices more empirically 
and concentrate on the efforts made by the competitor to reduce potential harm to the 
trademark owner, and the effects thereof on consumer perception, this could further 
competition and improve consumer choice, although some consumers might be confused.   
The best option is therefore to apply the right amalgam of empirical findings and 
normative corrections. If the perception of consumers is approached too normatively, 
trademark law fails to properly reflect market reality and prevent consumer confusion. On the 
other hand, if we approach consumer perception too empirically, trademark owners can teach 
consumers to perceive almost any sign as a trademark and subsequently ask for protection. 
EU trademark law would then be nothing more than a self-servicing mechanism for the 
industry since the investments made by trademark proprietors would define the scope of 
protection. Opting for one of these two ends of the spectrum could generate unwelcome 
results and should be avoided.  
 
To fulfil the twofold objective of trademark law, i.e. balancing the interests of trademark 
owners in preventing consumer confusion against safeguarding the interests of competitors 
and the interests of the general public in keeping signs freely available, we need to find a 
combination of legal tools that satisfies both objectives. Three possible scenarios emerge.     
First, we could opt for a trademark law system that provides strong exclusions from 
registration and protection that cannot be overcome through the possibility of acquiring 
distinctiveness through use in trade (‘upfront access control’). For instance, signs could be 
refused on the grounds that they are against morality or public order, or that they cannot be 
represented in a clear and precise way. Other exclusion grounds could be that the sign consists 
of functional elements and therefore protects the product itself instead of functioning as a 
source identifier attached to the product. These refusal grounds cannot be overcome through 
use in trade. A high threshold of acquired distinctiveness could also prevent the registration of 
non-distinctive, descriptive and generic signs, for example with proof of extensive prior use, 
but would not be as strict as an absolute refusal ground.  
In this scenario, the registration phase would function as a strict gatekeeper that 
effectively prevents the monopolisation of signs that should remain freely available to other 
traders and the general public. The emphasis lies on normative corrections, although there is 
still room for empirical findings. Signs that are not particularly burdensome for other traders 
can be registered without proof of extensive prior use.  
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The infringement question could then be based strongly on empirical findings, such as 
consumer studies seeking to demonstrate the existence of a likelihood of confusion or the 
reputation of the trademark, or turnover figures, sales numbers, market shares, advertising-
expenditure, or other empirical data, although some room for normative corrections remains. 
The trademark limitations could also be interpreted in light of empirical findings, considering 
in particularly the efforts of traders to minimise possible harm and the effect thereof on 
consumer perception. 
Second, it is possible to develop a trademark system with hardly any preservation 
mechanisms in the registration phase, such that almost any sign could be registered if it 
acquires distinctiveness. Trademark owners could freely pick any sign from the public 
domain. In this scenario, non-distinctive, descriptive and generic signs such as shapes, colours 
and cultural signs could be easily registered after some efforts on the part of the trademark 
owner in educating consumers to perceive these signs as a source identifier for a certain 
product. In this scenario the registration of signs is left to the willingness of trademark owners 
to invest in a particular trademark and the ability of consumers to recognise signs as a 
trademark. Since consumers are quite able to perceive any sign as a source identifier, 
particularly when they are used on the packaging where they expect trademarks to be found, 
trademark owners will not experience many difficulties in registering the desired trademark.    
In this scenario, courts should make strong normative corrections in favour of 
freedom-of-competition arguments when assessing infringement questions to neutralise the 
consequences of this flexible registration process (‘intermediate check’). Even if trademark 
owners can for instance register an attractive loudspeaker shape or a triple-headed rotary 
shaver, normative corrections could still ensure that competitors are free to use similar shapes 
because of the common need to keep functional product elements freely available on the 
market. Trademark limitations could play an additional role since most of the normative 
corrections would already be made in the infringement procedure.  
This option can however lead to more legal uncertainties because traders cannot rely 
on the trademark register. They have to risk an infringement procedure if they wish to use 
similar trademarks. Traders with fewer financial resources will probably not want to take the 
risk of a legal proceeding but the costs for designing an alternative shape are also high, such 
that some traders might be disadvantaged. Trademark owners might also not be certain 
whether the investments they make to educate consumers to recognise the trademark as a 
badge of origin are worthwhile, since there is a chance that courts will reject their 
infringement claim because of interests based on the need to keep free, although the 
trademark limitations could already indicate which trademark use cannot in principle be 
prevented. 
Third, we could opt for a trademark system with the same flexible registration 
procedure as in the second option, but with a more empirical approach to assessing 
infringement questions. Empirical data such as consumer studies would greatly influence the 
decision regarding the existence of any trademark harm. In this scenario, trademark 
limitations must offer sufficient room for commercial and other freedom of expression to 
counterbalance the strong position that trademark owners have acquired in previous phases 
(‘ex-post control’). This could be done by interpreting the honest practices proviso more 
empirically. Courts could concentrate on traders’ efforts to reduce any possible trademark 
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harm and the effect thereof on consumer perception. Nevertheless, the problem remains that 
traders may not want to risk a legal procedure, and decide not to use certain signs at all even if 
some trademark limitations applied. Furthermore, consumers might be more easily directly or 
indirectly confused if trademark owners train them to perceive any sign as a badge of origin. 
As the scope of trademark protection grows, consumers also increasingly expect trademark 
owners to have broad control over their trademarks. Traders may have to make more efforts to 
minimise potential trademark harm than in a system where some signs are excluded from 
protection from the start, such that the scope of protection might be greater. 
 
In all three scenarios the different interests are aptly balanced; each scenario includes both 
empirical findings and normative corrections. Nevertheless, the different combination of 
empirical findings and normative corrections generates different outcomes. From the 
perspective of a trademark owner, the third option is most attractive because the scope of 
protection is greatest when an empirical approach is taken in both the registration phase and 
the infringement procedure. Trademark owners are given the option to invest in educating 
consumers to perceive any sign as a source identifier and to be granted trademark protection 
when they succeed. From the perspective of competitors, the first option is optimal. In this 
scenario, appealing signs that give the trademark owner advantages from the sign as such 
cannot be monopolised and remain freely available to other traders on the market. When 
applying a high threshold of distinctiveness, signs can only be monopolised after extensive 
marketing campaigns. Normative corrections can still be made when it comes to an 
infringement procedure. As the trademark owner is the one who starts a legal procedure, it 
makes sense to leave the risks to the trademark owner. 
 Arguably, the EU trademark law system comes relatively close to the first option. 
Admittedly, EU trademark law accepts several non-traditional signs as trademarks, such as 
shapes, abstract colours, colour combinations, sounds, position marks, taste marks, etcetera,790 
with the exception of smell signs, which cannot be registered yet.791 Nevertheless, the 
requirement of distinctiveness appears to be a significant threshold for trademark owners that 
cannot easily be overcome. The CJEU has ruled that consumers are not in the habit of making 
assumptions about the origin of goods or services when non-traditional source identifiers are 
attached, such as shapes and abstract colours. With this assumption the CJEU in fact requires 
trademark applicants to demonstrate distinctiveness through use in trade before registering a 
non-traditional trademark. Providing evidence of acquired distinctiveness through use in trade 
could be especially difficult with regard to EU trademarks. Evidence of acquired 
distinctiveness through use in trade is necessary with regard to each individual EU Member 
 
790 Following the EU trademark law reform of 2015, the requirement of graphical representation has been erased 
and exchanged for a new standard stating that trademarks must be capable of being represented in a manner that 
enables the competent authorities and the public to establish ‘the clear and precise subject matter of the 
protection afforded to its proprietor.’ (Art. 4(b) EUTMR; Art. 3(b) TMD 2015). Trademark applicants are 
permitted to represent the mark in any suitable form using any technologies available, on condition that the 
representation is ‘clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective.’ (CJEU, 
judgment of 12 December 2002, case C-273/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:748 (Sieckmann), para 55). 
791 In the Sieckmann case, the CJEU ruled that neither a chemical formula nor a description or smell specimen or 
a combination thereof meet the registration requirements. (CJEU, judgment of 12 December 2002, case C-
273/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:748 (Sieckmann), para 73). 
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State, which is a high threshold to overcome.792 Furthermore, the EU functionality doctrine, 
applying to shapes but also to other product characteristics since the reform of the EU 
trademark system, has made it even more difficult for trademark applicants to register shapes 
and product characteristics. If trademark applicants stress that the shape or another product 
characteristic for which they seek trademark protection departs significantly from the norm or 
customs in the relevant sector, there is a chance that registration will be rejected because of a 
finding of aesthetic functionality.  
Although the CJEU has developed a high threshold in order to keep non-traditional 
marks in the public domain, obtaining trademark rights for non-traditional marks is not 
impossible. For instance, moderate product design might not fall under the refusal grounds 
and trademark owners are still allowed to register functional elements if these are not entirely 
prescribed by technical norms. The CJEU’s assumption that consumers are not in the habit of 
perceiving non-traditional signs as a source identifier becomes unreliable as soon as 
consumers no longer search for traditional source identifiers, such as wordmarks and logos, 
and do not experience particular difficulties in understanding non-traditional signs as 
trademarks. Furthermore, the CJEU leaves the possibility of obtaining exclusive rights on 
non-traditional signs to marketing specialists keen to educate consumers to perceive shapes 
and colours as a trademark. This makes the threshold of distinctiveness risky and 
unpredictable and may in fact encourage trademark owners to invest in non-traditional signs.  
It is therefore advisable to refrain from relying too much on empirical findings with 
regard to shapes and colours per se demonstrating the capacity of consumers to perceive these 
signs as source identifier. The same applies to descriptive and cultural signs which can also be 
registered if they have acquired distinctiveness through use in trade. In any case, we should 
avoid empirical evidence concerning consumer perception degenerating into a protection 
automatism that directly grants trademark owners exclusive rights on these signs without 
considering normative purposes. Otherwise, the EU trademark system may shift from the first 
scenario outlined above to the second or third scenario – with additional risks for inroads into 
freedom of competition and freedom of (commercial) expression. Outright exclusion of 
cultural signs without high symbolic value, descriptive signs, shapes and abstract colours that 
cannot be overcome through acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade would in any event 
ensure the preservation of these signs.  
In compliance with the first scenario, the EU trademark law system also takes an 
empirical approach with regard to the infringement assessment. Empirical data are important 
to the decision, although courts are not obliged to follow the outcomes of consumer studies. In 
contrast to the first scenario, however, judges are not permitted to make normative corrections 
towards third-party interests based on the need to keep free since the infringement assessment 
must be based solely on consumer perception. Nevertheless, the CJEU’s ruling that 
consumers are more likely to be confused when confronted with signs that are similar to a 
highly distinctive trademark is incorrect, and is in fact a normative correction in favour of 
trademark owners’ investments. This incorrect mix of normative considerations and empirical 
findings may lead to dysfunctional impulses.  
 
792 CJEU, judgment of 25 July 2018, joined cases C‑84/17 P, C‑85/17 P and C‑95/17 P, ECLI:EU:C:2018:596 
(Nestlé/Mondelez (KitKat)), paras 67-68, 76. 
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To minimise these risks, it is essential to apply normative corrections not only in 
favour of trademark owners but also in favour of competitors. The need to keep free must be 
recognised as an additional factor in the confusion analysis. Overreliance on empirical 
evidence must be avoided. Signs that actually need to remain in the public domain but 
nevertheless slip through the net can be kept free to some extent by also applying normative 
corrections in favour of third parties’ interests in the context of the infringement analysis.793 
For instance, if trademark owners add a new element, such as a decorative or imaginative 
element that is not inherent to the generic function of the goods but nevertheless plays an 
essential role, functional elements can still be validly registered and need to be kept free at the 
infringement stage.794 
Deviating from the first scenario outlined above, the CJEU simply repeats assessment 
criteria that have already been used to establish prima facie infringement when assessing 
defence arguments and compliance with honest practices. It is advisable to take a more 
empirical approach when assessing compliance with the requirement of honest practices in 
cases where limitations of trademark rights are invoked. If the defendant takes measures to 
minimise possible harm to the trademark owner but some confusion still exists or unfair 
advantage is still taken, the use of the conflicting sign can nonetheless be allowed as long as 
the detriment caused to the trademark is outweighed by overarching benefits for society, such 
as enhanced freedom of competition and freedom of (commercial) expression, and enhanced 
consumer information and consumer choice.  
This conduct-based approach ensures that not only the legitimate interests of the 
trademark owner but also those of third parties are taken into account. Trademark owners 
cannot prevent unauthorised use of the trademark if the defendant has made sufficient efforts 
to minimise harm and the defendant’s use contributes to the achievement of the 
aforementioned overarching societal values. At the same time, competitors must respect the 
 
793 If the CJEU revises the Adidas/Marca case, national courts could explicitly refer to the need to keep signs 
freely available with regard to non-distinctive, descriptive and generic signs such as shapes, colours and cultural 
signs. They could argue that although for instance the colours of the packaging or the logo are similar to the 
trademark, there is nevertheless no likelihood of confusion because of the general interest of colours being kept 
freely available to competitors on the market. However, national courts could also do this more implicitly. For 
example, in the Adidas/H&M case, the Court of Appeal of The Hague ruled that there was no likelihood of 
confusion because the similarity between the signs was very limited. The gaps between the two stripes were 
different and therefore also the global impression of the stripes. The consumer studies were also not decisive and 
yielded unreliable results. Besides interpreting the facts differently (emphasising the gaps between the stripes 
instead of focusing on the stripes themselves and the global impression thereof), the judge used rules of 
experience about the perception of the consumer. According to the court, the consumer would be used to stripes 
on clothing, and a stripe itself or the random combination of two stripes are so simple and trivial that they do not 
have any distinctive character (Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgment of January 28, 2020, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2020:72 (H&M/Adidas)). The same should apply to cases concerning a descriptive sign that 
has not acquired distinctiveness through use in trade. Even though in the Hansson case, the CJEU rejected the 
principle that a likelihood of confusion could not be established if the allegedly infringing sign coincided in 
elements that were descriptive or non-distinctive, national courts could simply argue that the signs were not 
similar and therefore no likelihood of confusion existed (CJEU, judgment of June 12, 2019, case C-705/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:481). 
794 CJEU, judgment of 18 September 2014, case C-205/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2233 (Stokke/Hauck), para 22. See 




interests of the trademark owner to the largest extent possible and take appropriate and 
available measures to avoid harm, if they want trademark limitations to apply.  
 
In sum, the foregoing study thus shows the current tension in EU trademark law between a 
normative and an empirical approach to consumer perception. Admittedly, the EU trademark 
law system provides several legal tools to keep the system balanced. However, this study also 
illustrates that some legal instruments may not be applied in a sufficiently effective way. 
Indeed, the trademark system might give trademark owners dysfunctional incentives to invest 
in signs that should remain freely available to other traders on the market or the public in 
general. Particularly, the distinctiveness requirement is unpredictable and risky since 
trademark owners can influence whether signs acquire distinctiveness and invest as needed 
until they acquire control of their preferred sign. To minimise the risk of encouraging traders 
to invest in signs that need to be kept free, such as non-distinctive, descriptive and generic 
signs, and to offer breathing space to other traders to use similar signs, it is strongly advised to 
allow courts to make normative corrections when assessing infringement questions. In this 
way, courts can still discourage undesirable trademark acquisition strategies by demonstrating 
that, even if a trademark registration can be obtained, the scope of protection will remain very 
limited. In the end, large investments in consumer education may thus fail to “pay off”. There 
is even more reason for this approach since courts already provide normative corrections in 
favour of trademark owners when confusion in respect of highly distinctive marks is at issue. 
Finally, a more empirical approach to assessing honest practices would further enhance 
freedom of competition and freedom of (commercial) expression, and enhanced consumer 
information and consumer choice. Allowing for normative corrections on both sides of the 
spectrum and at all levels would prevent the circularity that seems to be inherently linked to 
the EU trademark system. Following these guidelines, signs cannot be automatically 
registered based only on empirical findings, and they cannot by definition achieve more 






















De perceptie van de consument speelt een centrale rol in het EU-merkenrecht. Vanwege de 
nauwe verbondenheid met het basiscriterium van het onderscheidend vermogen, is de 
perceptie van de consument niet alleen van belang voor de beslissing of een merkenrecht 
wordt verleend, maar heeft het ook een grote impact op de inbreukanalyse. Daarom is het 
uitermate van belang om zicht te krijgen op de vraag welke beoordeling van de perceptie van 
de consument de juiste is: in hoeverre zou een normatieve of een empirische benadering van 
de perceptie van de consument gevolgd moeten worden om een eerlijke mededinging, de 
bescherming van de consument en een goed functionerende markt te verzekeren?  
Om een goede basis te kunnen leggen voor de bespreking van deze onderzoeksvraag, 
is het nodig de theoretische grondslagen van het merkenrechtsysteem in kaart te brengen 
(hoofdstuk 2). Door de doelstellingen die ten grondslag liggen aan het merkenrecht nader te 
bestuderen, is het mogelijk om argumenten te distilleren die ervoor pleiten de perceptie van de 
consument centraal te stellen bij de beoordeling van merkregistraties en inbreuken in het EU-
merkenrecht. De analyse zal bovendien de spanning die er is tussen een normatieve en 
empirische benadering ten aanzien van de perceptie van de consument aan de orde stellen.  
In het licht van deze theoretische achtergrond bespreken hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 6 
de impact die een normatieve of empirische analyse van de perceptie van de consument heeft 
op beslissingen over de inschrijving van een merk en de vaststelling van inbreuk. Deze 
hoofdstukken onderzoeken of het huidige EU-merkenrecht ten aanzien van de verkrijging 
(hoofdstuk 3) en de beschermingsomvang (hoofdstukken 4-6) hoofdzakelijk is gebaseerd op 
normatieve overwegingen of empirische bevindingen en of dit problematisch is in het licht 
van de overkoepelende doelstellingen van het EU-merkenrecht.  
De resultaten uit dit onderzoek worden gebruikt als uitgangspunt om tot nieuwe 
oplossingen te komen die bijdragen aan het voorkomen van dysfunctionele impulsen en een 
juiste balans verzekeren tussen merkenrechten en de belangen van consumenten, concurrenten 
en de gemeenschap als geheel. In het laatste hoofdstuk zullen een aantal aanbevelingen 
worden gedaan omtrent de juiste combinatie van empirische en normatieve benaderingen ten 
aanzien van merkinschrijvingen en inbreukzaken.  
 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de grondslagen van het merkenrecht besproken. De primaire functie 
van het merkenrecht is het verzekeren van markttransparantie. In een transparante markt 
waarin onderscheidende tekens uitsluitend zijn verbonden aan producten van een bepaalde 
herkomst, kunnen handelaren gemakkelijk hun producten van elkaar onderscheiden en kunnen 
consumenten snel een keuze maken tussen de aangeboden producten en hun voorkeur uiten 
door het gewenste product aan te schaffen. Dit verzekert ook dat de juiste producten worden 
geproduceerd en verkocht op de markt.  
 De herkomstfunctie is gerelateerd aan het verminderen van de zoekkosten van de 
consument. Door herkomstaanduidingen te beschermen voorkomt het merkenrecht dat 
consumenten in verwarring raken. Daarnaast draagt het bij aan een handelsklimaat waarin 
consumenten kunnen vertrouwen op herkomstaanduidingen. De zekerheid dat de informatie 
over de herkomst van het product correct is, zorgt ervoor dat de zoekkosten van consumenten 
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worden verminderd. Deze kunnen worden opgevat als de kosten die nodig zijn om informatie 
over een product te verkrijgen of onzekerheden weg te nemen.  
 De sterke nadruk op de perceptie van de consument en de daarbij behorende 
zoekkostenfunctie zou echter kunnen hebben bijgedragen aan de uitbreiding van 
merkenrechten. Het huidige merkenrecht hangt sterk af van de perceptie van de consument. 
Met behulp van marketeers gespecialiseerd in het beïnvloeden van de waarneming van de 
consument, hebben merkhouders stelselmatig de merkenrechten weten uit te breiden. Een 
empirische benadering ten aanzien van de perceptie van de consument heeft dit proces 
mogelijk verder versterkt.  
 Dit hoofdstuk gaat daarnaast in op de argumenten die worden gevoerd om andere 
merkfuncties zoals goodwill te beschermen. Het verstrekken van extra bescherming die verder 
gaat dan de herkomstfunctie is echter moeilijk te rechtvaardigen. Maar tegelijkertijd is het ook 
niet mogelijk om simpelweg juridische bescherming te ontzeggen, aangezien de economische 
realiteit zo is dat de perceptie van de consument een centraal onderdeel vormt van de 
bescherming van het merk. In plaats van aanvullende bescherming van het merk af te wijzen, 
zou het beter zijn om ruimte te maken voor andere waarden, zoals de (commerciële) vrijheid 
van meningsuiting en onvervalste mededinging.  
  
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt beargumenteerd dat een zwaardere normatieve toets noodzakelijk is. De 
hervormingen in het EU-merkenrecht en de uitbreiding van de vormuitsluitingsgronden door 
het Hof van Justitie EU (HvJ EU) zijn weliswaar toe te juichen, maar zijn niet voldoende. 
Gelet op de positie die suggestieve, arbitraire en fantasiemerken innemen, is het noodzakelijk 
om een sterkere normatieve benadering te volgen ten aanzien van beschrijvende, culturele, 
generieke en niet-onderscheidende tekens.   
 Hoofdstuk 3 toont aan dat de beweringen van het HvJ EU met betrekking tot de 
perceptie van merken niet stroken met wat we weten uit wetenschappelijk onderzoek over hoe 
consumenten daadwerkelijk waarnemen. Consumenten zijn wel degelijk in staat om 
beschrijvende en niet-traditionele tekens als herkomstaanduider op te vatten. De onjuiste 
aannames van het HvJ EU over de perceptie van de consument berusten daarom eigenlijk op 
normatieve overwegingen.  
 Het HvJ EU kiest er niet voor om beschrijvende en niet-traditionele tekens anders te 
benaderen, omdat consumenten niet gewend zouden zijn om deze als herkomstaanduider op te 
vatten, maar omdat het HvJ EU eigenlijk wil dat deze tekens in het publieke domein blijven 
vanwege het algemene belang dat er is in het niet onnodig beperken van de beschikbaarheid 
van deze tekens voor concurrenten op de markt.  
 De pogingen van het HvJ EU om bepaalde tekens vrij te houden van merkenrechten 
kunnen echter merkhouders aansporen om deze tekens te monopoliseren en opmerkelijk 
genoeg juist dysfunctionele impulsen creëren. Terwijl het HvJ EU misschien denkt dat de 
inburgeringstoets hoog genoeg is om merkhouders af te schrikken, zou het goed kunnen dat 
het toch aantrekkelijk is voor merkhouders om juist in deze tekens te investeren, met name als 
steeds meer merkhouders succes hebben in het onderwijzen van consumenten in het opvatten 




De beloning voor deze marketinginspanningen is groot: merkhouders kunnen 
exclusieve rechten op een teken verkrijgen die positieve productkenmerken weergeeft en zo 
een oneerlijk economisch voordeel verwerven, omdat consumenten snel weten waar het merk 
voor staat en de beschikbaarheid van deze tekens voor concurrenten niet onbeperkt is. De 
conclusie is daarom dat het vereiste van onderscheidend vermogen onvoorspelbaar en 
risicovol is. Merkhouders kunnen beïnvloeden of de tekens onderscheidend vermogen 
verwerven en zoveel als nodig investeren totdat zij de zeggenschap hebben verkregen over het 
gewenste teken.  
In dit hoofdstuk wordt geadviseerd de mogelijkheden die merkhouders momenteel 
hebben om beschrijvende, culturele en niet-traditionele tekens toe te eigenen in te perken en te 
heroverwegen of het eigenlijk wel wenselijk is dat deze tekens kunnen inburgeren. Een 
absolute uitsluitingsgrond voor culturele tekens zonder hoge symbolische waarde, 
beschrijvende tekens en abstracte kleuren die niet opzij gezet kan worden door inburgering, 
zou in ieder geval het behoud van deze tekens verzekeren.   
 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt geconcludeerd dat het van cruciaal belang is om bij de beoordeling van 
verwarringsgevaar normatieve correcties toe te passen in het licht van de 
vrijhoudingsbehoefte. Het klinkt vanuit empirisch oogpunt misschien overtuigend om 
consumenten te beschermen tegen verwarring, dit onderzoek echter toont aan dat de 
verwarringsvraag in werkelijkheid berust op normatieve overwegingen. De regel van het HvJ 
EU dat consumenten eerder in verwarring zullen zijn wanneer zij geconfronteerd worden met 
een teken dat overeenstemt met een bekend merk, is onjuist. Het tegendeel is eerder correct: 
hoe bekender het merk, hoe minder waarschijnlijk het is dat consumenten in verwarring 
zullen raken wanneer zij geconfronteerd worden met een overeenstemmend teken.  
 De consequentie is echter dat marketinginspanningen worden beloond: hoe groter de 
investeringen in een bepaald teken, hoe meer bescherming merkhouders verkrijgen voor een 
bepaald teken. Tegelijkertijd worden de belangen van concurrenten vanwege de 
Adidas/Marca regel mogelijk buiten spel gezet. Dit is met name problematisch ten aanzien 
van attractieve tekens zoals streepmotieven. Deze tekens fungeren niet alleen als 
herkomstaanduider, maar zij trekken ook de aandacht van consumenten en verschaffen 
merkhouders voordelen ten opzichte van concurrenten. Nu Adidas de enige is die uitsluitend 
bevoegd is om bepaalde streepmotieven op sport- en vrijetijdskleding te gebruiken, worden 
concurrenten mogelijk oneindig benadeeld. Merkhouders zouden eerder aangemoedigd 
moeten worden om te investeren in de kwaliteit en de aantrekkelijkheid van hun producten in 
plaats van beloond te worden met concurrerende voordelen die voortvloeien uit het teken als 
zodanig.  
Exclusieve rechten op aantrekkelijk design kunnen daarnaast innovatie belemmeren en 
standaardisatie stimuleren. Concurrenten kunnen er bijvoorbeeld voor kiezen om op sport- en 
vrijetijdskleding helemaal geen streepmotieven te gebruiken om zo risicovolle 
merkprocedures te vermijden. Zolang niet-onderscheidende tekens kunnen inburgeren, zullen 
merkhouders blijven investeren in attractieve tekens die hun concurrerende voordelen 
opleveren. Het benadrukken van de verrichte investeringen bij de beoordeling van 
verwarringsgevaar zal dit proces verder faciliteren. Indien rechters bij de beoordeling van de 
inbreukvraag bovendien niet proactief verwijzen naar de vrijhoudingsbehoefte, zou het 
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merkenrechtsysteem uiteindelijk kunnen gaan fungeren als zelfbedieningsmechanisme voor 
de industrie. In een dergelijke markt maken nieuwkomers weinig kans.    
Dit onderzoek illustreert verder dat sinds de Adidas/Marca uitspraak verscheidene 
rechters deze investeringsbenadering lijken te volgen. De herijking van de verwarringsanalyse 
wordt daarom bepleit. Om voldoende ruimte aan zowel de belangen van merkhouders als 
concurrenten (en uiteindelijk ook consumenten) te bieden, is het noodzakelijk om normatieve 
correcties toe te passen die niet alleen ten voordele zijn van merkhouders maar ook van 
concurrenten. Tegen deze achtergrond concludeert dit hoofdstuk dat de Adidas/Marca zaak 
moet worden herzien en de vrijhoudingsbehoefte moeten worden erkend als relevante factor 
in de beoordeling van verwarringsgevaar.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 bevestigt dat het EU-merkenrecht inderdaad merkhouders op verschillende 
manieren stimuleert tot het verrichten van investeringen en daarvoor beloont bij de 
beoordeling van verwarringsgevaar. Hoofdstuk 4 richtte zich slechts op uitspraken met 
betrekking tot driestreepmotieven. Dezelfde problematiek is echter ook van toepassing op 
andere tekens. In dit onderzoek waren twee kenmerken van het merkenrechtsysteem met 
name problematisch. Ten eerste kunnen merkhouders het onderscheidend vermogen van 
merken versterken door te investeren in marketing en branding. Ten tweede kunnen 
merkhouders zich dure marktonderzoeken veroorloven die de bekendheid van hun merk 
aantonen en hun positie daarmee in een inbreukzaak versterken.  
Een onderzoek van 189 Nederlandse uitspraken toont aan dat bij de beoordeling van 
verwarringsgevaar de mate van het onderscheidend vermogen en marktonderzoeken naar de 
bekendheid van het merk een grote invloed kunnen hebben. Dit onderzoek geeft weer dat 
merkhouders vaker winnen dan verliezen. Daarnaast hebben merkhouders naarmate ze meer 
investeren ook een grotere kans om te winnen. Indien rechters de regel van het HvJEU 
inhoudende dat consumenten eerder in verwarring zijn wanneer zij geconfronteerd worden 
met een teken dat overeenstemt met een bekend merk toepassen, winnen merkhouders ook de 
meeste zaken. Daarnaast zijn rechters meer geneigd om tekens als overeenstemmend te 
beoordelen als het merk bekend is. Tevens kunnen consumentenonderzoeken de claim van de 
merkhouder verder versterken.  
Dit onderzoek toont echter ook aan dat beschrijvende, culturele en niet-traditionele 
tekens niet vaak ter discussie staan. In de praktijk is het risico dat deze tekens worden 
toegeëigend daarom mogelijk beperkt. Het verlenen van merkenrechten op fantasienamen en 
andere fantasierijke aanduidingen lijkt in overeenstemming te zijn met de doelstellingen van 
het merkenrecht. Bovendien hadden partijen in sommige zaken voldoende financiële 
middelen om de vaak dure marktonderzoeken te bekostigen. Daarnaast wijzen rechters niet 
altijd bredere bescherming toe wanneer een merk erg bekend is. Indien nodig kunnen rechters 
eenvoudigweg concluderen dat de merken niet overeenstemmend zijn.  
Dit wil echter niet zeggen dat er geen enkel risico bestaat dat bescherming tegen 
verwarringsgevaar wordt verleend ten aanzien van beschrijvende, culturele en niet-
traditionele tekens. Het onderzoek van Nederlandse uitspraken illustreert dat in sommige 
zaken merkhouders succes hadden in het verwerven van bescherming ten aanzien van 
beschrijvende, culturele en niet-traditionele tekens. Beeldmerken vormen met name een 
risico. Via deze tekens kunnen merkhouders niet alleen normatieve restricties omzeilen bij de 
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inschrijving van het beeldmerk, maar in het licht van de Adidas/Marca zaak is het rechters 
ook niet toegestaan om normatieve correcties toe te passen ten faveure van de 
vrijhoudingsbehoefte en de daaruit voortvloeiende belangen van derden. Met als resultaat dat 
merkhouders met diepe zakken nog vrij ver kunnen komen in inbreukzaken. Dit resulteert 
mogelijkerwijs in een onevenwichtige markt met aan de ene kant merkhouders die brede 
merkenrechtbescherming en concurrerende voordelen genieten van het merk als zodanig, en 
aan de andere kant derden die worden uitgesloten om gebruik te maken van deze gunstige 
tekens en gedwongen worden om minder effectieve merken te gebruiken, omdat de gewenste 
tekens niet meer in voldoende mate beschikbaar zijn.  
Zolang het HvJ EU de vrijhoudingsbehoefte niet als relevante factor in de beoordeling 
van verwarringsgevaar erkent, zullen merkhouders fors investeren – en soms beloond worden 
– met goede beschermingsmogelijkheden. In dit hoofdstuk wordt er daarom ervoor gepleit dat 
als we willen dat beschrijvende, culturele en niet-traditionele tekens vrijelijk beschikbaar zijn, 
dan moeten we de verwarringsgevaaranalyse herijken en rechters toestaan normatieve 
correcties toe te passen in het licht van de vrijheid van meningsuiting en de vrijheid van 
mededinging. Dit maakt ook dat rechters beter uitgerust zijn om de belangen van 
merkhouders af te wegen tegen de belangen van concurrenten en het algemene publiek.  
Daarom wordt in dit hoofdstuk geconcludeerd dat rechters het gebruik van merken toe 
moeten kunnen staan zelfs wanneer dit mogelijk verwarringsgevaar oplevert bij consumenten. 
Nationale rechters zouden meer ruimte moeten hebben om normatieve correcties toe te passen 
met het oog op de vrijheid van mededinging. Dit zou het rechters ook mogelijk maken om te 
voorkomen dat merkhouders oneerlijke economische voordelen verwerven die voortvloeien 
uit de tekens als zodanig.  
 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt besproken hoe de bepaling over de eerlijke gebruiken in nijverheid en 
handel dient te worden geïnterpreteerd bij de beoordeling van de beperkingen in het 
merkenrecht. Als men kijkt naar het voorstel van de Commissie dat is gedaan ten behoeve van 
de hervorming van het merkenrecht en mede de rechtspraak van het HvJ EU waarop dit 
voorstel is gebaseerd in ogenschouw neemt, zou men kunnen denken dat de eerlijk gebruik 
bepaling strikt moet worden opgevat.  
 Uit dit voorstel blijkt namelijk dat het gebruik van een inbreukmakend teken niet in 
overeenstemming is met de eerlijke gebruiken in nijverheid en handel wanneer het zonder 
geldige reden de indruk wekt dat er een commerciële band is tussen de derde en de 
merkhouder, of wanneer ongerechtvaardigd voordeel wordt getrokken of afbreuk wordt 
gedaan aan het onderscheidend vermogen of de reputatie van het merk. Op dit voorstel werd 
scherpe kritiek geleverd, omdat het ongeschikt en risicovol zou zijn. Het zou neerkomen op 
een bijna letterlijke herhaling van de inbreukcriteria resulterend in een cirkelredenering en het 
zinledig maken van de beperkingen. De situatie lijkt echter nauwelijks verbeterd te zijn nu de 
bepaling omtrent de eerlijke gebruiken in nijverheid en handel niet verder is omschreven en 
de rechtspraak van het HvJ EU nog steeds leidend is.  
 Dit hoofdstuk analyseert of er voldoende ruimte is om het begrip eerlijke gebruik in 
het EU-merkenrecht breder op te vatten. Voor de bespreking daarvan is Art. 10bis Verdrag 
van Parijs onderzocht, omdat dit de bepaling is waar het begrip ‘eerlijke gebruiken in 
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nijverheid en handel’ vandaan komt. Dit begrip wordt van oudsher geïnterpreteerd volgens 
ethische maatstaven over gedragsnormen van eerlijkheid in een bepaald circuit.  
 Deze normatieve benadering kan echter worden bekritiseerd vanwege haar 
onnauwkeurigheid, omdat de gedragsnormen sterk worden beïnvloed door gewoonten en 
gebruiken die gelden in een bepaald handelscircuit. Een definitie omtrent eerlijke gebruiken in 
nijverheid en handel is in zekere zin circulair van aard wanneer gekeken wordt naar hoe 
eerlijke handelaren in werkelijkheid met elkaar concurreren, omdat het handelscircuit dan in 
feite bepaalt wat de richtlijnen zijn voor eerlijk gebruik en aan de hand daarvan vervolgens 
het gedrag van concurrenten beoordeelt.  
Daarom wordt meer recentelijk het begrip eerlijk gebruik geïnterpreteerd in het licht 
van het doel de goede werking van markten te waarborgen als belangrijkste element van de 
markteconomie. Een empirische benadering waarin de nadruk wordt gelegd op de perceptie 
van de consument, zou tot herintroductie van ethische normen kunnen leiden, zoals 
persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid voor handelingen, aandacht voor de belangen van derden 
en eerbiediging van gelijke rechten.  
 Bepleit wordt dat de bepaling over eerlijke gebruiken in nijverheid en handel meer 
empirisch moet worden opgevat. De rechtspraak van het HvJ EU biedt voldoende ruimte om 
de bepaling ook op deze manier op te vatten. Bij de beoordeling van eerlijk gebruik zou gelet 
moeten worden op de inspanningen die zijn verricht door de concurrent en daarnaast of deze 
inspanningen ertoe geleid hebben dat consumenten daardoor het vermeend inbreukmakend 
teken anders zijn gaan opvatten. Als een derde redelijke stappen heeft genomen om mogelijke 
schade aan de merkhouder te verminderen, maar enige verwarring blijft toch bestaan of 
ongerechtvaardigd voordeel is getrokken, zou het gebruik van het merk moeten worden 
toegestaan om enige ruimte te bieden aan marktwaarden, zoals het bevorderen van de 
mededinging op de markt en het verbeteren van de keuzevrijheid van de consument.  
 Deze gedragsbenadering waarborgt niet alleen de gerechtvaardigde belangen van de 
merkhouder, maar ook die van derden. Op deze manier kunnen merkhouders het eerlijk 
gebruik van een merk niet verbieden, indien een concurrent redelijke inspanningen heeft 
verricht om de schade te beperken, terwijl derden de belangen van merkhouders in acht 



















Een correcte mix van empirische bevindingen en normatieve correcties is noodzakelijk om 
niet alleen te verzekeren dat merkhouders worden beschermd, maar ook dat andere 
kernwaarden worden gewaarborgd, zoals de bescherming van de vrijheid van mededinging en 
de (commerciële) vrijheid van meningsuiting. Op alle niveaus van creatie tot bescherming van 
het merk moeten de belangen van merkhouders worden afgewogen tegen de belangen van 
concurrenten en het algemene publiek. 
 Verscheidene juridische instrumenten staan ter beschikking die het EU- 
merkenrechtsysteem in balans kunnen houden. In de eerste fase, waarin een beslissing over de 
inschrijving van het merk wordt genomen, zien verschillende weigeringsgronden erop toe dat 
tekens niet worden geregistreerd en beschermd, ongeacht of er verwarringsgevaar bestaat 
onder consumenten (strenge normatieve benadering). Zonder de verlening van merkenrechten 
staat het gebruik van een teken door concurrenten en het algemene publiek volkomen vrij. 
Deze benadering brengt met zich mee dat in zaken waarin tekens inderdaad onderscheidend 
vermogen hebben, consumenten mogelijk in verwarring raken. Het teken zal niet worden 
ingeschreven, ongeacht of en hoeveel merkhouders hebben geïnvesteerd in een merk.  
Anderzijds kunnen we ervoor kiezen om te vertrouwen op een lage drempel van het 
onderscheidend vermogen die gemakkelijk kan worden weggenomen met enige 
marktinspanningen (soepele empirische benadering). Deze optie heeft als voordeel dat het kan 
inspelen op de actuele behoeften van de markt. Zodra consumenten een teken als een merk 
opvatten, fungeert het teken als herkomstaanduider en kan het onder deze benadering 
beschermd worden. De inschrijving van een teken hangt af van de mate waarin de 
merkhouder bereid is te investeren in het onderwijzen van consumenten in het herkennen van 
tekens als herkomstaanduider. 
 In de tweede fase, bij de beoordeling van inbreukzaken, zouden rechters ervoor 
kunnen kiezen hun beslissing louter te baseren op empirische bevindingen, zoals 
consumentenstudies. Consumenten zouden dan in hoge mate beschermd zijn tegen 
verwarring. Het belang om consumenten te beschermen tegen verwarring loopt echter niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs parallel aan de belangen van merkhouders om de investeringen in de 
creatie van het door hen gewenste merkimago te beschermen. Merkhouders van zeer bekende 
merken zullen waarschijnlijk minder succes hebben in verwarringszaken als rechters de 
verwarringsvraag empirisch zouden beoordelen. Vanwege het groot onderscheidend 
vermogen zullen consumenten gemakkelijk verschillen ontdekken en niet snel in verwarring 
raken bij het zien van een teken dat lijkt op het bekende merk. Als rechters echter een 
benadering zouden volgen die gebaseerd is op ervaringsregels inhoudende dat bekende 
merken per definitie een grotere beschermingsomvang zouden moeten hebben, dan wordt de 
hoge mate van onderscheidend vermogen van een merk opeens een factor dat juist bijdraagt 
aan het vaststellen van verwarringsgevaar.  
 Aan de andere kant van het spectrum kan het scenario worden geschetst van rechters 
die normatieve correcties aanbrengen en inbreukclaims afwijzen, zelfs wanneer er sprake is 
van verwarringsgevaar. In dit scenario zijn de belangen van derden ten aanzien van de 
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concurrentievrijheid en het vergroten van de keuzevrijheid van consumenten beter 
gewaarborgd, maar sommige consumenten zijn mogelijk in verwarring.  
 In de derde fase, bij de beoordeling van de beperkingen op het merkenrecht, zouden 
rechters het begrip ‘eerlijk gebruik’ normatiever kunnen opvatten, dat wil zeggen volgens de 
ethische standaarden ten aanzien van gedragsnormen van eerlijkheid die gelden in een 
bepaald handelscircuit. Als rechters een inbreukzaak overeenkomstig ethische normen 
beoordelen, zullen hoofdzakelijk de investeringen van de merkhouder worden beschermd. Als 
enige verwarring ontstaat of schade wordt aangericht aan de merkhouder, dan kan dit niet 
worden aangemerkt als eerlijk. Dit zou de mogelijkheid voor concurrenten om alternatieve 
producten op de markt aan te bieden inperken. Tevens zou dit een impact hebben op de 
keuzevrijheid van consumenten en de belangen van het algemene publiek om zonder 
restricties bekende merken te kunnen bekritiseren en te becommentariëren.   
 Anderzijds als rechters het begrip ‘eerlijk gebruik’ empirischer zouden beoordelen en 
zouden letten op de inspanningen die zijn verricht door een concurrent om potentiële schade 
aan de merkhouder te verminderen en de effecten daarvan op de perceptie van de consument, 
dan zou dit de concurrentie ten goede komen en de keuzevrijheid van consumenten 
verbeteren, ook al zijn mogelijkerwijs enkele consumenten in verwarring.  
 De beste optie is daarom te kiezen voor een juiste mix van empirische bevindingen en 
normatieve correcties. Als rechters de perceptie van de consument te normatief zouden 
opvatten, dan zou het merkenrecht sterk afwijken van de daadwerkelijke marktsituatie en 
consumenten zouden in verwarring zijn. Anderzijds als we de perceptie van de consument te 
empirisch zouden opvatten, dan zouden merkhouders consumenten in bijna elk teken kunnen 
onderwijzen deze op te vatten als merk en vervolgens om bescherming vragen. Het EU-
merkenrecht zou dan niets anders zijn dan een zelfbedieningsmechanisme voor de industrie, 
aangezien de investeringen die worden verricht door merkhouders, de beschermingsomvang 
zouden bepalen. De keuze voor één van deze twee uiteinden van het spectrum zou leiden tot 
ongewenste effecten welke dienen te worden vermeden.  
 
Het merkenrecht heeft een tweeledige strekking. Enerzijds beschermt het de investeringen van 
merkhouders en probeert het verwarring onder consumenten te voorkomen. Anderzijds dienen 
de belangen van concurrenten en het algemene publiek in het vrij beschikbaar houden van 
tekens te worden gewaarborgd. We moeten daarom op zoek naar de juiste combinatie van 
juridische instrumenten die beide doelen vervult. Drie mogelijke scenario’s kunnen worden 
geschetst. 
 Ten eerste zouden we kunnen kiezen voor een merkenrechtsysteem dat voorziet in 
absolute uitsluitingsgronden ten aanzien van registratie en bescherming die niet opzij kunnen 
worden gezet door inburgering (‘toegangscontrole vooraf’). Tekens kunnen bijvoorbeeld 
worden geweigerd, omdat deze in strijd zijn met de goede zeden of de openbare orde of, 
omdat deze niet op een duidelijke en nauwkeurige manier kunnen worden weergegeven. 
Andere uitsluitingsgronden zouden kunnen zijn dat het teken functionele elementen bevat en 
daarom het product zelf beschermt in plaats van als herkomstaanduider fungeert dat is 
aangebracht op een product. Deze weigeringsgronden kunnen niet door inburgering opzij 
gezet worden. Een hoge drempel van het onderscheidend vermogen zou ook kunnen 
voorkomen dat niet-onderscheidende, beschrijvende en generieke tekens ingeschreven 
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worden, bijvoorbeeld met bewijs van extensief eerder gebruik, maar dit instrument zou niet zo 
strikt zijn als een absolute weigeringsgrond.  
 In dit scenario zou de registratiefase fungeren als een strenge ‘poortwachter’ die de 
monopolisering van tekens welke eigenlijk beschikbaar zouden moeten blijven voor 
concurrenten en het algemene publiek, effectief zou kunnen voorkomen. De nadruk ligt op 
normatieve correcties, alhoewel er ook ruimte is voor empirische bevindingen. Tekens die 
niet bijzonder bezwarend zijn voor concurrenten, kunnen zonder bewijs van extensief eerder 
gebruik worden ingeschreven.  
 De inbreukvraag zou dan in sterke mate kunnen worden gebaseerd op empirische 
bevindingen, zoals consumentenstudies, waarmee verwarringsgevaar of de reputatie van het 
merk kan worden aangetoond, omzetcijfers, verkoopcijfers, marktaandelen, reclame-uitgaven 
of andere empirische gegevens, alhoewel enige ruimte voor normatieve correcties blijft 
bestaan. De beperkingen op het merkenrecht zouden bovendien meer empirisch kunnen 
worden opgevat door te letten op de inspanningen van concurrenten om mogelijke schade te 
reduceren en het effect daarvan op de perceptie van de consument.  
 Ten tweede is het mogelijk om een merkenrechtsysteem te ontwikkelen, waarin bij de 
registratieprocedure nauwelijks gebruik gemaakt wordt van enige preserveringsmechanismen, 
zodat bijna elk teken zou kunnen worden ingeschreven als het wordt opgevat als merk. Het 
staat in een dergelijke situatie merkhouders vrij om bijna elk teken uit het publieke domein te 
halen. In dit scenario zouden niet-onderscheidende, beschrijvende en generieke tekens, zoals 
vormen, kleuren en culturele tekens, gemakkelijk kunnen worden geregistreerd, nadat de 
merkhouder enige inspanningen heeft verricht om consumenten aan te leren deze tekens als 
herkomstaanduider voor een bepaald product op te vatten. In dit scenario is de registratie van 
tekens overgelaten aan de bereidheid van merkhouders om te investeren in een bepaald merk 
en het vermogen van consumenten om tekens als merk op te vatten. Nu consumenten vrij 
goed in staat zijn om zo ongeveer elk teken als herkomstaanduider op te vatten, met name 
wanneer deze ergens zijn aangebracht op een productverpakking waarvan verwacht kan 
worden een dergelijk merk aan te treffen, zullen merkhouders geen grote moeilijkheden 
ondervinden bij de registratie van het gewenste merk.  
 In dit scenario zouden rechters, wanneer zij dienen te oordelen over een mogelijke 
inbreuk, bijzonder veel normatieve correcties moeten toepassen ten faveure van de belangen 
van concurrenten en het algemene publiek, om de consequenties van een flexibele 
registratieprocedure te compenseren (‘tussentijdse controle). Ondanks dat merkhouders 
bijvoorbeeld een aantrekkelijke vorm van een luidspreker of een driekoppig scheerapparaat 
hebben geregistreerd, staat het concurrenten vrij om overeenstemmende vormen te gebruiken 
met een beroep op de maatschappelijke noodzaak dat functionele productkenmerken vrij 
beschikbaar zouden moeten blijven op de markt. Beperkingen op het merkenrecht zouden 
slechts een aanvullende rol hebben, nu de meeste normatieve correcties reeds zullen zijn 
toegepast bij de beantwoording van de inbreukvraag. 
 Deze optie zou echter kunnen leiden tot meer juridische onzekerheid, omdat 
concurrenten niet kunnen afgaan op het merkenregister. Zij moeten in een dergelijk scenario 
het risico van een inbreukprocedure op de koop toe nemen, als zij overeenstemmende merken 
willen gebruiken. Concurrenten met onvoldoende financiële middelen zullen waarschijnlijk 
dit risico op een juridisch geschil niet durven te nemen, maar als de kosten voor het 
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ontwerpen van een alternatieve vorm ook hoog zijn, zullen zij worden benadeeld. Voor 
merkhouders zal het ook niet altijd duidelijk zijn of de gedane investeringen in het opleiden 
van consumenten een merk als herkomstaanduider op te vatten, wat opleveren. Rechters 
kunnen immers de inbreukvordering afwijzen op grond van de vrijhoudingsbehoefte, 
alhoewel de beperkingen reeds een indicatie kunnen geven welk merkgebruik in ieder geval 
niet kan worden tegengehouden.  
 Ten derde zouden we kunnen kiezen voor een merkenrechtsysteem, waarin eenzelfde 
flexibele registratieprocedure wordt gevolgd als in het tweede scenario, maar waarin de 
inbreukvraag op een meer empirische wijze wordt opgevat. Empirische bevindingen, zoals 
consumentenstudies, zouden dan van grote invloed zijn op de beoordeling of er enige schade 
is toegebracht aan het merk. In dit scenario moet er bij de beoordeling van de 
merkenrechtelijke beperkingen voldoende ruimte zijn voor de (commerciële) vrijheid van 
meningsuiting, om tegenwicht te kunnen bieden aan de sterke positie die merkhouders hebben 
verworven in eerdere fasen (‘ex-post controle’). Dit zou kunnen worden gedaan door de 
eerlijk gebruik bepaling empirischer op te vatten. Rechters zouden zich kunnen richten op de 
inspanningen die concurrenten hebben verricht om mogelijke schade aan het merk te 
verminderen en het effect daarvan op de perceptie van de consument. Het blijft evenwel een 
probleem dat derden mogelijk niet een juridische procedure durven te riskeren en besluiten 
om bepaalde tekens helemaal niet te gebruiken, ook al zouden de beperkingen van toepassing 
zijn geweest. Consumenten zouden daarnaast sneller direct of indirect in verwarring kunnen 
zijn, als merkhouders hen blijven onderwijzen om welk teken dan ook op te vatten als 
herkomstaanduider. Als de beschermingsomvang groeit, verwachten consumenten ook dat 
merkhouders meer macht hebben over hun merken. Concurrenten moeten mogelijk meer 
inspanningen verrichten om potentiële schade aan het merk te reduceren, dan in een systeem 
waarin sommige tekens van begin af aan van bescherming zijn uitgezonderd, zodat de 
beschermingsomvang mogelijk groter is.  
 
In alle drie scenario’s zijn de verschillende belangen goed in balans; elk scenario bevat zowel 
empirische bevindingen als normatieve correcties. Een verschillende mix van empirische 
bevindingen en normatieve correcties heeft echter een andere uitkomst ten gevolge. Vanuit 
het perspectief van de merkhouder is de derde optie het aantrekkelijkst, omdat de 
beschermingsomvang het grootst is als zowel in de registratiefase als in de inbreukprocedure 
een empirische benadering wordt gehanteerd. Aan merkhouders wordt de mogelijkheid 
gegeven om te investeren in het onderwijzen van consumenten om welk teken dan ook op te 
vatten als herkomstaanduider en vervolgens merkenrechtbescherming te verkrijgen wanneer 
zij daarin slagen. Vanuit het perspectief van concurrenten is de eerste optie het optimaalst. In 
dit scenario kunnen aantrekkelijke tekens die merkhouders voordelen verschaffen, niet 
worden gemonopoliseerd en vrijelijk beschikbaar blijven voor andere marktdeelnemers. 
Indien de drempel voor het vaststellen van onderscheidend vermogen hoog is, kunnen tekens 
slechts worden gemonopoliseerd na extensieve marketingcampagnes. Normatieve correcties 
kunnen echter nog steeds worden toegepast bij de beoordeling van de inbreukvraag. Nu de 
merkhouder degene is die een juridische procedure aanvangt, is het raadzaam om de risico’s 
bij de merkhouder te leggen.  
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 Het EU-merkenrechtsysteem lijkt het meest op het eerste scenario. Het is juist dat het 
EU-merkenrecht verscheidene niet-traditionele tekens als merk erkent, zoals vormen, 
abstracte kleuren, kleurcombinaties, geluiden, positiemerken, smaakmerken, enzovoorts,795 
met uitzondering van geurmerken welke nog niet kunnen worden ingeschreven.796 Het 
vereiste van onderscheidend vermogen lijkt echter een aanzienlijke drempel te vormen voor 
merkhouders die niet gemakkelijk kan worden weggenomen. Het HvJ EU heeft namelijk 
geoordeeld dat consumenten niet gewend zijn om aannames te doen over de herkomst van 
waren of diensten, wanneer een niet-traditioneel teken als merk wordt gebruikt, zoals vormen 
en abstracte kleuren. Met deze aanname vereist het HvJ EU in feite dat merkaanvragers 
aantonen dat het merk is ingeburgerd, voordat het niet-traditionele merk wordt ingeschreven. 
Het verstrekken van bewijs met betrekking tot inburgering kan met name lastig zijn wanneer 
het een EU-merk betreft. Bewijs van inburgering is namelijk noodzakelijk voor elke 
individuele EU-lidstaat en wordt daarom als een hoge drempel gezien.797 Daarnaast heeft de 
functionaliteitsdoctrine die van toepassing is op vormen, maar ook op andere 
productkenmerken sinds de hervorming van het EU-merkenrechtsysteem, het zelfs nog 
moeilijker gemaakt voor merkaanvragers om vormen en andere productkenmerken te 
registreren. Als een merkaanvrager benadrukt dat de vorm of een andere productkenmerk 
waarvoor zij merkenrechtbescherming zoeken, aanzienlijk afwijkt van de norm of van wat 
gangbaar is in de betrokken sector, kan de registratie worden geweigerd vanwege een beroep 
esthetische functionaliteit.  
 Hoewel het HvJ EU een hoge drempel heeft ontwikkeld om niet-traditionele tekens in 
het publieke domein te houden, is het verkrijgen van merkenrechten op niet-traditionele 
tekens niet onmogelijk geworden. Een middelmatig productontwerp valt mogelijk niet onder 
de weigeringsgronden en merkhouders kunnen nog steeds functionele kenmerken registeren, 
als deze niet geheel worden bepaald door technische normen. De aanname van het HvJ EU 
dat consumenten niet gewend zouden zijn om niet-traditionele tekens op te vatten als 
herkomstaanduider, kan daarnaast worden betwijfeld, zodra consumenten zich niet langer 
meer slechts richten op traditionele herkomstaanduiders, zoals woordmerken en logo’s, en 
geen bijzondere moeilijkheden ondervinden in het opvatten van niet-traditionele tekens als 
merk. Bovendien laat het HvJ EU de mogelijkheid om exclusieve rechten te verkrijgen op 
niet-traditionele tekens over aan marketingspecialisten, die wel raad weten hoe consumenten 
te onderwijzen in het opvatten van vormen en kleuren als merk. Dit maakt de drempel van het 
 
795 Door de hervorming van het EU-merkenrecht in 2015 is het vereiste van de grafische weergave geschrapt en 
ingewisseld voor een nieuwe standaard. Merken moeten nu in het register kunnen worden weergegeven op een 
wijze die de bevoegde autoriteiten en het publiek in staat stelt ‘het voorwerp van de aan de houder ervan 
verleende bescherming duidelijk en nauwkeurig vast te stellen.’ (Art. 4(b) EU Merkenverordening; Art. 3(b) 
Merkenrichtlijn 2015). Het is verzoekers toegestaan om het merk weer te geven in elke geschikte vorm en door 
elke beschikbare technologie te gebruiken, op voorwaarde dat die voorstelling ‘duidelijk, nauwkeurig, als 
zodanig volledig, gemakkelijk toegankelijk, begrijpelijk, duurzaam en objectief is.’ (HvJ EU, uitspraak van 12 
december 2002, zaak C-273/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:748 (Sieckmann), para. 55).  
796 In Sieckmann oordeelde het HvJ EU dat noch een scheikundige formule noch een beschrijving met woorden, 
noch het depot van een geurmonster noch een combinatie daarvan voldeed aan de registratievereisten (HvJ EU, 
uitspraak van 12 december 2002, zaak C-273/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:748 (Sieckmann), para. 73).  
797 HvJ EU, uitspraak van 25 juli 2018, gezamenlijke zaken C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P en C-95/17 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:596 (Nestlé/Mondelez (KitKat)), para. 67-68, 76. 
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onderscheiden vermogen risicovol en onvoorspelbaar en zou in feite merkhouders kunnen 
aanmoedigen om juist te investeren in niet-traditionele tekens.  
 Het is daarom raadzaam om niet te sterk af te gaan op empirische bevindingen 
wanneer deze aantonen dat consumenten wel degelijk in staat zijn om vormen en abstracte 
kleuren op te vatten als herkomstaanduider. Hetzelfde geldt ten aanzien van beschrijvende en 
culturele tekens die eveneens kunnen worden geregistreerd als inburgering kan worden 
aangetoond. We moeten echter uitkijken dat empirisch bewijs over de perceptie van de 
consument niet automatisch leidt tot de verlening van exclusieve rechten op tekens zonder dat 
er normatieve correcties worden toegepast. Anders zou het EU-merkenrechtsysteem niet 
langer meer vallen worden onder het eerste scenario, zoals geschetst hierboven, maar 
opschuiven naar het tweede of het derde scenario met extra risico’s op beperkingen op de 
vrijheid van mededinging en de vrijheid van (commerciële) meningsuiting van dien. Absolute 
uitsluitingsgronden ten aanzien van culturele tekens zonder hoge symbolische waarde, 
beschrijvende tekens, vormen en abstracte kleuren die niet opzij gezet kunnen worden door 
inburgering, zouden in ieder geval de preservering van deze tekens verzekeren.  
 Conform het eerste scenario volgt het EU-merkenrechtsysteem ook een empirische 
benadering bij de beoordeling van inbreuk. Empirische gegevens zijn belangrijk voor de 
beslissing, maar rechters zijn niet verplicht de uitkomsten van consumentenstudies op te 
volgen. Anders dan in het eerste scenario mogen rechters echter niet op grond van de 
vrijhoudingsbehoefte normatieve correcties toepassen ten gunste van derden, nu de perceptie 
van de consument leidend is voor de beoordeling van een vermoedelijke inbreuk. De regel 
van het HvJ EU dat consumenten eerder in verwarring zullen zijn wanneer zij geconfronteerd 
worden met een teken dat overeenstemt met een bekend merk, is onjuist en is in feite een 
normatieve correctie ten faveure van de belangen van de merkhouder. Deze onjuiste mix van 
normatieve correcties en empirische bevindingen leiden mogelijk tot disfunctionele prikkels.  
 Om deze risico’s te verminderen is het van groot belang dat niet alleen normatieve 
correcties worden toegepast ten gunste van merkhouders, maar ook ten faveure van andere 
marktdeelnemers. De vrijhoudingsbehoefte zou moeten worden erkend als een extra factor in 
de verwarringsgevaaranalyse. Voorkomen moet worden dat rechters zich te zeer laten leiden 
door empirisch bewijs. Tekens die eigenlijk in het publieke domein hadden moeten blijven, 
maar toch door de mazen van het net zijn geglipt, kunnen toch tot zekere hoogte worden 
vrijgehouden door in de inbreukfase normatieve correcties toe te passen in het voordeel van 
derde partijen.798 Als merkhouders bijvoorbeeld een nieuw element toevoegen, zoals een 
 
798 Als het HvJ EU de Adidas/Marca uitspraak herziet, zouden nationale rechters expliciet kunnen verwijzen naar 
de vrijhoudingsbehoefte wanneer het gaat om niet-onderscheidende, beschrijvende en generieke tekens, zoals 
vormen, kleuren en culturele tekens. Zij kunnen bijvoorbeeld erop wijzen dat ondanks dat de kleuren van de 
verpakking of het logo overeenstemmend zijn, toch geen sprake is van verwarringsgevaar vanwege het algemene 
belang dat kleuren vrijelijk beschikbaar moeten blijven voor concurrenten op de markt. Nationale rechters 
kunnen echter ook op impliciete wijze gehoor geven aan de vrijhoudingsbehoefte. In de Adidas/H&M uitspraak 
bijvoorbeeld, oordeelde het Hof Den Haag dat er geen sprake was van verwarringsgevaar, omdat de 
overeenstemming tussen de tekens zeer gering was. De ruimtes tussen de strepen waren verschillend en daarmee 
ook de totaalindruk van de strepen. De consumentenonderzoeken waren ook niet beslissend en waren bovendien 
niet betrouwbaar. Naast het verschillend interpreteren van de feiten (benadrukken van de ruimtes tussen de 
strepen in plaats van te kijken naar de strepen zelf en de totaalindruk die dit oplevert), maakte de rechter tevens 
gebruik van algemene ervaringsregels over de waarneming van de consument. De consument zou volgens het 
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decoratief of een fantasie-element dat niet inherent is aan de generieke functie van de waren, 
maar desondanks een essentiële rol vervult, dan kunnen deze functionele kenmerken toch 
geldig worden geregistreerd en dienen daarom vrij te worden gehouden in de 
inbreukprocedure.799  
 In tegenstelling tot het eerste scenario, zoals dat hierboven is geschetst, herhaalt het 
HvJ EU simpelweg de beoordelingscriteria die reeds zijn toegepast om een prima facie 
inbreuk vast te stellen, bij de beoordeling van de verweren en de naleving van eerlijke 
gebruik. Het is aan te raden om de beperkingen en de eerlijk gebruik toets meer empirisch te 
benaderen. Als de gedaagde maatregelen neemt om mogelijke schade aan de merkhouder te 
verminderen, maar er toch enige verwarring ontstaat of oneerlijk voordeel wordt genomen, 
dan kan het gebruik van een inbreukmakend teken desondanks worden toegestaan, zolang de 
afbreuk die wordt gedaan aan het merk opweegt tegen andere overkoepelende 
maatschappelijke voordelen, zoals meer mededingingsvrijheid en meer (commerciële) 
vrijheid van meningsuiting en een betere informatievoorziening en keuze voor consumenten.  
 Deze gedragsbenadering verzekert niet alleen dat de gerechtvaardigde belangen van de 
merkhouder, maar ook die van derde partijen in aanmerking worden genomen. Merkhouders 
kunnen niet het ongeautoriseerde gebruik van hun merk voorkomen als de gedaagde 
voldoende inspanningen heeft verricht om schade te verminderen en het gebruik van de 
gedaagde bijdraagt aan de verwezenlijking van de genoemde overkoepelende 
maatschappelijke waarden. Andere marktdeelnemers moeten echter tegelijkertijd ook zoveel 
mogelijk de belangen van de merkhouder eerbiedigen en geschikte maatregelen nemen om 
schade te voorkomen als zij een beroep willen doen op de beperkingen. 
 
Kortom, de bovenstaande studie geeft dus de onderhavige spanning in het EU-merkenrecht 
weer tussen een normatieve en een empirische benadering van de perceptie van de consument. 
Het is inderdaad zo dat het EU-merkenrecht verscheidende juridische instrumenten ter 
beschikking heeft die het systeem in balans kunnen houden. Dit onderzoek toont echter ook 
aan dat sommige juridische instrumenten mogelijk niet op een voldoende effectieve manier 
worden toegepast. Sterker nog, het merkenrechtsysteem spoort merkhouders mogelijk op 
disfunctionele wijze aan om juist te investeren in tekens die vrijelijk beschikbaar zouden 
moeten blijven voor andere marktdeelnemers of het algemene publiek. Het vereiste van 
onderscheidend vermogen is met name onvoorspelbaar en risicovol, nu merkhouders kunnen 
beïnvloeden of tekens onderscheidend vermogen verwerven en zoveel als nodig investeren, 
 
hof gewend zijn aan strepen op kleding en was de streep zelf en de willekeurige combinatie van de twee strepen 
zo eenvoudig en triviaal dat deze niet onderscheidend waren (Hof Den Haag, uitspraak van 28 januari 2020, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2020:72 (H&M/Adidas)). Hetzelfde zou moeten gelden voor beschrijvend tekens die niet zijn 
ingeburgerd. Ook al heeft het HvJ EU in de Hansson uitspraak het principe afgewezen dat er geen sprake is van 
verwarringsgevaar als het beweerdelijk inbreukmakende teken elementen bevat die beschrijvend of niet 
onderscheidend zijn, nationale rechters zouden simpelweg moeten beargumenteren dat de tekens niet met elkaar 
overeenstemmen en er daardoor geen verwarringsgevaar kan ontstaan (HvJ EU, uitspraak van 12 juni 2019, zaak 
C-705/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:481). 
799 HvJ EU, uitspraak van 18 september 2014, zaak C-205/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2233 (Stokke/Hauck), para. 22. 
Zie ook: HvJ EU, uitspraak van 14 september 2010, zaak C-48/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:516 (Lego Juris/BHIM), 
para. 68-70.  
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totdat zij de controle hebben over het gewenste teken. Als we willen voorkomen dat 
merkhouders worden aangemoedigd juist te investeren in tekens die vrijelijk beschikbaar 
moeten blijven, zoals niet-onderscheidende, beschrijvende en generieke tekens, en we 
voldoende ruimte willen overhouden voor andere marktdeelnemers om overeenstemmende 
tekens te gebruiken, dan zou het rechters ook moeten worden toegestaan om normatieve 
correcties aan te brengen wanneer zij inbreukvragen moeten beoordelen. Zo kunnen rechters 
merkhouders ontmoedigen om strategieën toe te passen met het oog op de toe-eigening van 
een bepaald teken, door te laten zien dat zelfs indien een merkregistratie heeft 
plaatsgevonden, de beschermingsomvang vrij beperkt blijft. Het moet niet per definitie lonen 
om veel te investeren in het onderrichten van consumenten. Er is reden te meer om deze 
richting te volgen nu rechters reeds normatieve correcties toepassen in het voordeel van 
merkhouders wanneer verwarringsgevaar moet worden beoordeeld ten aanzien van een 
bekend merk. Een meer empirische benadering bij de beoordeling van eerlijk gebruik zal 
tenslotte de vrijheid van mededinging en de (commerciële) vrijheid van meningsuiting 
versterken, en de beschikbare informatie en keuzevrijheid voor consumenten verbeteren. Het 
toestaan van normatieve correcties aan beide kanten van het spectrum en op alle niveaus, zou 
het circulaire karakter dat eigen lijkt te zijn aan het EU-merkenrechtsysteem kunnen 
voorkomen. Door deze richtlijnen toe te passen, kunnen tekens niet zonder meer worden 
ingeschreven wanneer empirische bevindingen dit voorschrijven en merkhouders kunnen niet 
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